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Foreword
In 2011, European policymakers initiated a major reform of the Common Fisheries
Policy (CFP) to improve the Union’s ﬁsheries management system, a challenge that
proved necessary given the state of ﬁsh stocks in European waters. Balancing
environmental and socio-economic objectives in ﬁsheries management was imper-
ative. The main objective of the reform was therefore to ensure the preservation of
marine resources while increasing the competitiveness of European ﬁshing ﬂeets.
These two aspects are not antagonistic but complementary, because the preservation
of ﬁsheries resources constitutes a prerequisite for a successful ﬁshing sector. This
principle has been assimilated by ﬁshers, who also understood that an overhaul was
necessary to ensure the sustainability of their activities.
There is no need to remind the reader that the task incumbent on the European
Parliament and the Council was far-reaching. After months of intense institutional
negotiations, the revised CFP was introduced in 2013, articulated as two ﬂagship
measures: (i) reach the objective of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) in 2020 and
(ii) introduce the Landing Obligation. Whether or not we consider the Landing
Obligation as being adapted to the overall objectives of the CFP will not be the
subject of my remarks. Whilst it is crucial that the Union’s ﬁsheries management
system should improve selectivity of catches and so contribute to the sustainability
of ﬁsheries, I have personally been a long-time opponent to the obligation to land.
But only time will tell whether this measure will prove successful. If the means of
action might be controversial and open to debate, the overall sustainability objective
is undeniable.
For the past 5 years, we have gradually introduced the measures necessary for the
implementation of the CFP. In 2015, I was acting as the rapporteur for the imple-
mentation of the Landing Obligation (omnibus regulation) where my objective was
to ensure a smooth transition for the ﬁsheries sector while respecting the principle of
sustainability and preservation of marine resources. The CFP imposes a step-by-step
organisation of the Landing Obligation with full implementation on 1 January 2019.
This represents a huge challenge for both the ﬁsheries sector, the legislators and the
scientiﬁc community, whose support are essential to ensure the implementation of
the Landing Obligation.
vii
The scientiﬁc community is a crucial ally in this process and plays a central role in
helping ﬁshers and the sector to adapt to the Landing Obligation through innovative
means. The Landing Obligation has been the subject of a lot of scientiﬁc research,
regarding both its relevance and feasibility as well as the means to achieve it. The
Committee on Fisheries that I chair at the European Parliament was regularly
informed of the latest studies available. The main observation about the Landing
Obligation remains the same: it will be hard to implement and will require a lot of
mobilisation from the sector. The Landing Obligation may lead to clear socio-
economic consequences for the ﬁsheries sector. A major challenge is the so-called
choke effect in mixed ﬁsheries. This matter has real socio-economic consequences
for many ﬁsheries. Therefore, signiﬁcant efforts must be made in research and
development to ease the implementation of the Landing Obligation.
For the Landing Obligation to prove successful, another crucial aspect must be
taken into account – an appropriate and effective control regulation. Without proper
control and enforcement, the Landing Obligation will fail in its objectives and will
not fulﬁl its expectations. Scientiﬁc research and new technologies will also be very
helpful in that area.
Once again, I would like to underline the importance of science in designing a
sustainable ﬁsheries management system. Reliable scientiﬁc data is a key component
of the CFP. In that sense, scientists work in a remarkable way to help create a better
understanding of maritime resources and ecosystems. The Landing Obligation is an
example of the close interaction of the scientiﬁc community with the CFP, as shown
by this book.
European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium
August 2018
Alain Cadec
viii Foreword
Preface
The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union was reformed in 2013 to
improve the conservation of marine biological resources and the viability of the
ﬁshing sector and reduce unsustainable ﬁshing practices (European Union 2013).
One of the cornerstones of the reform is Article 15 (termed the Landing Obligation,
LO), stipulating the obligation to bring to land all catches of quota- or size-regulated
species with the overall aim to gradually eliminate discards.
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation’s (FAO) Fisheries Glos-
sary (FAO 2018) describes discards as
the proportion of the total organic material of animal origin in the catch, which is thrown
away or dumped at sea, for whatever reason. It does not include plant material and post-
harvest waste such as offal
and bycatch as
the part of a catch of a ﬁshing unit taken incidentally in addition to the target species towards
which ﬁshing effort is directed. Some or all of it may be returned to the sea as discards,
usually dead or dying.
Bycatch and discards may be dead or alive, depending on the severity of any
sustained injury and stress suffered by being caught and discarded (Davis 2002).
Globally, it has been estimated that between 7 and 10 million tonnes of commer-
cial ﬁsheries catches are discarded annually (Kelleher 2005; Zeller et al. 2018). In
Europe, the North-East Atlantic and North Sea have been identiﬁed as “discard
hotspots” with a number of discard-intensive ﬁsheries operating in the area (Guillen
et al. 2018). The levels of discards vary across regions, species and ﬁsheries
(Uhlmann et al. 2013; Catchpole et al. 2017), and the reasons for discarding usually
fall within four categories: (i) ﬁsh are too small (minimum size restrictions),
(ii) quota restrictions (no right to land), (iii) low market value and/or (iv) ﬁsh are
damaged. Discarding possibly contributes to European ﬁsh stocks being ﬁshed at
levels above those delivering maximum sustainable yields (MSY), and that total
removals are, at least for some ﬁsheries, higher than reported due to unreported
landings and discards (IUU; Zeller et al. 2018).
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To reduce unwanted catch, European institutions have developed and introduced
the Landing Obligation (LO) policy whereby catches of regulated species in
European waters, or by Union vessels in international waters, must be brought
back to shore and are deducted from applicable quotas, unless exempted.
Paradoxically, under the LO, ﬁshers are asked to potentially increase mortality of
unwanted catches by bringing them to shore instead of discarding them at sea
(Borges 2015). The reasoning behind this is that bringing in unwanted catches of
very low market value will incur additional costs, and this should incentivise ﬁshers
to avoid catching them in the ﬁrst place (European Commission 2012; Condie et al.
2013). But until this happens, there remains a risk that ﬁshing mortality will increase
under the LO instead of decreasing.
Due to the LO, for the ﬁrst time in its history, the Common Fisheries Policy is
shifting its focus from landed catches to all catches, including discards. Deducting
unwanted catches from quota shares increases variability in ﬁshing opportunities,
especially in mixed, multispecies ﬁsheries. Fishing opportunities are traditionally
distributed based on constant schemes (one particular scheme known as “relative
stability”, Sobrino and Sobrido 2017), both across Member States and within
Member States (with different allocation schemes between ﬁshers). When discarding
is allowed, the potential mismatches between what is caught and what can be legally
landed can be dealt with by discarding surplus catches. But when all catches must be
landed, “choke” situations may arise, where a quota for a regulated species may
become exhausted before another target species’ quota, leading to the possibility of
early closures of some ﬁsheries. New mechanisms must therefore be established
under the LO to reduce unwanted catches without jeopardising the viability of the
ﬁshing sector (Salomon et al. 2014). The LO represents a major paradigm shift in the
history of EU ﬁsheries management with potentially far-reaching consequences.
Considerable efforts have been dedicated in recent years to understand these conse-
quences and address the many questions surrounding the implementation of this new
policy. This book aims to assemble these efforts into one place and so provide a
comprehensive overview of the Landing Obligation.
The book consists of ﬁve major parts. The ﬁrst part provides global and European
perspectives on current discard ban policies in the world and reviews the new
knowledge needs which they require. Chapter 1 by Karp et al. proﬁles various
discard ban legislations that have been introduced as a top-down management
measure throughout the world to reduce unwanted catches and the waste of natural
resources. Together with the full or partial prohibition to discard unwanted catch at
sea, country-speciﬁc combinations of input control measures such as gear modiﬁ-
cations to increase selectivity, effort restrictions on where to ﬁsh (e.g. spatial discard
avoidance, real-time closures) and improved utilisation of catches from quota trading
and catch valorisation are described. Effective catch documentation may also pro-
vide the option to fully account for all removals to evaluate the impact on ﬁsh stocks
and ecosystems. Next, Chap. 2 by Borges and Penas Lado describes the evolution of
the European discard policy from 1992 onwards and identiﬁes the internal and
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external drivers in European institutions that shaped the Landing Obligation with its
inclusion of the de minimis, high survival exemptions and inter-stock quota ﬂexi-
bility. Finally, Chap. 3 by Rihan et al. describes the new needs for scientiﬁc evidence
and documentation triggered by the Landing Obligation. It summarises the process
by which exemptions are applied for by Member States, evaluated by the EU
Scientiﬁc, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) and enacted
by the European Commission. The implications of changes on how unwanted
catches are registered and incorporated in the advice process by the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) are also detailed.
The second part of this book broadly sketches some consequences that the
introduction of the LOmay bring to the livelihoods of commercial ﬁshers throughout
Europe. A perspective piece sets the scene and fuels the debate with arguments about
why ﬁshers throughout Europe show very little acceptance for this policy, foreseeing
more bad than good from its implementation. Chapter 4 by Fitzpatrick et al. sum-
marises ﬁshers’ arguments based on a range of interviews. Chapter 5 by Villasante
et al. collected more speciﬁcally concerns by small-scale ﬁshers in the Mediterra-
nean Sea and compared their reasoning for discarding. More concrete and quantita-
tive projections are carried out in Chap. 6 by Hoff et al. using bioeconomic models to
foresee undesirable economic effects of the policy for ﬁshing ﬂeets and their
communities and evaluate alternative policy scenarios. Finally, the potential impacts
of the LO on an ecosystem scale were investigated in Chap. 7 by Depestele et al.,
reviewing evidence of scavengers’ reliance on marine carrion and summarising
ecosystem-scale modelling results of food-web interdependencies. This chapter
deviates slightly from the other chapters in this book in the sense that it is less
directly linked to the LO, but it represents a very comprehensive and novel overview
on the resilience of scavengers in the sea and on their potential ability to switch to
other food sources if ﬁsheries discards are reduced.
Following on from these potential impacts, the third part explores the cultural,
institutional and multi-jurisdictional challenges that need to be overcome to achieve
a successful implementation of the LO and minimise undesirable and deleterious
impacts. However, as Stockhausen in Chap. 8 warns, through his eyes, the Landing
Obligation was weakened after its adoption in 2013 by including exemptions and
delaying the control and enforcement of any infringements, risking that discarding
may continue at undesirable levels. In the Netherlands, ﬁshers’ protests against the
Landing Obligation were eminent and, in Chap. 9 by van Hoff et al., partial blame is
levelled at a multi-governance structure, where regionalisation left stakeholders in
limbo on how to reach common ground about the policy goals. In another case study
focusing on demersal cod ﬁsheries in the Baltic Sea, Chap. 10 by Valentinsson et al.
demonstrates that the introduction of the Landing Obligation has been unsuccessful
and has so far failed to deliver any of the expected beneﬁts. Finally, using an
alternative approach, Kraak and Hart in Chap. 11 hypothesise that ingrained
behavioural mechanisms may hamper an understanding of, uptake of, and compli-
ance with the objectives of the Landing Obligation.
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The fourth part of the book features scientiﬁc and technical results from recent
research efforts (mainly, but not exclusively, from the EU Horizon 2020
DiscardLess and MINOUW and the Life-iSEAS projects) to suggest options for
either avoiding the capture of unwanted catches in the ﬁrst place or, if unavoidably
caught, evaluating how to use and valorise them to reduce any wastage. Chapter 12
by Bellido et al. introduces a Marine Spatial Planning approach to avoid discards by
guiding ﬁshers with maps to areas where undersized ﬁsh are less likely to occur.
Chapter 13 by Reid et al. summarises several studies conducted in different regions
of Europe, including, among others, some “challenge trials” in Denmark, Ireland and
France, where ﬁshers were asked to reduce their discards by whatever legal means
they would prefer. Chapter 14 by O’Neill et al. summarises knowledge about gear
selectivity and describes recent innovations for a range of gear types, while Chap. 15
by Marçalo et al. speciﬁcally focuses on solutions to mitigate slipping mortality in
purse seine ﬁsheries. Chapter 16 by Viðarsson et al. discusses which technology and
vessel modiﬁcations are possible to handle and stow unwanted catches onboard.
Finally, Chap. 17 by Iñarra et al. reviews a great number of uses of unwanted catches
other than for human consumption and provides a decision support tool to help
prioritise the most suitable ones.
The ﬁnal part of this book tackles the key elements of control, monitoring and
surveillance, without which the LO cannot be enforced and successfully
implemented. To facilitate an accurate documentation of ﬁshing activity, effort and
catches, Chap. 18 by James et al. compares various sensor-based on-board technol-
ogies to monitor ﬁshing operations. Chapter 19 by Nuevo et al. describes how the
EU Member States in collaboration with the European Fisheries Control Agency are
streamlining their control programmes in the so-called “Last Haul” inspection
programme. Finally, Chap. 20 by Jacobsen et al. looks to the future, gauging the
potential of genetic techniques in monitoring and reducing bycatches.
We believe that the 20 chapters of this book provide a comprehensive examina-
tion of the European Landing Obligation from all relevant perspectives. The book
was timely published exactly at the time where the Landing Obligation was expected
to be fully implemented. The book should hopefully be of signiﬁcant interest not
only to all stakeholders involved but also to the general public of Europe and other
jurisdictions throughout the world that are also searching for ways to deal with
bycatch and discard issues.
Oostende, Belgium Sven Sebastian Uhlmann
Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark Clara Ulrich
Cronulla, Australia Steven J. Kennelly
xii Preface
References
Borges, L. (2015). The evolution of a discard policy in Europe. Fish and Fisheries, 16(3), 534–540.
https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12062.
Catchpole, T.L., Ribeiro-Santos, A., Mangi, S.C., Hedley, C., Gray, T.S. (2017). The challenges of
the landing obligation in EU ﬁsheries. Marine Policy, 82, 76–86.
Condie, H.M., Grant, A., Catchpole, T.L. (2013). Does banning discards in an otter trawler ﬁshery
create incentives for more selective ﬁshing? Fisheries Research, 148(2013), 137–146. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.ﬁshres.2013.09.011.
Davis, M.W. (2002). Key principles for understanding ﬁsh bycatch discard mortality. Canadian
Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 59, 1834–1843. https://doi.org/10.1139/f02-139.
European Commission (2012). Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Common Fisheries Policy – general approach. 11322/12.
European Union (2013). Regulation (EU) No 1380/201308 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations
(EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/
2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC. Ofﬁcial Journal of the
European Union, L 354: 22–61. Brussels, Belgium.
FAO (2018). Fisheries Glossary. http://www.fao.org/faoterm/collection/ﬁsheries/en. Accessed
30 August 2018.
Guillen, J., Holmes, J.S., Carvalho, N., Casey, J., Dörner, H., Gibin, M., et al. (2018). A review of
the European Union landing obligation focusing on its implications for ﬁsheries and the
environment. Sustainability. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10040900.
Gilman, E., Suuronen, P., Hall, M., Kennelly, S. (2013). Causes and methods to estimate cryptic
sources of ﬁshing mortality. Journal of Fish Biology, 83, 766–803.
Kelleher, K. (2005). Discards in the world’s marine ﬁsheries. An update. FAO Fisheries Technical
Paper (Vol. No. 470. R). 22 p.
Sobrino, J.M., & Sobrido, M. (2017). The common ﬁsheries policy: A difﬁcult compromise
between relative stability and the discard ban. In G. Andreone (Ed.), The future of the law of
the sea: Bridging gaps between national, individual and common interests (pp. 23–43). Cham:
Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51274-7_2.
Salomon, M., Markus, T., Dross, M. (2014). Masterstroke or paper tiger – The reform of the EU0s
Common Fisheries Policy. Marine Policy, 47, 76–84. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MARPOL.2014.
02.001.
Uhlmann, S.S., van Helmond, A.T.M., Stefánsdóttir, E.K., Sigurðardóttir, S., Haralabous, J., et al.
(2014). Discarded ﬁsh in European waters: general patterns and contrasts. ICES Journal of
Marine Science, 71, 1235–1245
Zeller, D., Cashion, T., Palomares, M., Pauly, D. (2018). Global marine ﬁsheries discards: A
synthesis of reconstructed data. Fish and Fisheries, 19(1), 30–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.
12233.
Preface xiii
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for the ﬁnancial support received from the Horizon 2020 Research
Projects DiscardLess (Grant Agreement 633680) and MINOUW (Grant Agreement
634495), which made the publication as an open access book possible. Our thanks
are extended to Alexandrine Cheronet and Judith Terpos from Springer for the
excellent assistance throughout the manuscript preparation and publishing phase,
Miriam Levenson for language editing and Kristian Schreiber Plet-Hansen for
checking references.
Sven Sebastian Uhlmann would like to thank his colleagues, his family, Tuia and
his lady luck (at the time) for the (moral) support in this undertaking.
Clara Ulrich would like to thank all the participants from the DiscardLess project
for the collective support to this book and for the many valuable contributions to
it. She is also grateful to her ever-supportive husband and children.
Steven J. Kennelly acknowledges the support of his company, IC Independent
Consulting (www.icic.net.au), in funding his role in this book as well as the support
of his wife, Peta.
Collectively, we would like to express our sincere gratitude for the invaluable
comments received from the following reviewers:
Nick Bailey (Independent Expert, Scotland)
Lee Benaka (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, USA)
Tom Catchpole (Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science, UK)
Barrie Deas (The National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations, UK)
Steven Degraer (Royal Belgian Institute of Natural Sciences, Belgium)
Elisabeth Druel (ClientEarth, Belgium)
Steve Dunn (Alliance Legal Services, Australia)
Eric Gilman (Pelagic Ecosystems Research Group, USA)
Jordi Guillen (European Commission – Joint Research Centre, Italy)
Mark Hager (Gulf of Maine Research Institute, USA)
Katell Hamon (Wageningen Economic Research, The Netherlands)
Dan Holland (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, USA)
xv
Claudia Junge (Institute of Marine Research, Norway)
Alexander Kempf (Thünen Institut, Germany)
Arne Kinds (Université de Bretagne Occidentale, France)
Leyla Knittweis (University of Malta, Malta)
Josep Lloret (University of Girona, Spain)
Colm Lordan (Marine Institute, Ireland & International Council for the Exploration
of the Sea, Denmark)
Tara Marshall (University of Aberdeen, Scotland)
Francesc Maynou (Institut de Ciències del Mar, Spain)
Howard McElderry (Archipelago Marine Research Ltd., Canada)
Christopher McGuire (Nature Conservancy, USA)
Matthew McHugh (Bord Iascaigh Mhara, Ireland)
Michael Morrissey (Oregon State University, USA)
Kåre Nolde Nielsen (The Arctic University of Norway, Norway)
Catherine O’Keefe (Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries, USA)
Martin Pastoors (Pelagic Freezer Trawler Association, The Netherlands)
Kathleen J. Pitz (Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute, USA)
Mike Pol (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, USA)
Hans Polet (Flanders Research Institute for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,
Belgium)
Graham Raby (University of Windsor, Canada)
Antonello Sala (Italian National Research Council & Institute of Marine Sciences,
Italy)
Milena Schreiber (University of Gothenburg, Sweden)
Sevaly Sen (Oceanomics Pty Ltd, Sydney, Australia)
Petri Suuronen (Luke, Finland)
Ian Tuck (National Institute of Water & Atmospheric research, New Zealand)
Sara Vandamme (North Western Waters Advisory Council, Ireland)
Gert Van Hoey (Flanders Research Institute for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,
Belgium)
Ingrid Van Putten (CSIRO & University of Tasmania, Australia)
Mike van ‘t Land (Flanders Research Institute for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,
Belgium)
xvi Acknowledgements
Contents
Part I Global and European Perspectives on Discard Policies
1 Strategies Used Throughout the World to Manage Fisheries
Discards – Lessons for Implementation of the EU Landing
Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
William A. Karp, Mike Breen, Lisa Borges, Mike Fitzpatrick,
Steven J. Kennelly, Jeppe Kolding, Kåre Nolde Nielsen,
Jónas R. Viðarsson, Luis Cocas, and Duncan Leadbitter
2 Discards in the Common Fisheries Policy: The Evolution
of the Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Lisa Borges and Ernesto Penas Lado
3 Requirements for Documentation, Data Collection and Scientiﬁc
Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Dominic Rihan, Sven S. Uhlmann, Clara Ulrich, Mike Breen,
and Tom Catchpole
Part II Potential Social, Economic and Ecological Impacts of the
Landing Obligation
4 Fishing Industry Perspectives on the EU Landing Obligation . . . . . 71
Mike Fitzpatrick, Katia Frangoudes, Laurence Fauconnet,
and Antoni Quetglas
5 The Implementation of the Landing Obligation in Small-Scale
Fisheries of Southern European Union Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Sebastian Villasante, Manel Antelo, Maria Christou,
Laurence Fauconnet, Katia Frangoudes, Francesc Maynou,
Telmo Morato, Cristina Pita, Pablo Pita, Konstantinos I. Stergiou,
Celia Teixeira, George Tserpes, and Vassiliki Vassilopoulou
xvii
6 Potential Economic Consequences of the Landing Obligation . . . . . 109
Ayoe Hoff, Hans Frost, Peder Andersen, Raul Prellezo, Lucía Rueda,
George Triantaphyllidis, Ioanna Argyrou, Athanassios Tsikliras,
Arina Motova, Sigrid Lehuta, Hazel Curtis,
Gonzalo Rodríguez-Rodríguez, Hugo M. Ballesteros,
Julio Valeiras, and José María Bellido
7 The Impact of Fisheries Discards on Scavengers in the Sea . . . . . . . 129
Jochen Depestele, Jordan Feekings, David G. Reid, Robin Cook,
Didier Gascuel, Raphael Girardin, Michael Heath,
Pierre-Yves Hernvann, Telmo Morato, Ambre Soszynski,
and Marie Savina-Rolland
Part III Cultural, Institutional and Multi-Jurisdictional Challenges
8 How the Implementation of the Landing Obligation
Was Weakened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Björn Stockhausen
9 Muddying the Waters of the Landing Obligation: How Multi-level
Governance Structures Can Obscure Policy Implementation . . . . . 179
Lucvan Hoof, Marloes Kraan, Noor M. Visser, Emma Avoyan,
Jurgen Batsleer, and Brita Trapman
10 The Baltic Cod Trawl Fishery: The Perfect Fishery for a Successful
Implementation of the Landing Obligation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Daniel Valentinsson, Katja Ringdahl, Marie Storr-Paulsen,
and Niels Madsen
11 Creating a Breeding Ground for Compliance and Honest
Reporting Under the Landing Obligation: Insights from
Behavioural Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Sarah B. M. Kraak and Paul J. B. Hart
Part IV Tactical and Technological Options for Reducing Unwanted
Catches
12 A Marine Spatial Planning Approach to Minimize Discards:
Challenges and Opportunities of the Landing Obligation
in European Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
José M. Bellido, Iosu Paradinas, Raúl Vilela, Guillermo Bas,
and Maria Grazia Pennino
xviii Contents
13 The Best Way to Reduce Discards Is by Not Catching Them! . . . . . 257
David G. Reid, Julia Calderwood, Pedro Afonso, Pierre Bourdaud,
Laurence Fauconnet, José Manuel González-Irusta,
Lars O. Mortensen, Francesc Ordines, Sigrid Lehuta,
Lionel Pawlowski, Kristian S. Plet-Hansen, Zachary Radford,
Marianne Robert, Marie-Joelle Rochet, Lucía Rueda, Clara Ulrich,
and Youen Vermard
14 Discard Avoidance by Improving Fishing Gear Selectivity:
Helping the Fishing Industry Help Itself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Finbarr G. O’Neill, Jordan Feekings, Robert J. Fryer,
Laurence Fauconnet, and Pedro Afonso
15 Mitigating Slipping-Related Mortality from Purse Seine Fisheries
for Small Pelagic Fish: Case Studies from European
Atlantic Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Ana Marçalo, Mike Breen, Maria Tenningen, Iñigo Onandia,
Luis Arregi, and Jorge M. S. Gonçalves
16 Onboard and Vessel Layout Modiﬁcations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Jónas R. Viðarsson, Marvin I. Einarsson, Erling P. Larsen,
Julio Valeiras, and Sigurður Örn Ragnarsson
17 What to Do with Unwanted Catches: Valorisation Options
and Selection Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
Bruno Iñarra, Carlos Bald, Marta Cebrián, Luis T. Antelo,
Amaya Franco-Uría, José Antonio Vázquez, Ricardo I. Pérez-Martín,
and Jaime Zufía
Part V Control, Monitoring and Surveillance
18 Tools and Technologies for the Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
of Unwanted Catches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Kelly M. James, Neill Campbell, Jónas R. Viðarsson, Carlos Vilas,
Kristian S. Plet-Hansen, Lisa Borges, Óscar González,
Aloysius T. M. van Helmond, Ricardo I. Pérez-Martín,
Luis Taboada Antelo, Jorge Pérez-Bouzada, and Clara Ulrich
19 Monitoring the Implementation of the Landing Obligation:
The Last Haul Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
Miguel Nuevo, Cristina Morgado, and Antonello Sala
20 Possible Uses of Genetic Methods in Fisheries Under
the EU Landing Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
Magnus Wulff Jacobsen, Brian Klitgaard Hansen,
and Einar Eg Nielsen
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
Contents xix
Part I
Global and European Perspectives
on Discard Policies
Chapter 1
Strategies Used Throughout the World
to Manage Fisheries Discards – Lessons
for Implementation of the EU Landing
Obligation
William A. Karp, Mike Breen, Lisa Borges, Mike Fitzpatrick,
Steven J. Kennelly, Jeppe Kolding, Kåre Nolde Nielsen, Jónas R. Viðarsson,
Luis Cocas, and Duncan Leadbitter
Abstract In many countries, policies regarding reduction of unwanted catch and
discards are crafted in response to concerns regarding accountability, conservation,
and waste as well as scientiﬁc needs to fully account for all sources of ﬁshing
mortality. It is important to note, however, that unwanted catch is minimal and
most, or all, of the catch has value in some ﬁsheries. Utilisation rates are very high,
and discarding is generally not of concern in such ﬁsheries which occur primarily,
but not entirely, in developing countries. Where unwanted catch and discards are a
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concern, legislation may be prescriptive, as can be seen in the EU Landing Obliga-
tion (LO), and programmes established in e.g. Norway, Iceland, Argentina, Chile
and New Zealand. Elsewhere, legislative language is intended to minimize unwanted
catch but allows for some ﬂexibility in developing strategies and solutions, as in the
USA. The effectiveness of these approaches depends on many factors and all require
effective cross-sectoral collaboration. Also essential is a comprehensive monitoring
and control system which insures regulatory compliance and collection of adequate
data to address scientiﬁc and management information needs. In this chapter, we
evaluate the effectiveness of discard and unwanted catch reduction approaches under
diverse legislative systems in different parts of the world, with reference to emerging
practices under the LO. We consider the importance of ﬁnding the balance between
top-down and bottom-up processes and look carefully at different governance/
regulatory frameworks (e.g. input controls, output controls, quota management and
transferability, cooperative/collaborative management), factors which encourage or
discourage innovation and collaborative problem solving, monitoring and account-
ability. This is accomplished through case studies from selected ﬁsheries around the
world.
Keywords Avoidance · Discards · Full retention · Selectivity · Unwanted catch ·
Utilisation
1.1 Introduction
Waste is associated with many contemporary food production processes, especially
in developed countries. In general, producers seek to reduce waste by improving
utilisation of raw materials and avoiding unwanted materials during harvesting. In
wild capture ﬁsheries, many strategies are available for reducing unwanted catch
(UWC) during harvesting. However, these strategies are rarely completely effective
with the result that parts of the catch are discarded at sea. Although avoidance is
preferable, discarding might be perceived as an acceptable practice under certain
circumstances, e.g. when discard-related mortality is low and, especially for rare,
endangered or protected species caught incidentally, when animals can be released
uninjured. However, for UWC where chances of survival may be small, discarding
at sea is generally considered wasteful and undesirable.
Conﬂicting regulatory and economic drivers often create perverse incentives for
ﬁshers to discard ﬁsh. This can occur when unmarketable or undersized ﬁsh are
taken, when a vessel operator is not permitted to retain marketable catch or when
catch of lower value is discarded so that ﬁshing for more valuable catch can continue
(high-grading; FAO 2016). Discarding is minimal or entirely absent in some ﬁsher-
ies where most, if not all, of the catch has a value and is fully utilised. This typically
occurs in small-scale/artisanal/traditional ﬁsheries (Kolding et al. 2014; Damalas
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2015) but examples can be found elsewhere such as in industrial ﬁsheries which
produce ﬁsh meal and oil.
The 2013 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) included an “obligation
to land all catches”, referred to as the Landing Obligation (LO). The objective of the
LO is to
“gradually eliminate discards, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the best available
scientiﬁc advice, by avoiding and reducing, as far as possible, unwanted catches, and by
gradually ensuring that catches are landed”. An additional objective is to “make the best use
of unwanted catches, without creating a market for such of those catches that are below the
minimum conservation reference size” (European Union 2013).
The LO is not a fully comprehensive discard ban as it only applies to TAC (Total
Allowable Catch) regulated species. In addition, it applies to species in effort-
regulated ﬁsheries in the Mediterranean for which a minimum size has been deﬁned.
Exemptions for the LO apply to species and ﬁsheries for which high survival rates
can be demonstrated for discarded ﬁsh. Furthermore, up to 5% of the total catch of
species may be discarded in cases where selectivity increases are difﬁcult to achieve
or where handling of unwanted catches creates disproportionate costs. The LO
requires that ﬁsh under a Minimum Conservation Reference Size (MCRS) are landed
but prohibits their use for direct human consumption.
In principle, the LO involves a shift from landing quota to catch quota manage-
ment as all catches must be recorded and accounted for against quotas (Mortensen
et al. 2017). The LO has raised serious concerns in the ﬁshing industry, especially
where choke species issues arise in mixed ﬁsheries regulated by TACs (Schrope
2010). Other concerns include the perception that there is insufﬁcient knowledge to
allow implementation of the LO, and that the period during which the LO is to be
phased in (2015–2019) is insufﬁcient to allow necessary preparation by those that
are involved and affected (Fitzpatrick et al. 2017).
In this chapter, we compare worldwide examples of strategies for reducing
discards in order to inform discussions on questions such as: “what makes a
successful discard mitigation strategy?”; and “what lessons can be learned with
regards to the successful implementation of the EU Landing Obligation (LO)?”.
We do so by brieﬂy reviewing approaches in several countries. The cases were
selected to offer insights regarding (a) scale and drivers of discarding issues – where
they exist, (b) motivation, objectives and legal status of a discard mitigation policy –
if applicable, (c) technical and management approaches employed to mitigate
discarding, and (d) perceived outcomes of the discard policy – or lack thereof.
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1.2 Case Studies
1.2.1 Norway
Norwegian ﬁsheries are managed through a complex system of regulations which
aims to control both input (i.e., ﬁshing licences) and output (i.e. quotas), as well as
the exploitation pattern, through a multi-facetted collection of regulations and
technical measures referred to as the “Discard Ban Package” (DBP: Johnsen and
Eliasen 2011; Gullestad et al. 2015).
The DBP is an integrated suite of regulatory and technical measures to minimise
unwanted catch including: the regulatory discard ban; gear selectivity technical
measures; closed areas; and monitoring and control measures. The Norwegian
Discard Ban evolved over ~30 years in response to speciﬁc ﬁsheries problems,
starting in 1987 with an ad hoc strategy to save the 1983 NE Arctic cod cohort
from “high-grading” (Gullestad et al. 2015). Between 1987 and 2008, regulations
and technical measures progressively extended this discard ban to include a further
17 commercially important species, to address bycatch issues in several ﬁsheries,
including demersal trawling for shrimp (e.g., Isaksen et al. 1992) and gadoid
trawling (Larsen and Isaksen 1993). In 2009, the “Marine Resources Act” (section
§15: Duty to Land Catches), in principle, extended the DBP to encompass all living
marine resources with the phrase: “All catches of ﬁsh shall be landed . . .”. However,
in practice, the Norwegian Seawater Fisheries Regulations (2014) (section §48:
Prohibition against discarding ﬁsh), which are enforced by the Fisheries Directorate
and the Coastguard, effectively limit the ban to 55 commercially important species.
In addition, the regulation introduces several “pragmatic exemptions” (Gullestad
et al. 2015), e.g., that surviving ﬁsh may be released, and that damaged catch (unﬁt
for human consumption) can be discarded, “in small quantities”.
Key features of the discard package include:
• Improved Selectivity – development and regulated application of bycatch reduc-
tion devices, and other technologies and technical measures to address ﬁshery-
speciﬁc UWC issues.
• Real-Time Closures – triggered by the UWC limits being exceeded in an area and
dimensions are deﬁned by the distribution of the UWC. They are perceived by
most stakeholders as a fair and effective way of addressing unpredictable distri-
butions of UWC, although there has been discontent amongst ﬁshers due to
extended delays in re-opening some areas, primarily due to a lack of resources
to survey them.
• Monitoring – using a “Reference Fleet” and targeted programmes to identify
emerging UWC issues in different ﬁsheries. However, there is no systematic
at-sea monitoring by observers.
• Decriminalisation – of catching UWC for ﬁshers who demonstrate responsible
behaviour and conduct in avoiding further UWC.
• Pragmatic application of regulations – by the authorities to engage the stake-
holders and ensure a “level playing ﬁeld”.
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• Improved dialogue – between management, ﬁshers and scientists – to ensure the
individual concerns of each have been recognised and that all stakeholders are
working towards a common goal.
The greatest beneﬁcial impact from the Norwegian Discard Ban is generally
considered to have been its role in catalysing a cultural shift among all stakeholders,
towards the recognition that needless waste of a living resource is no longer
acceptable (Gullestad et al. 2014). The burden of proof on ﬁshers to demonstrate
responsible behaviour and conduct is arguably resulting in increased professional
responsibility (Johnsen and Eliasen 2011). This change in mindset has driven an
ambition to minimise UWC and contributed to the development of a “common code
of conduct” in relation to resources and compliance (Gezelius 2006). Recently, this
has stimulated the development of strategies and technologies to avoid issues related
to excessive catches in some ﬁsheries, due to localised high densities of ﬁsh, e.g.
high-grading of cod in the Barents Sea (Grimaldo et al. 2014; Underwood et al.
2014) and slipping of mackerel from purse seines (Breen et al. 2012). It has also
promoted greater utilisation of the retained catch (Richardsen et al. 2017).
1.2.2 Iceland
A ban on discarding six primary commercial species was introduced in the Icelandic
ﬁshery in 1977 (European Commission 2007). Requirements evolved as manage-
ment strategies progressed from effort- to quota restrictions (Johnsen and Eliasen
2011). The ban has gradually expanded, and now applies to all species, including
those with no market value. Catches that marginally exceed quotas can be landed
legally since the law allows 5% of the quota to be transferred between years. Fishers
can also land up to 5% of catches without deduction from quota but must then forfeit
most of the value of the surplus catch (Fiskistofa 2018a). Fishers are also allowed to
land catches under minimum size limits and only 50% of the weight of this portion of
the catch is deducted from their quotas. This creates an incentive to land undersized
catches (Fiskistofa 2018b). Larger overruns and non-target catch can be covered
through the purchase or leasing of additional quota. Failure to cover excess catch
with allowed overages or purchased quota can result in ﬁnes and/or revocation of
licenses (Fiskistofa 2018c).
Capture of juvenile ﬁsh is discouraged through real-time area closures if catches
below minimum sizes exceed prescribed limits (Johnsen and Eliasen 2011). Catches
are monitored by on-board inspectors from the Directorate of Fisheries, dockside
surveillance and use of electronic logbooks. The coastguard also inspects vessels to
verify catch reporting. Coastguard surveillance and on-board inspector coverage
levels are quite limited; inspectors from the Directorate of Fisheries are at sea for
around 1200 days a year in total and the coastguard only patrols Icelandic waters for
around 300 days a year using four patrol vessels, one ﬁxed-wing aircraft and two
helicopters (Fiskistofa 2018d; Landhelgisgæslan 2018).
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Catch records and size composition information are matched and compared to
identify possible discarding (Fiskistofa 2017). Despite a mandatory landings policy,
discarding still occurs, but the level has gradually declined since the early 1990s.
According to estimates from the Icelandic Marine Research Institute, haddock
discard rates have, for example, fallen from 22% in 1997 to 0.12% in 2013, and
cod discard rates have not exceeded 2% since 2001 and were estimated at 0.60% in
2013 (Pálsson et al. 2015; Pálsson 2003). These estimates are based on sampling by
the Directorate of Fisheries and the Marine Research Institute. Some stakeholders
question the validity of these estimates and believe the discard numbers are substan-
tially underestimated while others consider them to be reliable. Limited coverage by
onboard inspectors and patrol vessels is the main reason for distrust of the ofﬁcial
discard estimates. Therefore, the Ministry of Fisheries is currently preparing a
regulation which will require all commercial ﬁshing vessels to be equipped with
Electronic Monitoring (EM) equipment including video cameras to remotely and
electronically monitor potential discarding (Ministry of Fisheries 2018). The regu-
lation will also require all ofﬁcial dockside weighing of catches to be electronically
monitored. If the regulation is passed in its current form, dockside monitoring will
come into effect immediately and onboard monitoring will be in full effect by
January 1, 2020.
Improved selectivity is important in reducing discards in Iceland. Selectivity
increases are primarily due to advances in gear technology, regulations on gear
selectivity devices, and widespread use of voluntary move-on solutions based on
real-time information shared between ﬁshers (Margeirsson et al. 2008).
The extensive consolidation that has occurred in the Icelandic ﬁshing ﬂeet over
the past 20–30 years has contributed markedly to the overall success in reducing
discards. This consolidation is one of the side-effects of the individual transferable
quota (ITQ) system, as smaller and less proﬁtable businesses merge with (or are
acquired by) larger entities that beneﬁt from economies of scale and better access to
capital. Small companies operating with limited quotas have almost disappeared and
large vertically integrated seafood companies that include catching, processing and
marketing are now in possession of the majority of the quota (Íslandsbanki 2017).
Consequently, the numbers of vessels and ﬁshermen have been reduced signiﬁ-
cantly, such that capacity and quota allocations are now better matched, and vessels
generally have enough quota to operate at full capacity throughout the year. This has
eliminated many of the incentives to discard. Nevertheless, allegations of illegal
discarding on larger vessels persist, despite allocation of adequate quota (RÚV
2018).
Key features to the success of the discard ban include:
• Improved selectivity.
• Real-time closures.
• Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) mechanisms that include discard
monitoring (although of limited in scope).
• Regulatory incentives to land undersized catch with partial or zero deduction
from quota.
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• Voluntary move-on measures are used to collect and share information on where
and when to avoid unwanted catch.
The discard ban is now accepted by all stakeholders and by the public such that it
is generally considered unacceptable to discard catch in Icelandic ﬁsheries. The focal
point of the “discard discussion” in Iceland has shifted towards the utilisation of
by-products, as full utilisation of the entire catch has been encouraged with a high
degree of success (Vigfusson et al. 2013).
1.2.3 USA
Science-based management has been the hallmark of US national policy since
enactment of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(MSA) in 1976. Under the current version of this act
Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (a) minimize
bycatch and (b) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of such
bycatch”; bycatch is deﬁned as ﬁsh which are harvested in a ﬁshery, but which are not sold
or kept for personal use [. . .],
and includes economic and regulatory discards. Regionalization underpins MSA and
the eight Regional Fishery Management Councils are allowed ﬂexibility in devel-
oping Fishery Management Plans (FMPs) that comply with the MSA. Therefore,
many approaches to reducing bycatch can be found in US ﬁsheries regulations, but
discarding is not banned in any US ﬁshery.
Fisheries for walleye pollock (Gadus chalcogrammus), the nation’s largest
single-species ﬁshery, take place throughout Alaska but primarily in the Eastern
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI). Since the late 1970s, catches in this region
have ranged between 0.8 and 1.5 million t (Ianelli and Stram 2015). The regulations
have been amended many times to reduce bycatch and discard in the pollock ﬁshery
(NPFMC 2016). The American Fisheries Act was passed in 1998 and mandated
signiﬁcant changes in management of the ﬁshery. Almost the entire quota (which is
reviewed annually) was permanently divided among three sectors: inshore catcher
vessels delivering to shore-side plants, catcher/processors, and motherships (catcher
vessels delivering to ﬂoating processors). This eliminated competition among and
within sectors. Provisions for binding agreements within or among co-operatives
were also established.
Bycatch challenges impacting the pollock ﬂeet include incidental catches of
Paciﬁc salmon and other ground-ﬁsh, and undersized pollock. Through a combina-
tion of regulatory action, internal contractual arrangements, and cross-sectoral
collaboration, innovative changes in ﬁshing practice have been developed and
implemented to address these challenges.
Regulations were amended in 1998 to require all ground-ﬁsh vessels to retain
all pollock and Paciﬁc cod (Gadus macrocephalus) and achieve deﬁned utilisation
standards (NPFMC 2016). Between 1997 and 1998, overall cod discard was reduced
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from 8.6% to 2.2% of cod harvest and overall pollock discard was reduced from
8.2% to 1.6% of pollock harvest (Witherell et al. 2000). Subsequently discards have
been further reduced. Pollock and cod constitute a very high proportion of the overall
ground-ﬁsh harvest in this region (85.7% in 2016, 80.1% in 2017; NPFMC 2017), so
overall discard rates were greatly reduced.
Bycatch of Paciﬁc salmon cannot be retained in the walleye pollock ﬁshery and
the ﬁshery can be penalized if salmon bycatch exceeds proscribed limits. Abundance
of limiting salmon species is highly variable and inﬂuenced by multiple factors
including spatial and temporal co-occurrence, and variability in the abundance of
salmon year classes. Concern about salmon bycatch is exacerbated by its cultural and
economic importance and long-term trends of reduced abundance of many stocks
(Stram and Ianelli 2015). NPFMC has taken many actions to reduce salmon bycatch.
These include time and area closures, hard caps, gear modiﬁcations, and incentive-
based measures (NPFMC 2016). The most recent action, approved in 2016, consti-
tutes a comprehensive approach including rolling hotspots (real-time, temporary
closures), required use of gear modiﬁcations and contractual arrangements which
obligate vessels to avoid high bycatch areas based on observer data (NPFMC 2016;
Karp et al. 2005; Stram and Ianelli 2015).
The effectiveness of the increased retention requirement can be evaluated through
catch and discard data obtained by observers. However, it is not possible to measure
the effectiveness of the salmon bycatch reduction programme directly because
bycatch rates are inﬂuenced by many factors including highly-variable patterns of
salmon distribution and abundance (Stram and Ianelli 2015); furthermore, once
vessels relocate, bycatch rates that would have occurred subsequently are unknown.
The programme has been effective in the sense that time and area closures and hard
caps have not constrained overall pollock harvests. Also, requirements for vessels to
relocate to avoid high bycatch areas have been enforced effectively.
For both the increased retention and the salmon bycatch avoidance measures,
elimination of the race for ﬁsh through permanent allocation of quota to cooperatives
has enabled collaboration and innovation in reducing bycatch. Also, for both
programmes, several best practices in bycatch management are satisﬁed; these
include observer coverage and data collection, explicit performance standards, and
adequate surveillance (Gilman 2011).
1.2.4 Chile
Chile has historically been among the 10 major ﬁshing nations in the world, with
annual landings (including aquaculture) exceeding 2.8 million t in 2016 (Sernapesca
2016). However, important ﬁshing stocks have shown signs of overexploitation and
consequently catches decreased from the maximum historical level of 7 million t in
the mid-1990s (Sernapesca 2017). Consequently, management changes have been
made to assure ﬁsheries and ecosystem sustainability.
10 W. A. Karp et al.
In this context the term “discard” ﬁrst appeared in the Fisheries Law amendment
of 2001, which also introduced an ITQ system. Before 2001, Chile had a “race for
ﬁsh”, i.e. vessels would ﬁsh until the total allowable catch (TAC) was reached and
the ﬁshery closed. The 2001 amendment prohibited discards without distinguishing
among species and sizes, and established penalties that would apply to offenders,
such as ITQ deductions of 30% (MEFT 2011). Without a concurrent extensive
enforcement system or changes in selectivity, these penalties discouraged ﬁshers
from complying with the requirements and also from reporting discards. As a result,
the magnitude of discards in Chilean ﬁsheries was unknown and the practice of
discarding continued (Borges et al. 2016).
The discard problem was revisited in the 2012 revision of the Fisheries Law. The
“discard ban”was re-deﬁned and the term “incidental catch”was applied to seabirds,
marine mammals and sea turtles caught during ﬁshing operations. This revision
included provisions for compulsory industry-funded electronic monitoring (EM)
on-board ﬁshing vessels (including video sensors); and strengthened the penalties
for discard offences. However exemptions from the discard ban and its penalties are
permitted to identify and quantify the causes of discards and incidental catch.
Through this process mitigation measures could be later tailored for each ﬁshery
and binding mitigation plans put in place as of 2018. Exemptions are conditional on
a minimum 2-year at-sea monitoring and research programme with observers
on-board commercial vessels. Suspending penalties under these exemptions largely
eliminates incentives for ﬁshers to alter their ﬁshing behaviour and therefore reduces
bias in the information collected. Once these penalty-exempt research programmes
are completed, mitigation plans are put in place where further exemptions can be
applied for as long as several requirements are met, such as on-board monitoring by
observers continues and a global catch quota, which accounts for discards, has been
set for the target species.
By February 2018, eight binding mitigation plans had been agreed upon, cover-
ing 11 ﬁsheries within the artisanal and industrial ﬂeets (Subpesca 2018). Even
though draft mitigation plans were proposed by the Under-Secretariat for Fisheries
to the respective Management Committees, they were further developed through a
participatory, bottom-up process that included skippers, vessel owners, ﬁshers and
NGOs, in addition to members of the Management Committees. Mitigation plans
and compliance monitoring by EM is required for all vessels in the industrial ﬂeets
by 2018 and by 2020 for artisanal vessels over 15 m (MEFT 2017).
The impact of the Chilean discard ban is not fully understood because it is still
being implemented. In some cases, these penalty-exempt programmes have enabled
ﬁshery-speciﬁc changes in regulations including changes in minimum landing size
(MLS) and authorization to catch and land species which were previously prohibited
for some gears or ﬂeets. In other cases, data collected has led to increases in target
species TAC, since discard mortality estimates are now included in the stock
assessments. However, restrictions and uncertainty related to choke species remain
in multispecies ﬁsheries. Quota transferability under the ITQ system (a potential
approach for reducing the impact of choke species) is limited. When the discard ban
is fully operational, and EM is in place, discarding choke species will no longer be
1 Strategies Used Throughout the World to Manage Fisheries Discards. . . 11
possible and this may constrain ﬁsheries for which selectivity improvements are not
possible.
1.2.5 Argentina
In Argentina, ﬁsheries resources are regulated and managed under federal law which
provides a framework for the management of discards. Furthermore, each of the ﬁve
provinces with maritime coasts has its own administration and applicable ﬁshing
legislation. Under article 21 of the Federal Fisheries Law “throwing discards and
wastes into the sea, which is contrary to responsible ﬁshing practices” is prohibited,
while the General Environmental Law obliges the state “to promote the rational and
sustainable use of natural resources”.
In 1996, regulations established minimum total length or length at sexual matu-
rity for several demersal and coastal species, prohibiting the capture of specimens
below those sizes. Further amendments restricted ﬁshing vessels to capturing no
more than 10% of sizes smaller than those ﬁxed under this resolution. After this
threshold is reached, captured specimens must be returned to the sea immediately.
This regulation also details provisions for the establishment of move-on rules when
catches of undersized ﬁsh are predominant, and for area closures when the presence
of undersized ﬁsh in an area is predominant. These minimum size requirements were
abolished in 2006 since vessels were discarding catches above the 10% threshold at
sea to avoid penalties.
Control and enforcement of ﬁshing activities in Argentina is weak, and while
discarding is illegal, it occurs frequently. A recent audit of the Under-secretariat of
Fisheries and Aquaculture1 has identiﬁed signiﬁcant weaknesses in all their areas of
operation, from inspections to data reporting and recording.
Argentina has had a National On-Board Observer Programme (PNOB) for the last
30 years to monitor activities of the main ﬁshing ﬂeets, and to obtain high quality
information to be used exclusively for scientiﬁc purposes. The data collect by the
observers is conﬁdential and cannot be used for control and enforcements purposes.
Argentinean trawl ﬁsheries are estimated to discard between 25% and 30% of
their total catch. These discards comprise ~85 ﬁsh and invertebrate species in the
bottom trawl ﬂeet, and ~60 and ~32 species, respectively, in the factory trawl and
shrimp trawl ﬂeets. In addition, there is bycatch of more than 20 species of sharks
and rays, many of them considered to be highly vulnerable to exploitation2.
1https://www.agn.gov.ar/informes-resumidos/subsecretaria-de-pesca-y-acuicultura-gestion-de-la-
tecnologia-informatica
2https://www.researchgate.net/proﬁle/Alicia_Boraso/publication/309672657_La_zona_costera_
patagonica_Vol_III_Pesca_y_Conservacion/links/581c829808aea429b291bdaa/La-zona-costera-
patagonica-Vol-III-Pesca-y-Conservacion.pdf
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In summary, even though there is a legislative framework to reduce UWC and
prohibit catches of undersized ﬁsh, discarding continues to occur frequently in
Argentinean ﬁsheries, especially when undersized individuals and/or
non-commercial species are caught.
1.2.6 Australia
Australia’s commercial ﬁsheries are managed by eight jurisdictions that use the full
range of contemporary ﬁsheries management methods (most in combination). How-
ever, discarding is not banned in Australian commercial ﬁsheries. Instead, the
approach generally used to manage commercial discards involves: (i) targeted
observer programmes to identify problematic discarding issues; (ii) research into,
and the implementation of, modiﬁcations to ﬁshing gears that reduce problematic
discards – using a variety of Bycatch Reduction Devices (BRDs) such as grids,
panels and escape vents; and (iii) if no such modiﬁcations can be developed, spatial
and/or temporal closures may be used.
For example, in the oceanic and estuarine prawn trawl ﬁsheries of New South
Wales (NSW) focused observer data collection in 1989–1991 identiﬁed problematic
discards of juvenile ﬁnﬁsh of species that were targeted by other commercial and
recreational ﬁsheries (Kennelly and Broadhurst 2002). Experiments were conducted
to develop grids and panels to reduce UWC that resulted in discarding. These were
used by ﬁshermen voluntarily for many years before they were required by regula-
tion. It has been estimated that these BRDs are now saving over 27 million juvenile
ﬁsh per year in this ﬁshery (Kennelly 2017; Kennelly and Broadhurst 2002).
1.2.7 New Zealand
Borges et al. (2016) and Telesetsky (2016) reviewed New Zealand’s management of
ﬁsheries discards and a summary is provided below. As in Australia, New Zealand’s
ﬁsheries are managed through use of the full range of contemporary ﬁsheries
management methods. However, unlike Australia, discarding/dumping by commer-
cial ﬁshers of ﬁsh, aquatic life, or seaweed covered by the New Zealand Quota
Management System is prohibited –with a few exceptions. Speciﬁcally, a commer-
cial ﬁsher is not permitted to “return to or abandon in the sea or any other waters any
ﬁsh, aquatic life, or seaweed of legal size. . .that is subject to the quota management
system”. What this means in practice is that New Zealand operates a “discard ban”,
with a prohibition on the discarding of catches of quota species over their minimum
legal size (i.e. to prevent high-grading) and all catches for quota species for which a
minimum has not been established. A catch does not need to be brought onboard for
it to be considered “abandoned”. Where quota ﬁsh are caught but left dead at sea, a
harvester has a duty to prevent dumping and “make reasonable efforts to retrieve”
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such ﬁsh or be subject to an offence. The NZ Fisheries Act is silent on whether it is
legal or not to discard non-quota species but there is some obligation to report
discards of such species.
Any quota species that is less than the minimum legal size must be “immediately”
returned “whether alive or dead to the sea or waters”, where the ﬁsh or aquatic life
were harvested. Generally, sub-MLS catches do not need to be reported except for
certain speciﬁed stocks. However, only 11 ﬁnﬁsh, rock lobsters, scallops, oysters,
and paua (abalone) have minimum legal sizes.
New Zealand deploys an instrument to mitigate discarding of over quota catches,
referred to as the “deemed value” system, by which the government puts a tax on the
landing of over quota catches. The level of the tax is it set through a complex set of
principles to discourage discarding, without creating incentives for targeting species
not covered by quota (Telesetsky 2016; Sanchirico et al. 2006).
Under Schedule 6 of the NZ Fisheries Act, a ﬁshing operator is authorised to
legally discard thirty-two stocks in New Zealand if they comply with area and
practice requirements. Three scallop stocks must be returned if they are collected
during a closed scallop ﬁshery season or in an area that has been closed to scallop
ﬁshing. Other scallops and dredge oysters may be returned as long as the shellﬁsh is
likely to survive. Most of the ﬁsh and shellﬁsh listed in Schedule 6 “may” be
returned to “the waters from which it was taken” if (1) the species is “likely to
survive on return” and (2) “the return takes places as soon as practicable” after the
species has been taken. This introduces a degree of discretion for the skipper and his
crew for the return of such species without any explicit duty spelled out in the Statute
to report such decisions. In practice, the Ministry requires that all Schedule 6 species
returned to the sea be reported on both catch and landing returns even though
Schedule 6 returns will not be counted against TACs.
In general Schedule 6 species are those understood to have high survivability
when discarded. Certain species such as cockles, scallops, oysters, mussels, lobsters,
and clams are likely to have high survival, depending on how they have been caught.
For ﬁnﬁsh, even if a ﬁsh is alive when it is brought on the deck, those with swim
bladders that inﬂate after capture because of barotrauma are less likely to survive
capture and discarding.
Exemptions may protect ﬁshers who discard ﬁsh from prosecution. For example,
as long as ﬁshers report a discard as part of his/her returns, the ﬁsher may return any
ﬁsh, aquatic life, and seaweed to the sea where a ﬁsheries ofﬁcer or observer was
present, the ofﬁcer or observer authorized its return, and the ﬁsher returned it under
supervision of the ofﬁcer or observer. Fishers may also legally discard parts of ﬁsh if
the ﬁsh were lawfully processed and the parts of the ﬁsh that are retained on board
allow for the accurate calculation of greenweight (weight prior to processing).
Fishers may also return catch where there are concerns for the safety of the vessel
or crew but there is no explicit requirement to report quota species that were returned
for safety reasons even though the Ministry has an expectation that these species will
be reported under the Fisheries (Reporting) Regulations on Catch Effort Returns.
While discards below MLS are not reported, discarding increased for legally
sized ﬁsh following the introduction of the ITQ system in New Zealand (MRAG
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2007). This occurred despite the provisions in the regulations that enabled ﬁshers to
match their catch to ﬁshing opportunities by leasing, borrowing, banking or pur-
chasing quota and the deemed value system (Lock and Leslie 2007). By 2007,
discarding was considered to be widespread and an increasing problem in
New Zealand’s ﬁsheries (MRAG 2007). According to Condie et al. (2014), at the
same time as the introduction of the discard ban, there was a small increase in
selectivity, but it is difﬁcult to assess the impact of the discarding prohibition
because accurate statistics on discards are unavailable. An analysis has suggested
that total catches have been about the double of reported catches since the introduc-
tion of the quota management system in 1986, indicating that discarding remains a
signiﬁcant problem in New Zealand’s ﬁsheries (Hersoug 2018 and references
therein). In line with this perception, the New Zealand government recently com-
menced on an agenda of mandatory EM of ﬁshing operations including on-board
cameras3).
1.2.8 Asia
1.2.8.1 Southeast Asia
In developing countries, including those in South-East Asia, small-scale ﬁsheries
generally harvest more ﬁsh than large-scale ﬁsheries (Mills et al. 2011) and usually
have low discard because utilisation is high (World Bank et al. 2012). Trawling
makes a major contribution to seafood production in Asia with about 50% of seafood
produced by an estimated 100,000 trawlers, ranging in size from those towing a net
behind a 5 m boat with a 2 hp engine up to vessels of 80 m length or more. In
Southeast Asia, large areas of trawlable continental shelf, fed by river inﬂows make
for some of the most productive ﬁshing grounds in the world. There is a wide range
of sizes and shapes of ﬁshes such that it is impossible to ensure that all species are
caught at sizes above their size at ﬁrst maturity (especially using trawls but also for
other gears).
Even though trawls have been used in the region since the early twentieth century,
after World War II there was a major increase in trawl ﬂeets as developing countries
sought to increase the supply of seafood for domestic consumption, export revenue
and job creation. Aid funding and technical advice from developed countries led to a
rapid increase in capacity which created large discarding issues and the depletion of
stocks. Concerns about the wastage of useable protein, at a time when governments
were seeking to increase protein supplies supply to the rural poor generated a debate
about solutions, at a time when the developed countries were also beginning to
address issues concerning bycatch, discards and wastage (e.g., FAO 1996).
3https://www.mpi.govt.nz/protection-and-response/sustainable-ﬁsheries/strengthening-ﬁsheries-
management/future-of-our-ﬁsheries/digital-monitoring-of-commercial-ﬁshing/
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Thailand’s discard problem was resolved in the late 1960s and early 1970s with
the development of a ﬁsh meal industry which supported poultry and shrimp farming
industries. In Vietnam, previously discarded ﬁsh were used as food for pigs.
Concerns about feeding animals encouraged a shift of interest towards products
for human consumption. As a result, the surimi industry developed in the mid-1980s
and has since grown throughout the region. In the Gulf of Thailand, the amount of
ﬁsh used for ﬁsh meal has declined considerably due (in part) to overﬁshing but also
the redirection of ﬁsh to higher value products. The same has occurred in Vietnam
and to a lesser degree in China. In Myanmar there is still a big focus on ﬁsh meal.
Throughout South-east Asia, large quantities of small ﬁsh are also used for ﬁsh
sauces and pastes or are dried. And there is increasing evidence that these ‘low-
value’ products have disproportional high value for alleviating prevalent micro-
nutrient deﬁciencies (Roos et al. 2003; Kawarazuka and Béné 2011).
1.2.8.2 India
One of the ﬁrst examples of the implementation of a discard ban in legislation
occurred in India. Pramod (2010) describes Regulation 5, of the Maritime Zones
of India Rules 1982: “Crews may not discard substantial surplus catch, catch
exceeding authorized quantities shall be retained onboard, recorded, and surrendered
as required by authorized ofﬁcers”. But Pramod goes on to note that mechanized
vessels have never abided by this law and in any case, India keeps no formal records
on quantities of discards. Nevertheless, over the last three decades, ﬁsheries discard
in India has been assumed to be low because, as in the other Asian countries
mentioned above, most catches are fully utilized given the demand for protein-rich
foods.
1.2.9 Africa
The following information summarizes observations from three African countries as
reported by Kennelly (2014).
Discarding is not prohibited in Nigeria, and its shrimp trawl ﬁsheries make
extensive use of bycatch reduction technologies. This is mostly driven by
European Union requirements for shrimp imports. Virtually all trawlers in Nigeria
use Turtle Exclusion Devices (TEDs) and quite well-designed square mesh panels
that effectively reduce the bycatch of large quantities of juvenile ﬁsh.
However, ﬁnﬁsh bycatch from the shrimp ﬁshery has a well-established market
where it is retained and sold from trawlers to small-scale canoe operators. These
operators sell the bycatch to onshore buyers (mostly women) who, in turn, dry and
smoke the ﬁsh for sale at local and regional markets. This multi-layered sector
(termed the “buyemsellum” sector) provides signiﬁcant seafood protein to a large
number of people who are often unable to ﬁnd sufﬁcient protein to meet their dietary
16 W. A. Karp et al.
needs. The use of BRD in to these ﬁsheries is effectively reducing the bycatch
available for local consumption. The current ﬁsheries challenge in Nigeria, therefore,
is to resolve this issue. Options for identifying alternative sources of seafood and
new employment possibilities are now being investigated.
Madagascar currently has a very well managed shrimp trawl ﬁshery, with no
buyemsellum sector and signiﬁcant use of bycatch reduction technologies, under
drivers that include the shrimp import requirements of the EU and a desire to achieve
Marine Stewardship Council certiﬁcation. The priorities for Madagascar’s trawlers
are to improve the performance of the BRDs currently used so that they release more
discards while increasing the retention of shrimp. Quite straightforward modiﬁca-
tions (that have been developed elsewhere) to the gears currently used are being
examined to assist with these priorities. It should also be noted that there is strong
growth in the aquaculture industry in Madagascar, which brings with it the need for
ﬁsh meal. As for Asian countries, increasing the utilisation of bycatch for aquacul-
ture feed will increase its value and reduce discards.
The Cameroon trawl sector is characterized by little formal ﬁsheries management,
no implementation of sustainable ﬁshing practices, and no pressing drive to improve
ﬁshing methods due to export requirements (most of the targeted shrimp is not
exported to Europe). There is also a signiﬁcant buyemsellum sector that, as in
Nigeria, complicates the perceived need to reduce bycatches with the need to provide
ﬁsh for undernourished people. The current challenges for this ﬁshery therefore
encompass most aspects of ﬁsheries management, especially implementation of
effective MCS, a programme to quantify and then mitigate bycatch issues, and
identifying ways to manage the buyemsellum sector.
In Africa is an overarching need for an “awareness and enlightenment” campaign
to educate the public and key stakeholders about the need for sustainable ﬁsheries
management, conservation of resources and effective use of ﬁshing practices. The
negative consequences of reducing access to important sources of protein and micro-
nutrients for the local people must be recognized, however and the ecosystem
consequences of reducing bycatch (or lack thereof) is also an important consider-
ation (Garcia et al. 2012; Kolding and van Zwieten 2011).
1.3 Discussion: What Makes a Discard Mitigation Policy
Work?
The variety of the described cases highlights that there is no single or simple answer
to the question of what makes a discard policy work. Thus, what works in one ﬁshery
or region may not be suitable elsewhere. For example, a policy to reduce unwanted
catch through selectivity improvements in countries such as Nigeria or Cameroon
may conﬂict with local food security needs. This situation is very different to
northern European ﬁsheries, for example, with high discard rates of undersized
ﬁsh of low market value. Accordingly, we have split the discussion of the cases
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we have described into two categories. The ﬁrst category covers ﬁsheries where
discard rates are, or were, high and where there has been an emphasis on the
reduction of UWC. The second category includes ﬁsheries where discard rates are
low, because most catches have value.
1.3.1 Fisheries with a Focus on Reducing Unwanted Catches
In this category we have included Norway, Iceland, the US, Argentina, Chile,
Australia and New Zealand. Most of the discard policies in this category are highly
complex. Each of these examples includes measures to reduce UWC, including
selectivity improvements, various spatial measures, quota related measures and
economic incentives. In addition, most the policies include monitoring and control
measures and improved utilisation. A similar range of measures is being used to
implement these discard policies regardless of whether the policy is deﬁned as a
discard ban (Norway, Iceland, Argentina, Chile and New Zealand) or as a policy
aimed at achieving discard reduction (US and Australia).
The term “discard ban” suggests elimination of all discards. However, none of the
discard bans currently in place (or under implementation) prohibit all discarding
(Borges et al. 2016). Instead, they focus on speciﬁc components of the catch and
exemptions apply (e.g. those with high chance of survival if released, those desig-
nated as endangered or threatened species). Moreover, there are no examples of
simple discard bans, with Chile’s ﬁrst and unsuccessful discard policy representing a
possible exception.
In some of the cases there has been a gradual evolution from a speciﬁc discard-
related issue, such as high-grading of cod in Norway, towards a more comprehensive
discard policy. In Iceland and Norway, for instance, the achievement of discard rate
reductions and mindset changes regarding the wastefulness of discarding required
periods of 30–40 years to achieve. The US walleye pollock ﬁshery is an exception in
that regard as discard rates were reduced rapidly, perhaps due to the initial require-
ment for full observer coverage. This case is possibly the most demonstrably
successful discard policy described here. Furthermore, some countries (e.g., Nor-
way, Iceland, USA and Chile) stress stakeholder involvement as an essential aspect
of their discard policies. This may include aspects such as: consultative processes
with the regulatory authorities, modiﬁcation of regulations based on stakeholder
feedback and initiatives for implementing selective technical measures (i.e.,
increased quota/access to closed areas).
An important component of many discard reduction strategies is the use of more
selective ﬁshing gears which may also be associated with temporal and spatial
closures to reduce UWC (see Bellido et al., this volume; O’Neill et al., this volume;
Reid et al., this volume).
TAC management, often together with individual quota allocations
(or allocations to groups or cooperatives) predominates in the ﬁsheries in this
category. Accordingly, policy initiatives to address discarding often feature changes
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in the arrangements for implementing and allocating quotas. Quota related measures
are, in most cases, a fundamental element of the overall discard policy and are
generally considered to at least partially remove incentives for discarding. This issue
is complex because inﬂexible quota management systems can cause or exacerbate
choke species problems, while quota management programmes, which allocate
quota to individuals and or groups of ﬁshers and include mechanisms for transfer
or leasing, can help reduce choke species effects and related discarding (Poos 2015).
However, assessing the contribution of quota-based measures to the overall effec-
tiveness of discard policies in isolation from the other policy elements is difﬁcult. In
New Zealand, the move to ITQs created an increase in discarding of legally sized ﬁsh
and whether that situation has improved is difﬁcult to ascertain due to a lack of
accurate discarding data.
For a number of the cases examined, increased utilisation has occurred as a means
of reducing UWC when it cannot be avoided completely. In both Iceland and
Norway, the utilisation initiatives include viscera and other processing waste gen-
erated at sea (e.g., Richardsen et al. 2017).
Within ﬁsheries focused on discard reduction, perhaps the greatest divergence in
approach concerns accountability and compliance monitoring. Accountability in the
context of discard restrictions or prohibitions is problematic. While it is relatively
straightforward to estimate and verify the retained or landed catch, estimation and
veriﬁcation of discards is difﬁcult (See Chap. 13). At-sea observers provide the data
necessary for discard estimation, but observer programmes are expensive, and
ﬁshers may behave differently when observed, which can result in biased discard
estimates (Benoît and Allard 2009). Technological approaches such as EM can be
effective, especially for compliance purposes when discards are prohibited (and may
also be an effective means of directly estimating catch and discard for certain gear
types). Self-reporting of discards by vessel operators is generally considered
unreliable (Kraan et al. 2013) unless veriﬁed by observers, EM or some other
method (Plet-Hansen et al. 2017).
The US walleye pollock ﬁshery stands out from the other cases described here
due to its comprehensive accountability measures. This ﬁshery requires a sufﬁcient
observer coverage to ensure that all hauls are monitored (one or two observers per
vessel), which not only provides conﬁdence that vessels are compliant, but also
ensures data quality that may be lacking in other countries and ﬁsheries (Stanley
et al. 2011). The other cases have less stringent observer coverage or other forms of
monitoring; although some, such as Norway and Iceland, feature signiﬁcant penal-
ties for non-compliance. It remains to be seen how the new discard regime in Chile,
which requires EM on board all vessels over 15 m by 2020, will affect compliance
levels and data quality. A similar question applies to the planned implementation of
EM in New Zealand ﬁsheries.
One of the striking ﬁndings of this comparative analysis is that discard data
quality appears to be problematic in the majority of cases (Borges et al. 2016).
This is despite the essential importance of a discard policy in many of the manage-
ment frameworks described and the data collection resources available. Several
issues arise from this, not least that it makes the task of determining whether a
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discard policy works or not signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult. At least one of the cases, the
ﬁrst iteration of Chile’s discard policy, provides evidence that an overly rigid and
punitive discard ban can have a negative impact on data provision and compliance.
1.3.2 High Utilisation Fisheries
In many African and Asian ﬁsheries, a local demand exists for non-targeted ﬁsh,
which serves an important role by contributing to human nutrition and animal feed.
In such cases, discards are low due to high utilisation levels. Accordingly, discarding
becomes less of an issue than whether the ﬁshery is sustainable. Improvements in
selectivity in such ﬁsheries would have a negative impact on important local supplies
of ﬁsh protein. Of the ﬁve cases described in this category, only India has a
regulatory discard ban which, however, has not been effectively implemented.
Although there is not a general management interest in improving selectivity in
these ﬁsheries, there remains concern over the capture and mortality of threatened,
endangered or protected species. These may be encountered frequently in the
tropical waters of Africa and Asia where, like elsewhere, retention is usually illegal.
The use of bycatch reduction devices (BRDs) in these ﬁsheries is uncommon and
generally occurs where the target species is destined for export (Kennelly 2014).
1.4 Lessons Learned
Reducing or eliminating discards is a public policy priority in some regions although
this is not always the case. For example, very high utilisation rates can be seen in
many small-scale and artisanal ﬁsheries and some industrial ﬁsheries, such as those
for ﬁsh meal and oil. Furthermore, there is much debate in the literature regarding the
factors which lead to high levels of discarding, and the costs and beneﬁts
(in economic and ecosystem contexts) of improving selectivity and avoidance
compared with increasing utilisation.
In ﬁsheries with a focus on reducing UWC, policy makers seek to implement
changes through a mixture of measures which include improved utilisation as well as
avoidance and improved selectivity. To some extent, we can draw from these
examples and experiences to better understand and mitigate problems associated
with implementation of the LO.
The LO constitutes a far-reaching change in EU ﬁsheries policy which impacts, or
will impact, ﬁshers and stakeholders throughout Europe (Condie et al. 2014). Yet the
goals and implementation process are poorly understood, and legitimacy of this
policy has been questioned by many ﬁshers, which tends to impede the implemen-
tation process (de Vos et al. 2016). Success in implementing policies to reduce
discards is generally easier to achieve if ﬁshers and other stakeholders are involved
in the formulation and implementation of policies. From our case studies, we can see
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examples of good and poor communication of goals, and the extent to which
formulation and implementation is guided by a participatory process and how
these have impeded or facilitated success. For example, under the initial Chilean
discard ban a top-down regulatory approach was employed with no accountability or
enforcement; this resulted in an ineffective policy. During reformulation of the
Chilean discard ban, ﬁshers and stakeholders played a substantial role in policy
development and in implementation through research and drafting of discard miti-
gation plans together with the high mandatory monitoring levels. The new
programme is better understood and accepted, and initial indications suggest a strong
likelihood of success. The US programmes for increased utilisation and avoidance of
salmon bycatch in the walleye pollock ﬁshery involved a great deal of participation
by ﬁshers and stakeholders that resulted in policies which were well-understood and
implemented successfully.
Effective Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) are difﬁcult to achieve
and poor MCS may render regulations ineffective. This has certainly been the case in
New Zealand and Argentina and under the ﬁrst iteration of the Chilean programme.
MCS in Iceland and Norway has also been limited and this makes veriﬁcation of
programme effectiveness difﬁcult, if not impossible. It should be noted, however,
that moving towards industry and stakeholder recognition of the importance of
reducing discards and developing a culture of compliance is integral to the long-
term strategies employed by Iceland and Norway. In addition, poor or inadequate
monitoring can make it difﬁcult or impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of a
discard reduction (or elimination) programme. In some parts of the world, MCS is
entirely independent of observer coverage because observers focus entirely on
scientiﬁc data collection. MCS is effective in the US walleye pollock ﬁshery so
that compliance is high, and accountability is fully documented (note that industry
pays for observer coverage in this ﬁshery). In this ﬁshery much of the compliance
monitoring is carried out by observers. In the US and elsewhere EM is beginning to
be used as a compliance monitoring tool and has been shown to be effective in some
instances. Regardless, an effective discard policy must have adequate MCS as well
at-sea monitoring through observers and/or EM. This is necessary to ensure the
accuracy of catch and discard data.
Requirements for reducing or eliminating discards work best as part of a broader
ﬁsheries management policy that integrates regulatory measures to address an
overarching goal. This can be seen in the Norwegian DBP which is comprised of a
suite of regulatory and technical measures to minimise unwanted catch, including:
the regulatory discard ban; gear selectivity technical measures; closed areas; and
MCS measures. Elements of a more comprehensive and integrated approach can be
found elsewhere such as the broad guidance to minimise discards in the US and in
the Chilean and Icelandic approaches. However, the EU LO was intended to be an
all-inclusive measure to eliminate unwanted catch and this will be more difﬁcult to
implement.
Integration of discard reduction policies within a broader strategy also requires a
measured, adaptive approach such has occurred in Iceland and Norway, and to some
extent in Chile. This facilitates alignment of the policy with industry incentives and
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fostering a culture of compliance and allows for incremental improvements in the
overall programme over time. The EU LO was originally conceived to be fully
effective after a relatively brief phase-in period (2014–2019), which therefore could
have undermined its effectiveness. However, its implementation through multi-
annual plans and discard plans could enable the adaptive, incremental and case-
speciﬁc approaches seen as favourable characteristics in some of the case-studies
reviewed here.
Also related to the need for a broader and more comprehensive, strategic
approach is the issue of governance as it relates to quota management. Quota
management programmes that provide for individual or group (co-operative) own-
ership or leasing of quota, such as those that occur in US, Iceland and New Zealand,
allow ﬁshers to manage and trade quotas so as to avoid or minimise choke species
problems which often result in discarding. In Europe, national quota management
regimes can differ but how they may be adapted to cope with the challenges of the
landing obligation is beyond the scope of this chapter. They may also allow for
improved efﬁciencies in ﬁshing operations which can facilitate change in operations
and uptake of innovative technologies. Furthermore, ﬂexibilities in these types of
quota management programmes can make it easier for ﬁshers to carry-over small
amounts of quota across ﬁshing years, or deduct overages from the next year‘s
allocation. These types of mechanisms greatly enhance the ability of the ﬂeet and
individual ﬁshers to adapt to regulatory change such as discard restrictions. Such
opportunities are not currently available to all EU ﬁshers working under the CFP
although ﬂexibility is allowed in some countries such as Denmark and the
Netherlands.
A successful discard policy requires careful balancing of top-down factors such
as legislative requirements and effective controls with bottom-up factors including
participation, stakeholder acceptance and cultural attitudes towards compliance. The
cases we have described have balanced these aspects differently, with some taking a
long-term approach emphasising a gradual development of a low discard mindset
and less restrictive and rigorous controls. Others have focussed on strong controls,
while attempting to retain stakeholder support, in an effort to achieve positive results
over a shorter timeframe. With the exception of India, the high utilisation ﬁsheries
described have not established discard policies and discard levels are low because
utilisation, especially for human consumption, is high. Balance among the factors
described above will differ within Europe due to the diversity and complexity of
European ﬁsheries and will most likely include aspects of all the approaches
described in this chapter.
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Chapter 2
Discards in the Common Fisheries Policy:
The Evolution of the Policy
Lisa Borges and Ernesto Penas Lado
Abstract This chapter deals with the development of the European Union
(EU) discard policy over time. It describes the process from 1992, when the issue
of discards was ﬁrst recognised in the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reform
process, to the Landing Obligation (LO) adopted in 2013. It analyses the context
to which policy choices were made that shaped the present format of the EU LO,
how it is being implemented and the impact it is having on associated ﬁsheries
management measures. Finally, future possible policy developments are examined.
Keywords de minimis and high survival exemptions · Discards · European
Commission · Landing Obligation
2.1 Introduction: Historical Background
2.1.1 Discards in the Common Fishery Policy
Discarding of ﬁsh has always taken place in European ﬁsheries and has continued
since the inception of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Although data are
incomplete, the levels of discards in some ﬁsheries have been well known for several
decades (CEC 1992).
Traditionally, discards are driven by economic reasons: for many species and
sizes there is a limited market acceptability, they have no or low commercial value,
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but also, in a system of limited landings by stock, ﬁshers have traditionally discarded
the smaller, lower-value ﬁsh to maximise the value of the ﬁsh landed and counted
against quotas, a practice known as ‘highgrading’. However, some rules of the CFP
have also traditionally contributed to discarding: certain provisions of the CFP made
discarding compulsory, namely for (a) catches over quota, (b) catches of undersized
ﬁsh and (c) catches not corresponding to the expected catch composition of the legal
mesh size (Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98; EC 1998).
The consideration of discarding as a problem for the Common Fisheries Policy
was recognised many years ago. As early as 1992, at the time of the ﬁrst reform of
the CFP, the European Commission raised the need to address and resolve this
problem in its communication on reform (CEC 1992). However, the question was
not seen as a signiﬁcant problem by the Council of Ministers, and no speciﬁc action
followed.
In the 2002 reform, discards were also raised as an issue (CEC 2001). However,
no speciﬁc proposals were made in that regard because the debate following the
2001 communication revealed that discards were not seen as a signiﬁcant problem,
and policy makers focused on other priorities, such as stakeholder consultation,
long-term management plans and vessel construction subsidies. Discards were seen,
in that context, as an inevitable result of the economic activity and partially a result
of the management system, which few seriously questioned at the time.
2.1.2 The Communications of 2007 and 2011
The perceptions toward discarding started to change in the mid-2000s. A report from
the EU Scientiﬁc, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) in
2006 illustrated the magnitude of the discard problem in EU ﬁsheries (STECF 2006).
Following this report in 2007, the European Commission made a ﬁrst attempt to
address the issue systematically in policy terms, through a communication (CEC
2007). But this had little impact: the only result was the introduction of a ban on
‘highgrading’ in all areas in 2010. This ban was poorly enforced and its effect on the
real level of discards was never evaluated.
By 2010 the problem of discarding was being increasingly referred to in the
European media and this inﬂuenced European public opinion which started to put
the EU under pressure to tackle the issue (Borges 2015). Pressure was particularly
important in the United Kingdom, where the high levels of discards were used to
criticise the CFP and, by extension, the European Union. The compulsory collection
of discard data from 2003 as part of the EU Data Collection Framework (DCF), and
the publication of some of these data in the mid-2000s contributed to raise awareness
by showing the high level of discarding in many EU ﬁsheries. The question of
discarding started to be a signiﬁcant source of embarrassment for the ﬁsheries policy
and, by extension, for the European Union.
In 2011 the European Commission published a second communication proposing
to set up a process to resolve the problem gradually through cooperation with the
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ﬁshing industry. However, this communication did not bring a real change in policy.
It has been suggested that the main reason for this was a lack of incentive for the
main players (the industry and Member State administrations) to engage. This, in
turn, was considered to be due to the ﬁshing industry believing that there would be
no advantage in reducing discards (Penas Lado 2016), coupled with a general
perception by most that it was too technically difﬁcult to implement (Fitzpatrick
et al. 2011). Finally, it was believed that the absence of a legally-binding common
approach would result in a piecemeal approach that would not provide a level
playing ﬁeld for different ﬂeets.
However, this experience was very important to shape the future policy. In a
policy characterised by top-down prescriptive approaches, only very few took
seriously an alternative, bottom-up, cooperative approach. This was also the lesson
learnt by non-EU countries that had previously implemented a non-discard policy,
such as Norway (Karp et al., this volume). This eventually led to the consideration
by the European Commission that a non-discard policy could only be established
through top-down legislation.
2.2 The Landing Obligation and the CFP Reform of 2013
2.2.1 Why a Ban on Discards? The Proposal by the European
Commission
The question of discarding was one of the most prominent issues in the reform of the
CFP in 2013. Why? It is interesting to note that the Commission’s ‘Green paper’ on
CFP reform, published in 2009 (CEC 2009) did not even consider discarding as one
of the ﬁve structural deﬁciencies of the policy. The Commission viewed discarding
as an undesirable, but largely inevitable consequence of a management system based
on individual stocks, allocated through ﬁxed shares for each Member State. Together
with other provisions, such as catch composition rules under the technical measures
regulation (EC 1998), discarding was made compulsory under certain circum-
stances. Since these policy elements were not being questioned, a ban on discarding
was initially considered as not appropriate.
In the public debate following the publication of the Green Paper, several
contributions touched upon the issue of discards. But these did not come from the
industry which, by and large, did not consider discards as a problem. But for a
number of environmental NGOs this was an example of the CFP’s inability to
resolve its many shortcomings, particularly with regards to ecological impacts. In
addition, some British media presented the discarding of good, large ﬁsh under the
CFP as the ultimate demonstration of the absurdity of the policy, and abundantly
used the images of ﬁsh being discarded as an argument to discredit the CFP (Borges
2015; Gambarato and Medvedev 2016).
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In a context where ﬁsheries issues were no longer conﬁned to ﬁsheries constit-
uencies, the problem of discarding was becoming a major iconic issue with political
consequences that reached beyond ﬁsheries policy itself. This was the fundamental
reason why an issue largely ignored in the preparation of the ﬁshery policy reform,
went to the top of the agenda almost overnight (Joa 2015).
The Commission understood that the high level of discards seriously undermined
the credibility of the policy, over and beyond the objective reasons and difﬁculties
behind the phenomenon. Furthermore, the failure to conceptualize the bottom-up
approach proposed in the Communication of 2007 illustrated the need for a new
approach to address the problem. Last but not least, the experience from abroad (i.e.,
Norway), having applied a non-discard policy for years, clearly indicated that for the
discard ban to work, it needed to be imposed top-down in law, as the only way to
overcome the initial resistance from the industry.
These considerations led the Commission to include in its proposal for the
reformed CFP (CEC 2011a) the idea of a phased-in ban on discarding by species.
This came about relatively late in the process of preparing the reform proposal, to the
extent that the initial Impact Assessment of the reform (CEC 2011b) did not evaluate
the effects of such a measure, which had to be incorporated at a later stage.
The Commission was fully aware that imposing a Landing Obligation as a
top-down measure in a policy that hitherto had made discarding compulsory under
a number of circumstances would present many difﬁculties and some contradictions.
However, it was felt that these difﬁculties could and should be resolved if all players
involved, from administrations to the industry, were jointly forced to make it happen.
The failure of the bottom-up approach of 2007 was believed to demonstrate that the
practical difﬁculties could be resolved only if the players were all under legal
pressure to deliver the results.
2.2.2 The Debate with the Council of the EU and the
European Parliament
The EU co-legislators reacted to the proposal with mixed feelings: while all agreed
that discards in EU ﬁsheries had to be addressed, several Member States and
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were critical with the speciﬁc pro-
posal. Nobody opposed the principle of eliminating or at least reducing discards, but
many disagreed on the level of ambition and on the speciﬁc details proposed.
The main issue in the negotiation concerned the level of ﬂexibility to apply to the
Landing Obligation. This divided the opinions between Member States in Council
and MEPs in Parliament. The positions largely reﬂected the relative weight of
industry versus the society at large in establishing the political positions (see also
Fitzpatrick et al., this volume; van Hoof et al., this volume). While those more
inﬂuenced by industry’s positions were in favour of a high level of ﬂexibility in
the objectives and speciﬁc provisions, those more inﬂuenced by other societal
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interests favoured more limited ﬂexibility. In any case, the need for at least some
mechanisms for ﬂexibility was recognised by all, notably due to the fact that some
discard practices were actually the result of the CFP rules themselves. These
mechanisms were included to facilitate implementation in practice.
While it was recognised that discard levels were highly variable between different
ﬁsheries and areas, the ﬂexibility mechanisms were the same for all cases. This was
the result of the emphasis by the co-legislators to ensure the level playing ﬁeld, and
the difﬁculty to demonstrate beyond doubt that the different discard levels of
different ﬁsheries were inevitable.
2.2.3 The Flexibility Mechanisms
The result of the negotiations was the adoption of a series of mechanisms of
ﬂexibility as follows: species for which ﬁshing is prohibited, species that have
high survival rates after being discarded and catches which fall under the de minimis
exemption.
2.2.3.1 The de minimis Allowance
The de minimis allowance was the clearest recognition by the co-legislators, that
achieving zero discards in some ﬁsheries would be almost impossible, notably on
account of quota allocations and the cost of handling unwanted ﬁsh. So certain
allowances should be established for well-deﬁned cases.
The most signiﬁcant point of friction was the maximum level of this allowance to
continue discarding at sea, and whether such allowance should be consistent in all
ﬁsheries or modulated according to different discard levels and different difﬁculty
levels to reduce discarding.
Regarding the former, the decision taken (a maximum of 5% after a transitional
period starting at 7%) corresponded to the political wish to avoid a bad image of the
policy: if the allowance was too high, then the policy would ‘look’ as if current
discard levels could in many cases be maintained, and the co-legislators wanted to
send a clear political message that current ﬁshing practices should change.
More difﬁcult was the second question. The evidence that different European
ﬁsheries have very different levels of discarding (for example in the North Sea
discard levels vary between practically zero in pelagic ﬁsheries to nearly 50% in
demersal ones, ICES 2017a) was compounded by the desire of the co-legislators
to establish measures that would not look discriminatory. And in the absence of
accurate data on different discard levels, providing for different allowance levels for
different ﬁsheries could be seen as discriminatory. The CFP’s traditional priority to
establish a ‘level playing ﬁeld’ translated into a de minimis provision with the same
ceiling for all ﬁsheries. This was introduced under the expectation that discard plans
in certain areas would not need to make full use of the maximum allowance and that
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this maximum allowance would be used only in the most difﬁcult cases. In any case,
it was believed by the co-legislators that there should not be, under any circum-
stance, discard levels higher than the 5% of the de minimis rule (although a phasing-
in starting at 7% was agreed). This was not based on science, but on the political
drive to look ambitious: some co-legislators indicated that a tolerance level of two
digits would look like nothing would change.
2.2.3.2 The High Survival Exemption
This exemption was an obvious one: there is no point in landing and eventually
killing individuals which otherwise would have survived being discarded. Therefore
a high survival clause was included to allow discarding of individuals and species
that were scientiﬁcally demonstrated to be resilient towards capture-and-discarding
processes. However, a deﬁnition of what threshold level may be considered as
“high” was not given.
Some species are known to survive outside seawater for a time, such as molluscs,
skates and rays. This may also be true for some crustaceans. It becomes more
complex for ﬁsh, whose survival after discarding is not well known in many cases,
nor how survival is inﬂuenced by technical, biological and environmental factors.
This complexity resulted in very loose provisions which have ample room for
interpretation.
2.2.3.3 The Inter-Stock Flexibility
This ﬂexibility mechanism (up to 9% of the TAC of a certain stock could be counted
against another stock) was established in recognition that under relative stability, the
shares of quota allocated to Member States could, in some cases, make it extremely
difﬁcult to comply with the Landing Obligation. Co-legislators, however, were very
conscious of the risks of this mechanism, and they established two associated
conditions: (a) that the stocks from which the catches are attributed to other stocks
would be inside safe biological limits – to prevent the mechanism to result in higher
catches of weak stocks and (b) that the real catches by species would be recorded, to
avoid catch data being misleading.
Catches that are caught in excess of quotas or for which the Member State has no
quota, may be deducted from the quota of the target species provided that they: (i) do
not exceed 9% of the quota of the target species and (ii) the stock of the non-target
species is within safe biological limits (i.e. F < Flim and SSB > Blim).
The inter-species quota ﬂexibility (and de minimis) can provide ﬂexibility in the
system to better adjust catch compositions to resemble ﬁshing opportunities and
increase both ecological and economic sustainability. However, a STECF report
(STECF 2013) warns that these provisions could be used to legally increase catches
well above desired or intended levels, and that they will require careful consideration
if negative and unintended consequences are to be avoided.
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2.2.4 What to Do with the Unwanted Fish?
This was also a hotly debated question concerning whether the undersized ﬁsh could
be sold for direct human consumption.
Some Member States (particularly from the Baltic basin) considered that, once
the undersized ﬁsh are caught and counted against quota, it was better to give them
some value. They expected this value to be low, so that consuming a signiﬁcant
proportion of the quota with low value ﬁsh would be sufﬁcient deterrent not to catch
too many undersized ﬁsh in the ﬁrst place.
Other Member States (notably from the Mediterranean basin) considered that this
possibility would actually ‘legalise’ the catch of undersized ﬁsh and could lead to an
increase in the level of their catches, considering that, unlike the Baltic, small ﬁsh
can fetch very good prices in that region.
To resolve this dilemma, the co-legislators adopted an intermediate solution:
undersized ﬁsh inevitably caught should be landed and (where relevant) counted
against quota, but then sold only for non-human consumption. The idea behind this
solution was twofold:
– if the undersized ﬁsh was devoid of any sales value, there would be little incentive
for ﬁshermen to land it in the ﬁrst place, and any amount landed would create a
disposal problem for port authorities if nobody could buy it. In addition, the
image of –even undersized- ﬁsh being shoveled away and dumped with beneﬁt to
no-one was not considered a good solution in terms of addressing the credibility
problem referred to above.
– If the undersized ﬁsh were given some value, but not the full value of the market
for direct human consumption, there would be a partial incentive to land the ﬁsh
inevitably caught, but there would still be an incentive to use the quotas to catch
ﬁsh that could fetch the full price.
These considerations were based on general knowledge, not on any speciﬁc
study. This compromise is still largely to be tested in practice (see Iñarra et al.,
this volume).
2.3 Implementation
The Landing Obligation introduced in the 2013 CFP in its article 15 (EU 2013)
includes four speciﬁc exemptions: species for which ﬁshing is prohibited, species
that have high survival rates after being discarded, catches which fall under the de
minimis exemption, and catches damaged by predators. It should be noted that the
interpretation of these exemptions is not always straightforward. This must be taken
into account when evaluating the implementation.
2 Discards in the Common Fisheries Policy: The Evolution of the Policy 33
2.3.1 The Flexibility Mechanisms
Species with scientiﬁc evidence of high survival rates after being discarded can have
an exemption from the obligation to be landed. However, the deﬁnition of what is
‘high’ survival is unclear, while STECF (2013) has concluded that deﬁning a single
value cannot be scientiﬁcally rationalised and therefore assessing proposed exemp-
tions on the basis of high survival need to be considered on a case-by-case basis,
taking account of the species and ﬁsheries involved (Rihan et al., this volume).
This provision has been adopted in several ﬁsheries since 2015. In pelagic
ﬁsheries, the application of the exemptions for survival (and the de minimis) in
some ﬁsheries have provided the ﬂexibility that allowed the industry to formally
comply with the Landing Obligation without any signiﬁcant change in their opera-
tions (PELAC 2015; MEDAC 2017).
As for the inter-species quota ﬂexibility, this instrument had not yet been used by
April 2017 (Veits 2017).
2.3.2 Predator-Damaged Fish
A further exemption to the LO was introduced with the Omnibus regulation
(European Union 2015a), where caught ﬁsh damaged by predators should be
returned to sea. The reason detailed in the regulation was that such catches “can
constitute a risk to humans, to pets and to other ﬁsh by virtue of pathogens and
bacteria which might be transmitted by such predators”.
Nevertheless, this exemption was seen as particularly important for Baltic Sea
ﬁsheries targeting salmon, due to the increase in the predatory behaviour of seals
consuming salmons caught mainly in longlines (Fitzpatrick and Nielsen 2016). This
exemption has indeed been applied to salmon ﬁsheries in the Baltic Sea. But there
are no safeguards to limit this mechanism to any particular species or area.
2.3.3 Discard Plans and Minimum Sizes
2.3.3.1 Discard Plans
With the delay in the agreement of the multispecies, multiannual plans foreseen in
the 2013 CFP between European institutions, and under the objective of introducing
the LO progressively, several so-called discard plans were, in accordance with the
CFP, adopted by the EC between 2014 and 2017 through delegated acts. The discard
plans identify the speciﬁc ﬁsheries and species entering the LO and applicable
exemptions by sea area for a period of 3 years, based on joint recommendations
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by regional Member States groups in consultation with the relevant Advisory
Councils.
Although the discard plans were originally planned as an intermediate legislative
measure to be substituted gradually by the agreed multiannual management plans in
each sea basin, these are now well-established legislative procedures that continue to
be adopted and amended regardless of the adoption of a corresponding
multiannual plan.
2.3.3.2 Reduction of Minimum Sizes
The 2013 CFP reform introduced speciﬁc provisions which allow changing mini-
mum landings/conservation sizes under discard plans and multiannual plans, still
under the prevailing aim of ensuring the protection of juveniles of marine organisms.
Catches below minimum conservation reference sizes (MCRS, comparable, but not
equivalent, to the previously known MLS) have limited use and cannot be sold for
human consumption to avoid creating markets for undersized ﬁsh.
In the Baltic Sea, the size at which cod can be sold for human consumption was
reduced in 2015, i.e. the MLS of 38 cm changed to a MCRS of 35 cm (EU 2014a).
As expected, there was an increase in cod landings between 35 and 38 cm, which in
turn caused an increase in national quota consumption, because the average ﬁsh size
of Baltic cod stocks is small (MRAG 2016). At the same time, the industry reported
difﬁculty in increasing gear selectivity due to the restrictions in the trawl gear
allowed in the Baltic Sea (BSAC 2016; Valentinsson et al., this volume). This
resulted in decreased selectivity by incentivizing commercialization of smaller size
eastern cod, while there was no apparent reduction in discard rates (ICES 2017a).
This ran counter to the idea of the legislators about the need for increasing selectivity
in order to facilitate the implementation of the Landing Obligation.
Furthermore, in south western Atlantic waters, anchovy caught in CECAF area
34.1.2 and in ICES subarea 9 also had a reduction in minimum size with the
introduction of the LO in 2015, from a MLS of 12 cm to a MCRS of 9 cm
(EU 2014b). In the Skagerrak and Kattegat in 2016, Nephrops human consumption
size was also reduced from 130 mm total length and 40 mm carapace length to
105 mm and 32 mm respectively (EU 2015b); while clam (Venus spp.) size limits in
the Adriatic Sea went from 25 mm to 22 mm in 2017 (EU 2016a).
2.3.4 Additional Regulatory Mechanism: TACs
and Prohibited Species
With the phased introduction of the LO between 2015 and 2019, several other
regulatory mechanisms have since been used to deal with the LO.
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2.3.4.1 TAC Footnotes
Historically, the TAC and quota regulations have included footnotes for some
pelagic stocks TACs (e.g. horse mackerel) detailing speciﬁc percentages (2% or
5%) of catches of non-target species (e.g. boarﬁsh, haddock, whiting and mackerel)
that can be taken as bycatch in pursuit of that target TAC, without being accounted
for in the respective non-target stock but on the target pelagic TAC. However, only
in 2018 have the footnotes included the LO provisions on interspecies ﬂexibility and
its 9%maximum combined catch, and more importantly that the non-target stocks be
within safe biological limits.
As the catches of non-target stocks are not necessarily accounted for in their
respective TACs, there is a risk of overexploitation of those non-target stocks.
STECF (2013, 2017b) highlighted that there is the potential to signiﬁcantly increase
the mortality on non-targeted bycatch species to levels inconsistent with achieving
FMSY to the extent that stock biomass could be reduced below safe biological limits.
This underlines the importance of ensuring that the use of ﬂexibility mechanisms
needs to be consistent with the achievement of the Maximum Sustainable Yield
(MSY) objective of the CFP.
2.3.4.2 TAC Increases
Since 2015, catches by ﬁsheries subject to the phased introduction of the LO (with
some exemptions) should have been brought to shore and landed. To accommodate
the predicted increase in landed catch from such ﬁsheries, the relevant 2015, 2016
and 2017 TACs were increased in accordance with the estimated catch that formerly
would have been discarded (Borges 2018). According to the European Commission
(2017a, b), TAC adjustments are part of the overall package of measures to imple-
ment the LO but they should nevertheless not jeopardise the FMSY objective or
increase ﬁshing mortality.
According to Borges (2018), of the 40, 64 and 88 TACs under the LO between
2015 and 2017, respectively, around 30% (the majority of which being TACs for
demersal stocks) were increased in 2016–2017 to account for the LO, and of these,
10 TACs were set already above landings advice before any adjustments were made.
Therefore, the author concludes that the LO is likely to have contributed to TAC
increases above maximum advised catch in 2016 and particularly in 2017 to
accommodate the predicted increase in landed catch, and will continue to do so
until 2019 when all EU TAC regulated stocks and ﬁsheries in the Atlantic come
under the LO. In addition, the fact that these TAC increases have been allocated
according to relative stability limits considerably compromises their ability to
resolve choke species situations for Member States having zero quota or very low
quotas of the stocks concerned.
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2.3.4.3 TACs Suppression
Removing TACs from annual TAC regulations so that associated stocks are
removed from the LO has been put forward by several stakeholders as a way to
deal with problematic stocks, i.e. where discarding is high due to low commercial
value and/or where quotas are insufﬁcient to cover catches.
In 2017, following a request from the EC, ICES assessed the sustainability risk to
the stock of dab and ﬂounder of having no catch limits as low, as long as dab and
ﬂounder remains largely bycatch species (ICES 2017b). With this advice, the EC
proposed, and Council agreed, to delete the combined TAC for dab and ﬂounder in
the North Sea (EC 2017a). With the suppression of the TAC, these two stocks
were removed from the LO and no longer constitute a risk for premature closure of
the target ﬁsheries for plaice and sole where they are bycaught. However, they
continue to be discarded in high numbers, likely to have between 10% and 30%
survival after discarding and low commercial value, but continue to be caught in
ﬁsheries that no longer have the incentive to improve selectivity.
In 2018a, discussion is going on regarding several additional TAC removals
(EC 2017b).
2.3.4.4 Zero TACs
Zero TACs have been used for a number of years in cases where speciﬁc stocks are
considered extremely overexploited and in need of complete protection from ﬁshing.
In the TAC 2017 regulation (EU 2017), picked dogﬁsh (spurdog, Squalus acanthias)
were listed as a prohibited species. Specimens should therefore not be harmed and if
caught should be released immediately, with the exception for vessels operating in a
speciﬁc area where landings of up to 270 tonnes of dead picked dogﬁsh are allowed,
as long as vessels are engaged in a ‘bycatch avoidance programme’. Furthermore,
any vessel engaged in such a programme may land not more than 2 tonnes per month
of picked dogﬁsh that is dead at the moment when the ﬁshing gear is hauled on
board.
The listing of spurdog on the prohibited species list, but with a TAC, has initiated
a discussion on how to deal with zero TAC species under the LO: in terms of which
species should be listed as prohibited, how species are chosen to be on the list, their
level of protection and the level of enforcement. NGOs’ position is that designating
stocks with zero TAC advice as prohibited species will not protect them from
overﬁshing, and provides little incentive for ﬁshers to improve the selectivity of
their ﬁshing practices.
Listing a species on the prohibited species list means discarding can continue, and
without a post-release high survival, this measure adds little to the sustainability of
the stock.
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2.3.5 Prohibited Species List
Both the annual TAC and the technical measures regulations include a list of species
for which deliberate catching, retention on board, transshipment or landing is
prohibited. Furthermore, when caught, specimens should not be harmed and should
be promptly released back into the sea. Species listed in the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Appendix I
are included on the prohibited list. However, except for when listed in CITES, no
other speciﬁc criteria are known for granting inclusion. As stated in the previous
section about zero TACs, several species and stocks have been recently added and
removed from the list when they pose a speciﬁc issue with the implementation of
the LO.
According to STECF (2017c), the prohibited species list should ideally only be
used for species which are biologically sensitive to any exploitation. Without
additional management measures to improve survival, listing a species will not
necessarily lead to a decrease in mortality. Furthermore, the decision to include, or
remove, any species on or off the list should be made according to transparent
criteria developed in a participatory process.
2.3.6 Technical Measures
Technical measures at EU level are speciﬁed through several regulations dating back
to 1998, when the original technical measures regulation was adopted (Council
Regulation (EC) No 850/98). This regulation speciﬁes areas and seasons where
ﬁshing is prohibited, prohibited ﬁshing methods, minimum landing sizes, minimum
mesh sizes, among many other measures to minimise the impact of ﬁshing on the
marine environment.
In light of the reformed CFP, to simplify rules, and to allow for the introduction of
new mechanisms to increase selectivity to facilitate the Landing Obligation, the EC
has proposed a new framework for technical conservation measures (EC 2016a). At
the time of writing, this proposal was still being discussed by the EU co-legislators.
2.3.7 Multiannual Management Plans
There have also been indirect effects of the LO in other ﬁsheries management
measures. The argument that the reality of mixed ﬁsheries associated with the LO
is incompatible with reaching MSY for all stocks simultaneously has been gaining
momentum in Europe and has been addressed inter alia by Sissenwine et al. (2014)
and in the EU research project MYFISH (Rindorf et al. 2017). The discussion
concerns different maximum allowed MSY catch opportunities, associated with
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premature closure of mixed ﬁsheries under the LO, and under- or over-utilization of
some of those catch opportunities.
2.3.7.1 FMSY Upper Range
The management plans in the reformed CFP have no explicit harvest control rules
(HCRs) but include FMSY ranges between which ﬁshing opportunities can be set
when pre-determined conditions are met (EC 2016b; EU 2016b).
The use of the FMSY upper range has been justiﬁed to allow for mixed ﬁsheries to
adapt to the LO. Managers argued that extra ﬂexibility is needed to cope with the LO
and avoid premature ﬁsheries closures, while NGOs defend that the objective of
“above MSY levels” enshrined in the CFP is not in line with any F value above
FMSY.
Actually, the case for a ﬂexible consideration of FMSY values is based on various
arguments: from the need to address choke species problems to the multi-objective
nature of the legal basis of the policy both in the EU Treaty and in international
ﬁsheries law.
This question has been resolved in the framework of the two ﬁrst management
plans adopted after the reform: the plans for the Baltic (EC 2016b) and the plan for
demersal stocks in the North Sea (EU 2018). In both cases, the implementation of
FMSY as a range was consolidated, albeit under certain conditions: that the upper
limit be precautionary and that the upper part be used only when SSB is above
certain thresholds.
It is too soon to evaluate the results of these conditions, whether they will provide
the necessary ﬂexibility to address choke species issues (at the level of the TAC) or
whether the conditions associated will limit this ﬂexibility to a very low number of
cases.
2.3.7.2 Target and Bycatch Species
The new multiannual management plan for the North Sea basin (EU 2018) considers
species: (a) that should be managed through MSY (FMSY by 2020) (b) species that
may be managed by precautionary approach if MSY advice is not available and
(c) other species not subject to catch limits to be managed according to the precau-
tionary approach.
Although the Landing Obligation must apply to all stocks under TAC manage-
ment, regardless of whether they are target or bycatch stocks, this classiﬁcation has
implications for the implementation of the policy: the classiﬁcation of the stocks
concerned as ‘target’ or ‘bycatch’ stocks seems to respond, at least to some extent, to
their consideration as ‘choke’ species, so this would seem to be a case where the
implementation of the Landing Obligation has implications for the approach towards
MSY objectives.
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2.3.8 Monitoring, Control and Enforcement
Monitoring and enforcement are essential parts of the implementation of the Landing
Obligation. Not only the credibility of the policy depends on effective enforcement,
but also its expected positive effects will only be realised if adequate monitoring
takes place. For example, the improvement of data (due to reporting on everything
that is removed from the sea) is an expected side beneﬁt of the Landing Obligation,
but only if effective monitoring takes place. On the other hand, the ﬂexibility
mechanisms available will only be used to the full extent if the industry feels the
pressure of enforcement; otherwise there would be little incentive to use such
mechanisms, which would in turn give the impression that the whole policy is
inapplicable.
The move to managing catches instead of landings requires new forms of
monitoring (James et al., this volume; Nuevo et al., this volume) and it is partly
through this monitoring that the incentive for compliance with the LO and the
motivation to avoid unwanted catches can be generated (see also Kraak and Hart,
this volume).
2.3.8.1 Postponement of Serious Infringement
Failing to comply with the Landing Obligation is categorized as a serious infringe-
ment under the control regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 1224/2009; EC 2009), but a
2 year delay was agreed in the so-called Omnibus regulation in 2015. Sanctions only
took effect from the January 1st, 2017 (EU 2015a); from this date MSs had to start
applying the points system for illegal discarding.
Although the omnibus regulation did not delay the enforcement and control of the
LO, MSs have taken a soft approach in these two ﬁrst years of the introduction of the
LO and have focused on information sharing and training activities rather than on
LO compliance (STECF 2017a).
2.3.8.2 Reporting on the Implementation of the LO
The Omnibus regulation (EU 2015a) introduced the obligation to the EC to submit
an annual report, starting in 2016 until 2020, on the implementation of the Landing
Obligation. This report should be based on information given by the Member States,
the Advisory Councils and other relevant sources.
The 2015, 2016 and 2017 MSs reports were reviewed and summarised by STECF
(2016, 2017a, 2018) and show a qualitative analysis of the efforts made by MSs on
the different areas of the LO implementation (Rihan et al., this volume). Neverthe-
less, in 2017 STECF noticed that, “overall, Member States indicate that difﬁculties
encountered so far have been minimal but several reports have highlighted that the
most signiﬁcant issue they face is the industries’ reluctance to implement the
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Landing Obligation, despite considerable efforts to disseminate information to them.
They also report that ﬁshers seem slow to change ﬁshing practices; and in many
areas, a “business as usual” mentality seems to prevail”.
2.3.8.3 Revision of the Control Regulation
EC is proposing a revision of the Control Regulation (EC) No. 1224/2009 (EC 2009)
with a draft proposal adopted in 2018 (EC 2018b). The EC has started a discussion
on the elements of this review, and have stated their intention to include the use of
Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM or EM, video and sensors system; James et al.,
this volume) to monitor the implementation of the LO on selected ﬁsheries on a
voluntary basis (EC 2017b).
In this context, and in a letter inviting inputs from Advisory Councils on its
proposal for establishing Speciﬁc Control and Inspection Programmes, the EC stated
that “independent research, audits of the MS control systems conducted by the
Commission, and the ‘last-haul’ (Nuevo et al., this volume) and other project
initiatives driven by the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) alongside the
MS authorities, all indicate a general lack of compliance with the LO and that illegal
and unrecorded discarding is widespread”.
2.4 Future Perspectives
At this point in time it is difﬁcult to foresee future developments. The effects of the
Landing Obligation as established cannot be assessed ex ante because these effects
depend largely on whether Member States will use existing ﬂexibility mechanisms to
the full. It also depends on the level of enforcement. However, the ongoing experi-
ence in the search for practical solutions for implementation allows certain initial
conclusions to be drawn.
2.4.1 Facilitating Implementation
The effective implementation of this policy as of 2019 will require progress in a
number of areas of the policy. Possible ideas are, inter alia:
– Strengthening of at-sea Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) systems to
allow for a level playing ﬁeld between ﬁsheries and Member States. Already new
technologies are being considered and made possible in the revised Control
regulation to allow for this.
– Using the ﬂexibility mechanisms to the full. This is not yet the case, in particular
with the inter-species cross-reporting mechanism, barely used so far;
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– Consolidating ﬁshing mortality ranges within new multiannual plans. These
ranges were ﬁrst introduced in the Baltic management plan (EU 2016b) largely
due to avoiding choke species effects, but have been seriously questioned by
environmental NGOs and subject to strict conditions by policy makers;
– Enhancing quota swaps through increasing transparency, providing the European
industry with a better knowledge of the swapping opportunities available in other
member States;
– Introducing bycatch quotas for stocks where some Member States have zero
quotas and where they cannot manage to obtain small quotas through swaps.
Although this option may be seen by many as a breach of relative stability, the
annual ﬁshing opportunities regulation already contain a number of such bycatch
quotas;
– Supporting the establishment of real-time closures, at least in certain ﬁsheries
with high proportions of juvenile ﬁsh. A legal basis for this already exists in the
control regulation (EC 2009);
– Facilitating (through funding of the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund
EMFF; EU 2014c) the investment in more selective gear, and in land-based
equipment to store and process unwanted catches. At present, very little invest-
ment of this kind is taking place.
These ideas may be necessary in different combinations in different areas/ﬁsher-
ies, and the EC has taken the initiative to discuss them with Advisory Councils and
Member States’ regional groupings to identify the most serious cases and the
mechanisms to resolve choke species issues.
2.4.2 Possible Legislative Changes?
The European Commission has no plan to propose an amendment to the existing
legislation. This indicates that the European Commission believes that it is necessary
to try to implement the 2013 policy, and has started a proactive campaign to discuss
and promote a variety of ideas to allow for its efﬁcient implementation. The reason is
clear: before thinking about a legislative change, it is necessary to use all the
elements of ﬂexibility and effective MCS systems to allow for effective
implementation.
For the future, the Commission must submit a report on the application of the
policy by 31 December 2022. Although it is premature to prejudge what the
Commission will decide to report on the Landing Obligation, one can, already at
this stage, suggest some ideas to consider regarding a future policy:
– The modulation of objectives. The current legislation provides for exactly the
same levels of discard allowances in all areas and all ﬁsheries, thus ignoring very
different current levels of discarding and very different levels of difﬁculty to
achieve to those target levels. In the North Sea alone, discard levels in different
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ﬁsheries range from 1% to 2% to around 50% (ICES 2017a). This harmonisation
may need to be revised to ﬁx more achievable objectives for different ﬁsheries;
– Establishing clearer objectives for the improvement of selectivity in the context of
technical measures. While the 5% above mentioned may be too simplistic and
poorly adapted to different circumstances, the legislation could at least establish
as a principle the improvement of exploitation patterns to levels that would
maximize MSY yields and minimize the catch of juvenile ﬁsh. These principles
would then translate into different objectives in different ﬁsheries and areas.
– Advancing towards multispecies approaches would also help reduce choke spe-
cies effects. The scientiﬁc basis for this is being developed, at least for certain
areas such as the North Sea (ICES 2013). This could allow a new policy focus
where greater ﬂexibility for individual stocks would be compensated with more
emphasis on the total removals from the ﬁshery (and thus a more ecosystem-
based management). Allocation-related chokes would also beneﬁt from a new
approach to implement relative stability: more focused on the total bonus that
Member States would obtain from the ﬁshery, and less on individual stock
allocations; this could be done based on an overall evaluation of the value of
ﬁshing rights by Member States and a redistribution of individual quotas within
that overall value.
– A new approach to the implementation of relative stability would help address the
problem of allocation-related chokes. Indeed, relative stability was established in
1983 as a principle, with the speciﬁc allocation keys being open to adaptive
revision (EEC 1983). The possibility to include bycatch quotas (already existing
in some TACs) would be a solution in some cases. A more ambitious approach
would be to recast relative stability as a total percentage of the value that each
Member State would obtain from the EU, and then allow for a reallocation of
national allocations within these overall percentages, to better match ﬁshing
rights with real catches.
In any case, there seems to be no way back from the non-discard policy. The
evolution of ﬁsheries policy around the world is going in that direction (Karp et al.,
this volume), and the practice of discarding is increasingly considered unacceptable
from different points of view, including considerations about food security. Any
possible future change in the policy is likely to be about adjustments to improve
practical implementation and mitigate possible negative results, but a CFP with high
levels of discarding will never return.
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Landing Obligation, for a particular regulated species. It details the process of
generating any exemption supporting evidence by Member States and the
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3.1 Introduction
According to the Basic Regulation (EU) 1380/2013, the Common Fisheries Policy
(CFP) recognises that to ensure good governance, decision-making should, among
others, be based on the principles of best available scientiﬁc advice. Scientiﬁc advice
comprises the provision of catch advice for setting ﬁshing opportunities, and eval-
uation and assessment of speciﬁc elements of the CFP. This chapter describes the
new challenges that the Landing Obligation (Article 15) has posed to the two main
advisory bodies: ICES (the International Council for the exploration of the Sea) and
STECF (the EU Scientiﬁc, Economic and Technical Committee for Fisheries).
The main role of ICES has been to change the focus of the advice provided to the
EU Commission from landings to catches to take account of the new management
approach under the Landing Obligation. In this context, ICES has considered how
best to provide information corresponding to wanted (i.e. catches above minimum
conservation reference sizes) and unwanted catches (i.e. catches below minimum
conservation reference sizes) and also to estimate catches discarded under exemp-
tions to the Landing Obligation. ICES has also developed advice and methodologies
to support experimental work in relation to high survivability exemptions, building
on initial work by STECF. Additionally, ICES has received speciﬁc requests from
the Commission to consider the impacts on the removal of TACs (ICES 2017) and
amending speciﬁc Regulations (e.g., the sprat box in the North Sea).
STECF performs scientiﬁc work directly requested by the EU Commission. The
main body of work carried out by STECF with regard to the Landing Obligation has
been in assessing the main provisions and ﬂexibilities provided for in Article 15 and
the likely impacts of applying such mechanisms. To date STECF has held nine
Expert Working Groups to advise on various aspects of the Landing Obligation
(STECF 2013, 2014a, b, c, d, 2015a, b, 2016a). STECF (2015c) has also developed a
methodology for the calculation of increases in TACs to take account of catches
previously discarded (i.e., so-called TAC uplifts). Finally, STECF has reviewed the
mandatory annual reports provided by Member States and the Advisory Councils on
the implementation of the Landing Obligation (STECF 2016a).
3.2 High Survival Exemption
Article 15, paragraph 2(b), of the CFP describes an exemption from the Landing
Obligation for “species for which scientiﬁc evidence demonstrates high survival rates,
taking into account the characteristics of the gear, of the ﬁshing practices and of the
ecosystem”. Clear, defensible, scientiﬁc evidence is required to support any proposal
for such an exemption for selected species or ﬁsheries. The inclusion of this provision
within the CFP has sparked a sudden and uniquely synchronized interest in discard
survival assessments and mobilised Member States and ﬁshing industry representative
organisations to apply for research projects to generate supporting evidence.
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In the 1990s and early 2000s, the importance of quantifying, and mitigating
sources of unaccounted ﬁshing mortality (e.g., discards, escapees, ghost ﬁshing,
illegal and unreported ﬁshing) in addition to landed catches was recognised at ICES
advisory level. This led to the establishment of several expert groups on unac-
counted ﬁshing mortality which also considered the survivability of escaping ﬁsh
and discards (e.g., ICES 1995, 1997, 2005). However, these groups ceased to exist
beyond 2009 due to a lack of activity in this research area, with funding prioritised
elsewhere. With the inclusion of High Survival Exemptions (HSE) in Article
15, interest in researching discard survivability has grown considerably. This
section describes the process on (a) how HSE evidence is generated, (b) how it is
submitted, and (c) which ﬁsheries (species/métier) have been subsequently granted
a HSE to the Landing Obligation after review by the European Commission and
evaluation by STECF.
3.2.1 Description of the Evidence
Following STECF (2013) advice, ICES established a workshop on Methods for
Estimating Discard Survival (WKMEDS) in January 2014, to provide guidance on
how to quantify discard survival robustly. WKMEDS published its ﬁrst draft
guidance in April 2014 (ICES 2014), ahead of the evaluation of the ﬁrst Joint
Recommendations (JR) submitted by the regional groups of Member States.
WKMEDS recommended: (i) assessments should be representative of discarded
catch and practices, ideally at a métier scale; (ii) methods should avoid biasing
results through observation induced mortality, and wherever possible demonstrated
with appropriate controls; and (iii) the monitoring period should be sufﬁciently long
to observe any delayed mortality attributable to the catch-and-discarding process.
To quantify (sub-) lethal stress and discard survival, three methodologies were
identiﬁed: captive observation; tagging/biotelemetry; and vitality/reﬂex assess-
ments; (ICES 2014; Breen and Catchpole in press). In captive observation,
sub-samples of animals are selected from the discarded catch and monitored to
provide estimates of survival rates. Tagging/biotelemetry use tagging technologies
to monitor post-release mortality of (tagged) organisms. Vitality assessments quan-
tify the health of the organism at the point of discarding. By combining vitality
assessments with one or both of the other two techniques, the at-capture condition
may be correlated with an individual’s likelihood of post-release survival (Davis
2010). Depending on the strength of such a correlation, a vitality index may be used
as a proxy for survival (e.g., Barkley and Cadrin 2012; Morﬁn et al. 2017).
Over a series of ﬁve subsequent meetings, WKMEDS provided an open forum for
researchers and stakeholders actively involved in survival assessments to discuss and
develop their methods (ICES 2015a, b, 2016a, b, c). Results from this group were
disseminated to other interested ICES expert groups and were used by scientists to
guide research efforts in this ﬁeld (e.g., Uhlmann et al. 2016; Methling et al. 2017).
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The WKMEDS group also developed protocols for systematically reviewing
survival assessments and meta-analysing survival data. Key questions were
established (ICES 2015a, b; Catchpole et al. in submission) which should be
considered by researchers and which may be used by external reviewers
(i.e., STECF) to gauge the quality and robustness of any collected evidence.
3.2.2 Evidence Collected So Far
Spanning from the Mediterranean to the Baltic, more than 20 studies have been
commissioned, in most cases with public funding, in at least 11 Member States, and
Turkey between 2013 and 2018. An overview of the studied species, their survival
rates and corresponding references has been included in an online supplement
(Table 3.3; in Electronic supplementary material). A critical review of the survival
rates of ﬂatﬁsh and Nephrops is in preparation (Catchpole et al. unpubl. data).
At least 20 species have been assessed for vitality status at the point of discarding
and monitored for delayed mortality through captivity experiments. Species of such
interest included ﬂatﬁsh such as Common sole (Solea solea), European plaice
(Pleuronectes platessa), turbot (Scophthalmus maximus); pelagic species such as
sardines (Sardina pilchardus), Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), European seabass
(Dicentrarchus labrax) and crustaceans such as Norway lobster (Nephrops
norvegicus) and common spiny lobsters (Palinurus elephas). The prioritisation of
species and ﬁsheries to investigate was inﬂuenced by the potential for high survival,
based on existing knowledge, and the likely timing for introduction under the Landing
Obligation during the phasing-in period. The emphasis for research has recently turned
to commercial skates and ray species, such as thornback ray (Raja clavata). This is,
because it has been recognised that, despite indications that the HSE was originally
intended for such relatively robust elasmobranch species in the ﬁrst place (see Borges
and Penas Lado, this volume), there are gaps in the evidence to support this.
Species discarded from both active and passive gear types have been studied
including beam and otter trawls, Danish and purse seines, trammel-nets, gill nets,
pots, creels and ﬁsh traps and some recreational hook-and-line ﬁsheries.
It is fair to say that generating robust evidence on discard survival estimates that is
representative of a ﬁshery is challenging. Most studies have faced logistical difﬁ-
culties in planning ﬁeld trips and accommodating equipment onboard commercial or
recreational charter vessels. Organisms monitored in captivity need to be housed in
conditions sympathetic to their biological needs and should be monitored long
enough for any ﬁshing-related mortality to occur (Uhlmann et al. 2016; van der
Reijden et al. 2017). Similarly, tagged organisms need to be monitored/detected/
recaptured in sufﬁcient numbers to produce meaningful survival estimates based on
detection/recapture rates. Some of these limitations mean that the generated evidence
is not purely empirical, but also model-based. For example, extension models were
developed to estimate survival in cases where monitoring periods could not be
extended (Catchpole et al. 2015) or where it was not possible to house ﬁsh holding
facilities on-board (Morﬁn et al. 2017).
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3.2.3 Review of the Evidence
The evidence submitted by Member States to support requests for a HSE has been
evaluated by STECF (STECF 2013, 2014a). These evaluations considered whether
the survival assessment methods are appropriate, and whether the limitations of the
results have been fully explored. The ICES (2014) guidance on survival assessment
protocols has been used to promote best practice and harmonisation of recently
conducted assessments (ICES 2014; 2015a). Furthermore, the guidance has pro-
vided a reference for critical review which is used by STECF to apply a systematic
and consistent evaluation process. Assessing the robustness of evidence, and its
representativeness across entire ﬁsheries, has proved challenging for STECF, and
many studies have been criticized for lacking sufﬁcient data to adequately describe
the potential variability in survival at the ﬁshery scale (STECF 2014b, 2015a,
2016b). STECF has repeatedly emphasized, “that before considering the implemen-
tation of a high survival exemption, it should be remembered that avoidance of
unwanted catch, through improved selectivity or other means, is the primary
objective of the Landing Obligation” (STECF 2016b).
Deﬁning what “high survival” means has also been challenging. STECF has
highlighted that this is a subjective term that involves trade-offs between different
management and societal objectives, driven by the management priority for that
ﬁshery at that particular time (e.g., improving stock sustainability; improving ﬁnan-
cial viability; or avoiding waste). However, survivability should be considered in the
context of the discard rates in the ﬁshery. If only a relatively small proportion of
discarded ﬁsh are likely to survive then granting such an exemption would seem
counter intuitive (STECF 2016b). This could be interpreted by some as opening a
loophole in the legislation that could be used to circumvent the Landing Obligation
(Stockhausen, this volume). But rigorous stock assessments accounting for discard
survival are needed to evaluate what the consequences may be for a stock.
Using the evaluation by STECF on the discard survival evidence provided by the
Member States, the EU Commission decides whether to grant exemptions. To date,
eight of the three-year Discard Plans, contained in the 13 Commission Delegated
Regulations enacted, have included survival exemptions, which have been approved
by the EU Commission. These apply to ﬁve regions (Baltic Sea, Black Sea, North
Western Waters, South Western Waters and the North Sea) and provide survival
exemptions for a total of 11 species such as anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus),
herring (Clupea harengus), mackerel (Scomber scombrus), horse mackerel
(Trachurus trachurus), jack mackerel (Trachurus picturatus), Atlantic cod (Gadus
morhua), Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus),
common sole (Solea solea), turbot (Scophthalmus maximus), and scallop (Pecten
jacobeus) caught in speciﬁc areas and ﬁshing gears. The empirical estimates of
discard survival derived from experimentation for these species caught in speciﬁc
ﬁsheries and areas range from 46–90% survival. Several high survivability exemp-
tions are also in place for highly migratory species, such as tunas and billﬁsh. These
exemptions implement recommendations emanating from relevant Regional Fisher-
ies Management Organisations (RFMOs), such as ICCAT (STECF 2017a).
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3.3 De Minimis
Article 15, paragraph 2(c) of the CFP allows for de minimis exemptions of up to 5%
of total annual catches of all species subject to the Landing Obligation that can be
discarded. Such catches are not counted against quotas, but must be recorded in
ﬁsher’s logbooks, such as Electronic Reporting Systems (ERS). According to
Recitals 29 & 31 of the CFP, the application of de minimis should be considered
as a “last resort” mechanism and only after other technical or tactical approaches to
avoid capture of unwanted catch have been fully explored. De minimis exemptions
in the CFP are subject to two conditions, “where scientiﬁc evidence indicates that
increases in selectivity are very difﬁcult to achieve” or “to avoid disproportionate
costs of handling unwanted catches, for those ﬁshing gears where unwanted catches
per ﬁshing gear do not represent more than a certain percentage, to be established
in a plan, of total annual catch of that gear”.
The ﬁrst of the STECF meetings in 2013 took this provision to mean that the spirit
and general purpose of the de minimis provision (‘a small discard proportion’), was to
provide a ‘safety valve’ allowing for some discarding in the most difﬁcult circum-
stances (STECF 2013). Accordingly, STECF outlined the types of information that
would be needed to justify such exemptions, based on the conditions contained in the
Regulation. While the de minimis exemption allows for minimal levels of discarding to
be authorised, it does not provide a solution to quota restrictions that could result in the
cessation of ﬁshing (a so called ‘choke’ event). The de minimis provision does not
enable more catches to be taken, but rather provides ﬂexibility on how catches are
handled onboard and the destination of those catches.
3.3.1 Description of the Evidence
At an early stage, STECF identiﬁed that the concept of de minimis exemptions was
largely an economic argument (STECF 2013, 2014a, d). It was based on the logic
that at a certain level of improvement in selectivity, losses of marketable catches
would render the ﬁshery in question uneconomic or that handling of unwanted
catches on board would signiﬁcantly increase the costs to the vessel owner, similarly
threatening the viability of the business. On this basis STECF advised that, Member
States should provide evidence to support these arguments (STECF 2013, 2014a).
For the ﬁrst condition, in respect of improvements in selectivity, STECF (2013) put
forward an approach using a ‘break-even indicator’ as a tool for evaluating potential de
minimis cases. This was designed to show that the larger the change in selectivity
towards unwanted ﬁsh, the more signiﬁcant the decrease in revenue could be, due to
losses of marketable catches. This was described as the ratio of current revenue to break
even revenue (CR/BER) and shows how close the current revenue of a vessel or ﬂeet is
to the revenue required for it to break even. If the ratio is negative, variable costs exceed
current revenue, indicating that the more revenue is generated, the greater the losses.
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For the other condition, STECF interpreted that, based on the wording in the
Regulation, there was no need to identify and justify what disproportionate costs
would be. However, providing studies that demonstrate the scale of additional costs
of handling and sorting unwanted catches on board, coupled with the increased
labour costs associated with these operations on board, would be useful. The
wording in the article suggests that disproportionate costs of handling unwanted
catch are assumed when the unwanted catch of a speciﬁc ﬁshing gear is below a
certain percentage of the total catch of that gear, and that the percentage threshold
would be established in a discard plan. The key question to STECF appeared to
relate to ‘the percentage unwanted’. On this basis STECF did not explore this issue
any further at that stage.
In 2016, STECF re-visited the de minimis issue and provided further guidance in
the form of an analytical framework to assist in the submission of economic cases for
de minimis exemptions. The framework proposed was based on an option appraisal
methodology, applying a multi-criteria performance matrix to structure the analysis
and present the results (STECF 2016b). The objective was to create a methodolog-
ical framework to improve consistency in the economic analysis provided in support
of de minimis submissions.
3.3.2 Evidence Collected So Far
Despite the provision of these detailed guidelines, in reality, unlike the proposals on
the basis of high survivability, requests for de minimis exemptions submitted by the
regional groups have varied considerably in terms of the quality and type of the
evidence supplied. It is evident from the Joint Recommendations submitted,
Member States have struggled to put together compelling cases to support de
minimis exemptions, while STECF has found it difﬁcult to evaluate the proposals,
particularly those justiﬁed under the disproportionate costs conditionality. The
CR/BER approach and multi-criteria performance matrix have not been used by
Member States and instead the approach taken has been ad hoc and based on rather
generic and simplistic arguments.
To justify requests under the ﬁrst condition, Member States have focused on the
results from one or more selectivity studies. The results of such studies generally
show losses of marketable catch associated with the use of selective gears. Using
simple analyses of the economic impacts of such losses on the whole ﬂeet, Member
States have attempted to demonstrate that improvements in selectivity are difﬁcult to
achieve. An example of this is in the beam trawl ﬁshery for sole in the North Sea,
where there is considerable evidence to suggest that increasing selectivity by
increasing mesh size will result in high losses of sole with only marginal gains in
terms of reduction in unwanted catches (STECF 2015a; Bayse and Polet 2015).
This argument has been used in most cases for de minimis exemptions. However,
there are examples where Member States have attempted to demonstrate the impacts
of handling and storing unwanted catches to justify these as “disproportionate costs”.
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Examples include the French “EODE” study (Balazuc et al. 2016) and a Dutch
impact assessment carried out by Buisman et al. 2013. In several other cases the
argument for the de minimis exemption is on the basis that the costs for handling and
disposing of unwanted catches ashore are disproportionate given there are limited
outlets for such catches. Such a justiﬁcation has been used in the cases of de minimis
exemptions in the Mediterranean and in this case has been based on information
supplied by the Mediterranean Advisory Council (STECF 2014b, 2017b).
3.3.3 Review of the Evidence
STECF has continued to struggle to review the evidence provided to support de
minimis exemptions, although over time improvements in the quality of cases put
forward by Member States have been noted by STECF (STECF 2016b, 2017b).
Increasingly, particularly in the North Sea and North Western Waters, the case for an
exemption has been conditional on vessels using a selective gear, the justiﬁcation
being that it is difﬁcult for selectivity to be improved any further and the de minimis
covers the residual unwanted catches. For instance, an exemption in the beam-trawl
ﬁsheries for sole in the North Sea and NWW (North Western Waters) is linked to the
use of an escape panel to reduce unwanted catches of sole and plaice (STECF
2015a). Such cases seem much more in the spirit of the Regulation than cases
where the de minimis seems to be requested to support a status quo of discarding
practices in speciﬁc ﬁsheries.
It has now been more or less accepted that the original break-even indicator
approach and option appraisal framework are too complex; requiring data that are
not available in many cases. In response, STECF has reﬁned its advice and
developed a simple template for the regional groups to provide an overview of the
ﬂeets involved and the catch data used to calculate the de minimis volume (STECF
2016b). STECF has then evaluated whether the supporting information supplied
sufﬁciently demonstrates signiﬁcant economic losses in the absence of a de minimis
exemption. Regional groups have tended to follow this approach and the evaluation
process has become more consistent; accepting that in many cases there is still a lack
of relevant supporting information that demonstrates economic losses rendering
ﬁsheries potentially uneconomic. In these cases, STECF have tended to give “neu-
tral” advice which neither endorses nor rejects out of hand any exemption. In all
cases, the ultimate decision to grant an exemption lies with the Commission.
To date, all the discard plans have contained de minimis exemptions, which have
been approved by the Commission, following the STECF evaluation. In total
42 exemptions are in place. These apply across a wide range of ﬁsheries and apply
to single stocks. Table 3.1 summarizes the extent of de minimis across the different
sea basins and shows the progression since implementation of the Landing Obliga-
tion began in 2014. Once a de minimis provision is awarded, it is deducted from the
TAC before the remainder is allocated to the relevant Member States, based on the
understanding that this amount will be caught and discarded. So far, the de minimis
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exemptions have been based on single stock, however, Member States have also
requested evaluations on using de minimis for combinations of stocks. The regula-
tion refers to the ‘total annual catches of all species subject to an obligation to land
to which de minimis can apply’ and therefore does not preclude a de minimis being
applied to a combination of stocks. STECF has noted that, while a combined de
minimis may provide some ﬂexibility where some unwanted species may be more
difﬁcult to handle than others, they may result in higher deductions from the TACs
than for the single stock approach, and therefore reduced ﬁshing opportunities
(STECF 2018).
3.4 Impact of the Landing Obligation on the Scientiﬁc
Advice on Fishing Opportunities
3.4.1 ICES Advice
Scientiﬁc advice for ﬁshing opportunities for North East Atlantic stocks is provided
by ICES. The advice involves two processes. First, stock assessments estimate the
current status of the stock and its historical development. Second, short-term fore-
casts estimate the catches in the following year corresponding to a given manage-
ment target. The target is usually expressed in terms of a ﬁshing mortality which
reﬂects a broad management objective (management plans, MSY or Precautionary
Approach). Stock assessments for the main commercial stocks are based on catch-at-
age estimates. Initially, catches comprised only landings, but discard estimates by
ﬁshing activity (“metier”) have been increasingly available through improved sam-
pling programs ﬁnanced by the EU Data Collection Framework (Council Regulation
(EC) No 199/2008). There is also a requirement for vessel operators to record discard
amounts for commercial species, however, limited compliance has meant that the log
book data provide a gross underestimate of discard levels and reliance on these data
is inadvisable (STECF 2013). Because of the limited coverage of scientiﬁc discard
sampling, estimates are not available for all stocks and métiers in all Member States.
Informed procedures have thus been developed over time to raise estimates of
discard ratios and allocate age structure to the unsampled strata, usually through a
dedicated ICES Database called InterCatch.1 In 2015, the scientiﬁc advice therefore
included a complete provision for both landings and discards by métiers for most
commercial stocks.
The Landing Obligation poses a signiﬁcant conceptual and technical challenge,
and has rendered the provision of scientiﬁc advice more complex to perform and
quality-check, and more difﬁcult to formulate. Since 2015, two main changes have
been triggered in the ICES process, involving the way catch data are collected and
the way forecasts are performed and presented.
1http://ices.dk/marine-data/data-portals/Pages/InterCatch.aspx
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Changes in catch data have emerged from the need to quantify and raise new
categories. It is still considered that even if landed, a part of the catch is still not
targeted by ﬁshermen, but they cannot be called discards anymore and are referred to
as “unwanted catch”, while landings are now referred to as “wanted catch”. To keep
track of these categories, the InterCatch database was expanded in November 2015,
and now includes ﬁve categories:
• L ¼ Landings. Landings above minimum size;
• B ¼ BMS Landings. Landings below minimum conservation reference size,
BMS. Relevant for stocks under the landing obligation. The BMS landing will
consist of BMS landings and predator damaged ﬁsh.
• D ¼ Discards. The part of the catch which is thrown overboard into the sea and
not registered in the logbook. This is still based on ﬁshery observer estimates and
applying to all stocks, both under and outside the Landing Obligation.
• R ¼ Logbook Registered Discard. Relevant for stocks under the Landing
Obligation. Logbook registered discard are discards, which are registered in the
logbook and are under the exemption rules (e.g. de minimis). Damaged ﬁsh can be
included under this Logbook registered discard.
• C ¼ Catch can be used for a few species, for which there is no separation in the
information of landings or discards
The sum of (B + D + R) is the “unwanted catch” and corresponds to what was
previously recorded as D alone. Thus, there are now many more strata to ﬁll and raise
in the stock assessment process. Even until now, the R and B categories have
remained negligible, and conceptual decisions must be made on how to sample,
monitor and include these catch components in the stock assessment. The categories
B and R are usually not sampled directly, but being considered “unwanted”, they are
allocated an age distribution from the category D.
Additionally, the logbook systems in place prior to the Landing Obligation were
not able to deal with the new categories, and software updates have been required in
all Member States. Depending on when and how updates took place, and on whether
B and R information are transmitted to the scientiﬁc institutes, differences in
reporting of all these categories to ICES have been observed across Member States.
The second major change in the process relates to the advice itself; i.e. to the
maximum tonnage advised by ICES to be in line with the management objective.
The target ﬁshing mortality (e.g., Fmsy) corresponds to the quantity of dead ﬁsh to be
removed from the population, regardless of whether they are landed or discarded.
Previously, the advice was expressed in terms of landings, assuming a given share of
discards based on previous years’ observations. In theory, the Landing Obligation
would ensure that all catches would be landed, and a single catch advice would
sufﬁce. In practice, this poses a number of quantitative challenges, linked to the facts
that: (i) discarding still takes place and cannot be ignored; and (ii) legal provisions
(e.g., high survivability, de minimis and predator damage ﬁsh) in article 15 mean that
the Landing Obligation is only partially applicable, particularly during the transition
period 2015–2018 where not all ﬂeets catching the same stocks have been phased-in
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at the same time, leading to partial uplifts (see below). It has been impossible to
formulate single catch advice that would encompass this management complexity.
ICES has therefore chosen to issue advice as a single maximum catch value split
between wanted and unwanted shares, leaving it to the Commission to decide the
actual level of the TAC. Combined together, the scientiﬁc information has become
more complex to collect, to use and to quality-check, and to explain to clients in a
simple and transparent manner.
3.4.2 TAC Uplifts
An added complexity in setting ﬁshing opportunities is the inclusion of a provision
within the CFP that allows for TAC adjustments to be made for those stocks under
the Landing Obligation. This takes account of ﬁsh that otherwise would have been
discarded but are now to be landed. These adjustments are to be made based on the
contribution by the ﬂeets under the Landing Obligation to total catches and discards
of the concerned stocks. This is contained in Article 16(2) of the CFP and, at the time
of the CFP negotiations, this was a key condition for Member States in agreeing to
the Landing Obligation.
This would seem a relatively straightforward exercise under full implementation
of the Landing Obligation, as the start point for the TAC would be the full catch
advice provided by ICES less any deduction for ﬁsh discarded under exemptions.
However, the methodology used for calculating TAC adjustments when setting the
ﬁshing opportunities has been the subject of extensive discussion; particularly in
cases where available discard data is incomplete, or Member States chose to use
catch thresholds based on historic landings to determine whether a vessel was
subject or not to the Landing Obligation. This has been the case in the NWW,
SWW and the North Sea where, in agreement with the Commission, Member States
chose a phased implementation approach with partial coverage of certain stocks
(e.g. In the NWW – “Where total landings per vessel of all species in 2013 and 2014
consist of more than 10 % of the following gadoids: cod, haddock, whiting and
saithe combined, the landing obligation shall apply to haddock”). This is illustrated
in Table 3.2.
STECF provided advice to the Commission on how to calculate TAC adjustments
and have developed a methodology to facilitate these calculations (STECF 2015c,
2017c):
• The ICES forecasts of catch and discards should be used as a starting point for
calculating TAC adjustments consistent with FMSY principles. Fleet speciﬁc
discard rates derived from the STECF database should then be used to determine
ﬂeet speciﬁc TAC adjustments.
• For stocks where the entire ﬁshery or clearly deﬁned ﬂeet segments, are subject to
the landing obligation, and for which speciﬁc discard rates are available, then
calculation of TAC adjustments can simply be based on the ICES catch forecast.
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• In situations where only a proportion of vessels (within a speciﬁc ﬂeet segment)
and that also meet a historic landing composition threshold are subject to the
Landing Obligation, then the average ICES discard rate should be applied to
reﬂect the proportion of vessels and landings covered under the landing
obligation.
This methodology has largely been followed up to and including the ﬁshing
opportunities set for 2018. The exception has been in the Baltic Sea, where the
Landing Obligation has been fully implemented since 2016, with all stocks managed
under TACs and the relevant ﬁsheries being subject to the Landing Obligation. In
these cases, the ICES catch advice has been applied. From 2019 onwards, in the
other sea basins TAC adjustments will no longer be relevant and, as in the Baltic, the
catch advice will be applied.
3.5 Annual Reporting
The CFP did not include a reporting requirement on the Landing Obligation.
However, during the negotiation of the so-called “Omnibus Regulation” (Regulation
(EU) No 2015/812), which aimed to remove incompatibilities of existing technical
and control measures with the Landing Obligation by amending or repealing such
measures, a mandatory reporting requirement was introduced. It covers seven
elements and is based on information from, among others, the Member States and
the Advisory Councils concerned. The elements are as follows:
• steps taken by Member States and producer organisations to comply with the
landing obligation;
• steps taken by Member States regarding control of compliance with the landing
obligation;
• information on the socioeconomic impact of the landing obligation;
• information on the effect of the landing obligation on safety on board ﬁshing
vessels;
• information on the use and outlets of catches below the minimum conservation
reference size of a species subject to the landing obligation;
• information on port infrastructures and of vessels’ ﬁtting with regard to the
landing obligation; for each ﬁshery concerned; and
• information on the difﬁculties encountered in the implementation of the landing
obligation and recommendations to address them.
After submission of the ﬁrst reports in 2016, covering implementation in 2015,
the Commission requested STECF review the reports submitted and also to provide
guidance on the structure of future reports to improve their utility (STECF 2016a).
STECF was also requested to identify additional elements that could be usefully
reported on.
Following the assessment of the 2015 submissions from Member States and
Advisory Councils, STECF concluded that, while they provided some insights into
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the operation of the Landing Obligation, they were generally lacking in structure and
quantitative information (e.g., catch documentation, levels of funding, number of
vessels impacted) making it difﬁcult to undertake any substantive evaluation. For
this reason, STECF developed a questionnaire to allow for ease of reporting in a
structured way. At the same time STECF discussed other metrics that might improve
the monitoring of the Landing Obligation given that the reporting requirements
contained in Article 15(14) focus on certain aspects of the Landing Obligation and
its potential impacts mostly ashore at port level. STECF identiﬁed that there was a
lack of emphasis relating to the monitoring of effects and impacts of the Landing
Obligation in terms of what happens at sea and in the environment. In particular,
impacts on catch and catch proﬁles, compliance, selectivity, spatial and temporal
changes in ﬁshing operations, longer term socio-economic and environmental effects
are not covered.
Subsequently, STECF has carried out reviews of the annual reports in 2017
(based on information from 2016; STECF 2017a) and in 2018 (reporting on 2017;
STECF 2018). In 2017, 21 Member States and three Advisory Councils submitted
reports for 2016, while in 2018 STECF received reports from 15 Member States and
two Advisory Councils, despite the reporting being a mandatory requirement. The
information supplied has remained qualitative rather than quantitative, but as most
Member States have followed the questionnaire, the information has at least been
supplied in a semi-structured way.
Based on the most recent assessment by STECF it is interesting to note that
implementation measures reported by Member States in response to the question-
naire do not necessarily imply successful implementation of the Landing Obligation
or that it is achieving its aims. STECF base this on the fact that there is little or no
evidence that there has been signiﬁcant relevant change in ﬁshing practices or
adequate monitoring and control of ﬁshing operations to implement the Landing
Obligation (STECF 2018). This supports claims by Member States and the ﬁshing
industry that the transitional phase of implementation has been challenging. Many of
the concerns are anticipated for the future and not yet necessarily observed and
STECF concluded that the reports of limited impact in some regions such as the
Mediterranean and Black Seas may also be related to non-implementation, rather
than because the Landing Obligation does not pose any issue.
It remains to be seen whether the quality of the information supplied will improve
and allow for a meaningful assessment of implementation of the Landing Obligation
and its associated impacts. However, at the present time it provides the best
opportunity for monitoring progress in the short to medium term.
3.6 Conclusion
It is well documented that the Landing Obligation is challenging for Member States
to implement and for the ﬁshing industry to comply with, but it has also created
several challenges for science. STECF has found it difﬁcult to provide conclusive
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advice on some aspects of the ﬂexibilities and exemptions in the legislative text. The
subjective nature of the conditions – “high survival”, “very difﬁcult to achieve” or
“disproportionate costs” – and limited information in many cases means that there is
a large element of expert judgement required rather than empirically assessing the
quality of the science. In saying this, the quality of submissions to support the
exemptions has improved since the ﬁrst JR’s were submitted in 2014. In particular,
progress has been made in the execution of survival experiments, which in most
cases closely follow the recommendations made by STECF and also ICES
(T. Catchpole, unpubl., data).
STECF has also highlighted the limitations in the information presented, in the
methodologies used or where there are inconsistences in the information provided.
On many occasions, information is presented that shows, for example, increasing
selectivity results in losses of marketable ﬁsh. But whether this constitutes a tech-
nical difﬁculty or whether these losses result in a reduction in revenue signiﬁcant
enough to render the ﬁshery uneconomic are not questions that can be readily
answered without further data and more detailed analysis. STECF has consistently
acknowledged that providing detailed information for individual ﬁsheries is chal-
lenging. It therefore has only been able to consider the validity of the supporting
information underpinning proposed exemptions. The lack of economic data in many
cases makes it impossible to do any meaningful analysis of the economic impacts.
With regard to exemptions based on high survivability, the wide range of factors
that can affect survival lead to considerable variability in the survival estimates
observed. However, identifying and quantifying these is difﬁcult due to the relatively
limited species-speciﬁc information and differences between assessment protocols.
Judging the representativeness of individual or limited studies as an indicator of
discard survival across an entire ﬁshery is therefore difﬁcult, given the range of
factors that can inﬂuence survival and how they may vary in time even within a
ﬁshery. The choice of acceptable survival thresholds, in the context of article 15.2
(b), will depend on which objective in the CFP (e.g., avoidance of waste; improve
stock sustainability; improve ﬁnancial viability) is set as a priority.
Finally, the introduction of the Landing Obligation has increased the potential for
uncertainty in the science supporting ﬁsheries management in the EU. An increased
emphasis on the use of selective technical measures to reduce unwanted catches
(O’Neill et al., this volume; Reid et al., this volume) is likely to increase uncertainty
in our understanding of harvesting/exploitation patterns (e.g., Breen and Cook 2002;
Breen et al. 2016). That is, it cannot be assumed that all of the escaping/released
animals will survive (e.g., Breen et al. 2007; Ingolfsson et al. 2007). Therefore, the
actual reduction in ﬁshing mortality, in real terms, will only be a proportion of what
is perceived from the reduction in discards caught. Moreover, the magnitude and
pattern of the escape/release related mortality is far more challenging to quantify and
monitor than discard related mortality. Furthermore, both ICES and STECF have
consistently highlighted the lack of reporting by vessel operators of ﬁsh discarded
under exemptions, discards of ﬁsh currently not subject to the Landing Obligation
and catches of ﬁsh below MCRS, which compromises the quality of stock assess-
ments and the accuracy of catch forecast. The quality of science supporting the
64 D. Rihan et al.
implementation of the Landing Obligation would strongly beneﬁt from provisions
that strengthen data collection in this respect (e.g. through innovative monitoring
measures such as Remote Electronic Monitoring, see Chap. 18). STECF concluded
that if the data situation does not improve and the true quantities being caught as
reported do not reﬂect the actual removals, then this will have a signiﬁcant impact on
the quality of scientiﬁc advice and, without a precautionary approach in setting
ﬁshing opportunities, a key objective of the CFP in achieving MSY may be
compromised.
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Part II
Potential Social, Economic and Ecological
Impacts of the Landing Obligation
Chapter 4
Fishing Industry Perspectives on the EU
Landing Obligation
Mike Fitzpatrick, Katia Frangoudes, Laurence Fauconnet,
and Antoni Quetglas
Abstract The Landing Obligation (LO) represents a fundamental change in
European Union ﬁsheries policy and it has a particularly signiﬁcant bearing on the
activities of Europe’s ﬁshing industry. This chapter provides an account of European
ﬁshing industry engagement with the discard issue prior to the LO and industry
attitudes towards the LO. A discussion about discard management in Europe fol-
lows. The ﬁshing industry had a consistent approach to discard management in the
run-up to the LO enactment: they favoured ﬁshery-speciﬁc discard reduction plans
and were unanimously opposed to an outright ‘discard ban’. Canvassing ﬁshers’
opinions from the North Sea (Denmark, France), Eastern and Western Mediterra-
nean (Greece, Spain and France), the Celtic Sea (France, the UK and Ireland),
Western English Channel (France) and the Azores between 2015 and 2018 reveals
a consistent negative attitude towards the LO. We found that choke species are the
main concern outside the Mediterranean Sea while in the Mediterranean region, the
cost of disposal and the creation of a black market for juvenile ﬁsh are seen as the
main negatives. Fishers recognise the necessity of reducing discards although zero
discard ﬁsheries are not seen as attainable. They favour a combination of selectivity
improvements and spatial management as the best discard reduction measures. New
measures to deal with intractable choke species problems are being sought by
industry and Member State groups but the European Commission want existing
measures to be utilised ﬁrst. We discuss some potential consequences of negative
stakeholders’ attitudes towards this key element of EU ﬁsheries management policy.
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These include control and compliance challenges, associated business reputation
problems for the industry, a longer LO implementation timescale, and deterioration
in the quality of scientiﬁc data about discards.
Keywords EU landing obligation · Fisheries control · Fisheries governance ·
Industry-science collaboration · Stakeholder engagement · Top-down policy
4.1 Introduction
Since 1984 when the annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC) regulation restricted the
carrying of catches onboard vessels beyond those allowed by quotas (EC 1983) EU
ﬁshers were frequently obliged to discard ﬁsh, for reasons ranging from lack of quota
to minimum size restrictions. With the introduction of the LO in 2015 the situation
has been reversed, and ﬁshers are now required to land catches of all ﬁsh subject to
TACs or minimum sizes. This basic shift is expected to have implications for the
industry at all levels from operational aspects (like sorting and storing of ﬁsh that
were previously discarded) to management and governance issues such as quota
management regimes.
This chapter ﬁrst provides an account of how the European ﬁshing industry
addressed the issue of ﬁsheries discards prior to the implementation of the LO.
Second it presents a synthesis of recent research on industry attitudes to the LO and
opinions from two individual EU ﬁshers on the LO. Finally, it discusses the
implications of these industry attitudes for discard management in Europe. Source
material was drawn from interviews and surveys with ﬁshers conducted as part of the
DiscardLess research project (http://www.discardless.eu), the lead authors’ own
experiences working in the industry, literature sources such as European Commis-
sion publications on discards, relevant EU legislation, published books and articles,
Advisory Councils’ advice and reports and ﬁshing industry press articles.
We have included the views of Advisory Councils (ACs) in some sections
although we recognise that they are not solely industry bodies as their membership
also comprises other groups such as environmental NGOs. However, the majority of
Advisory Council members are from the ﬁshing industry and as such their views and
positions are generally reﬂective of the industry. For opinions from NGOs on the LO
see e.g. Borges et al. (2018) and Stockhausen (this volume).We have noted cases
where there is a non-consensus or majority position that is unsupported by at least
some of the other interest groups within an Advisory Council. The chapter on small
scale ﬁsheries (Villasante et al., this volume) also contains some more detailed
information on the views of small scale sectors on the LO which may differ from
those reported here where we attempt to represent a broad cross section of ﬁshing
sectors.
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4.2 European Fishing Industry Engagement
with the Discard Issue up to the LO
In the run up to the 2012 CFP reform, public interest in the issue of ﬁsheries discards
was raised due to the UK TV programme and online campaign, “Hugh’s Fish Fight”,
which gathered over 800,000 signatures for a petition to ban discarding (Borges
2015). Within EU ﬁsheries policy circles, however, discards had been acknowledged
as an important issue at least two decades previously (Borges and Penas Lado this
volume). In 1991, the ﬁrst 10 year review of the CFP noted the fact that the TAC
system and relative stability would lead to “inevitable discards at sea” (CEC 1991).
Also at that time, a discard ban was considered but rejected as unenforceable (CEC
1992). In 2001, as part of the next CFP reform a Commission Green Paper (CEC
2001) proposed pilot discard bans but the 2002 CFP (EC 2002) did not speciﬁcally
address the discard issue.
In 2007, the European Commission took a position on the discards issue in an
ofﬁcial communication, stating that the EC aimed to “reduce unwanted by-catches
and progressively eliminate discards in European ﬁsheries” (CEC 2007). In
response, the European Association of Fish Producer Organisations (EAPO) stated
that while the industry recognized discarding as a signiﬁcant problem, there were
complex drivers behind it, including the TAC system and catch composition rules.
This, they argued, precluded a simple solution such as an absolute discard ban for all
species. The socio-economic implications of a discard ban were also poorly under-
stood (EAPO 2007).
The action plan on tackling discards proposed in the 2007 Commission commu-
nication never materialized. This has been interpreted by a member of the Commis-
sion as evidence that addressing discards was either not a priority for the industry
andMember States or that the Commission “failed to ﬁnd the right incentives for that
to happen” (Penas Lado 2016). An industry representative, in an interview
conducted for this chapter, points to an 8-page long response produced by the
North Sea Advisory Council (NSAC) as evidence that the industry took the Com-
mission’s discards paper seriously (NSAC 2007). The NSAC response welcomed
the Commission’s approach while highlighting that a discard ban would necessitate
fundamental changes across a range of ﬁsheries regulations and require huge
increases in enforcement efforts. The NSAC document proposed ﬁshery speciﬁc,
long-term management plans as a more favourable and practical means of achieving
discard reductions. It also mentioned the use of overages or the ability for vessels “to
acquire quota post-landing for over quota species caught” as a useful mechanism
employed in the operation of the Norwegian and Icelandic discard bans. The
industry representative stated that the Commission did not respond to their paper
and that momentum on the issue was lost.
The next signiﬁcant milestone in the EU ﬁsheries discards debate was the
publication of the 2009 Green Paper on reform of the CFP (CEC 2009) that
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contained multiple references to the elimination of discards. Simultaneously, public
pressure on the discards issue was considerably ramped up through the aforemen-
tioned Hugh’s Fish Fight campaign. Industry responses to the Green paper
highlighted their opposition to discarding as “it is a nuisance to their business,
and it is detrimental to rebuilding of stocks” (Danish Fishermen’s Association
2009). Industry also supported the reduction of “landings of unwanted ﬁsh to lowest
possible levels” (Federation of Irish Fishermen 2009).
But they rejected an outright ban which they considered overly simplistic and
instead looked for a gradual reduction of discards through ﬁshery and gear-speciﬁc
discard plans (EAPO 2009). Industry organisations also stressed their viewpoint that
greater industry participation in the development of discard plans would “reduce
discards signiﬁcantly” (Danish Fishermen’s Association 2009).
In 2011, a Commission proposal for a new CFP introduced the term Landing
Obligation (LO) to refer to a requirement to land all catches of species regulated by
TAC or Minimum Landing Size (MLS) (CEC 2011). Article 15 of the proposal set
out the conditions and timeline by which the LO would be gradually implemented.
In response, ﬁshing industry organisations came together to issue an alternative
proposal (Europêche, EAPO, Cogeca 2012). The industry suggestion was for a
landing obligation only in ﬁsheries where Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) was
below Blim for 3 consecutive years. All other ﬁsheries (regulated by TAC or
MLS), would be obliged to reduce discards “to the lowest possible level” by 2019
through ﬁshery speciﬁc management plans. Where reduction targets speciﬁed in the
management plans were not achieved by 2019, landing obligations should be
introduced.
The LO was ﬁnally agreed in May 2013 by EU ﬁsheries ministers. Despite the
multiple consultation processes that were a feature of the 2012 CFP reform (there
were over 400 submissions on the 2009 Green Paper), the ﬁnal iteration of the
discard policy was essentially a political creation. It featured a 4 year implementation
timeline, which could be regarded as short for such a fundamental policy change. A
member of the commission staff described the situation as one where the experience
of other countries on gradual approaches had to be ignored as “the political pressure
was there for quick solutions” (Penas Lado 2016).
4.3 Fishing Industry Stakeholders’ Opinions of the LO
The DiscardLess project gathered industry stakeholders’ opinions towards the
LO. This section synthesises the results from this research. Opinions from different
groups of stakeholders are collected every year throughout the project using different
methodologies (interviews, focus groups, opinion survey). Industry participants
included ﬁshers, ﬁsheries organisations (Producers’ Organisations (POs) or associ-
ations) and the seafood processing industry. One of the principal tasks is aimed at
monitoring changes in economic and social factors during and after the actual
implementation of the Landing Obligation policy.
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The selected case studies represent different regional seas and different types of
ﬂeets from the North Sea (Denmark, France), Eastern and Western Mediterranean
(Greece, Spain and France), the Celtic Sea (France, the UK and Ireland), the Western
English Channel (France) and the Azores. The results are based on a combination of
70 individual interviews (see e.g. Reid et al., this volume) and 200 responses to a
postal survey (in France and Greece) that were conducted between 2015 and 2018.
A very broad range of issues and views were raised during these interviews and
surveys and in order to present them coherently we have organised them into the
following broad categories: (i) knowledge of the LO, the implementation process
and participation in it; (ii) likely impact of the LO; (iii) adaptation or mitigation
strategies.
4.3.1 Knowledge of the Landing Obligation and Participation
in the Implementation Process
There are diverse views among ﬁshers regarding their knowledge and awareness of
the LO. French ﬁshers in the Eastern English Channel, who ﬁsh from a mix of larger
and smaller scale vessels mainly using towed gears, felt they have a good knowledge
of the LO. This is due to an industry-led project initiated by local PO’s and the
Regional Fisheries Committee which simulated and tested in real time the opera-
tional and economic impacts of the LO (Balazuc et al. 2016). The project also
included some gear selectivity trials but these were restricted due to ﬁshers’ percep-
tions about the negative economic impacts of new trawl gears. Some aspects of the
LO remain poorly understood by ﬁshers, such as the implementation timeline and
issues such as how unwanted catches should be disposed of.
A signiﬁcant number of ﬁshers, in particular but not exclusively within the small
scale sectors, claim that they are aware of the implementation of the LO but have
very little detailed knowledge about it. Small scale ﬁshers from the Azores raised
some fundamental questions about its application such as whether they would be
subject to it due to their current low discard rates. Many Azorean ﬁshers felt that the
policy was artiﬁcial, disconnected from the reality of ﬁsheries in the region and
would beneﬁt neither themselves nor the resource. Greek trawl ﬁshers had very low
awareness of the LO, perhaps due to the absence of a representative organisation, but
in discussions they felt it went against the work done recently in eliminating catches
and sales of smaller ﬁsh.
According to a French ﬁshers’ representative, ﬁshers need to understand the
rationale of the LO regulation as this would provide some incentive to comply.
This problem is summarised by the following quote from a French Eastern Channel
ﬁsher “There is no need to increase our work and our costs, spend our quotas and
not get a good price for our ﬁsh”. This sentiment appears to be mirrored by at least
some of the EU Commission staff. One of them described the policy’s lack of clarity
in the following terms: “A non discard policy would imply changes that may affect
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direct ﬁshermen’s revenues without a clear perspective of possible tradeoffs.”
(Penas Lado 2016).
Almost all ﬁshers’ general attitudes towards the LO were negative and this
perception has not changed signiﬁcantly over the past 3 years. For Mediterranean
ﬁshers in particular, the LO is perceived as being designed for quota managed
ﬁsheries in the Atlantic as it doesn’t take into account the speciﬁc context of
Mediterranean ﬁsheries. All ﬁshers met in Boulogne-sur-Mer (France) expressed
their opposition to the LO and its implementation in EU waters.
Regarding participation of ﬁshers in the LO implementation process, Danish
ﬁshers consider that their voice was partially, but insufﬁciently, heard. In France,
ﬁshers consider that the national ﬁsheries administration did represent their views in
LO negotiations. Catalan, Greek and Azorean ﬁshers felt that they had not partici-
pated in any negotiations related to the LO.
Some ﬁshers have expressed concern that the LO implementation time frame is
too short for such a radical change and that it will create economic viability problems
for them.
Among representatives of ﬁshers’ organisations, there is a much better knowl-
edge about the in’s and out’s of the LO and its implementation process. However,
they feel that their views were not sufﬁciently taken into account during the design of
the policy. They also argue that their role in the implementation process, speciﬁcally
in drafting Joint Recommendations for regional discard plans, should be clearer.
Fishers’ representatives feel that the LO is taking up a lot of time which detracts from
their ability to deal with other important ﬁsheries management issues. They are still
uncertain about aspects of LO implementation despite their sound knowledge about
the subject and participation in meetings. This uncertainty extends to the handling of
choke situations, conﬂicts between the LO and technical and control regulations and
how discard plans will be integrated into Multi-Annual Plans.
4.3.2 Impacts of the Landing Obligation
The impacts of the LO were highlighted by ﬁshers in particular with regard to
working conditions, safety, economic viability and ecosystems.
Fishers across all case studies are concerned that the LO will increase the time to
sort out catches and to store additional quantities of ﬁsh. These issues are also
viewed as a safety problem onboard arising from an increased workload related to
sorting the catch, as well as the transfer at sea of unwanted catches.
Fishers think that the LO will negatively impact on their economic viability as
operational costs (fuel, ice, disposal costs of unwanted catches) will increase and
new investments will be required (e.g., purchasing of more selective gears and
increasing the storage capacity of vessels). Many ﬁshers mentioned that they cannot
afford such investments and would require support from the European Maritime and
Fisheries Fund (EMFF). Small-scale ﬁshers, in particular small trawlers, stated that
their fuel consumption will increase as storage capacity is limited and they will have
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to return to harbour more often. The lack of utilisation options for unwanted catch at
a reasonable cost, linked to the absence of a processing industry capable of dealing
with discards, was highlighted in the majority of regions.
The most pressing and signiﬁcant issue for ﬁshers (outside the Mediterranean) is
undoubtedly the problem of dealing with choke situations and the potential negative
effects on ﬁshing ﬂeets. A choke species is “a species for which the available quota
is exhausted (long) before the quotas are exhausted of (some of) the other species
that are caught together in a (mixed) ﬁshery” (Zimmermann et al. 2015). All of the
relevant ﬁshery Advisory Councils have been conducting some form of risk analysis
of ﬁsheries likely to cause choke problems in their region. Some have taken a stock-
speciﬁc approach (NWWAC 2017), while others have looked at which mitigation
measures may work in a general sense (NSAC 2017). All ACs agreed that some
residual choke problems will persist even when all available measures are applied
and are looking to both Member States and the Commission for guidance on how
these can be resolved. A NSAC Demersal Working Group meeting in February 2018
stated that due to Relative Stability problems, Member States were unwilling to use
quotas to address residual chokes (NSAC 2018a). This uncertainty was also
summarised at a 2018 LO seminar by the Scottish White Fish Producers Association
when the LO challenge for industry was described as needing to satisfy legal,
societal and market demands without going out of business but also without know-
ing how (Pew 2018).
Fishers felt that the LO will also have a negative impact on ecosystem health,
referring to birds and other organisms that have fed on discards until now.
4.3.3 Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies
The most commonly proposed mitigation strategies by ﬁshers across case studies are
selectivity improvements and exemptions. Mediterranean ﬁshers said that selectivity
of the bottom trawl ﬂeet has already improved with the introduction of 40 mm square
mesh cod-ends but that this measure would need to be applied to the whole
Mediterranean (including in non-EU countries). Fishers in a number of cases
mentioned selectivity trials which have been conducted, as well as their desire to
use EMFF funding to support adoption of more selective gears (East and West
Mediterranean, Celtic Sea, North Sea).
Fishers across all case studies also mention spatial and temporal closures as
possible mitigation strategies (see also Reid et al., this volume). They stress that
such closures should be scientiﬁcally based and that mapping programmes of zones
with concentrations of juvenile ﬁsh are required. The need to integrate ﬁshers’ local
ecological knowledge into discard plans was mentioned as a strategy to address
choke problems.
The ﬁshing industry has also pointed out that there is a trade-off between
selectivity improvements and economic losses in mixed ﬁsheries which limits the
extent to which selectivity can resolve discard problems (NSAC 2018a).
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4.3.4 Control and Monitoring
Some LO speciﬁc issues have been raised by stakeholders on the revision of the EU
Fisheries Control System proposed by the European Commission in 2017
(EC 2017).
The North Western Waters Advisory Council (NWWAC) response agreed that
there is a need for full control of high-risk vessels and that dedicated programmes to
measure compliance with the Landing Obligation should be implemented
(NWWAC 2018a). However they point out that the use of Electronic Monitoring
(EM) with video on vessels is a controversial tool for some ﬁshers and that “good
communication will be needed to ensure buy-in on the use of this technology by the
industry”.
The NSAC response to an earlier version of the proposal supported a risk-based
monitoring approach but pointed out that the majority of ﬁshers do not see the LO as
fair or rational and thus there is an associated compliance problem (NSAC 2016).
They also drew attention to the controversial nature of EM with video on vessels at a
NSAC meeting in April 2018 (NSAC 2018a). French ﬁshers consider that ﬁshing
vessels are private spaces and vessel owners are concerned that crew members will
protest against videos on this basis.
4.3.5 Industry-Science Collaboration
A concern often mentioned by ﬁshers is that discard data provided by them under the
LO could negatively impact their ﬁshing opportunities in the long term. This concern
is manifested in declining observer coverage in some Member States and regions
(Our Fish 2017), which in turn could have a negative impact on the quality of
scientiﬁc data about discards. Fishers are concerned that in the context of uncertainty
around how choke situations will be dealt with, there could be a negative impact on
data provision and industry-science collaboration which many ﬁshers felt was
improving prior to the LO.
In contrast to this position, there have been a number of strategic collaborations
between ﬁshers and scientists arising directly from the LO. These have arisen mainly
as initiatives to examine survival of discarded ﬁsh as such information is required in
order to justify exemptions from the LO on the basis of high survival (see also Rihan
et al., this volume). An example of such collaborations is research on survival of
ﬂatﬁsh and rays in pulse trawls (Schram and Molenaar 2018). This research was
conducted by Wageningen Marine Research and commissioned by a Dutch ﬁshers
organisation VISNED.
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4.3.6 Opposition to the LO
Some sectors within the industry are taking a more oppositional approach to the
LO. The South Western Waters Advisory Council (SWWAC) communicated some
very clear statements regarding their difﬁculties with the LO in a recent opinion
document (SWWAC 2017) submitted to the Commission. (This position was not
supported by all of the non-industry groups in the SWWAC).
Their proposals included:
• Compensation of crews for losses associated with unwanted catches.
• Greater ﬂexibility in granting exemptions as all of the requests for information
sought by STECF are not “humanly or ﬁnancially possible” to provide.
• Simpliﬁcation of the exemption process by, for example, granting high-survival
exemptions for all hook or pot ﬁsheries.
• Application of ﬁxed multi-year TACs.
• Deferral of any further extension and implementation of the LO beyond 2018
until agreement can be reached on the points above.
A Fisher’s Thoughts on the LO:
Joan J. Vaquero, bottom trawl ﬁsherman, Mallorca-Balearic Islands, (Spain).
“Our ﬁsheries are highly multispeciﬁc with more than a hundred commer-
cial species. We can improve the selectivity using larger mesh sizes but we’re
going to lose a lot of small-sized species (but adult individuals), which will
endanger the economic viability of the ﬁshery. Adult ﬁsh here in the Mediter-
ranean do not reach the sizes they reach in the Atlantic; this is only due to
differences in conditions, the Mediterranean is a poor sea compared to the NE
Atlantic.
As it stands, the LO will produce a lot of problems on board. We use
relatively small bottom trawlers compared to the Atlantic ﬁsheries. Our
vessels are not prepared to store large quantities of ﬁsh because we work on
a daily basis, returning to our homeport every afternoon (we work from
5:00 am to 17:00 pm), so we can only store the commercial catch of the
day. Taking large volumes of catch on board (landings plus discards) could be
also dangerous under bad weather conditions. We would also have a problem
in case we have to sort out the discards by species because nowadays the crew
is reduced to the minimum to allow the economic viability of the ﬁshery; we
cannot afford to contract an additional person on board. Finally, but more
importantly, if we land the discards, what do we do with them? We do not have
ﬁsh processing industries so what are the alternatives for discard disposal? It
seems the only alternative here in Mallorca would be bringing them to the
incineration plant. Imagine what society would say about this practice,
(continued)
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because at the end we ﬁshers would be the focus of the criticism. And the
bottom trawl ﬁshery is already seen as the bad boy of the ﬁshing family. . .
The future of ﬁshing in the Mediterranean was bleak even before the
LO. The number of vessels has been reduced a lot during the last 20 years,
mainly because of socioeconomic aspects. We live in a highly touristic area so
young people prefer working on in the tourist sector rather than at sea. Apart
from the hard work at sea, ﬁshing has been burdened with a lot of adminis-
trative commitments making it even harder to maintain the activity. The LO is
a new, imposed load to the sector. Consumer preferences have also changed:
consumers now buy processed, frozen ﬁsh. At the end, a very reduced number
of vessels will persist and I think they will have no problem maintaining their
activity as with a reduced ﬁshing effort stocks will be healthier. Also, lower
supplies will mean higher prices for ﬁsh. I cannot imagine the future under the
LO. Are we going to build ﬁsh processing industries here? I do not think so.
As I said before, increasing mesh size could be a problem for the viability of
the ﬁshing sector in the Mediterranean. In my case, if I see that I take large
volumes of undersized ﬁsh in some areas I reduce the trawling time to reduce
the unwanted catch. We also avoid working in areas and periods of the year
where and when we take a lot of undersized ﬁsh. But in most cases these
choices are done on a daily basis, based on day-to-day experience, because
it’s not possible to foresee the areas and times with large discard volumes. We
try to avoid large ﬁsh shoals, not only to reduce discards but also because we
will saturate the market if all of us land such large volumes. For some species
we have adopted voluntary daily quotas to avoid affecting market prices (e.g.,
for picarel, 150 kg per vessel per day) which also has the effect of reducing
discards.
In the Balearic Islands the largest discard volumes are taken on the
continental shelf. In our port, for instance, we reduce the time ﬁshing on the
shelf and focus on slope grounds. In summer, we do not work on the shelf at all
and leave these ﬁshing grounds to small-scale ﬁshers targeting red lobster,
mainly to avoid towing in areas where they set their trammel nets. As such, we
reduce both the effort and the discards on the shelf grounds.
Maybe the only positive aspect of the LO would be to raise awareness
among ﬁshers about the discard problem and the need to reduce unwanted
catches; in essence, adopting practices in line with sustainable exploitation.
But I do not see any other positive aspect. On the contrary, I see a lot of
negative ones. I’m not a biologist so I don’t know the best fate for undersized
ﬁsh. But I see the sea as a harvested ﬁeld: discards are like manure to feed ﬁsh
and the entire food chain, I do not think it is a good idea to remove all this
biomass from the sea.”
(continued)
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A Fisher’s Thoughts on the LO:
John Lynch, Fisherman, Howth, Co. Dublin, Ireland.
“When the idea of a landing obligation, or discard ban as it was then, was
ﬁrst proposed by the Commission I, like many ﬁshermen, thought the worst,
that it could never work. But in fact we had been working towards it for many
years with ever-improving selectivity. The idea of large amounts of juvenile
ﬁsh going over the side has always gone against my idea of what ﬁshing
should be. However in some ﬁsheries that use smaller mesh there has always
been a problem with excessive discards and in this regard I agree totally with
the objectives of the landing obligation.
There are two main objectives of the landing obligation. The ﬁrst one,
reduction of catches that are below the minimum conservation reference size,
is probably the easiest to deal with. These ﬁsh cannot be sold for human
consumption, as they are too small. This is the area where ﬁshermen and other
stakeholders have been working to reduce the discards of undersized ﬁsh and
in some ﬁsheries discards of juvenile ﬁsh are down to very low levels. This has
greatly helped in rebuilding stocks as more ﬁsh can now mature and
reproduce.
The other objective of the landing obligation, eliminating discards of
mature ﬁsh, is much more difﬁcult to solve. Demersal ﬁsheries in North
West waters are very mixed in nature and this makes the task very difﬁcult.
The tools available to us may not solve this problem for all stocks. As I see it
the tools currently in place are as follows:
Quota Uplift is from my understanding the increase of TAC to allow for the
amount of ﬁsh that used to go over the side to be landed, thus reducing
discards and increasing landings but not increasing the effort on the stock.
However, the quantities of quota uplift have been derisory in most cases
around 10%. This I think is because the cart was put before the horse in
that the discard problem was not dealt with before the landing obligation was
applied to these species, for example Celtic Sea haddock. In my view, the new
technical conservation measures should have been introduced at least 2 years
before a discard ban was imposed.
The discard problem for some species will be solved by getting a high
survival exemption. At the moment work is ongoing on skates and rays,
Nephrops and plaice to see if a survivability exemption can allow them to be
released back to the sea. This however will not solve the problem for the
ﬁsherman who sees good quality ﬁsh going over the side.
De minimis is a small quantity of a stock which can be discarded – usually
about 5% of the TAC. This is to allow for some discarding of ﬁsh below
minimum conservation reference size and is to be reduced to zero over time. I
(continued)
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believe it will be necessary to have de minimis in place permanently to allow
for some small amount of juvenile discards, which inevitably are caught.
Fishermen, scientists and ofﬁcials have long been working together to solve
the problems of discards of ﬁsh at sea. While not always agreeing on how to
solve a problem, with trials of different selectivity and spatial measures, a
compromise can be found. The issue of discards will never be 100% solved but
the important thing is to continually strive to improve the situation for the ﬁsh
and for the ﬁsherman. As I said at the beginning, the idea of a landing
obligation is perfectly good but the anomalies of reality have to be considered,
and the deadline of ﬁrst January 2019 for all TAC stocks is a bridge too far.”
4.4 Discussion and Conclusions
Here we discuss what the implications of industry perceptions of the Landing
Obligation are for management of discards and also broader ﬁsheries governance
in the EU. There are some potentially serious consequences arising from the main
ﬁshery stakeholders having a negative attitude towards one of the main pillars of EU
ﬁsheries policy. We discuss some of the more obvious ones, e.g. compliance, and
also some of a more indirect nature but with nevertheless signiﬁcant implications,
such as the quality of scientiﬁc data.
The above sections show that a major issue for the ﬁshing industry regarding the
LO remains the choke problem. Despite intense efforts to come up with solutions
(including a strong industry emphasis on selectivity improvements), Advisory
Councils have identiﬁed a signiﬁcant number of ﬁsheries that will have residual
choke problems, even after all available mitigation measures are applied. The
principle concern that ﬁshers have with the choke problem is the potential for
signiﬁcant negative economic impacts. Some NGOs have proposed speciﬁc cases
where industry could receive ﬁnancial compensation but only if they have ﬁrst
implemented effective selectivity measures (SWWAC 2017). A more general appli-
cation of this approach could incentivize progress while reducing industry fears
regarding vessels going out of business due to either choke related ﬁshery closures or
the loss of economic efﬁciency due to the use of more selective gear.
Signiﬁcant uncertainty still exists among ﬁshers and their representatives regard-
ing how these residual choke problems can be solved without ﬁsheries closures and
associated negative economic impacts. Advisory Councils and high-level Member
State groups are looking to the Commission for new measures, in addition to those
allowed for in Article 15 (the LO) of the 2013 CFP (EU 2013), which could assist in
solving this problem. Such measures could include removal of stocks from the TAC
process or deﬁning target and bycatch species of which only the target species would
be subject to a discard ban (NSAC 2017). Industry proposals have also mentioned
the use of overages, or post-landing purchasing of quota as is used in Norway and
Iceland to provide some ﬂexibility and reduce choke-type problems. Recent
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indications from the Commission are that the use of such measures may only be
possible when all other available measures under Article 15 have been applied (CEC
2017).
The choke problem has produced some negative outcomes in terms of discard
data provision by industry arising from fears that data provided could potentially
precipitate choke closures with associated economic impacts. This has resulted in a
reported decrease in discard observer coverage in some Member States including
Ireland (DAFM 2017) and Sweden (Sverige Radio 2016) and also in regions such as
the Eastern Baltic (ICES 2017; Valentinsson et al., this volume). A situation where
ﬁshers are not incentivized to provide data represents a backward step in the
collaborative process necessary for improved ﬁsheries management. Unless there
is a realigning of the incentives for ﬁshers to provide data in support of discard
mitigation, this issue is likely to remain a signiﬁcant barrier to the successful
implementation of the LO. The quality of scientiﬁc data may also be negatively
affected and implementation will be overly reliant on control and enforcement rather
than a collaborative approach.
The problem of compromising collaborative research and industry-science rela-
tionships is linked also to the more general principle of good governance that
involves stakeholder participation in management. These linked issues are all com-
plicated by industry uncertainty regarding the use of data and a poor understanding
of the underlying rationale and objectives of the LO. The fact that industry perceives
that their views, expressed consistently in the run-up to agreement of the LO, were
not really taken on board seem to have created a perception for some of a backward
step in terms of partnership and participatory management where the main drivers
are bottom-up rather than top-down (see also van Hoof et al., this volume).
This viewpoint was expressed by Poul Degnbol, a former scientiﬁc advisor to the
Commission, in a 2018 seminar on CFP reform (NWWAC 2018b). He described the
LO as an example of top-down ﬁsheries management, which he stated was the
wrong way to go about achieving sustainable and effective management and
expressed concern that it may have big implications for science. Industry sources
have also highlighted that adopting a ﬂexible, adaptive approach to the LO is made
more difﬁcult by the co-decision process in Brussels which has proven, in some
cases, to be a slow one (Marchal et al. 2016).
The top-down nature of the LO and industry compliance issues are also resulting
in more complex management. Each year the Joint Recommendations for regional
discard plans and the delegated acts that put these plans on a legal footing become
more complex. The Joint Recommendations for 2019, when for the ﬁrst time all
TAC species are subject to the LO, have been drafted and submitted at the time of
writing (NSAC 2018b). It can be seen from these that the trend towards complexity
has strengthened with a signiﬁcant increase in both the number of exemptions sought
and the number of supporting documents. This increased complexity in a single area
of ﬁsheries management is surely contrary to the desire for a less complex and
devolved approach that is implicit in the 2013 CFP’s move toward regionalization.
The complexity is largely due to industry appeals for exemptions but these in turn are
driven by the desire to avoid signiﬁcant choke closures across EU mixed demersal
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ﬁsheries that a Landing Obligation without exemptions would create. The key to
simplifying this policy area most likely lies in ﬁnding some improved mechanism for
resolving the choke problem.
The additional complexity creates a number of further knock-on effects. It widens
the gap between ﬁshers’ representatives who are tasked with understanding this
complexity and the ﬁshers they represent. Complex rules, combined with uncertainty
at the management level, are translated into confusion and inaction at the operational
level and create a signiﬁcant barrier to implementation.
Furthermore the raft of exemptions and selectivity and control measures point to a
situation where the implementation timescale will be longer and more complex than
envisaged. This is in line with industry statements that the 2019 deadline for full
implementation is ambitious. The ﬁrst amendment of the LO was made in recogni-
tion of the fact that it is taking longer to develop multi-year management plans than
originally envisaged (EU 2017). Could a similar recognition that LO implementation
may likewise take longer than originally hoped take place also? This amendment
also shows that difﬁculties with making changes to Article 15 may be more political
than legal in nature.
To conclude, it can be said that there are some, almost unanimously held industry
viewpoints on the LO, for example opposition to the requirement to land unwanted
catch without any apparent economic value. However, there is also some diversity of
views evident among ﬁshers, with some having more proactive views on how to
resolve problems posed by the LO while others are more reactive and are simply
opposed to it. One side is hoping that the LO will never be implemented while the
other is concerned with being as well prepared as possible when it is. The challenge
now for ﬁshers is to reconcile their consistently stated goal over the past 20 years, of
having ﬁshery-speciﬁc discard reduction plans, with a Landing Obligation covering
all TAC or MCRS subject species. Proactive industry voices are likely to be much
more persuasive than reactive ones in arguing for a discard policy that is both
effective in reducing discards and more aligned with industry needs. It remains to
be seen how this will play out over the ﬁrst few years of full LO implementation
from 2019 onwards and beyond that in the next reform of the CFP in
approximately 2022.
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European Union’s small-scale ﬁsheries (SSF). This is mainly due to the fact that
discards are mostly generated by industrial ﬁsheries, while SSFs were generally
thought to have lower discard rates than industrial ﬁsheries. A Landing Obligation
(LO) is being introduced in European waters with the reform of the Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP) (Article 15, EU regulation 1380/2013) to limit/reduce
discarding. However, management recommendations are required to support its
implementation. The reality and challenges to enforce the LO in SSF are analyzed
in this chapter, gathering information from different small-scale ﬁsheries and ﬁshers
from the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea who were asked about their percep-
tions toward the LO. The objectives of this chapter are to (a) identify the reasons for
discarding and (b) investigate the multiple ecological, economic, social, and insti-
tutional drivers which act as a barrier toward the implementation of the LO in SSF.
Given the high importance of SSF in the southern countries of Europe, different case
studies of SSF from France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain coasts are used to illustrate
the reasons for discarding, the impacts of the LO on SSF, and the barriers for its
implementation.
Keywords Common Fisheries Policy · Discards · Impacts · Landing Obligation ·
Small-scale ﬁsheries · Southern Europe
5.1 Introduction
In the European Union (EU), discards represent a major source of undocumented
(or poorly documented) mortality, contributing to the overﬁshing of European ﬁsh
stocks. Discarding levels in EU ﬁsheries vary between locations, gears, species, and
ﬁshing grounds (Uhlmann et al. 2013). However, data collection and estimates of
discards for all commercial species in EU waters under the CFP are far from being
complete and generally have low precision. This reﬂects the relatively low intensity
of discard sampling and the high variability in amounts of ﬁsh discarded, even within
a single ﬁshery. The omission and/or poor discard data from stock assessments may
also result in underestimation of exploitation rates and can lead to biased assess-
ments and policy recommendations, hampering the achievement of resilient and
sustainable ﬁshery resources uses (Aarts and Poos 2009).
The implementation of a Landing Obligation (LO) was one of the key elements of
the recent reform of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (Regulation (EU) No
1380/2013). A phased LO was formally implemented in January 2015, and by 2019
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it will be in force in all EU waters, covering all ﬁsheries that capture commercial
species covered by the CFP regulation, including SSF. Landings from EU SSF are
worth around €2 thousand million euros annually, i.e., 25% of the revenue generated
by EU ﬁsheries, and SSF therefore have a high value in the seafood supply chain.
Around 80% of EU ﬁshing boats and more than 40% of EU ﬁshers (90,000) are
engaged in SSF (Macfadyen et al. 2011), emphasizing that SSF is a sector with great
social, economic, and cultural importance for coastal communities, especially in
southern Europe.
The small-scale ﬂeet has declined by 20% over the last 10 years, to just over
70,000 vessels. Small-scale vessels are on average between 5 and 7 m in length,
weigh 3GT, and have engines with a power of 34 kW (Macfadyen et al. 2011). More
than 90% primarily use passive gears (i.e., gears that are not towed or dragged
through the water) such as drift and ﬁxed nets, hook and lines, or pots and traps.
Despite their importance, for decades, EU ﬁshery policy (e.g., quotas, subsidies,
management systems) has focused on large-scale ﬁshing, and there is a lack of
knowledge about biological, environmental, socioeconomic, management, and pol-
icy aspects of SSF. SSF faces diverse challenges and pressures, not least to establish
appropriate governance systems.
However, little research has been done on the impacts of the LO on SSF
(Villasante et al. 2015a; Veiga et al. 2016). Therefore, the speciﬁc objectives of
this chapter are to (i) identify the reasons for discarding among SSF, (ii) determine
the factors (ecological, economic, institutional) that act as barriers for the successful
implementation of the LO, and (iii) identify the institutional arrangements and/or
rules that either inhibit or facilitate an adaptation of the LO.
5.2 The Status of Discards in Small-Scale Fisheries
To examine research gaps regarding discards in SSF, we did a systematic literature
search to identify relevant scientiﬁc papers published up to August 2018 in Scopus,
by searching titles, abstracts, and keywords using the following terms: “ﬁsher*” or
“ﬁshing”; “discard*”; and “artisan*” or “small-scale” or “traditional” or “subsis-
tence” or “local” or “industrial” or “commercial” or “large.” The results obtained
show that the topic of discards in SSFs attracted little attention among the scientiﬁc
community. A total of 1219 papers have been published on the topic of discards from
1950 to August 2018, of which 952 are related to industrial ﬁsheries (78%) with only
267 papers focused on SSF (21%) (Fig. 5.1). The review also showed that the little
attention paid by the scientiﬁc community to discards in SSFs is due to the belief that
discard problems were mainly concentrated in industrial ﬁsheries, while SSFs
generally have lower discard rates (Villasante et al. 2016a).
Discarding occurs not only due to poor gear selectivity and the capture of
unwanted “low value” ﬁsh but also due to the mismatch between catch composition
and regulatory catch or size limits. Undersize ﬁsh may be discarded due to the MLS
regulations; over-quota ﬁsh can be discarded in a multi-species ﬁshery due to quota
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exhaustion of one species, and less valuable size classes of target species may be
discarded to make room for more valuable size classes (high grading). Even if high
grading has been legally forbidden, it is still known to occur on a regular basis. All
these issues are reported to be present in EU SSF (Villasante et al. 2016a, 2016b,
2016c). These different reasons for discarding impact heavily on the willingness to
comply with rules and regulations.
5.3 Impacts of the Landing Obligation in Small-Scale
Fisheries
The term SSF implies small vessel size and, sometimes, low levels of technology and
capital investment per ﬁsher. For the purposes of the European Maritime and
Fisheries Fund (Regulation (CE) No 508/2014, “small-scale coastal ﬁshing” was
formally deﬁned as ﬁshing done by vessels of an overall length < 12 m and not using
towed gear. SSF are thus typically “artisanal” and coastal, using small boats,
targeting multiple species using traditional gears.
To investigate the impact of the LO in SSF, we will focus on the impact of this
measure on selected SSF in the EU – in France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. We will
describe these ﬁsheries, their discards, the reasons for discarding, impact of the LO,
factors that act as barriers for the successful implementation of the LO, and the
institutional arrangements and rules that inhibit or facilitate the adaptation to the LO.
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5.3.1 France
Small-Scale Fisheries in the British Channel, Celtic Sea, and Bay of Biscay
In France, the small-scale ﬂeet is not legally deﬁned. The number of hours spent at
sea is the main criterion to classify the vessels rather than length or use of passive
gears. For the purpose of this chapter, only vessels < 12 m of the length operating
within territorial waters (12 nm) in the British Channel, Celtic Sea, and Bay of
Biscay are taken into account. See Table 5.1 for the characteristics of this ﬂeet and
the main species landed. The majority of the target species in the Atlantic Coast/
Ocean are subject to Total Allowable Catch (TAC) regulations.
Interviews were done with small-scale ﬁshers operating in the English Channel,
Celtic Sea, and Bay of Biscay as part of the EU DiscardLess project (http://www.
discardless.eu). All French ﬁshers interviewed perceived the LO negatively not only
because they felt that it will reduce their activity and increase expenditure on their
boats but that it also shows that decisions were made at the top level without taking
in account the good management practices implemented by the ﬁsheries committees
or POs over the last 15 years (van Hoof et al., this volume). That is, French small-
scale ﬁshers feel that European decision-makers satisfy claims and interests of
lobbies (conservationists, aquaculture) rather those of ﬁshers (De Vos et al. 2016).
According to interviewed ﬁshers, the main reasons for discarding are regulatory,
such as quotas, forbidden species, etc. Low market prices and high grading are also
given as reasons for discarding (Table 5.2). Damaged ﬁsh was also mentioned by
netters or long-liners. It is probably that because SSF implemented a quota system
later than the larger ﬂeet, and the fact that they have smaller amounts of quota, these
ﬁshers discard more. New ﬁshers, who do not own quotas, have to ﬁsh under an open
national quota system, managed by the national ﬁsheries administration, and because
these quotas are rapidly ﬁlled, they are obliged to discard all ﬁshes over quota.
Young ﬁsherwomen using nets as the main ﬁshing gear say: “As soon as the national
quota closes, all ﬁsh caught under the quotas system are discarded. We are not
members of the local PO, and we cannot access more quotas.” In some regions, POs
manage quotas collectively; thus, the quota can be swapped among ﬁshers, with the
result that it is easier for them to avoid high discard rates.
Undersize ﬁsh, when mentioned, did not really represent a constraint to French
small-scale ﬁshers. They all say that the gears they use are more selective than those
used by the industrial ﬂeet. But they cannot avoid all undersize ﬁsh as “there is not a
ﬁshing gear which doesn’t catch undersize ﬁshes.” For those using handline or traps,
unwanted ﬁsh can easily be returned alive to the sea. The “lack of a good price” for
some species, for example, European plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) in the Eastern
Channel and European hake (Merluccius merluccius) or Atlantic horse mackerel
(Trachurus trachurus) in the Bay of Biscay, is given as another reason for
discarding. For ﬁshers, discarding species without commercial value is not perceived
as discards. It is the same when it comes to high grading practiced by ﬁshers to
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Table 5.1 Case studies characterization
Case study Country Fishing ﬂeet Gear used
Main species
landed
Rules and
regulations
SSF in the
British
Channel,
Celtic Sea,
and Bay of
Biscay
France Vessels less
than 12 m
operating
mainly within
territorial
waters (12 nm)
using mainly
passive gear
Gillnets, tram-
mel nets, long-
lines,
handlines, nets,
pots and traps,
some SSF ves-
sels using
dredges or
trawls
Common sole,
European sea
bass, pollack,
and monkﬁsh;
total landings
80,000 tons
(in 2013)
Most target
species subject
to TAC and
MLS
SSF in the
Thermaikos
Gulf
Greece Polyvalent pas-
sive gears
Nets, pots,
longlines, traps
Lands a wide
array of spe-
cies, the most
important
being hake,
common cuttle-
ﬁsh, mullets,
annular
seabream, sad-
dled seabream,
common octo-
pus, common
pandora, and
scorpionﬁsh;
accounted for
18,152 tons
(in 2016)
Most target
species have
minimum
landing size
(MLS). Plus
spatial restric-
tions and tem-
poral restric-
tions (e.g.,
vessels
targeting hake
and exceeding
the limit of
>20% of land-
ings are not
authorized to
ﬁsh in
February)
SSF in
Catalonia
Spain Polyvalent pas-
sive gears
operating
within 6 nm
Trammel nets,
gillnets, boat
seines, pots for
octopus, and
longline
Lands over
200 species, the
most important
being demersal
species (cuttle-
ﬁsh, hake, pan-
dora, sole,
golden
seabream),
sand-eel, octo-
pus, and
bonito. Aver-
age landings of
3000 ton/year
Some species
subject to
MLS (e.g.,
hake, sole,
Sparidae,
octopus).
Technical lim-
itations to the
size of ﬁshing
gear (e.g.,
maximum
length of nets;
maximum
number of
hooks; maxi-
mum number
of traps)
SSF in
Galicia
Spain Vessels less
than 12 m
operating
mainly within
Gillnet Hake, horse
mackerel,
mackerel,
pouting,
surmullet.
Most target
species subject
to TAC, MLS,
and ﬁshing
effort
(continued)
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obtain better prices. Only the biggest individuals are landed; all the others, including
those having legal size, are discarded.
The impacts of the LO will be different for ﬁshers using different gears. Netters
think that in some seasons they will have high rates of discards (e.g., Atlantic horse
mackerel), that they will have to come to the harbor to land before returning back to
their ﬁshing areas. Handling and sorting ﬁsh will take longer, and they do not know
if crew members will do it. For them, the need to employ one more crew member to
deal with longer handling times means less income for the crew. All ﬁshers want to
know who will pay the different taxes related to auctions, dealing with trash, etc.
Netters and long-liners consider that the LO will have a negative economic impact
on their activity. But for the more selective handliners, the LO was felt to have little
economic impact.
Table 5.1 (continued)
Case study Country Fishing ﬂeet Gear used
Main species
landed
Rules and
regulations
6 nm using
passive gear
Average daily
catch of
3000 kg
(in 2018)
Deepwater
hook-and-
line ﬁshery
in the
Azores
Portugal Deepwater Bottom long-
lines, handlines
Blackspot
seabream,
European
conger,
Forkbeard, sil-
ver
scabbardﬁsh,
bluemouth
rockﬁsh,
wreckﬁsh.
Total landings
of 4070 t
(in 2014), 15–
21 M€ between
2010 and 2017
Target and
secondary
species subject
to TAC (e.g.,
blackspot
seabream,
alfonsinos).
Deepwater
sharks subject
to TAC zero.
MLS for sev-
eral species,
minimum
hook sizes,
area and tem-
poral closures,
and bans on
the use of spe-
ciﬁc gear
Beach seine Portugal Purse seine Trawling net to
the beach;
small ﬁshery
consisting of
solely 143 ves-
sels in the
entire country
Small pelagic
ﬁsh such as
mackerel,
Atlantic horse
mackerel, and
sardine
Horse mack-
erel
(Trachurus
spp.) subject
to TAC
Note: SSF, small-scale ﬁsheries; MLS, minimum landing size; nm, nautical miles; TAC, Total
Allowable Catch
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Table 5.2 Reasons for discarding and barriers to implementing the Landings Obligation (LO)
Case study Country
Main reasons
for discarding
Barriers to the implementation of the LO
Ecological Economic Institutional
SSF in the
British
Channel,
Celtic Sea,
and Bay of
Biscay
France Mainly regu-
lations
(quotas, MLS,
and forbidden
species). Also,
low market
value, lack of
commercial
value/market,
high grading,
and damaged
catch
Mix ﬁsheries,
in some sea-
son’s abun-
dance of some
species are not
easy to avoid.
Few vessels
located in
estuary areas
deal with
undersize ﬁsh
The LO will
increase opera-
tion costs for
netters and
long-liners
(more trips to
land all catch,
increase in crew
to deal with
extra work).
Worries about
who will pay for
taxes related to
the auction,
trash, etc.
Most target
species subject
to quota and
many small-
scale ﬁshers
operate under
the national
open quota
system, which
ends fast
SSF in the
Thermaikos
Gulf
Greece Low market
value of the
landings,
damaged
catch,
mishandling
on board,
undersize ﬁsh,
small catch
Many factors,
mostly caused
by the nature
of the Greek
SSF (multi-
ﬂeet and multi-
species).
Recent data
show that dis-
cards have
risen and are
dominated by
alien species
Economic
incentives seem
to contribute to
discarding prac-
tices; high local
market demand
for ﬁsh contrib-
utes to the regu-
lar selling of
undersized ﬁsh
in the black
market
Loose enforce-
ment; lack of
spatial moni-
toring system
for vessels
< 12 m (the
majority of SSF
ﬂeet).
Unknown
number of rec-
reational ves-
sels hardens the
role of ﬁsheries
managers
Fishers do not
perceive an
increase in
operation costs
due to the LO
because they
have little
discards
Fishers oppose
the LO because
it will decrease
their catch.
There is the
need to
decrease the
MLS for some
species to avoid
discards
SSF in
Catalonia
Spain Damaged
catch; low
market value
Largely mixed
ﬁsheries with
relatively
small quanti-
ties of discards
of regulated
species; very
Increased cost
of sorting; inex-
istence of eco-
nomic outlet for
unwanted
catches brought
to land
Loose monitor-
ing, control,
and enforce-
ment capacity
by the ﬁsheries
administration;
lack of
(continued)
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Table 5.2 (continued)
Case study Country
Main reasons
for discarding
Barriers to the implementation of the LO
Ecological Economic Institutional
difﬁcult to
optimize oper-
ations to
completely
avoid
unwanted
catches
incentives for
compliance
SSF in
Galicia
Spain Lack of quotas
for harvested
commercial
species
Largely mixed
ﬁsheries with
relatively
small quanti-
ties of discards
of regulated
species; very
difﬁcult to
optimize oper-
ations to
completely
avoid
unwanted
catch
The hold space
on board is cur-
rently opti-
mized, and it
would not be
possible to
expand the hold
space without
affecting the
navigability of
the ﬁshing ves-
sels. Small-scale
ﬁshing vessels
hold their
catches on
board in boxes
classiﬁed by
species and size,
and the potential
increase on their
number would
increase insecu-
rity of the
vessels
Fishers
strongly
oppose the LO
and the manda-
tory measure to
annotate all
catches in the
electronic log-
book, because
it will be very
difﬁcult and
impractical
during the ﬁsh-
ing activities
Deepwater
hook-and-
line ﬁshery
in the
Azores
Portugal Undersize ﬁsh
(< MLS),
quota in the
case of
“alfonsinos,”
low market
value, dam-
aged catch
Difﬁcult to
avoid
unwanted
catch due to
mixed
resources,
especially
juveniles of
blackspot
seabream;
ﬁshers per-
ceived high
abundance of
deepwater
sharks
Fishers strongly
oppose that
unwanted
undersize catch
cannot be sold
for direct human
consumption;
Representatives
of ﬁsh auctions
concerned about
the economic
costs of
collecting and
dealing with the
unwanted catch
Fishers
strongly
oppose that
catch will count
against quota;
limiting quota
for
“alfonsinos”
and TAC zero
for deepwater
sharks could
prematurely
choke the
ﬁshery
(continued)
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It was felt that the ecosystem will also likely be negatively impacted by the LO
because discards returned to the sea are often eaten by birds, other ﬁsh, mammals, or
benthic scavengers (Depestele et al., this volume). Small-scale ﬁshers wonder what
will happen to the ecosystem if discarding practices are ended. They also prefer to
continue discarding as usual rather than supporting the aquaculture sector which they
perceive is bound to beneﬁt from the implementation of the LO.
For the moment, SSF avoids unwanted catches, especially undersize ﬁshes, by
changing ﬁshing areas. Their main concern is the avoidance of seasonal species like
mackerels (Scomber spp.) for which they have little or no quota at all. Choke species
are the most important constraint because there is always the risk of the ﬁshery to
choke, rendering a continuation of operation impossible. Until now, the LO has not
been fully implemented, with exemptions having been implemented in all regional
seas, but discards are still not landed nor registered ofﬁcially.
5.3.2 Greece
Small-Scale Fisheries in the Thermaikos Gulf
SSF accounts for the majority of SSF vessels operating in Greek waters (94%) with a
ﬂeet numbering 12,762 vessels in 2014. They are active along the extensive Greek
coastline, using polyvalent passive gears and catching a multitude of species
(Stergiou et al. 2002; Gonçalves et al. 2007; Tzanatos et al. 2007; Brodersen et al.
2016), and the SSF métiers exhibit signiﬁcant spatiotemporal variations in catch
composition (Tzanatos et al. 2007; Palialexis and Vassilopoulou 2012a, b;
Table 5.2 (continued)
Case study Country
Main reasons
for discarding
Barriers to the implementation of the LO
Ecological Economic Institutional
Beach seine Portugal Undersize ﬁsh
(< MLS), low
market value
Difﬁcult to
implement the
LO due to
ﬁshery being
carried out on
the beach
Fishers strongly
oppose the fact
that catches of
juvenile horse
mackerel
(Trachurus
spp.) cannot be
sold for human
consumption
Fishery carried
out in areas of
great ecological
sensitivity
(nursery areas,
spawning
zones, and/or
growing areas)
and undersize
ﬁsh constitute
an important
part of the
catch, but these
can survive
Note: SSF, small-scale ﬁsheries; MLS, minimum landing size; LO, Landing Obligation
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Table 5.1). Landings are channeled to the market through short supply chains, or
directly to restaurants, and sold at an average value of 9 €kg1. However, landings
per vessel as well as income per ﬁsher are generally very low, and each business has
low invested capital.
The Greek SSFs are mostly family-owned vessels with one or two people on board,
sometimes the husband and wife together. Based on the Data Collection Framework
in 2014, this is the largest ﬁshing ﬂeet in European waters, with a steady decrease
since 2008, following the general trend in the overall Greek ﬂeet. This segment had a
combined gross tonnage of 24.8 thousand GT and a total power of 238.3 thousand
kW (STECF 2016).
SSFs are characterized by their multi-gear nature and the targeting of multiple
species, with Sepia ofﬁcinalis, Mullus surmuletus, Diplodus annularis, Oblada
melanura, Octopus vulgaris, Pagellus erythrinus, and Scorpaena porcus being
landed in high numbers (Stergiou et al. 2002; Gonçalves et al. 2007; Tzanatos
et al. 2007; Brodersen et al. 2016) and the SSF metiers exhibit signiﬁcant spatio-
temporal variations in the catch composition (Tzanatos et al. 2007; Palialexis and
Vassilopoulou 2012a, b).
In relation to discarding practices, SSF in Greece documents relatively low
discarding, with estimates ~10% of the total catch (Tzanatos et al. 2007;
Vassilopoulou et al. 2007). More recent data show that discards have risen (17%
of the catch in 2014–2016, compared to 7.5% of the catch in 2004–2006) and have
been dominated by alien species catches: Siganus luridus – which is commercial in
some regions – represented 18% of discards in weight, while three more alien
species (Siganus rivulatus, Stephanolepsis diaspros, Balistes capriscus) have also
been documented in a SSF in the Saronikos Gulf (Brodersen et al. 2016).
SSF discards are a result of (i) low commercial value of the landings (e.g.,
Atlantic lizardﬁsh (Synodus saurus); (ii) ﬁshing practices, i.e., damage to individuals
before being brought on board (e.g., European hake); (iii) mishandling on board;
(iv) the catch of undersize individuals for species under MLS regimes (e.g., annular
seabream (Diplodus annularis); and (v) ﬁsh having commercial value but not caught
in adequate numbers to be sold (Tzanatos et al. 2007; Gonçalves et al. 2007)
(Table 5.2). Other factors such as soaking time, depth of the ﬁshing operations,
and the mesh used affect considerably the discard numbers in the trammel net
ﬁsheries of the Ionian Sea (Vassilopoulou, unpublished data). In Table 5.1 more
information is given on the studies dedicated to the investigation of discard practices
of SSF in Greece. They all showed that the overall discarded fraction from SSF is
considered as far from being negligible.
There are many factors that act as barriers for the successful implementation of
the LO, mostly caused by the nature of the Greek SSF (i.e., different gear used with
different species being targeted simultaneously) (Table 5.2). Economic incentives to
not discard result in undersized ﬁsh being sold regularly on the black market
(Damalas and Vassilopoulou 2013).
Interviews with small-scale ﬁshers operating in the Thermaikos Gulf were done in
2015 and 2017 as part of two H2020 projects (MINOUW http://minouw-project.eu
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and DiscardLess). Small-scale ﬁshers in the Thermaikos Gulf said that they never
heard about the LO (Christou et al. 2017; Maynou et al. 2017; Fitzpatrick et al.
2017). But as soon as it was explained to them what the LO means, all of them
declared to be against it. The rule is perceived as an additional threat for their
activity. Small-scale ﬁshers operating in the area say that they are currently in
competition with dolphins which constantly destroy their ﬁshing gear (nets) and
damage captured ﬁsh. They said that dolphins leave little ﬁsh in the nets. “If we want
to bring ﬁsh home, we have to watch our nets; therefore, we stay on the spot.” To
avoid nets being destroyed due to the presence of the dolphins, ﬁshers never set their
nets for several hours. Sometimes soaking time is less than an hour, and ﬁshers of
this region have problems earning a living. Within this short time of operation,
discards are very low.
Fishers did not know that the LO is already implemented in Greece and had never
heard about the ongoing exemptions already granted to them. For them, the main
reason for discarding is regulatory and principally the MLS. The other reasons are
damaged ﬁsh and lack of market prices for some species. They considered that the
discarded quantities are low, and they would not have problems to land them if they
had to do so. Nowadays, unwanted catches are often landed for human consumption.
For example, undersized ﬁsh may be offered as a present to clients, to family
members and friends, especially when practicing direct sales. Species used to
make ﬁsh soups, or undersize ﬁsh appreciated by the local market (e.g., surmullet
Mullus surmuletus) are often given as gifts.
They do not have any problem moving to another ﬁshing area when the quantity
of MLS individuals is high because they stay near the nets during the ﬁshing
operation “to chase dolphins attacking their gear.” If catches contain a lot of small
ﬁsh, they turn to other ﬁshing grounds. They do not face the same problem when
they use pots because unwanted catches remain alive, and as soon as they are put on
board, they are released into the sea. They think that live individuals have a high
survival rate as soon as they are back into the water. In this way, small-scale ﬁshers
think that the LO is not a problem compared to the threat represented by dolphins.
For them, the daily struggle against dolphins makes LO a softer constraint. LO
doesn’t really impact their activity due to their low rates of discards. It is observed
that this latter ﬁnding contradicts their ﬁrst negative vision of the LO.
According to ﬁshers, the LO will impact more on trawlers, which generate more
discards. For SSF ﬁshers it is a good thing that these boats will have to reduce
discards. These two métiers do not operate in the same areas, and little competition
for space occurs. But both ﬂeets are targeting the same species, and during the
months that trawlers are operating (trawling activity is forbidden in territorial waters
between June and the end of September), SSF ﬁshers have problems selling their
catch at a good price.
When asked whether they record discards, ﬁshers respond that until the end of
2017 “nobody asked them to record them.” And if somebody tells them to do so,
they will not comply because they “don’t want to complicate their life by adding
more administrative tasks.” From the interviews, it appears that small-scale ﬁshers of
the Thermaikos Gulf are against the LO by principle, but an analysis of their
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discourse demonstrates the opposite. This is due to the fact that such a rule will have
little impact on their activities. In the case of effective implementation, they can
easily adapt to the LO. The gears that ﬁshers use are among the most selective, and
they do not think that they will need to make more effort under the LO (Table 5.2).
The current conditions of SSF in the Thermaikos Gulf may be different from
other areas in Greece, but in terms of discards, it seems to be similar to the results of
other studies undertaken in that country. Yet, it is crucial to investigate discard levels
speciﬁc for each métier and quantify the discards problem among the whole SSF
sector, using robust indices (Stergiou et al. 2007). The low discards generated by
Mediterranean ﬁsheries (Tsagarakis et al. 2014) and also by other ﬁsheries (includ-
ing areas under a quota system) should prompt authorities to claim a speciﬁc
exemption at the EU level, as SSF is an important activity for coastal communities
and provides income and employment for local populations in areas with few
alternative economic activities (Pita et al. 2010), particularly in small, isolated
islands. The ongoing ﬁnancial recession in Greece has further hardened the socio-
economic state of these ﬁsheries. Thus, it is important to safeguard the sector and
maintain the social and economic sustainability of the coastal communities.
5.3.3 Portugal
Two examples are provided for the impact of the LO in the Portuguese SSF sector:
the beach seine ﬁsheries in mainland Portugal, an ancient activity registered in the
National Archive of Intangible Cultural Heritage (e.g., in Costa da Caparica beach
seine ﬁshery; Diário da República, 2nd series, N 34, of 16 February 2017), and the
deepwater hook-and-line ﬁsheries in the Azores islands.
5.3.3.1 The Beach Seine Fishery
The beach seine ﬁshery is an ancient commercial ﬁshing activity on the Portuguese
coast, with reports dating as far back as the early ﬁfteenth century (Franca and Costa
1979; Martins et al. 2000). Nowadays, the beach seine ﬂeet is composed of 143 ves-
sels, distributed along the Portuguese mainland coast, mainly on the northwest coast
(European Commission 2018) (Table 5.1). Each vessel employs ~12 people, 5 work-
ing on board the vessel, and 7 working on land. This is a seasonal ﬁshery, typically
occurring from March to November. The main target species of the ﬁshery are small
pelagic ﬁsh such as Atlantic chub mackerel (Scomber colias), Atlantic horse mack-
erel, and European pilchard (Sardina pilchardus) (Gaspar and Pereira 2014). In
Portugal, ofﬁcial ﬁshing statistics landings are presented by ﬂeet component
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(divided into trawling, purse seine, and multi-gear); therefore, it is not possible to
know the proportion of landings (in volume and value) by the beach seine ﬁshery.
The beach seine ﬁshery operates in a coastal zone of great ecological sensitivity,
as this ﬁshing activity occurs in nursery areas, spawning zones, and/or growing areas
for many species of high economic interest. As a consequence, juveniles constitute
an important fraction of captures, which commercialization is not allowed by law, as
individuals are < MLS, and are thus discarded (Jorge et al. 2002). In addition to
capture large numbers of juveniles, this ﬁshing technique is not selective and also
captures a wide variety of bycatch species (Faltas 1997; Lamberth et al. 1997; Cabral
et al. 2003), despite having seasonally target species (Fagundes et al. 2007). The low
commercial value of bycatches and legal constraints results in bycatches not being
traded and mostly discarded (Cabral et al. 2003). In this ﬁshery, the LO was
implemented on January 1, 2015, and applies to catch of horse mackerels (Trachurus
spp.) and blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou).
5.3.3.2 The Deep-water Hook-and-Line Fishery in Azores
The Azores is a Portuguese oceanic archipelago in the North Atlantic Ocean, with a
one million km2 exclusive economic zone (EEZ), no continental shelf and great
depths, with an important demersal ﬁshing around the island slopes and the many
seamounts present in the area (Silva and Pinho 2007; Morato et al. 2008). The
bottom hook-and-line ﬁshery is the most important ﬁshery in the region, employing
about 60% of all professional ﬁshers in the archipelago (Carvalho et al. 2011). This
ﬁshery is mostly small-scale, with 92% of the vessels < 12 m (N ¼ 478 in 2016)
(Table 5.1). Two main ﬁshing gears are used: (i) bottom longlines targeting mainly
deep-sea demersal ﬁshes, such as blackspot seabream (Pagellus bogaraveo),
alfonsinos (Beryx spp.), or blackbelly roseﬁsh (Helicolenus dactylopterus), or deeper
species such as common mora (Mora mora), and (ii) handline targeting mostly
blackspot seabream and wreckﬁsh (Polyprion americanus). Both gears operate all
year round. The bottom longline and handline ﬁshery is by far the most valuable in
terms of landed value, with an annual landed value varying from 15 to 21 million €
for the period 2010–2017, around 58% of all landed value in the Azores (SREA, http://
estatistica.azores.gov.pt).
Unreported catch for this ﬁshery was estimated to amount to 830 t per year on
average over the period 2000–2014, i.e., 10.3% of the total catch (Pham et al. 2013).
Around half (47%) of this unreported catch is used as bait, kept for crew consump-
tion, or offered, while the remaining was discarded at sea (447 tyear1) (Fauconnet
et al. in press).
Discard practices are believed to be similar between handlines and bottom
longlines. Observer data suggest that the catch of individuals smaller than the
MLS is the main cause for discarding in this ﬁshery, followed by low market
value (Canha 2013). About 90 species are regularly discarded by this ﬁshery, 40%
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of which due to low commercial value (Canha 2013). However, 61% of the discards
can be attributed to six species of commercially important ﬁsh, such as silver
scabbardﬁsh (Lepidopus caudatus), European conger (Conger conger), blackbelly
roseﬁsh, splendid alfonsino (B. splendens), blackspot seabream, and thornback ray
(Raja clavata). At least ten species of deepwater sharks are occasionally caught by
this ﬁshery. Even if limited, this bycatch is of concern since many deepwater sharks
such as Deania spp., Centrophorus spp., Etmopterus spp., Centroscymnus spp., and
kiteﬁn shark (Dalatias licha) are listed in the IUCN red list of endangered species.
Due to their vulnerability, the EU has set their TAC to zero in 2010 (EC Reg. N
1359/2008). Since then, discard of those species has been compulsory. Deepwater
sharks accounted for 8% of the discards of the ﬁshery over the period 2010–2014
(Fauconnet et al. 2016).
The implementation of the LO in Azorean demersal ﬁsheries will only take place
from January 2019 onward. Several factors were identiﬁed, in semi-structured
interviews and meeting with stakeholders, as part of the DiscardLess project, to
potentially act as barriers for the successful implementation of the LO in the Azores
(Table 5.2).
5.3.4 Spain
Two cases from Spain illustrate the complexities of the implementation of the LO in
different regions of Spain: the case of SSF in Catalonia (NWMediterranean) and the
gillnet ﬁshery in Galicia (NW Atlantic).
5.3.4.1 Small-Scale Fisheries in Catalonia
SSF in Catalonia is carried out by a relatively high number of ﬁshing units (365 out
of a ﬂeet of 727 vessels in 2016) operating from 32 ﬁshing harbors. Landings of the
SSF ﬂeet oscillate between 1800 and 3800 tyear1 in recent years (average
2960 tyear1 for the period 2000–2016), with a corresponding value of landings
around 15 million € (Table 5.1). This ﬁsheries production corresponds to ca. 10% of
the production/landings in Catalonia but employs ca. 50% of the ﬁshing ﬂeet and
25% of the labor/ﬁshers. The ﬂeet operates in coastal waters, typically within 6 miles
of the coast, uses a multitude of gears, and lands over 200 species, the most
important being demersal species and sand eels (Gymnammodytes spp.), common
octopus (Octopus vulgaris), and Atlantic bonito (Sarda sarda). Refer to Table 5.1
for detailed information about the ﬂeet, gear and main species landed. In general, the
commercial catches of each individual vessel are very low (20–50 kgday1) but of
high value, with ex-vessel prices of the target species oscillating between 10 and
20 €kg1.
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Compared to other segments of the ﬂeet, SSF is highly selective, and the amount
of discards is relatively low. The fractions of the catch that are discarded are usually
noncommercial species, such as epibenthic invertebrates, or damaged ﬁsh. Com-
mercial species that could be otherwise sold are discarded when they are damaged
due to scavengers preying on the catch. This problem is particularly acute for set net
ﬁshing gear (trammel nets and longlines). Undersize ﬁsh are usually not discarded
but sold on the black market. Field studies carried out in the MINOUW project show
that the amount of catches below legal size is generally low, but for certain species
and certain gear deployments, the proportion of catches that will fall under the remit
of the Landing Obligation can be high. Trammel nets employing inner panels of
40–60 mm mesh can produce a relatively high proportion of undersize European
seabass (Dicentrarchus labrax), Sand steenbras (Lithognathus mormyrus),
blackspot seabream (Pagellus bogaraveo), or common sole (Solea solea). In the
case of the blackspot seabream, its large legal size (33 cm TL) results in all catches
from all ﬁshing gears studied being undersize. Several barriers for the implementa-
tion of the LO have been identiﬁed such as low quantities of discards, the lack of
capacity to monitor SSF by the regional administration, and increase costs of sorting,
among others (Table 5.2).
5.3.4.2 The Gillnet Fishery in Galicia
Fishing is a major contributor to gross domestic product in Galicia (an autonomous
community in northwestern Spain), the main ﬁshing region in Spain (Villasante
2012). The artisanal/SSF ﬂeet is comprised mainly of small vessels (on average 6 m
long), ﬁshing with a great variety of passive gears, the so-called artes menores
(traps, hooks and lines, gill and trammel nets, and small seines), and exploiting a
diverse range of species, most of which are subjected to TACs.
The ﬂeet using gillnets comprises 1000 ﬁshing vessels, operating in a
multispeciﬁc SSF, mainly harvesting European hake, pouting (Trisopterus luscus),
horse mackerels, and surmullet at depths of 30–140 m and up to 8–10 miles from the
coast. Based on results from interviews started in 2015 and updated until 2018, the
reasons for discarding are the precautionary closure and the full closure of the ﬁshery
due to the full harvest of the TAC (Villasante et al. 2016a, b).
Recently, Villasante et al. (2015b) estimated the total removals of ﬁsheries
catches (including IUU catches, subsistence catches, and discards for commercial
and recreational ﬁsheries) for the 1950–2010 period. The authors demonstrated that
the discard rate for SSFs ranges between 5–18% depending on the type of commer-
cial species harvested. However, the authors also found that the discard rate for some
sedentary resources (e.g., goose barnacle (Pollicipes pollicipes) 74% and razor clams
Ensis spp. 49%) can be signiﬁcantly higher than for other SSFs.
However, the species under TAC and quota regulations present high discard rates
which ranged between 0 and 50% (European hake, mackerels) and/or 50200%
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(horse mackerels). Catches of horse mackerels and mackerels are highly variable due
to migratory movements from Portuguese to Galician waters and can sometimes lead
to high discard rates. Harvesting of immature individuals was reported to be very
low or nonexistent for all species caught by this ﬁshery (Villasante et al. 2015b,
2016c).
Regarding the compliance to the LO, the expert’s opinion and the participatory
consultation made with the small-scale ﬁsheries sector show that changing the
ﬁsheries management system based on the TAC regulation would be the most
important reason to comply with the LO (Villasante et al. 2016a, b) (Table 5.2).
5.4 Conclusion
Despite the increased recognition of SSFs, there is a still need to ensure that policy-
makers receive robust scientiﬁc data about such ﬁsheries on which to base decisions
and thus ensure coherent policy. Our results show that only 21% of 1219 papers that
have been published until 2018 focused on the discard problem in SSF.
Key SSFs from around Europe selected to investigate the reasons for discarding,
impact, and barriers to implementing the LO illustrate that discard rates vary greatly
from ﬁshery to ﬁshery and species to species. However, the main reasons ﬁshers
discard are relatively similar from ﬁshery to ﬁshery and are mostly due to regulations
(mainly TACs, quotas, and MLS), low market value of some catch components,
capture of noncommercial species, high grading, and damaged catch.
Small-scale ﬁshers perceive that it will be difﬁcult to comply with the LO and
could identify ecological, economic, and institutional barriers to the implementation
of the LO. From an ecological perspective, most ﬁshers are of the opinion that
resources are largely mixed, and unwanted catch is very difﬁcult to avoid. For
example, the fact that the beach seine ﬁshery in Portugal is carried out in areas of
great ecological sensitivity, such as nursery areas, results in the capture of large
numbers of juveniles. From an institutional perspective, the lack of monitoring,
control, and enforcement capacity by ﬁsheries jurisdictions, combined with lack of
incentives for compliance, are critical barriers perceived by ﬁshers for the imple-
mentation of the LO in all case studies. Plus, some ﬁshers identiﬁed that the
implementation of the LO requires the adoption of more selective gear technology
(Galicia and Azores). Azores ﬁshers think they are already using one of the most
selective gear in European ﬁsheries and as such that the LO should not apply to
them.
From an economic perspective, ﬁshers state that the LO will increase the opera-
tional costs of ﬁshing activities. They strongly oppose the fact that unwanted
undersize catch cannot be sold for human consumption and that this catch will
count against their quota. In general, the potential socioeconomic impacts of the
LO could be high for SSF. For example, it is estimated that the future yield (catches)
under the LO in Galicia (Spain) would be only 50% of catches expected in the
absence of the LO, regardless of the total volume of quotas allocated to the ﬂeet.
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economic performance of ﬂeets before and after implementing the LO. It is shown
that for most of the analysed ﬁsheries, their economic outcome will be negatively
affected in the long term by the LO, when compared to the expected outcome with
no LO. Efﬁcient mitigation strategies (exemptions, quota uplifts, improved selectiv-
ity, effort reallocation and others) may, for some of the analysed ﬁsheries, reduce the
negative economic effect of the LO. Moreover, the possibility to trade quotas, both
nationally and internationally, may also reduce the economic losses caused by the
LO. However, even with mitigation strategies and/or quota trade in place, most of
the analysed ﬁsheries are worse off under the LO than what could be expected if the
LO was not implemented.
Keywords Costs and earnings · Discards · Economic repercussions · Fisheries
management · Fleet adjustment
6.1 Introduction
Commercial ﬁsheries in Europe are diverse, with ﬁsh being caught for varied
purposes ranging from high-value species for human consumption to ﬁsh used for
ﬁshmeal and ﬁsh oil. Technological and biological interactions make it difﬁcult to
catch target species completely selectively. For almost a century, landings of imma-
ture ﬁsh have been prohibited by regulations. Discarding ﬁsh below a minimum
conservation reference size (MCRS) has been mandatory in European waters since
the adoption of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1983. The CFP Landing
Obligation (LO) of 2013 requires ﬁsh under the MCRS to be landed, with imple-
mentation being phased in from 2015 to 2019. Similarly, before 2013, it was
forbidden to land species for which quota was exhausted, and discarding of catches
at or above MCRS was therefore required, a logical practice in mixed species
ﬁsheries.
Many businesses expect signiﬁcant short-term negative economic repercussions
of the LO due to increased operating costs, decreased income from landings and
underutilisation of quotas (Condie et al. 2014). However, the actual outcomes of the
LO will depend on several factors, including (i) the management system in place,
(ii) application of exemptions (e.g. de minimis allowance of discards up to 5%), (iii)
interannual transfers, (iv) catch allowances of stocks without TACs, (v) quota
adjustments and quota swaps/movements, (vi) application of selectivity measures,
(vii) costs of landing unwanted catch, (viii) prices obtained for unwanted ﬁsh and
(ix) compliance of the sector. It is hoped that short-term losses could be mitigated by
longer-term gains, given the desired reduced pressure on ﬁsh stocks and anticipated
increases in quota and catch rates.
This chapter considers economic outcomes for ﬂeets by analysing possible
economic effects of the LO for seven diverse European case studies comprising
(i) UK and Danish North Sea demersal ﬁsheries, (ii) the French demersal trawl
110 A. Hoff et al.
ﬁshery in the Eastern English Channel, (iii) the Spanish trawl ﬁshery in the Bay of
Biscay, (iv) the Spanish trawl ﬁshery in the Cantabrian-NW region, (v) the Greek
trawl and small-scale coastal ﬁshery in the Thermaikos Gulf (Eastern Mediterranean)
and (vi) the Spanish demersal trawl ﬁshery in the Western Mediterranean. Common
for all these ﬂeets is that they have a history of substantial unwanted catches before
the LO; therefore it can be expected that the LO would affect them substantially.
6.2 What Can the Literature of Economics Tell Us?
The literature tells us that ﬁshers tend to use more ﬁshing effort than socially optimal
due to market failures such as the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). An
unregulated, open-access ﬁshery leads to overexploitation of ﬁsh resources; there-
fore the EU has attempted to prevent this by use of total allowable catches (TACs),
limited ﬁshing effort, MCRS and technical speciﬁcations for ﬁshing gears, closed
areas and seasons, among other measures. However, in mixed ﬁsheries, these
restrictions may also, in some cases, encourage a ‘race to ﬁsh’ and may increase
incentives to discard because low quotas of some species prevent full exploitation of
species with higher quotas. Quotas may also increase incentives to high-grade
(discard lower-value ﬁsh) to maximise proﬁt.
Although the CFP has a common approach to managing the ﬁshing opportunities
of the European Union including rules of compulsory discard, the management and
organisation of ﬂeets differ between Member States. Therefore, the economic
repercussions of the LO not only depend on the rules of the LO but also on the
national management system to which ﬁshing businesses are subjected.
When interest for the discard issue arose in the 1990s, four general types of
factors that encouraged discarding were identiﬁed (FAO 1996b; Nordic Council of
Ministers 2003): (i) institutional, e.g. management measures such as quotas, effort
restrictions, minimum landing size of ﬁsh and mesh size regulations; (ii) biological,
e.g. species interaction and characteristics of the ﬁsh (e.g. gender, and size); (iii)
technological such as gear selectivity (e.g. prohibited gear, damage to ﬁsh); and
(iv) economic, for example, price and cost relationships determined on the market
and high-grading (discarding low-value ﬁsh, both regulated and unregulated) to
maximise proﬁt by using quota and room on-board for more valuable ﬁsh (Batsleer
et al. 2015).
Discarding originates primarily from non-selective catch and high-grading prac-
tices. These form the basis for the empirical and theoretical economic research that
has been done regarding discarding over the last 20 years.
This research began in the 1990s (e.g. Flaaten and Larsen 1991; Frost 1996;
Christensen 1996; Pascoe and Revill 2004). Empirical approaches also appeared in
conferences and research programmes (FAO 1996a, b; Clucas 1997). In the FAO
context, the economics of discarding can be found in Pascoe (1997) with an update
in Kelleher (2005). The Nordic Council of Ministers (2003) investigated incentives
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to discard and options to reduce it. An EU Framework 7 project, NECESSITY,
investigated options to reduce discarding by using increased mesh sizes or panels in
ﬁshing gear (Frost et al. 2007).
Alongside empirical research, theoretical work based on socio-economic model-
ling has developed. One approach concerns unwanted catch in open-access and
individual transferable quota (ITQ)-managed ﬁsheries (Ward 1994; Ward et al.
2012; Boyce 1996; Turner 1996, 1997). These analyses usually include two species
(target and nontarget) and two ﬂeets and deal with the optimal use and allocation of
effort subject to a proﬁt- (or resource rent-) maximising objective. In this context,
bycatches of nontarget species constitute an endogenous externality, i.e. an outside
impact inﬂuenced by ﬁshers. In a simple situation where harvest of the target and
nontarget species is in ﬁxed proportions, ﬁshing effort used to harvest target species
can simply be scaled up and down to reach a ﬁrst-best optimum. However, harvest of
target and nontarget species may take place in variable proportions. Boyce (1996)
compares maximisation of welfare in situations governed by open access and ITQs
of harvesting two such species by two ﬂeets. He ﬁnds that open access leads to
excessive bycatches and that an ITQ system can only secure a ﬁrst-best optimum if
imposed on both target species and bycatches. Segerson (2007) extends this analysis
to include stochastic bycatches and shows that neither landing fees nor ITQs on both
target species and bycatches can secure an expected ﬁrst-best optimum in which all
market failures are corrected in an economically optimal way. A different approach
to analyse bycatches is adopted in Abbott and Wilen (2009) where actual regulation,
as opposed to estimated economically optimal regulation, is introduced. A given
ﬁshery is regulated with quotas for both target and nontarget species combined with
limited entry programmes, and this actual regulation generates excessive bycatches
and too short harvest seasons.
Another theoretical approach deals with high-grading. High-grading may occur
for several reasons, e.g. to extend a quota that is nearly exhausted, to get the best
value per tonne of quota or to make room on-board the vessel for more valuable ﬁsh.
Arnason (1994) and Anderson (1994) show that a traditional ITQ system strengthens
the incentive to high-grade. However, Turner (1997) shows that a value-based ITQ
system (quotas measured in value instead of volume) secures a welfare optimal level
of high-grading in a similar way that open access does. Under open-access or effort
management, the distance between ﬁshing grounds and ports of landing affects
vessel operators’ decisions about catching patterns; limited hold or processing
capacity may be increased in the short term for high-priced ﬁsh through discarding
of low-priced ﬁsh, and this discarding can thus pay for one or two more hauls per trip
(turnaround cost) (see Vestergaard 1996). In the market policy of the CFP, the
suppression of withdrawal prices in 2014 also constituted an incentive to discard,
as the removal of a ﬁxed minimum price increases the economic propensity to
discard.
Analysing high-grading requires the inclusion of high- and low-priced ﬁsh. This
can be done by including age-structured ﬁsh stocks in the model or simply dividing
the stock in two parts: a low-priced and a high-priced part.
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Fish sales prices relative to ﬁshing costs also inﬂuence the incentives to discard: if
the price of ﬁsh is lower than the costs of putting the ﬁsh on the market, then the ﬁsh
should be discarded – at least from an economic point of view. However, it may pay
to land ﬁsh even when handling costs are higher than the total value. That is, if costs
of discarding are higher than the loss likely to be incurred by putting the ﬁsh on the
market, then the ﬁsh should be landed.
When it is illegal to discard ﬁsh while incentives to discard remain, monitoring
and control must be effectively invoked to offset incentives to discard (Sutinen and
Andersen 1985; Nuevo et al., this volume). Also, social norms, trust and cooperation
play a role (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Kraak and Hart, this volume). When it is
difﬁcult to monitor vessel operations at sea, vessel operators may decide not to
comply with regulation. Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) consider discarding in a
moral hazard context, i.e. when ﬁshers hide their actions at sea; when these actions
cannot be detected, repercussions are placed on them based on common elements
such as estimated changes in target ﬁsh stocks.
To discourage non-compliance, measures are required to assist enforcement,
including penalties, incentives to adapt to social norms, increased acceptance of
management rules (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Kraak and Hart, this volume) and a
governance structure which addresses diverging perceptions about the legitimacy of
discarding in the ﬁrst place (Fitzpatrick et al., this volume; van Hoof et al., this
volume). In theory, a premium can be introduced, e.g. an increase in the price of ﬁsh
that would otherwise be discarded because of a low price. It could also be invoked as
a penalty placed on the (estimated) net beneﬁt from discarding. In such a case, the
vessel operator will include the beneﬁt/penalty in their decision function. However,
he/she will also consider the probability of being detected and the likelihood and size
of any ﬁne. If the risk of being detected and the penalty are low, ﬁsh will probably be
discarded and vice versa.
6.3 The European Case Study Fisheries
Possible economic implications of the LO are presented through seven diverse
European ﬁshery case studies. Characteristics of each case are summarised in
Table 6.1. Cases are divided into three groups: (i) demersal ﬁsheries in the North
Sea, West of Scotland and English Channel, represented by ﬂeets from Denmark, the
UK and France, (ii) Spanish Atlantic ﬁsheries represented by the Basque mixed
demersal ﬁshery in the Bay of Biscay and the Galician trawl ﬂeet in the Cantabrian-
NW region and (iii) Mediterranean ﬁsheries represented by two mixed demersal
trawl ﬁsheries from the Balearic Islands (Spain, Western Mediterranean) and the
Greek trawl and small-scale coastal ﬁshery in the Thermaikos Gulf (Eastern
Mediterranean).
All cases have different management systems on top of which the LO is imposed.
However, all have a certain degree of MCRS regulation, and before the LO, it was
compulsory to discard ﬁsh below MCRS, with a few derogations in certain pelagic
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Table 6.1 Base characteristics of the European case study ﬁsheries with respect to the type of
ﬁshery, its target species, a brief description of the management system and key reasons for
discarding
Fishery
Target
species Fleet
Management
system
Reasons for
discarding
North Sea,
West of Scot-
land, Eastern
English
channel
Danish North
Sea demersal
ﬁshery
Cod, plaice,
hake, had-
dock, sole
and Norway
lobster
Netters and
trawlers,
with length
groups from
12 to
40 metres
TACs allo-
cated in ITQs,
MCRS
Quota
utilisation
optimisation
Fish below
MCRS
High-
grading
UK mixed
demersal ﬁsh-
eries in the
North Sea,
West of Scot-
land and area
7
73 main UK
stocks
targeted by
different
ﬂeets in dif-
ferent areas.
Pelagic spe-
cies and
non-quota
species
representing
around 58%
of value and
75% of
weight landed
by UK ﬂeet
are excluded
All UK
active vessels
grouped in
99 producer
organisation
ﬂeet
segments
TACs allo-
cated in ﬁxed
quota alloca-
tion units that
can be pooled
within a PO,
traded by
vessel
owners, or
can be leased
by other ves-
sels in the
same or other
PO, MCRS
Quota
utilisation
optimisation
Fish below
MCRS
High-
grading
French
demersal ﬁsh-
ery in the
Eastern
English
Channel
Sole, scal-
lops, whiting,
cephalopods,
cod, red mul-
let, sea bass
and plaice
Bottom
trawlers,
mixed
trawlers and
trawl-
dredgers,
with length
groups from
12 to
40 metres
TACs,
MCRS, sea-
sonal closures
for scallops
and effort
limitation
Quota
utilisation
optimisation
Fish below
MCRS
High-
grading
Mediterranean Spanish
demersal ﬁsh-
ery in Western
Mediterranean
Four different
ﬁshing tactics
are used,
depending on
the main tar-
get species
(Palmer et al.
2009):
(1) shallow
shelf (striped
red mullet),
(2) deep shelf
(European
Mixed
demersal
trawl
MCRS and
other techni-
cal measures
Hake below
MCRS
High-grad-
ing
Discard of
low-value
species
(continued)
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ﬁsheries. Under the LO, it has become obligatory to land these ﬁsh, but they cannot
be sold for human consumption. On top of this new obligation to land small ﬁsh, the
North Sea, West of Scotland and English Channel ﬁsheries are regulated by TACs,
in some cases combined with effort regulation and technical conservation measures.
While TACs are set at the European level, national quotas (i.e. ﬁxed shares of the
TACs) are managed differently by the Member States. They are managed as ITQs in
Denmark, are distributed between producer organisations (POs) and vessel owners
Table 6.1 (continued)
Fishery
Target
species Fleet
Management
system
Reasons for
discarding
hake),
(3) upper
slope (Nor-
way lobster)
and (4) mid-
dle slope (red
shrimp)
Greek demer-
sal trawl and
small-scale
ﬁshery in the
Thermaikos
Gulf
Mainly hake
and red mul-
let (also
surmullet and
deep-water
rose shrimp)
Bottom
trawlers and
small-scale
coastal ves-
sels using gill
nets and
trammel nets
Spatial and
temporal
restrictions,
MCRS, other
technical
measure
Hake and
red mullet
below
MCRS
High-
grading
Spanish ﬁsh-
ery in the
Atlantic
Spanish
mixed demer-
sal trawl ﬁsh-
ery in the Bay
of Biscay
Pair trawlers:
mainly hake.
Otter
trawlers:
hake,
megrims,
horse mack-
erel, blue
whiting,
mackerel,
rays, red mul-
let, seabass,
squids and
cuttleﬁsh
Pair and otter
trawlers
using differ-
ent métiers
The ﬂeet is
managed with
ﬁshing rights,
TACs and
Total allow-
able Effort,
together with
mesh and
MCRS
limitations
Quota
utilisation
optimisation
Fish below
MCRS
Spanish
demersal
trawl ﬁshery
in the
Cantabrian-
NW region
Hake,
megrim, ang-
lerﬁsh, blue
whiting,
horse mack-
erel and
mackerel
Otter bottom
trawlers
(average
length
28 metres)
The ﬂeet is
managed with
ﬁshing rights
and Total
allowable
Effort
together with
mesh and
minimum
landing size
limitations
Quota
utilisation
optimisation
Fish below
MCRS
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in the UK in a system that is essentially a quasi-ITQ system and are distributed
between POs in France. Swaps and quota exchanges are allowed between organisa-
tions in the UK and France. The Atlantic Spanish ﬁsheries are regulated with Total
Allowable Effort (Prellezo et al. 2016) and TACs. The Mediterranean ﬁsheries are
regulated through technical gear speciﬁcations and MCRS for the main target
species, temporal and spatial closures and other technical measures (Stergiou et al.
2016).
Demersal ﬁshing activities in the North Sea, West of Scotland and in the English
Channel have highly mixed catches of species, and therefore it is not possible to fully
catch all quotas at the same time in the year, leading to either underutilisation of
quota or discarding of ﬁsh for which quotas are exhausted ﬁrst. Under the LO, the
risk of a choke situation, i.e. having to stop ﬁshing when the quota of a low-quota
stock is exhausted, is a great concern to managers and vessel operators alike (Ulrich
et al. 2011). This is especially expected to be a problem for French vessels, operating
with ﬁxed quota shares within producer/ﬁshery organisations, while this problem
may be less severe for UK and Danish ﬂeets, where quota trade may mitigate the
problem to some extent. For Spanish demersal ﬁsheries in the Bay of Biscay,
mackerel and horse mackerel are discarded because of low-quota allocations,
i.e. to optimise quota utilisation of other species, while hake is primarily discarded
because of being below MCRS. Thus, in these ﬁsheries choke situations may also be
an issue. In the Mediterranean ﬁsheries, discarding is primarily due to ﬁsh below
MCRS and to high-grading. As such, all cases face lower revenues under the LO
given that previously discarded ﬁsh of low value and below MCRS must now be
landed, combined with increased handling costs of these unwanted catches.
6.3.1 Mitigation Strategies
Given the different challenges that the selected ﬁshing ﬂeets face under the LO,
different scenarios have been analysed, mainly addressing (i) how ﬂeets will respond
given the threats faced and (ii) how economic losses can be reduced through
mitigation strategies most relevant for that ﬂeet. Table 6.2 gives an outline of the
scenarios analysed for each case study.
In all case studies, the economic situation was analysed for the ﬂeet, given the
current management system (cf. Table 6.1), i.e. if the LO had not been implemented
(named ‘business as usual’). This scenario is used as a ﬁrst benchmark when
analysing the effects of the LO. In all case studies the full implementation of the
LO with no exemptions was also analysed, i.e. the economic situation for the ﬂeets
given their current management system with the LO superimposed. This is a second
benchmark against which the effects of introducing mitigation strategies are com-
pared. Application of full implementation in the case study models was based on
different assumptions for each case study:
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• In the Danish North Sea demersal case, ﬁsh below MCRS must be landed, with
gradual implementation from 2016 to 2019 depending on species.
• In the UK mixed demersal ﬂeets, each vessel in a PO has its initial quota
available, and by 2019 no demersal species below MCRS can be discarded.
The LO is implemented gradually towards 2019 depending on the ﬁsh stock.
• In the French mixed demersal case, vessels in métiers are forbidden to continue
ﬁshing as soon as the quota of one of their target stocks is reached, and ﬁshing
effort is then allocated between the remaining métiers. Fish under MCRS are
landed but cannot be sold (price set to zero).
• In the Bay of Biscay Basque mixed demersal trawl case, the ﬁshing activity of a
given métier is stopped when the most binding quota share is reached.
Table 6.2 Scenarios analysed for the European case study ﬁsheries
North Sea, West of Scotland
and English Channel
Spanish Atlantic
fisheries
Mediterranean
fisheries
Denmark UK France Bay of
Biscay1
Cantabrian
-NW
Spain
(W. Med)
Greece (E.
Med)
Business as usual (no
LO)
Full LO
implementation, no
exemptions
De minimis
Year Transfer
Mesh size selectivity
Effort
reallocation2/Flexibility
Quota adjustment
Decrease minimum
landings size
Catch allowance for
stocks with zero TACs
Vessel effort 
movements between
métiers
Quota movement
(swaps)
Notes: 1Quota adjustments assumed in all LO scenarios for the Bay of Biscay
2Effort reallocation can be seasonal and between ﬂeets (the Danish case) and spatially (the French
case) or more efﬁcient effort use (the Cantabrian-NW case)
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• In the Galician mixed trawl case, all catches of species subject to TACs or MCRS
must be landed.
• In both Mediterranean cases, a 10% increase in daily variable costs and one more
crew member on-board are assumed to reﬂect the extra effort needed to bring
ashore unwanted catches. Three full implementation scenarios were examined for
the Greek case (Eastern Mediterranean) based on varying discard rates: (i) 5%
increase of daily costs, no extra crew member; (ii) 10% increase of daily costs,
10% extra crew (the original full implementation scenario); and (iii) 20% increase
of daily costs, 20% extra crew (based on the discard rates reported in the
literature). The reason for the extra full implementation scenarios was that,
according to ofﬁcial reports (DCF 2016), the percentage of hake and red mullet
discards in Greece had dropped to less than 5% since 2013; thus, this case differs
substantially from initial estimates that were based on the literature
(e.g. Tsagarakis et al. (2014)).
The analysed mitigation strategies (see Table 6.2) are different for each case,
reﬂecting the speciﬁc challenges each ﬂeet faces when the LO is introduced.
In the UK, Danish and French cases, the focus is on maximising quota utilisation.
For the Danish demersal ﬁshery, the effect of introducing a 5% de minimis exemp-
tion is analysed. In addition, economic effects of lowering the MCRS for cod
(making it possible to sell some fraction of cod below the previous MCRS) are
analysed. For the UK North Sea and West of Scotland mixed demersal ﬂeets, a
number of mitigation strategies are analysed: (i) allowance for catching and landing
species with zero TAC; (ii) as scenario (i) but with quota adjustment to all TAC
species; (iii) as scenario (ii) but with the possibility to reallocate effort to other areas
of operation to better utilise producer organisation (PO) quota; (iv) as scenario (iii)
but with quota reallocation allowed within the UK to maximise use of quotas; and
(v) as scenario (iv) but with international and national swaps at the level of the
baseline year incorporated and UK end of year quota reallocated to PO ﬂeets in need
of quota. The French mixed demersal ﬁshery in the English Channel case focused on
(i) quota adjustments for sole, plaice, cod and whiting and (ii) assuming that ﬁshers
can shift to ﬁsh in other areas.
The choke situation and having to land ﬁsh below MCRS are also issues in the
Spanish Atlantic cases. Thus the focus is on quota utilisation optimisation and on
ﬁshing gear selectivity. For the Spanish Bay of Biscay mixed demersal ﬁshery, the
focus is on investigating the economic effects of implementing (i) 5% de minimis
exemption, (ii) inter-year quota ﬂexibility, (iii) combining de minimis and inter-year
ﬂexibility and (iv) selectivity changes for the pair trawlers, given the single-species
nature of their catches (90% hake), assuming a change in minimum mesh size from
100 mm to 120 mm. For the Spanish demersal trawl ﬁshery in the Cantabrian-NW
region, the focus is on (i) 5% de minimis exemption and (ii) effects of improved
selectivity, e.g. through effort reallocation or non-compliance, assuming this will
reduce unwanted catches by 50%.
The two Mediterranean cases focus predominantly on selectivity issues, given
their high catches of unwanted species and ﬁsh below MCRS. For the Spanish
demersal trawl ﬁshery around the Balearic Islands (Western Mediterranean), several
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selectivity possibilities for hake are analysed: (i) no ﬁshing mortality for hake at age
0, (ii) no ﬁshing mortality of hake below MCRS (by decreasing the ﬁshing mortality
of age 1 individuals by 10%) and (iii) no ﬁshing mortality of immature individuals
(through modiﬁcation of age-selectivity parameters).
For the Greek demersal trawl and small-scale coastal ﬁshery in the Thermaikos
Gulf (Eastern Mediterranean), three selectivity scenarios are applied to both hake
and red mullet: (i) no ﬁshing mortality at age 0, (ii) no ﬁshing mortality below
MCRS (by additionally decreasing the ﬁshing mortality of age 1 individuals by
10%) and (iii) no ﬁshing mortality for hake and red mullet at ages 0 and 1 through
modiﬁcation of age-selectivity parameters.
6.3.2 The Model Tools
The analyses were done using different bioeconomic models constructed for the
geographical areas of the case study ﬂeets (Table 6.3). Given the level of detail and
complexity of each model, model descriptions are not provided in this chapter but
can be found in the references listed in Table 6.3. All but one of the models are
dynamic, evaluating the development of ﬂeet capacity, economic performance and
effort, together with stock dynamics, during the period 2015–2025. The exception is
the analysis of the Spanish trawl ﬁshery in the Cantabrian-NW region, which is
based on input-output models.
6.4 Results
Analyses of the economic consequences of implementing the LO include two parts,
ﬁrstly the economic outcome under the LO relative to the outcome if the LO had not
been introduced and secondly the LO mitigation scenarios benchmarked against the
LO scenario with no exemptions or other mitigation strategies included. These
results differ depending on whether they are evaluated in the short or long term.
Short term is deﬁned as a period in which only variable inputs can change (e.g. fuel
and crew) but not ﬁxed inputs such as vessels, equipment and gear, while in the long
term, all inputs can change.
Generally, some short-term negative economic effects of the LO can be expected.
The main reasons for this are (i) the choke species issue for ﬁsheries regulated with
quotas, whereby catch of some species is constrained once catch of another species
has reached its total quota, (ii) that landing of unwanted ﬁsh below MCRS and of
low market value will replace landings above MCRS and of high value and (iii) the
higher costs created by landing instead of discarding. The scale of these short-term
losses is case-speciﬁc. In the long term, choke situations and displacement of vessels
to other areas are expected to reduce ﬁshing pressure, leading to biomass increases
and thus improved ﬁshing possibilities. However, ensuing economic improvements
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will differ for individual ﬂeet segments and vessel businesses, depending on catch
composition and on whether TACs increase proportionally when biomasses
increase. If the latter is not the case, the choke situation may be enhanced.
Here we present a single year view of the economic outcome of the LO for the
considered ﬁsheries in 2025 assuming that the LO has been fully implemented
(Table 6.4). The exception to this is the Cantabrian-NW case that represents a static
view of the impact of the LO in an average year (based on 2014–2016) in the
Table 6.3 Model tools applied to evaluate the consequences of the LO for European case ﬁsheries
Fishery Model
North Sea, West of Scot-
land, Eastern English
channel: Mixed demersal
Danish North Sea demersal
ﬁshery
Fishrent: A bioeconomic proﬁt
maximisation model integrating,
and allowing feedback between, the
economy and the biology of the
ﬁshery (Frost et al. 2013)
UK mixed demersal ﬁsher-
ies in the North Sea, West of
Scotland and area 7
SEAFISH: Based on the Fishrent
structure, the SEAFISH simulation
model is developed to analyse the
activity of the total UK ﬂeet (Mardle
et al. 2017)
French demersal ﬁshery in
the Eastern English Channel
ISIS-Fish: A spatialised operational
simulation model which simulates
the dynamics of ﬁsh populations
and ﬂeets of the mixed ﬁsheries in
the Eastern Channel (Pelletier et al.
2009; Lehuta et al. 2015)
Mediterranean Spanish demersal ﬁshery in
the Western Mediterranean
MEFISTO (Mediterranean Fisher-
ies Simulation Tool): A
bioeconomic ﬁsheries simulation
model with an age-structured bio-
logical component (Lleonart et al.
2003, https://meﬁsto2017.
wordpress.com/)
Greek demersal ﬁshery in
the Thermaikos Gulf (East-
ern Mediterranean)
Spanish Atlantic ﬁsheries Spanish mixed demersal
trawl ﬁshery in the Bay of
Biscay
FLBEIA: A management strategy
evaluation model coupling eco-
nomic, biological and social
dimensions; it shares economic
structure with Fishrent but with an
age-structured biological compo-
nent (Garcia et al. 2017)
Spanish demersal trawl ﬁsh-
ery in the Cantabrian-NW
region
Input-output analysis: Based on
input-output tables for the Galician
Fishing and Preserved Fish Sectors
2011 (García-Negro et al. 2016), the
function of production of the ﬂeet
was recalculated considering the LO
and the biological data obtained
from IEO (Spanish Institute of
Oceanography) campaigns
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scenarios considering full implementation and de minimis, while the scenario con-
sidering ﬂexibility is a longer-term view, assuming a 50% reduction of catches in the
long term given improved effort reallocation or other means. Whether 2025 corre-
sponds to a long term will, to some degree, depend on the speciﬁc case study, i.e. on
whether adjustments are ongoing in the given ﬂeet or whether equilibrium is
reached. Theoretically, a better measure of impacts would have been the net present
Table 6.4 This table displays the economic outcomes in 2025 for the LO scenarios relative to the
scenario assuming no LO (business as usual)
Mitigation
measures3
North Sea, West of Scotland and
English Channel
Spanish Atlantic
fisheries
Mediterranean fisheries
Denmark UK France Bay of
Biscay
Cantabrian-
NW
Spain
(W. Med)
Greece (E.
Med)
Full LO 
implementation,
no exemptions
P R R P P P P
De minimis P P P
Year Transfer P
Mesh size
selectivity
P P P
Effort 
reallocation2
P R P
Quotaadjustment R R
Decrease
minimum
landings size
P
Catch allowance
for stocks with
zero TAC 
R
Vessel effort
movements
between metiers
R
Quota movement
(swaps)
R
For most scenarios the economic outcome is measured as the total proﬁt in 2025 for the included
ﬂeets, while for the UK and French cases, the economic outcome is measured in total revenue for
the included ﬂeets. Results at a glance: total economic result (proﬁt¼‘P’, revenue¼‘R’) in 2025
with LO implemented relative to the business-as-usual case (no LO)
Note: 1For the Spanish Cantabrian-NW case, the results represent the expected outcome in 2017
given the assumed scenario
2Effort reallocation can be seasonal and between ﬂeets (the Danish case) and spatially (the French
case) or more efﬁcient effort use (the Cantabrian-NW case)
3Yellow indicates less than 5% change, red indicates more than 5% decrease and green indicates
more than 5% increase
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value (NPV) covering the whole period from 2015 to 2025. However, not all models
included in the present synthesis are able to provide NPVs over that period, and it has
therefore been chosen to present the outcomes for 2025 alone.
In 2025, four of the seven case studies are expected to be negatively affected by
the LO, when no exemptions are assumed (see Table 6.4). The exceptions are the
Danish North Sea demersal ﬂeet, the Spanish Bay of Biscay ﬂeet and the Eastern
Mediterranean ﬂeet. The reasons for the expected economic losses are increased
daily and crew costs (Western Mediterranean case), the industry being unable to
process the previously discarded ﬁsh, and lost landings value due to cessation of
ﬁshing after choke situations (the UK and French cases). The assumption of constant
TACs in the French case probably exacerbates the problems and results in overly
pessimistic scenarios. For the Danish case, where choking on low-quota stocks is the
greatest concern, possible negative economic consequences of the LO are reduced
through (i) quota trade under the ITQ system in place and (ii) seasonal effort
ﬂexibility. In the Spanish mixed demersal ﬂeet in the Bay of Biscay, possible
economic losses are reduced by the effects of choke situations reducing mortality
and increasing stock size, i.e. under full implementation of the LO, other ﬂeets face
choke situations and cease ﬁshing before catching quotas of other stocks, such that
the target species stock size increases in the long term, thus increasing catch
possibilities (Prellezo et al. 2016). In the Eastern Mediterranean case study, the
percentage of discards for hake and red mullet that are ofﬁcially reported is below
5% for trawlers and even lower for netters (DCF 2016). For that reason, the full LO
implementation scenario will result in very low increase (< 5%) in the daily costs and
will not necessarily require an extra crew member to handle the extra catch.
Compared with how the case study ﬁsheries would have evolved without the LO,
the LO implemented with mitigation measures is, in some cases, expected to make
the ﬁsheries equally or better off in 2025. This is so for the Danish North Sea
demersal ﬁshery, as the ITQ management system makes it possible for the ﬂeets
involved to avoid choke situations through quota trade and seasonal effort ﬂexibility.
For the Spanish demersal ﬁshery in the Bay of Biscay, interannual quota ﬂexibility
(with a limit of 10% of the initial quota) and increased selectivity (assuming an
increase in minimum mesh size from 100 mm to 120 mm) also limit the possible
negative economic effects of the LO. However, the application of the de minimis
exemption has a negative effect in the long term. The application of the de minimis
exemption increases the ﬁshing mortalities compared to the case with no LO and the
harvest control rule will then reduce the advised TAC for the next year (which then
happens every year). Thus, the penalty imposed, given increased ﬁshing mortalities,
is higher than the ﬂexibility gained by the exemption itself.
Increased selectivity also makes the ﬁshery better off for the Spanish ﬁshery
around the Balearic Islands (Western Mediterranean) and for the Greek trawl and
small-scale coastal ﬁshery in the Thermaikos Gulf, especially if the catch of imma-
ture hake individuals is totally avoided, which raises the proﬁt in 2025 above what
could be expected without the LO.
At a glance Table 6.4 shows that for most of the analysed ﬁsheries, their
economic outcome will be negatively affected in the long term by the LO. But the
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possibility to trade quotas, both nationally and internationally, and for some ﬂeets
increased selectivity and/or year-transfers may mitigate this effect.
Under the LO, a key question is to what degree the overall negative economic
outcome can be avoided through appropriate mitigation measures. Table 6.5 shows
the economic outcome in 2025 in the mitigation strategy scenarios for each of the
analysed ﬁsheries, relative to the expected situation in 2025, assuming full imple-
mentation of the LO with no exemptions.
Half of the mitigation strategies analysed do not signiﬁcantly improve the eco-
nomic outcome relative to full implementation of the LO with no exemptions (see
Table 6.5). This is the case for the Spanish trawl ﬁshery in the Bay of Biscay when
Table 6.5 Results at a glance: total economic result (proﬁt¼‘P’, revenue¼‘R’) in 2025 with
mitigations relative to full implementation of the LO with no mitigations
Mitigation
measures3
North Sea, West of Scotland and
English Channel
Spanish Atlantic
fisheries
Mediterranean fisheries
Denmark UK France Bay of
Biscay
Cantabrian-
NW
Spain,
(W. Med)
Greece (E.
Med)
De minimis P P P
Year Transfer P
Mesh size
selectivity P
P P
Flexibility
(effort
reallocation)
P R P
Quota
adjustment
R R
Decrease
minimum
landings size
P
Catch allowance
for stocks with
zero TAC 
Vessel effort
movements
between métiers
Quota 
movement 
(swaps)
R
R
R
Note: 1For the Spanish Cantabrian-NW case, the results represent the expected outcome in 2017
given the assumed scenario
2Effort reallocation can be seasonal and between ﬂeets (the Danish case) and spatially (the French
case) or more efﬁcient effort use (the Cantabrian-NW case)
3Yellow indicates less than 5% change, red indicates more than 5% decrease and green indicates
more than 5% increase
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inter-year quota transfers and increased mesh size selectivity are introduced. Like-
wise, the de minimis exemption in the Spanish ﬁshery in the Cantabrian-NW region
does not lead to an increased economic result compared to when no exemptions are
applied. In parallel with this, applying the de minimis exemption leads to a reduced
economic result for the Spanish demersal ﬁshery in the Bay of Biscay, because
increased ﬁshing pressure leads to higher mortality and reduced hake and megrim
stocks and thus reduced ﬁshing possibilities. Likewise, for the French ﬁshery in the
Eastern English Channel, applying increased ﬂexibility through spatial effort
reallocation leads to a decreased economic result compared to the LO with no
mitigation strategies.
Mitigation strategies that do increase the economic outcome relative to the full
implementation of the LO with no exemptions are (i) quota adjustments in the
French demersal ﬁshery in the Eastern English Channel, (ii) more efﬁcient effort
use leading to reduced unwanted catches in the Spanish ﬁshery in the Cantabrian-
NW region, (iii) increased selectivity in the Spanish ﬁshery around the Balearic
Islands (Western Mediterranean) and (iv) all mitigation strategies (quota adjustment,
catch allowance for zero TAC stocks, vessel movements between metiers and quota
swaps) considered for the UK ﬁshing ﬂeets, but the scale of changes depend on the
ﬁshing ﬂeets concerned (North Sea and West of Scotland).
Thus, at a glance, Table 6.5 shows that for the analysed ﬁsheries, the most
effective mitigation strategies depend on both the ﬁshing ﬂeet and the management
system in place. Model structure and the assumptions applied in the models may also
inﬂuence the results, but all models have been calibrated and tested against the actual
situation in each case study. It is thus believed that the relative results provided in
each case study are good indicators of the effects of the LO and applied mitigation
strategies.
6.5 Summary and Policy Recommendations
To assess the likely ﬂeet economic repercussions of the Landing Obligation,
bioeconomic models covering seven European ﬁsheries have been applied to esti-
mate the economic performance of ﬂeets before and after implementing the LO. The
selected ﬁsheries cover different species compositions and ﬁshing technologies and
different management systems ranging from the North East Atlantic to the
Mediterranean.
When the four groups of factors that encourage discarding, i.e. institutional,
biological, technological and economical, are combined, the main issues to address
are (i) that certain stocks cause a choke species situation for some ﬂeets; (ii) landings
of small or damaged ﬁsh, which have low market values; and (iii) illegal high-
grading as a consequence of the two former issues when vessel operators seek to
maximise their proﬁts. Consequently, it is important to improve catch selectivity
through gear changes, changes to ﬁshing patterns and effort reallocation and to apply
management measures that decrease effects of choke situations, such as enabling
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quotas to be traded or reallocated. Finally, the use of price measures (deemed value)
that consider the differences between market prices and the social value of the ﬁsh
should be considered to reduce the relative beneﬁts of high-grading (Pascoe 1997).
In the short term, when ﬂeet structure has not adapted to the new situation, the
introduction of the LO will generally result in decreasing proﬁts for all selected ﬂeets
mainly because of choke situations constraining the catch of other species in
TAC-regulated ﬁsheries and because of lower catches of higher-value larger ﬁsh
given the requirement to land undersize ﬁsh in MCRS-regulated ﬁsheries. Obvi-
ously, this is of concern for vessel operators, who see the risk that their economic
performance will deteriorate.
In the long term, economic repercussions will differ as the four factors mentioned
above interact in different ways for each ﬁshery and the type of management affects
the options for businesses to adjust. In the Mediterranean, which is managed with
MCRS and has a wide variety of species, the main anticipated issue is the cost of
dealing with undersized ﬁsh which cannot be sold for human consumption and for
which there is a lack of processing facilities to make it into ﬁshmeal or other
non-food products. This issue also applies to the northern ﬁsheries, but here the
choke issue also plays a role. Countries that have tradable quota systems, such as
Denmark and the UK, can, to some degree, avoid or delay choke situations through
quota trade. While trading is possible however, there are no mechanisms to ensure or
require trading of quota units to mitigate choke situations. The choke issue could be
more severe for stocks managed by non-transferable quota shares such as in France
and Spain. Although long-term proﬁts are expected to increase, some vessel busi-
nesses may not have the ﬁnancial resources to overcome the severe economic losses
predicted during the ﬁrst years of implementation. Some governments might ﬁnd it
appropriate to implement measures to ensure that businesses do not fail as a result of
short-term impacts of a fully implemented Landing Obligation.
What deﬁnes the short and long term depends on the individual ﬁsheries and how
fast these are able to adjust to the new situation. It must be expected that the ﬂeet
structure will have adapted in ~10 years for most of the analysed ﬁshing ﬂeets, which
is why it has been chosen to monitor the results in 2025 in the present context.
Mitigation strategies such as selectivity changes, de minimis exemptions and
quota adjustments equal to previous discarded quantities could enable ﬁshing busi-
nesses to increase proﬁts with the implementation of the LO. But for the ﬁsheries
analysed in this chapter, the proﬁts are generally lower than or equal to proﬁt with no
LO. For the North East Atlantic ﬁsheries, regulated with TACs and quotas, a useful
policy could be to further develop a system to mitigate the problem of choke stocks.
Such a policy is already in place in the EU (cf. Frost 2010) through the annual setting
of TACs, when single-species assessments show recommended total removals that
are adjusted to take account of multispecies interactions and ﬂeets’ technological
characteristics. Reducing differences between stock TACs and ﬂeets’ catch compo-
sitions could mitigate the choke problem and allow individuals, producer organisa-
tions or ﬂeet segments to land and sell ﬁsh and decrease the inherent incentive to
discard. However, this approach would also to some extent negate the purpose of the
Landing Obligation, which is to encourage more selective ﬁshing by creating
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incentives to avoid catching species with lower quotas. To create incentives to avoid
catching ﬁsh below MCRS, price measures could be used to correct the difference
between the sale price and the estimated social value of the ﬁsh. The difference must
be sufﬁcient to cover handling costs of landing the ﬁsh, and thus create an incentive
to do so, but not high enough to incentivise targeting the ﬁsh beyond the quota, and
vice versa to reduce prices for ﬁsh species with unused quotas.
Generally, the modelled economic outcomes for the seven selected ﬁsheries
under the LO suggest that ﬁshing businesses may have incentives not to comply
with the LO. Monitoring and enforcement are generally considered to be currently
insufﬁcient to motivate compliance. Therefore, high-grading and continuing to
discard will still be an issue that must be addressed. The success of the LO is likely
to require either larger investment in monitoring and enforcement or implementation
of policies that create incentives for compliance or at least weaken incentives for
non-compliance.
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Chapter 7
The Impact of Fisheries Discards
on Scavengers in the Sea
Jochen Depestele, Jordan Feekings, David G. Reid, Robin Cook,
Didier Gascuel, Raphael Girardin, Michael Heath, Pierre-Yves Hernvann,
Telmo Morato, Ambre Soszynski, and Marie Savina-Rolland
Abstract A scavenger is an animal that feeds on dead animals (carrion) that it has
not killed itself. Fisheries discards are often seen as an important food source for
marine scavengers so the reduction of discards due to the Landing Obligation may
affect their populations. The literature on scavenging in marine ecosystems is
considerable, due to its importance in the trophic ecology of many species. Although
discards undoubtedly contribute to these species’ food sources, few can be seen to be
solely dependent on carrion (including discards). Ecosystem models predicted that
discards contributed very little to the diet of scavengers at a regional scale. A
reduction in discards through the Landing Obligation may therefore affect
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populations for a few species in some areas, but generally this is unlikely to be the
case. But it is challenging to identify how important discards might be to scavengers,
as they are taxonomically diverse and vary in the role they play in scavenging
interactions.
Keywords Carrion · Discard consumption · Food subsidies · Food web models ·
Scavengers
7.1 Introduction
Trophic interactions are increasingly recognized as an important driver of ecosystem
change (Pikitch et al. 2004; Möllman et al. 2015). Foraging relationships primarily
focus on predator-prey interactions while the consumption of carrion, as a high-
quality form of dead animal matter, has received far less attention in the ecosystem
context. There is considerable literature at the experimental level, but very few
studies have brought this information to the higher level of assessing the actual
role of discards/carrion in the marine food web. Carrion consumption should
however have different consequences for the structure and functioning of food
webs than predation, because it does not cause direct mortality or demographic
changes (Wilson and Wolkovich 2011).
A scavenger is an animal that feeds on dead animals (carrion) that it has not killed
itself (Dictionary 2018). Obligate scavengers are those that rely on carrion for
survival and reproduction. Facultative scavengers are those species that will scav-
enge, but do not depend solely on carrion for their survival or reproduction (Beasley
et al. 2015). On land, vultures are believed to be the only obligate vertebrate
scavengers (DeVault et al. 2016). In the sea some benthic scavengers (e.g., hagﬁsh,
Lysianassidae amphipods) may also be obligate scavengers (Kaiser and Moore
1999; Smith and Baco 2003; Beasley et al. 2012). Facultative scavengers, in
contrast, are widely present in the marine environment and range from nematodes
to crustaceans, echinoderms, molluscs, ﬁsh and marine mammals (Jensen 1987;
Luque et al. 2006).
Apart from whale deaths, recordings of naturally-occurring marine carrion in the
sea are limited (Britton and Morton 1994; Smith and Baco 2003). The lack of
naturally-occurring carrion may be due to few animals dying from natural senes-
cence (Britton and Morton 1994) or to their rapid consumption by scavengers
(Kaiser and Moore 1999). Fisheries produce non-discarded carrion due to mortality
in the tow path or organisms escaping the capture process (Broadhurst et al. 2006;
Collie et al. 2017; Hiddink et al. 2017). Marine carrion from ﬁsheries discards was
globally estimated to have been less than 5 million tonnes in 1950, rising to a peak of
18.8 million in 1989 and now less than 10 million tons per year (Kelleher 2005;
Zeller et al. 2018).
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Fisheries discards are often perceived as an important source of food for marine
scavengers that may be lost if discarding stops. A decline in European ﬁsheries
discards is currently envisaged with the gradual phasing in of the Landing Obligation
(EU 2013). Such a lack of discards may have knock-on effects on seabird
populations and communities (Votier et al. 2004; Bicknell et al. 2013) and this
may also be true for non-avian marine scavengers, depending on their position along
the obligate-to-facultative scavenging continuum.
This chapter focuses on scavengers in the sea rather than scavenging by seabirds.
Two approaches were used to assess the impact of discards on scavengers in the sea:
(1) a review of knowledge from ﬁeld observations and (2) modelling studies.
Noticeably, the review of ﬁeld observations (Sect. 7.2) is less directly dealing with
the EU Landing Obligation itself compared to other chapters of this book. But this
study represents the ﬁrst published synthesis on the fundamental knowledge on the
biological and ecological processes involved in scavenging, and thus provides a very
comprehensive and novel overview on the resilience of scavengers in the sea and on
their potential ability to switch to other food sources if ﬁsheries discards are reduced.
This improved understanding of the processes involved will then be useful for a
more accurate parameterization of the ecosystem models presented in the second part
of this chapter. The ﬁnal section of this chapter ‘Synthesis and outlook’ summarizes
information about discard-scavenger interactions and how to progress knowledge on
this topic.
7.2 Field Observations of Discard-Scavenger Interactions
Fisheries discards are considered to be an important food source for marine scaven-
gers in the sea (e.g. Link and Almeida 2002; Fondo et al. 2015). Several ﬁeld studies
have been conducted using various observational techniques in various locations and
seasons (Yamamura 1997; Groenewold 2000). Here we review these studies and
empirical information with the overall objective of (1) identifying scavenger taxa
and (2) scaling scavenger taxa along the continuum of obligate to facultative
scavenging. In Sect. 7.2.4, we discuss the relevance of these observational studies
to the assessment of discard-consumer candidates and highlight current
knowledge gaps.
7.2.1 Methodological Approach
7.2.1.1 List of Observational Studies
We listed observational studies that identiﬁed organisms that are attracted to discards
or to marine carrion (presented as a proxy for discards). Most of the reviewed studies
used baited traps or lines (N ¼ 16) or baited video frames (N ¼ 16; Fig. 7.1)
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to observe interactions between scavengers and marine carrion. Alternative obser-
vational techniques made use of laboratory observations (N ¼ 8), stomach analyses
(N ¼ 6) or divers (N ¼ 3). We also included seven studies that investigated
aggregations, increased abundances or stomach contents of scavengers after the
passage of a trawl, including the reaction of scavengers to carrion produced in the
tow path and/or carrion from discards (Kaiser and Hiddink 2007). Three ﬁeld studies
on scavenging at ghost ﬁshing nets have also been listed (Gilman 2015). These
observations were complemented with studies of interactions between surface scav-
engers and discards from spatial interaction analysis in combination with direct
observations by eye or using remote sensing systems with GPS-referenced data
(Bicknell et al. 2016). The extensive series of observational studies are documented
in Table 7.A of the Electronic supplementary material1 to this chapter.
The majority of the studies were done in Europe and thus have a direct relevance
to the EU discard policy (30 out of 43 studies). Most studies were conducted at or
near the seabed (N ¼ 39, with one in the intertidal zone), with three studies in the
mesopelagic zone and only four studies at the water surface; 20 studies were done on
Fig. 7.1 Images taken from a baited camera trial in the Kattegat. (Photo courtesy Feekings,
unpublished data; Feekings and Krag 2015)
1Table 7.A in the Online Supplement refers to an extensive overview of studies investigating
interactions between discards and scavengers.
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the continental shelf and 6 in deep sea areas (> 500 m). The number of studies in the
various depth zones of the sea (surface, mesopelagic and bentho-demersal zone)
suggest how much aquatic scavenging activity is occurring in each zone. The limited
number of studies in the mesopelagic zone is partly due to high sinking rates of the
carrion, although it may also reﬂect the difﬁculty in studying carrion-scavenger
interactions in that zone.
7.2.1.2 Review of Empirical Information and Observational Studies
Empirical information and observational studies were reviewed in two steps to
address the objectives of: (1) scavenger identiﬁcation and (2) scavenger scaling
along the obligate to facultative scavenging continuum.
Scavenger Identiﬁcation
Primary scavenger taxa from observational studies were identiﬁed (Table 7.A in the
Online Supplement). This list of scavenger taxa complements the species enumer-
ation from Britton and Morton (1994) with recent studies (1990–2017) but requires
caution in determining the relative importance of different scavenger groups as
consumers of marine carrion, because the different techniques used have technical
constraints in determining species composition. The retention efﬁciency and mesh
sizes of the different types of traps, for instance, may cause bias in the observed
abundances.
The list of scavenger species from observational studies were complemented
using data from commercial baited ﬁsheries. Species were listed as scavenger
species when annual landings between 2003 and 2016 exceeded 1 ton in ICES
Subdivisions IV and VII a, d, f and VIIg. This list of species excluded discarded taxa.
Discard data were available from French and UK longline ﬁsheries (Da Silva 2009;
Cornou et al. 2015). A list of species which are highly discarded (more than half of
the catch) was provided for the French and UK commercial baited ﬁsheries. These
species generally comprise < 10% of the total catch of all species combined
(in weight).
Assessing Scavenger Abilities
The variety of species covered in the overview of ﬁeld studies (Table 7.A in the
Online Supplement) and the species from commercial baited ﬁsheries highlighted
recurrent characteristics across all scavengers in the sea: from the surface into the
seabed and from marine mammals to infaunal invertebrates. The overview showed
that a vast range of marine aquatic taxa utilize a scavenging lifestyle to a lesser or
greater extent along the facultative-obligate scavenging continuum.
Species that rely on scavenging to sustain substantial portions of their diets must
encounter a sufﬁcient amount of carrion and must be able to out-compete potential
competitors and efﬁciently assimilate carrion to meet their energetic requirements
(Ruxton et al. 2014; Kane et al. 2017). We summarized the suite of biological and
functional traits that increase carrion discovery and monopoly (Table 7.A in the
Online Supplement) because these traits can be used to assess any organism’s ability
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to scavenge, i.e. to scale an organism along the obligate to facultative scavenging
continuum.
A scale of scavenging was developed to predict the qualitative importance of
carrion in a scavenger’s diet (DeVault et al. 2003; Kane et al. 2017) and to partition
the encountered carrion between scavenging taxa. This approach is analogous to the
partitioning of ﬁsheries discards between aerial and aquatic scavengers, which is
presented in Depestele et al. (2016).
Two principal parameters of optimal foraging strategy were used to this end:
(1) encounter probability and (2) handling tactics.
1. Encounter probability is the likelihood to come across carrion or ﬁsheries dis-
cards. Carrion availability is, in general, relatively unpredictable, ephemeral and
of short duration (Britton and Morton 1994; Kaiser and Moore 1999; DeVault
et al. 2003; Yang et al. 2010). Scavengers can either scan vast areas at low
metabolic cost to detect carrion or have limited home ranges where carrion is
regularly produced and rapidly detected and encountered (Schlacher et al. 2013;
Moleón et al. 2014). Four traits are presented to assess whether an organism is
likely to ﬁnd carrion quickly: home range, detection ability, locomotion and
metabolism, the latter is the rate at which animals expend energy in relation to
its acquisition (via feeding) (Brown et al. 2004). Scavengers are expected to
reduce energetic maintenance costs to allow for longer inter-feeding periods
(Kane et al. 2017).
2. Upon encountering carrion, scavengers require handling tactics to overcome
competitors and maximize nutrient gains during feeding so that they can replenish
their reserves until the next, unpredictable discovery of carrion (Ruxton and
Houston 2004). Two traits, i.e. competitive abilities and capacity to facilitate
the consumption of the encountered carrion, are presented to evaluate whether an
organism is well ﬁtted to scavenge.
Both parameters must occur to promote an organism’s ability to ﬁnd and consume
carrion like ﬁsheries discards (Depestele et al. 2016). The traits within each param-
eter do not necessarily work multiplicatively or additively, but taken together, they
make up a qualitative scale of scavenging abilities that can be applied to any species
to assess the likely relative encounter and consumption of carrion in relation to other
scavenging taxa (Greene, 1986; Kane et al. 2017).
7.2.2 Identiﬁcation of Scavenging Taxa
7.2.2.1 Observational Studies
A few studies highlight the importance of marine mammals as surface scavengers
(killer whales, dolphins and seals), but most studies focused on the identiﬁcation of
taxa in association with the seabed. Demersal ﬁsh scavengers that were identiﬁed in
more than ten ﬁeld studies in Table 7.A in the Online Supplement included the
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orders Gadiformes and Perciformes. Interestingly, both orders also occurred fre-
quently in longline landings (Sect. 7.2.2.2). Gadiformes covered several families:
Gadidae (e.g. Gadus morhua,Merlangius merlangus), Merluccidae (e.g.Merluccius
merluccius), Lotidae (e.g. Molva molva), Moridae (e.g. Antimora rostrata) and
Macrouridae (e.g. Macrourus holotrachys). Perciformes also occurred frequently
and were represented by several families: Sparidae, Labridae, Callionymidae,
Zoarcidae, Trachinidae, Scombridae, Gobiidae. Fish taxa that were observed in
fewer studies (N ¼ 4–10) or in longline discards (see below) were sharks belonging
to the Carcharhiniformes (e.g. Scyliorhinus canicula), or taxa from the orders
Myxiniformes (hagﬁshes), Anguilliformes (e.g. Conger conger), Pleuronectiformes
(e.g. Limanda limanda) and Scorpaeniformes (e.g. Triglidae). Rajiformes and
Squaliformes occurred in less than four studies.
Invertebrate taxa were dominated by Decapoda, in particular Brachyura (>10
studies) like Cancer pagurus, Hyas araneus, Maja spp. and portunid crabs
(e.g. Carcinus maenas, Liocarcinus spp. and Necora puber). Amphipoda
(Orchomene spp., Scopelocheirus hopei), Isopoda (e.g. Natatolana borealis),
Asteroidea (e.g. Asterias rubens), Ophiuroidea and Neogastropoda (in particular
Buccinidae and Nassariidae) were also attracted to bait in at least ten studies. Taxa
encountered in fewer studies (N¼ 3–10) were Cephalopoda, as well as hermit crabs,
lobsters and shrimps, i.e. Decapoda belonging to the Anomura (Paguroidea,
e.g. Pagurus bernhardus), Nephropoidea (e.g. Homarus gammarus and Nephrops
norvegicus) or the Caridea (e.g. Crangon crangon). Polychaeta and Nemertea were
identiﬁed in less than three studies, which is likely due to the mesh sizes used in the
sampling methods. Landings from pot ﬁsheries highlighted the importance of
brachyuran Decapoda, whelks (Buccinum undatum) and Cephalopods.
7.2.2.2 Commercial Baited Fisheries
Scavenger species from landings data of commercial baited ﬁsheries are listed in
Table 7.1. Species which were discarded in French and UK commercial baited
ﬁsheries were: Conger conger, sharks and ray species (Galeus melastomus,Mustelus
spp., Raja undulata, Scyliorhinus spp.) and quota-limited species like Brosme
brosme, Helicolenus dactylopterus, Phycis blennoides orMicromesistius poutassou.
7.2.3 Assessing Scavenger Abilities
7.2.3.1 Encounter Probability: Home Range
Most marine organisms exhibit site ﬁdelity, i.e. their movements are directed and
conﬁned to a smaller area rather than random. Routine activities like resting,
spawning and feeding are done in established areas, deﬁned as their home range
(Pittman and McAlpine 2003). Home ranges are related to foraging strategies which
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are broadly categorized as (1) scavengers employing a sit-and-wait strategy and
(2) those actively foraging in search of carrion, the free-ranging strategy (Greene
1986; Higginson and Ruxton 2015).
The nature of the sit-and-wait strategy conﬁnes the home range of the scavenger
to a smaller radius of activity. Carrion detection of ‘sit-and-wait’ scavengers typi-
cally requires well-developed sensory capabilities (Sect. 7.2.3.2) but offers in return
the advantage of refuge from predation and low metabolic costs (Løkkeborg et al.
2000; Bailey and Priede 2002). Hagﬁshes are a primary example of ﬁsh taxa with a
sedentary life style and low metabolic requirements (Lesser et al. 1997). The ‘sit-
and-wait’ strategy of scavengers has been observed in ﬁeld trials as they rapidly
arrive at carrion e.g. snake eels (Ophichthus rufus) and amphipods (Sect. 7.2.3.3;
Table 7.A in the Online Supplement). These rapid responses, reﬂected in short
arrival times in baited experiments, have been used to model ﬁsh scavenger abun-
dances (Bailey et al. 2007). Several amphipod and isopod species with small home
ranges (Sainte-Marie 1986; Sainte-Marie and Hargrave 1987; Groenewold and
Fonds 2000; Johansen 2000) are candidates that quickly respond to odour plumes
(Tamburri and Barry 1999).
Free-ranging scavengers typically occupy larger areas to search for food and may
apply a range of search techniques to encounter carrion. Bailey and Priede (2002)
described two techniques in the deep sea: (1) drifting on ambient currents and
detecting carrion by the sound produced by other animals feeding and (2) cross-
current swimming which increases the probability of detecting carrion, albeit at a
Table 7.1 Landings of commercially valuable scavenger species from pot and longline ﬁsheries
between 2003–2016, extracted from ﬁsheries data collection website (JRC 2018)
Scientiﬁc name Common name
Mean annual landings
(tons)
Pot ﬁsheries Cancer pagurus Edible crab 233
Buccinum undatum Common whelk 232
Homarus gammarus European lobster 27
Maja squinado Spinous spider crab 12
Necora puber velvet swimming
crab
9
Sepiidae, Sepiolidae Cuttleﬁshes, 6
Sepia ofﬁcinalis Common cuttleﬁsh 2
Carcinus maenas Shore crab 2
Longline
ﬁsheries
Scomber scombrus Mackerel 22
Merluccius
merluccius
Hake 12
Gadus morhua Atlantic cod 4
Dicentrarchus labrax Seabass 3
Molva molva Ling 2
Pollachius pollachius Pollack 2
Squalus acanthias Spiny dogﬁsh 2
Conger conger Conger eel 2
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high-energy cost. Free-ranging facultative scavengers in continental shelf areas
actively forage with little, if any, knowledge of resource availability (Sims et al.
2008). When resources are sparse and patchily distributed, several species, including
sharks and teleost ﬁsh, exhibit Lévy ﬂights (where area-restricted search (ARS)
behaviour is alternated with movements across longer distances to detect resources –
Fauchald and Tveraa 2003), while Brownian movements occur when resources are
abundant (Humphries et al. 2010; Sims et al. 2012). ARS-behaviour has been
observed in facultative free-ranging scavengers like plaice Pleuronectes platessa
(Hill et al. 2000), cod Gadus morhua (Løkkeborg and Fernö 1999) and ling Molva
molva (Løkkeborg et al. 2000) and over larger areas by Atlantic cod than by ling,
which increases the probability of carrion encounters. Highly mobile generalist
species like cod and sharks generally occupy larger home ranges than less mobile
specialist such as gobies, Conger conger and epibenthic invertebrates like Cancer
pagurus and Maja squinado (Pittman and McAlpine 2003; Pita and Freire 2011;
Abecasis et al. 2014; Carlson et al. 2014). The combination of ARS-behaviour and
larger home ranges increases the probability of encountering carrion that does not
normally constitute part of their diet. When accounting for the spatial extent of home
ranges, one should acknowledge that free-ranging scavengers may establish different
areas for spawning and feeding. And feeding areas may vary further diurnally,
monthly, seasonally and by animal personality, which can affect their interest in
scavenging (Yamamura 1997; Hunter et al. 2005; Humphries et al. 2017; Villegas-
Ríos et al. 2018).
7.2.3.2 Encounter Probability: Detection Ability
Foraging by ﬁsh and marine invertebrates typically consists of various phases with
distinctly different characteristics (Hara 2011; Kamio and Derby 2017). The ﬁrst
phase, ﬁnding food, involves food detection whereby scavengers are alerted by a
stimulus. Initial arousal is followed by a search, involving orienting and tracking the
food source. The second phase, food selection and consumption, typically involves
other mechanisms, which are discussed in Sect. 7.2.3.5.
The sensory mechanisms for distant food detection in aquatic environments are
primarily olfactory (smell) and gustatory (taste), rather than vision, electro- or
mechanoreception (Løkkeborg et al. 2010). Whereas terrestrial scavengers may
discriminate themselves from non-scavengers by well-developed olfactory senses
(Kane et al. 2017; Verheggen et al. 2017), the distinction is much less pronounced in
benthic and demersal aquatic environments where visibility is much lower and
olfactory search behaviour is more predominant across a variety of taxa and foraging
types (Seibel and Drazen 2007; Paul et al. 2011; Puglisi et al. 2014). Also, the
chemical composition of the cues does not distinguish between marine scavenging
and non-scavenging taxa, as non-nutritious metabolic waste from urine or other
tissues of living organisms might also signal the presence of prey. The presence of
odour in water is long-lasting (hours) over long distances (hundreds of meters) and
has promoted evolutionary chemoreception beyond the exclusive domain of
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scavengers. Nearly all demersal ﬁsh and benthic invertebrates use olfaction for
distant food detection and respond to similar threshold levels (Kohn 1961; Croll
1983; Zimmer-Faust 1987; Hara 1994; Derby and Sorensen 2008; Hay 2011;
Løkkeborg et al. 2014; Kamio and Derby 2017).
While the detection thresholds of amino acids in live prey may not be species-
speciﬁc (Hara 1994), various species show different behaviours when presented with
choices between living, damaged or dead prey (Jenkins et al. 2004; Brewer and
Konar 2005). Two deep-sea scavengers for instance, the hagﬁsh Eptatretus stouti
and the amphipod Orchomenella obtusa, began searching for dead and decaying
food within seconds while they did not for odours that reﬂected live prey (Tamburri
and Barry 1999). The ratio of amino acids to ammonia decreases with increasing
carrion age, which may reﬂect relatively decreasing nutritional quality and elicit
different responses across scavenging taxa (Zimmer-Faust 1987). Fisheries discards
constitute a variety of living, damaged and dead organisms (Depestele et al. 2014)
and may, as such, attract scavengers along a continuum of those preferring freshly
killed carrion to those depredating on merely damaged and/or live prey (Table 7.A in
the Online Supplement). Dead discards could be colonized by bacteria in a few days,
which will then deter certain higher-order scavengers (Burkepile et al. 2006; Hussain
et al. 2013). These processes may lead to a clear succession of scavengers in deep-
sea environments and for larger carcasses (Smith and Baco 2003; Quaggiotto et al.
2016). In continental shelf areas, it is more likely that dead discards will not reside in
the benthic environment for longer than a few days (Groenewold and Fonds 2000),
and therefore primarily attract higher-order scavengers which will consume the
freshly killed carrion before it can fragment by physical forces and deteriorate.
Even the scraps created by wasteful feeders that macerate carrion may be fed upon
by indirect feeders before becoming available to detritivores (Davenport et al. 2016).
It is therefore not so much the detection threshold of carrion which will determine
whether an organism will encounter carrion or not, but rather the combination of
response time following detection (see arrival times in Table 7.A in the Online
Supplement) and the area of attraction. Groenewold and Fonds (2000) estimated, for
instance, that the attraction areas of gadoids reached up to 1200 m2, of amphipods,
hermit crabs and swimming crabs to 100 m2, of starﬁsh, whelks, dab, shrimp and
brittle stars between 10 and 100 m2 and attraction areas were less than 10 m2 for
gobies, solenette, sea urchins and sandstars. Both response time and attraction area
are thought to be a function of swimming abilities (Sect. 7.2.3.3), intrinsic motiva-
tion (e.g. hunger status, Moore and Howarth 1996; Laidre and Elwood 2008), local
enhancement (e.g. through mucus secretion by conspeciﬁcs Lee et al. 2004) or social
learning behaviour (Ryer and Olla 1992; Brown and Laland 2003) as well as a
function of environmental variability (e.g. currents, substratum – Bailey and Priede
2002; Stoner 2004), diel rhythm (Bozzano and Sardá 2002) and ﬁshery-related
stimuli (e.g. acoustic cues from ﬁshery-generated noise – Thode et al. 2007).
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7.2.3.3 Encounter Probability: Locomotion
Locomotion performance is another important driver in ﬁnding carrion, and can be
considered as a trade-off between extensive searching to ﬁnd carrion fast versus
limited searching with extended resting times between feeding bouts (Ruxton and
Bailey 2005). Sit-and-wait scavengers will typically reduce searching and invest in
rapid reaction upon carrion detection. Hagﬁsh, for instance, respond quickly to
carrion (Tamburri and Barry 1999) and move fast towards it despite their limited
swimming capabilities (Collins et al. 1999). In contrast to other burrowing scaven-
gers like Nephrops norvegicus which only forage upon carrion in the vicinity of their
safe burrows (Nickell and Atkinson 1995), it is likely that hagﬁshes aggregate close
to a previous feeding area to increase the probability of carrion encounters (Martinez
et al. 2011). Free-ranging scavengers, in contrast, invest to a greater extent in
scanning large areas to increase probabilities of encountering carrion. This foraging
strategy is efﬁcient when they can cover vast areas at a low energetic cost (Ruxton
and Bailey 2005). The high energetic cost of swimming for marine mammals for
instance (Williams 1999) means that they need to trade-off metabolic costs and
carrion encounter between natural foraging behaviours and scavenging upon dis-
cards following ﬁshing vessels. Whether marine mammals adapt to a scavenging
lifestyle may also vary between individuals (see examples in Table 7.A in the Online
Supplement). Other large marine organisms, like sharks, have been proposed as
good scavenging candidates, as their large pectoral ﬁns are adapted to cruising
swimming (Carrier et al. 2004), much like typically obligate aerial scavengers,
such as vultures (Kane et al. 2017). Indeed, cruising specialists like sharks and
scombrids (Videler and He 2010) appeared regularly in ﬁeld trials (Sect. 7.2.2).
Similarly, taxa with increased swimming abilities like Gadiformes and Perciformes
occurred in a larger number of studies than orders with lower swimming speed such
as Pleuronectiformes, Rajiformes and Anguilliformes (Videler and He 2010; van
Weerden et al. 2014). Several ﬁeld studies also showed that ﬁsh arrived ﬁrst,
followed by fast-moving invertebrates like decapod crustaceans and lastly by
slow-moving foragers such as starﬁsh and whelks (Table 7.A in the Online Supple-
ment). Swimming abilities are therefore an important driver to determine an organ-
ism’s ability to move towards carrion fast.
7.2.3.4 Encounter Probability: Metabolism
Animal biology and ecology depends on metabolism to fuel vital activities, such as
foraging (Glazier 2014; Harrison 2017). Metabolic rate (MR) provides an objective
measure to attribute cost to their activities like locomotion, predator-prey interac-
tions and to assess what animals do compared to some optimal behaviour, i.e. a
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behaviour that maximizes one or more biological characteristics such as growth or
reproductive success (Metcalfe et al. 2016a, b) or a scavenger versus a predator
strategy. Body size and temperature are primary determinants of respiration (Brown
et al. 2004) but once accounted for, metabolic rate also reveals much about activities
like foraging and the risk of being eaten (Hirst and Forster 2013; Glazier 2014). In an
interplay with locomotive performance, carrion detection and foraging time, scav-
engers tend to reduce metabolic requirements in contrast to their predatory counter-
parts. A striking example is the higher MR of shallow-living pelagic predators like
gadoids and tunas using visual stimuli to locate their food and spending energy to
pursuit them (Farrell 1991; Seibel and Drazen 2007). The limited likelihood of a
scavenging foraging strategy in pelagic organisms is further reinforced by the
division of discards into ﬂoating versus rapidly sinking carrion, reducing their
incidental encounter in midwater (Harris and Poiner 1990; Croxall and Prince
1994; Bergmann et al. 2002).
Scavengers exhibit low metabolic requirements so that they can survive long
periods without food and beneﬁt from efﬁcient assimilation of carrion when it
becomes available. Sharks, for instance, have the ability to fast for weeks and
focus on energy-rich carrion to replenish their expenditures (Fallows et al. 2013).
Other large organisms like marine mammals have higher energy expenditures to
maintain their body temperature (Williams 1999; Hirt et al. 2017) and need to trade-
off gains and costs of scavenging. Ansmann et al. (2012) showed, for instance, that
dolphins preferred associations with trawlers as a reliable, easily located and large
food source when ﬁshing effort was high, but they returned to group living to ﬁnd
food when ﬁshing effort reduced and costs of depredation became too high. In
contrast, scavenging hagﬁsh, amphipods, starﬁsh and gastropods may survive long
periods (4 weeks to 13 months) without food (Vahl 1984; Tamburri and Barry 1999).
Lysianassoid amphipods, in particular, exhibit a sit-and-wait strategy, withstanding
long periods of starvation, followed by a rapid response and localisation followed by
high rates of consumption and efﬁcient carrion utilisation (Smith and Baldwin 1982;
Sainte-Marie 1992). Shallow-living demersal scavenging ﬁsh (Gadiformes,
Perciformes and Pleuronectiformes) have standard metabolic rates within the same
order of magnitude, while energy consumption of Anguilliformes and Myxiniformes
is generally much lower (Lesser et al. 1997; Clarke and Johnston 1999; Drazen et al.
2011). Lower mass-speciﬁc standard respiration rates of slowly moving (crawling)
invertebrate scavengers (including crustaceans and echinoderms) were also
suggested in Brey (2010).
Besides taxonomic differences in metabolic rates, a signiﬁcant decline of meta-
bolic rate with depth was demonstrated for organisms whose activities depend on
light and vision (e.g. benthopelagic ﬁsh like cod), even after adjustments for
temperature and body size (Seibel and Drazen 2007; Drazen and Seibel 2007).
Comparisons of the deep-sea grenadier Coryphaenoides armatuswith the facultative
scavenger Gadus morhua, for instance, showed the increased scavenging abilities of
the grenadier moving at slow swimming speeds and with a low metabolic rate,
i.e. 15–30% lower, than similar-sized cod at similar temperatures (Ruxton and
Bailey 2005). Such depth-related differences in metabolic rates were not found
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between shallow and deep-living echinoderms, benthic ﬁsh, crustaceans and ceph-
alopods – organisms which depend less on visual interactions as do their
benthopelagic counterparts.
7.2.3.5 Handling Tactics: Competitive Abilities
Scavenging typically involves a large number of individuals at the carrion and leads
to a complex network of direct competition (this Section), facilitation (Sect. 7.2.3.6)
and indirect processes e.g. increased or decreased predation (Oro et al. 2013; Moleón
et al. 2014). Assessing an organism’s competitive abilities is particularly predictive
for marine scavengers, because of the short generation times of carrion pulses
(Nowlin et al. 2008; Beasley et al. 2012). Indeed, baited experiments show how
numerous interactions between scavengers dictate the opportunities to consume the
encountered carrion (see Table 7.A in the Online Supplement and references
therein). Observations from baited ﬁeld trials focus primarily on competition related
to small amounts of carrion as used in ﬁeld studies, rather than the potentially greater
amounts of carrion which become available from commercial discarding practices.
The competitive abilities of marine taxa are positively correlated to their willing-
ness to expose themselves to risk (boldness), which greatly inﬂuences their oppor-
tunities for food consumption and, ultimately, survival (Ward et al. 2006; Hamilton
2018). Several baited experiments highlighted the trade-off between feeding prefer-
ences (e.g. by damage level of discards), nutritional status (starvation level), the risk
of death by predation (e.g. risk aversion of dead conspeciﬁcs) and carrion density
and distribution (McKillup and McKillup 1994; Davenport and Moore 2002; Collins
and Gerald 2009; Tanner et al. 2011; Yeh and Drazen 2011). Overall, organisms
with larger body sizes have a higher efﬁcacy as scavengers than smaller individuals,
which is not only because they arrive ﬁrst at the carrion (Sect. 7.2.3.3), but also
because they ingest carrion faster, have access to larger bodied carrion, are less prone
to hyper predation and are more powerful in outcompeting with smaller organisms
(Juanes 1992; Collins et al. 2005; Ward et al. 2006; Nordström et al. 2015). In
response, smaller organisms have developed alternative strategies to compensate for
their small body size. Small scavengers can aggregate at the carrion and outnumber
competitors, e.g. abundance increases of hagﬁsh and amphipods (Table 7.A in the
Online Supplement). They may also discourage competitors, e.g. by slime excretion
in hagﬁsh (Zintzen et al. 2011) or by threat displays in crabs and ﬁsh (Davenport
et al. 2016). Competition may also lead to temporal niche partitioning and succes-
sional stages of carrion feeding, which is not only driven by the differential reaction
speed to carrion but also by an organism’s ability to ingest it (Sect. 7.2.3.6).
7.2.3.6 Handling Tactics: Facilitation
Once the food has been encountered and competitors excluded, carrion can be
selected (or rejected) for consumption. The selection and consumption of carrion
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as a food source is facilitated when overlapping with dietary preferences, and when
food processing abilities of the organism are adapted to the pulsed availability of the
resource. These two characteristics, (1) dietary preferences and (2) food processing,
jointly determine which taxa are best able to select and consume carrion and ﬁsheries
discards.
Scavengers in baited experiments were not indiscriminately attracted to any bait
type but showed differential attraction according to dietary preferences
(e.g. Groenewold and Fonds 2000; Jenkins et al. 2004 in Table 7.A in the Online
Supplement). Starﬁsh, for instance, showed higher abundances and attraction to
mollusc bait types, with a preference for damaged carrion (Jenkins et al. 2004;
Brewer and Konar 2005). The amphipod Tryphosa nana preferred dead crustaceans
(Kaiser and Moore 1999). Dietary preferences are not dictated by olfactory sensory
systems only, but are inﬂuenced by gustatory, visual, electro- and/or
mechanosensory stimuli in species-speciﬁc ways (Carrier et al. 2004; Derby and
Sorensen 2008; Løkkeborg et al. 2014; Kamio and Derby 2017). Information on
sensory systems are scarce in scavenging observations, but lessons can be drawn
from observations of predators. Plaice, dab and ﬂounder, for instance, use visual
stimuli more than Dover sole to target prey (de Groot 1969). Another predator, ling,
targets mobile prey more often than cod, potentially showing increased dependency
on visual stimuli (Løkkeborg 1998). Elasmobranch species feeding on (live) benthic
prey use electrosensory means to locate food prior to its consumption (Desender
et al. 2017). The dependency on other sensory systems like electrosensory location
or the dependency on the mobility of food items may reduce the relevance of marine
carrion (and ‘dead’ discards) as a targetable food source for organisms using these
feeding mechanisms.
Whether scavengers will feed upon marine carrion will in part depend on these
dietary portfolios and the sensory systems to locate their food, but they will also be
dictated by a species’ dietary plasticity. Several examples have illustrated the dietary
ﬂexibility of birds, dolphins, ﬁsh and amphipods in response to carrion availability
(Whitehead and Reeves 2005; Ansmann et al. 2012; Sinopoli et al. 2012; Oro et al.
2013; Johnson et al. 2015; Seefeldt et al. 2017).
Carrion size is another potential driver of a species’ ability to consume the
encountered carrion. Food size is positively related with mouth gape size in ﬁsh
(Scharf et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2012), while brachyurans prefer medium-sized
food items as a trade-off between energetic gains from larger food amounts with the
mechanical costs of predation on larger species (Juanes 1992; Kaiser et al. 1993).
While these studies suggest that larger scavengers are more likely to consume
larger carrion, a series of studies demonstrated various strategies and techniques that
scavengers deploy to proﬁt from carrion overcoming the gape limitation. Small
scavengers like amphipods, gobies and hagﬁsh may immerse themselves into cav-
ities of decaying animals and forage from inside out ensuring consumption of rich
nutrient sources ﬁrst (Kaiser and Moore 1999; Bucking et al. 2011; Polačik et al.
2015). Scavengers may also jerk or shake carrion to tear it to pieces or may, in case
of larger carrion, spin around their longitudinal axis, as observed in eels (Helfman
and Clark 1986) and Atlantic cod (Svendsen 2018). Sharks and brachyurans
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scavengers are particularly able to exhibit high biting or crushing forces to cut larger
food items into digestible pieces (Preston et al. 1996; Huber and Motta 2004;
Lucifora et al. 2009). Macerating practices are generally wasteful practices, gener-
ating easy access to food for indirect feeders (Sainte-Marie 1992), which is another
frequently applied scavenging tactic (Sainte-Marie 1992; Britton and Morton 1994).
Small-sized carrion used in baited experiments is expected to be consumed within
days (Table 7.A in the Online Supplement). These experiments presented small
amounts of small-sized carrion in comparison to ﬁsheries discards, where larger
amounts are released at once. It is likely that not all carrion is consumed within days,
leading to decay and subsequent changes in palatability of the discarded carrion.
While some species like gastropods do not clearly discriminate between fresh and
old carrion (Morton and Jones 2003), others (Eptatretus stouti, Pycnopodia
helianthoides and Orchomene spp.) show clear preferences for dead or damaged
organisms (Moore and Wong 1995; Tamburri and Barry 1999; Brewer and Konar
2005). Successional stages have been documented for large-sized carrion, like whale
falls in the deep sea (Smith and Baco 2003) and in shallow waters (Glover et al.
2010; Quaggiotto et al. 2016).
The limited time window for carrion consumption (due to, for example, compe-
tition and decay) has also stimulated morphological and metabolic adaptations to
maximise energy gain from carrion while minimizing handling time. Deep-sea
lysianassoid amphipods, for instance, can be divided into two groups: highly
specialised necrophagivores (e.g. Eurythenes gryllus) that have mandibles and guts
which process food in batches, while Orchomene spp. process food in a more
continuous way, and have small guts and mandibles which are not well suited for
rapid food ingestion (Sainte-Marie 1992; Jones et al. 1998). Another typical scav-
enger, Paciﬁc hagﬁsh (Eptatretus stoutii), can ingest large amounts of protein which
would result in high rates of post-feeding ammonia and urea excretion. Indeed,
Paciﬁc hagﬁsh has a wide scope for ammonia and urea excretion, which allows it not
only to process decomposing tissue but also to process large amounts of protein
which it acquires during short-term feeding bouts (Wilkie et al. 2017).
7.2.4 Towards Identiﬁcation of the Most Likely Discard-
Consumer Candidates
Field observation studies have elucidated how various traits, and trade-offs between
these traits, enable organisms to scavenge upon marine carrion. A trait-based
assessment enables scaling of marine scavengers along the obligate-facultative
scavenging continuum is given in Fig. 7.2. This scaling can pinpoint the scavenging
taxa that will primarily make use of marine carrion (including discards) and therefore
have the potential to experience a population level effect when discard levels change.
As discussed in more details in Sect. 7.4, the next step of this work will thus be to
perform the actual ranking of the taxa identiﬁed in Sect. 7.2.2 into the continuum, on
the basis of their life history.
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Most observational studies used marine carrion as a proxy for discards in their
ﬁeld tests. In general, these trials did not reﬂect commercial discarding practices. We
acknowledge, for instance, that not all discarded organisms are dead when they are
returned to the sea after commercial ﬁshing. Foraging upon a mixture of dead,
stressed, injured and potentially undamaged discarded organisms implies that dis-
cards are not only suitable as a food source to obligate scavengers, but also to
predators. The consumption of stressed and injured organisms following discarding
practices were less frequently examined in the observational studies but may affect
foraging by facultative scavengers in commercial discarding practices.
Observational studies have also not focused on mimicking the total amount of
carrion that is discarded in commercial ﬁshing practices, nor the way it is spread or
lumped on the seabed or the frequency of discard availability. Although observa-
tional studies indicated that discards are consumed in a short time window (within
days), we are not aware of any observational studies underpinning these assumptions
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Fig. 7.2 Encounter probability and handling tactics determine an organism’s scavenging ability.
The traits of these two parameters make up a qualitative scale of scavenging that can be applied to
any given species to assess the relative importance of carrion, including dead discards, in its diet.
The ranking of species in the triangle is for illustrative purposes but does not represent a formal
analysis as such. (Scavengers from left to right: hagﬁsh and amphipod spp., dogﬁsh and edible crab.
In the centre: starﬁsh, ophiurids and hermit crabs. Predator: tuna. Detritivore: Echinocardium spp).
NB: The probability that facultative scavengers also consume ﬁsheries discards (with more or less
focus upon predation or detritivorous strategies – e.g. injured or stressed discards) was not estimated
in ﬁeld observation trials and requires further research. Inspired by Kane et al. (2017)
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in relation to the recurrent high amounts of discards that become available following
commercial discarding. When the assumption of rapid consumption of all discarded
material does not hold in certain circumstances, we may expect that not all ﬁsheries-
induced carrion will be consumed by scavengers. A fraction of the discards may be
fragmented and become available to detritivores later.
In conclusion, ﬁeld observation studies improve the qualitative assessment of the
scavenging abilities of taxa on marine carrion (Fig. 7.2, upper panel). To evaluate
how organisms with scavenging abilities proﬁt from ﬁsheries discards requires
additional information, notably on the total amount of dead versus living discards
and how discards are consumed by organisms with various foraging strategies. The
impact of discards on marine taxa with a facultative scavenging strategy requires
information on how predation and/or detritivorous strategies may inﬂuence the
consumption of ﬁsheries discards (Fig. 7.2, lower panel). Predation and detritivorous
foraging strategies were not addressed in this chapter but cannot be ignored when the
impact of discards as a food source for marine organisms is evaluated.
7.3 Modelling Approaches to Discard-Scavenger
Interactions
Discarding is considered in existing ecosystem models evaluating the effects of
various ﬁsheries management measures (Fulton et al. 2014; Kaplan et al. 2014;
Libralato et al. 2015; Mackinson et al. 2018), but very few have focused on
exploring the effects of varying discard ﬂows on marine food webs (Lauria 2012;
Heath et al. 2014; Fondo et al. 2015). Here, we used ﬁve ecosystem models
implemented across Europe to illustrate the lessons learned and challenges still
ahead in modelling discard ﬂows in marine food webs.
7.3.1 Materials and Methods
Three ecosystem modelling frameworks have been used: Ecopath with Ecosim
(EwE), StrathE2E and Atlantis (Table 7.2). They differ in their representation of
space, time and processes but all of them aim at modelling the whole food web by
using functional groups (representing species sharing similar life history traits).
Five existing models were considered in this study. They are generally
implemented at the scale of ﬁsheries management regions (Fig. 7.3). The food
web description in each region is speciﬁc to its general ecology, ﬁsheries and
conservation stakes (see Table 7.3 for details). However, in the outputs presented
here, biomasses of functional groups were pooled in aggregated categories for the
purpose of comparison. Discard ﬂows are speciﬁc to each model and have been
parameterised using data from ﬁsheries monitoring programs.
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We evaluated two scenarios using the design in Table 7.3:
1. “Discard as Usual”: ﬁshing mortalities and discard rates are ﬁxed per group and
constant throughout the simulation, the discard survival rates are all assumed to
be nil;
Table 7.2 Main features of the three modelling frameworks used
Model
type Principle Functional groups Space
More
details
EwE Mass balanced Biomass pool (with life
stanza possible)
Functional groups and
singled-out species
No Heymans
et al.
(2016)
StrathE2E Tracks the ﬂows of nitro-
gen in groups of func-
tionally similar taxa and
materials, spanning the
entire ecosystem from
biogeochemistry to sea-
birds and marine
mammals
Biomass pools (with life
stanza possible)
Vertical layers Heath
(2012)
Atlantis Age structured popula-
tion (abundance) and
growth (average individ-
ual weight) dynamic for
vertebrates and biomass
pols for invertebrates
Functional groups and
singled-out species
Irregular hori-
zontal poly-
gons and
regular verti-
cal layers
Fulton
(2010)
Fig. 7.3 Geographic implementation of the 5 models used: the Azores EEZ (red), the Bay of
Biscay (ICES regions VIIIa and b, yellow), the Celtic Sea (VIIe, h, f, g and j, blue), the Eastern
Channel (VIId), and the North Sea (IV c, b and most of a)
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2. “No Discards”: total ﬁshing mortalities per group remain the same, but the
discard rates are all set to 0, leading to no discards being released in the system2,
which allows one to test the ‘pure’ effect of the discard ﬂow into the marine
food web.
The scenarios represent extreme cases to bracket the range of possible realities
and allow us to isolate the ecosystem response to the ﬂow of discards. In the baseline
model, zero survival of discarded ﬁsh is extreme, as is complete cessation of
discarding in “No Discards” (especially without changes in the ﬁshing pressure).
7.3.2 Results
7.3.2.1 The Flow of Discards Into the Environment
The ﬁshing pressure varies considerably across the different modelled ecosystems,
but it is apparent from Fig. 7.4 that the ﬂow of discards into the marine ecosystem is
extremely low (< 1%), when compared to the biomass of potential consumers of
discards (all living groups except plankton and primary producers).
In the ﬁve models used, the actual proportion of discards in the diet of a scavenger
depends on its (parameterized) preference for this type of food, and on the abun-
dance of discards available to feed on (together with other factors depending on the
model, such as spatial overlap or consumer clearance rate). Fig. 7.5 shows the
average calculated diet of three groups of scavengers in the Eastern English Channel
Atlantis model, among those with the highest parametrized preference for discards.
The discards never accounted for more than 0.4% of the total diet, which is due to the
very low abundance of discards available to consume.
Fig. 7.4 Living biomass extracted from the ecosystem (landings) over the total biomass (left),
biomass returned to the ecosystem as discards over the total living biomass (middle) and discards
over total potential consumer biomass (right). The total living biomass includes vertebrates, benthic
and pelagic invertebrates, benthic primary producers, as well as phytoplankton and zooplankton.
The total consumer biomass includes vertebrates, benthic and pelagic invertebrates (excluding
zooplankton and phytoplankton and benthic primary producers)
2In the case of the North Sea StrathE2E model however, a residual discard ﬂow remains for the
benthos, corresponding to 4% of the baseline discard ﬂow (Heath et al. 2014).
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7.3.2.2 Effect of Removing Discards on the Ecosystem
Removing discards from the ecosystem had an extremely low effect on the evaluated
ecosystems (Fig. 7.6), with virtually no effect (< 0.2%) on the Azores ecosystem,
where the discard ﬂow was the smallest. In the other case studies, the effect of
removing discards was small but noticeable on the benthic carnivores and scaven-
gers (1.3% in the Celtic Sea and 2.4% in the North Sea). The largest negative
effect of removing discards was observed in the North Sea on the mammals/seabirds
Fig. 7.5 Average diet composition of four groups of scavengers in the Atlantis Eastern English
Channel model: crabs, prawns (PWN), deposit-feeders (DEP) (mainly amphipods and some poly-
chaetes) and whelks (WHE), as calculated by the model. All the consumed food items appear in the
legend, but the ones representing less than 1% of the diet do not appear on the pie charts. Benthic
inverts: benthic invertebrates
Azores Celc Biscay NorthSea Channel
DET
ZOO
PEL_INV
CAR_SCAV
SUSP_DEP
DEM
PEL
MAM
% Change
0.2
0.5
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Fig. 7.6 Percentage changes in the biomass of aggregated categories between the “No Discards”
scenario and the “Discard as usual” baseline. Data is shown as absolute values colored in red for
negative change and green for positive change. The size of the circle is proportional to the absolute
% changes in the biomass. Aggregated categories: DET: detritus, ZOO: zooplankton, PEL_INV:
pelagic invertebrates, CAR_SCAV: carnivorous and scavenging benthos, SUSP_DEP: suspension
and deposit feeding benthos, DEM: demersal and bentho-pelagic ﬁsh, PEL: pelagic ﬁsh, MAM:
mammals
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group. Not surprisingly, the effect of removing discards is dependent on the impor-
tance of discards in the diets of the different groups.
7.3.3 Discussion
Discard ﬂows may seem large when considered as absolute values, and with regards
to the waste of natural resources it represents. When considered as a potential food
source, however, discard ﬂows appear to be low relative to the living biomass in the
ecosystem, and when compared with other sources of food (natural carrion).
The models found little effect of a full discard ban (with no changes in the ﬁshing
pressure) on the ecosystem. These results are in agreement with other modelling
studies. Sánchez and Olaso (2004) conﬁrmed the low importance of discards as a
food source in the Cantabrian Sea in comparison to detritus, primary producers or
other low trophic levels (0.07% of the total food intake, EwE model). Kaiser and
Hiddink (2007) and Collie et al. (2017) estimated that ﬁsheries-generated carrion
could only sustain benthic carnivores for 3 days per year at the scale of the North Sea
and scavenging ﬁsh for approximately 6 days per year. Depestele et al. (2016)
similarly estimated that discards in the Grande Vasière (northern Bay of Biscay)
contributed to less than 2% of the scavenging benthic community’s total food
requirements. Our ﬁndings are also consistent with the spatial analysis done by the
Working Group on Ecosystem Effects of Fishing Activities (WGECO) of the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) who found no relation-
ship between discarded biomass and scavenger abundance in the North Sea (ICES
2016; ICES 2017). Other modelling studies, in contrast, found an inﬂuential effect of
discards on benthic scavengers (Catchpole et al. 2006; Fondo et al. 2015) but at a
smaller spatial scale (respectively Moreton Bay, and the North Sea Nephrops
English ﬁshing grounds). Ecosystem modelling can help extrapolate available data
and empirical knowledge (to a certain extent) on the fate of discards in the environ-
ment at the regional scale, and in testing a full Landing Obligation scenario.
However, some discrepancies between modelling and empirical knowledge should
be noted. First, the discards are all pooled into one group in the models, while
observational studies showed that the consumption of discards differs between the
provided types of discards and dietary preferences of the scavengers (Table 7.A in
the Online Supplement). Second, benthic and demersal scavengers tend to be
aggregated into coarse functional groups in ecosystem models. This aggregation
does not allow one to fully account for varying degrees of importance of discards to
speciﬁc taxa (e.g. Sect. 7.2 of this chapter; Kaiser and Hiddink 2007; Mackinson and
Daskalov 2017). Further splitting the scavenger groups would help, but only if
sufﬁcient data are available for parametrization, which is unlikely at the scale of
the presented models.
A closer interaction between empirical and modelling approaches could increase
our understanding of the importance of discards in the marine food web. For
example, observational studies may inform modelling exercises regarding the
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differences between discard consumption ratios of taxa within one functional group.
Observational studies may also set the boundaries to conduct sensitivity analyses on
the existing groups, and help explore whether a different partitioning of discards as
food sources across taxa results in a signiﬁcant food subsidy for some species and
not for others.
A major source of uncertainty in the modelling work was due to the quality of the
discards data. The limited ﬂeet coverage of discard monitoring programs hampers
the possibility of discard estimations at a small spatial scale. Furthermore, current
discard monitoring programs focus primarily on commercial species and have been
designed to estimate discard rates per ﬂeet and stock rather than to estimate discard
ﬂow into the environment. Reliable quantitative information on the ratio of com-
mercial versus non-commercial discards is relatively sparse (Uhlmann et al. 2013;
Depestele 2015), but existing data could be used to speculate on the orders of
magnitude changes that non-commercial discards may cause in the energy ﬂow in
the ecosystem. Here again, sensitivity analyses will be necessary to complete the
present work.
7.4 Synthesis and Outlook
There is a considerable literature about the ecology of scavenging in marine eco-
systems, showing that scavenging is an important aspect of the trophic ecology of
many marine species. Discards undoubtedly contribute to this with a global maxi-
mum of close to 20 million tonnes per year at its peak. Despite this, it is challenging
to identify how important discards might be to the scavenging community, as they
are very diverse taxonomically and in the role they play in scavenging interactions.
When marine scavengers are explicitly included as groups in ecosystem models,
the impact of stopping discards is shown as minimal (Sect. 7.3). These ﬁndings
corroborate earlier empirical and analytical studies where it was suggested that
discards only deliver a small-scale food subsidy in large areas. They contrast,
however, with a few studies (Catchpole et al. 2006) where ﬁsheries discards may
have more signiﬁcant effects in certain locations with high discards
One problem with our conclusion regarding the low impact of discards is that we
treated the scavenger community as a few functional groups over large spatial scales.
It is more than likely that there will be particular species that are more dependent on a
discard subsidy than others (Table 7.A in the Online Supplement). This was the case
with small-spotted catsharks (Scyliorhinus canicula) and smooth skate (Dipturus
inominatus) which made signiﬁcant use of ﬁsheries discards but not with starry rays
(Raja asterias) (Forman and Dunn 2012; Navarro et al. 2016). This highlights one
way in which modelling studies could be taken forward; to differentiate within the
models between scavenger species that might be more, or less, dependent on
discards. This would integrate improved knowledge regarding these species’ relative
dependencies on carrion (Sect. 7.2). It is easy to speculate, for instance, that hagﬁsh,
which consume 82% of discards would be more affected than more opportunistic
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species by banning discards. That is, it may be possible to include more categories
with low to high discard dependencies within the functional groups. The trait-based
approach discussed in this chapter is intended to stimulate such an assessment of
scavenging abilities.
Scavenging is not only an activity of epibenthic invertebrate scavenger commu-
nities as we know that not all discards reach the seabed. Signiﬁcant amounts will be
consumed by marine mammals and seabirds, depending on the type of discard
(Depestele et al. 2016). An unknown but likely smaller quantity will also be taken
by mid water scavengers. Many demersal ﬁsh species will also likely scavenge to
some extent (Table 7.A in the Online Supplement). Finally, discards may often be in
large quantities locally, and may simply exceed the capacity of scavengers to utilise
them all, and will then likely become available to a detritivore community. Empirical
ﬁeld evidence should be the main source of information to parameterise discard
partitioning and usage, and therefore suggest scenarios for the models.
It is, however, important to also remain aware of the limitations of this evidence.
Empirical parameterisation should be based on more than one sampling technique
given the selectivity issues with observation within particular benthic and demersal
environments. While numerous studies in continental European seas have
highlighted what this means for benthic invertebrate scavengers, few experiments
have focused on implications to ﬁsh. Also, while baited traps or cameras are
excellent tools for studying which species might utilise discards and what discard
types they prefer, they may not be representative of the real situation, for instance in
the amount, condition or species mix of actual discards. Most importantly, these in
situmethods are expensive and difﬁcult and only provide information that is speciﬁc
to a place, time and particular conditions. Extrapolating those data to population
levels can be risky (Levin 1992; Dickey-Collas et al. 2014).
This brings us back to the value of the models. The models could be used in a
number of scenarios to test their sensitivity to assumptions about the scavenger
group. These could include giving the scavenger group a much greater dependency
on discards than might otherwise be expected, and possibly ﬁnding at what level of
dependency a discard ban would likely start to have effects on populations. Alter-
natively, we could assume a much higher level of discarding, prior to the Landing
Obligation, than is suggested from observer data. Then the models could be run to
show the sensitivity to the assumptions of such a high, pre-Landing Obligation
discard volume. The sensitivity testing should give us some idea of what we still
need to know to understand the importance of discards in the marine food web, and
so the likely effects of eliminating them. This information could then be used to
design subsequent ﬁeld studies and analytical assessments. To date most ﬁeld work
has had a broad natural history approach –what do we see coming to some discarded
ﬁsh? The model sensitivities could be used to deﬁne more hypothesis-based ﬁeld
work, focusing on particular species, discard types, places and seasons.
In conclusion, thus far, modelling and empirical studies suggest that carrion is
used by many species, but few species are solely dependent on carrion (including
discards). For a few species and areas, a reduction in discards due to the Landing
Obligation may have a population level effect, but generally this is unlikely to be the
7 The Impact of Fisheries Discards on Scavengers in the Sea 153
case. The way forward is to determine the sensitivities in the models to certain
assumptions, particularly in the importance of discards to some species in a broader
scavenging community, and the actual volume of discards. That information can
then be used to focus the ﬁeld work on testing hypotheses which are tailored to
particular species and/or discard volumes in particular locations, periods and ﬁsher-
ies where modelling predicts higher impacts of discards on scavengers.
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Part III
Cultural, Institutional and
Multi-Jurisdictional Challenges
Chapter 8
How the Implementation of the Landing
Obligation Was Weakened
Björn Stockhausen
Abstract This chapter covers the development of provisions and exemptions to the
Landing Obligation in the years following the adoption of the Common Fisheries
Policy in December 2013. It focuses on the processes leading to certain changes in
Article 15, the development of discard plans, and describes reasons for the slow
implementation of the Landing Obligation. It provides further insight into why the
intention of the objective of the discard ban, the reduction of unwanted catches, has
not yet been achieved to its maximum possible extent.
Keywords Data collection · Discard plans · High survival · Implementation ·
Omnibus Regulation
8.1 Introduction
Prior to the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), European policy makers
were aware of the issue of discarding ﬁsh and considered it to wasting a natural
resource. The European Commission described ways forward in a green paper
(European Commission 2009) and outlined provisions to improve that situation in
its ﬁnal legislative proposal in 2011 (European Commission 2011).
This initial proposal, while it contained already a gradual phasing-in of the new
rules per ﬁsh stock, was substantially changed by both co-legislators, the European
Parliament and the European Council of Ministers (hereafter referred to as “Coun-
cil”). Amongst those changes were a delayed timeline for the introduction of the new
Landing Obligation, a range of exemptions based on scientiﬁc evaluations, and the
possibility for Member States to jointly propose, on a regional basis, so-called
discard plans, comprising details of the implementation of the Landing Obligation
for respective sea basins.
A political agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission was found in May 2013 at the end of the trilogue where all three entities
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negotiated a compromise between their respective positions they had adopted before.
After the publication of the basic regulation of the Common Fisheries Policy, the
new legal text and its provisions came into force on January 1st, 2014.
However, the political developments and discussions in the following years after
the legal text was adopted changed the impact on ﬁsheries management again, and in
many cases weakened the positive impact on selectivity and ﬁsheries management a
full implementation might have had.
This chapter covers the development of respective provisions in the Landing
Obligation (CFP Article 15) in the years following its legal adoption. It focuses on
the processes leading to certain changes in Article 15, the development of discard
plans and describes reasons for the slow implementation of the Landing Obligation.
It provides further insight into why the intention of the objective of the discard ban,
the reduction of unwanted catches, has not yet been achieved to the maximum
possible extent.
8.2 The Omnibus Regulation 2013–2015
One week before Christmas’ Eve 2013, and two weeks before the adopted basic
regulation of the reformed CFP came into force, the Commission released a proposal
for the so-called ‘Omnibus regulation’ (2013/0436 [COD]).
The reason for this proposal was that the new reformed CFP contained several
key objectives and provisions that meant that existing legislation was no longer in
line with the new policy framework. In particular, the phasing in of the Landing
Obligation from January 1st, 2015 onwards meant that there was not enough time to
completely revise other framework legislation containing detailed rules that made
the application of the new paradigm regarding discards difﬁcult. This is exempliﬁed
by the Commission stating that “legislation is required to remove any legal and
practical impediments to implementation on a transitional basis while this new
framework is being developed” (European Commission 2013).
In its proposal for the Omnibus regulation, the Commission therefore proposed
amendments to Council regulations (EC) No 850/98 (‘Technical Measures Regula-
tion), (EC) No 1224/2009 (the ‘Control Regulation’), and other associated regula-
tions. Provisions within the Technical Measures Regulation such as the Minimum
Landing Size (MLS) and catch composition rules meant challenges for ﬁshers, as
they would stand in contradiction to the Landing Obligation that foresaw that over
time unwanted catches should be avoided and reduced as far as possible. From a
control perspective the implementation of the Landing Obligation would mean a
shift from monitoring and controlling of landings to catches, this meant that,
amongst others, the respective rules on data recording in the Control Regulation
would have to be adapted.
Apart from the content of the proposal, the timing of the adoption of the reformed
CFP played a key role. The political process was initially hampered by the fact that
the Commission only published its proposal in December 2013, while a political
166 B. Stockhausen
agreement between the co-legislators on the reformed CFP had been found in May
2013 and the ﬁnal agreed text existed since October 2013. Further, despite the
approaching entry into force of the ﬁrst phase of the Landing Obligation by January
1st, 2015, the co-legislators were not able to agree on their position on the Omnibus
regulation proposal and subsequently on a joint compromise that would have
allowed amending the existing regulations in time, before January 2015.
While the Council agreed on its position regarding the Commission proposal on
the Omnibus Regulation in June 2014, the Fisheries Committee of the European
Parliament was facing upcoming European Elections in May 2014. The Fisheries
Committee would only resume its meetings in July – after the election. This implied
that the composition of members of parliament could change and potentially further
delay discussions. In January 2014, the report on the legislative ﬁle was attributed
(European Parliament 2014a) to the Fisheries Committee president who would table
a working document. In February (European Parliament 2014b), the Commission
was invited to present the proposal, while a foreseen exchange of views on the
dossier in March was cancelled (European Parliament 2014c). For the April com-
mittee meeting, a hearing (European Parliament 2014d) had been organised as
agreed in February to provide insights to members on the Landing Obligation on
both technical measures and control aspects.
It was therefore unfortunately not possible for the Fisheries Committee to discuss
the proposal further prior to the end of its legislative term and to facilitate and
accelerate the legislative procedure towards an earlier adoption in 2014 than ulti-
mately achieved in 2015.
After the European Elections in May 2014, the new members of the Fisheries
Committee reconvened in July. A new Chair of the Fisheries Committee was
appointed, who continued discussions based on previous agreements. For the July
2014 meeting, a working document had been prepared summarising the presenta-
tions and discussion of the April hearing including additional studies by the
European Parliament Policy Department B (European Parliament 2014e). As the
Fisheries Committee had been partially reshufﬂed and new members had to become
familiar with the ﬁle, it took still until December for the Fisheries Committee to
adopt its position. It was only in January 2015 that a political agreement with the
Council was reached. Following approval by Council and Parliament plenary, the
ﬁnal legislative act came into force in June 2015 – 6 months after the Landing
Obligation had been introduced for the ﬁrst ﬁsheries (European Union 2015).
At this point, the content of the Omnibus proposal had changed signiﬁcantly.
What was originally intended as a regulation to align existing legislation with the
new CFP and in particular to facilitate the implementation of the Landing Obliga-
tion, had in some respects weakened the recently agreed CFP.
Amongst the changes was, for example, an additional exemption to the Landing
Obligation. The originally adopted Article 15 of the CFP foresaw exemptions from
the Landing Obligation such as for high survivability or for de minimis in case that
increases in selectivity are difﬁcult to achieve or to avoid disproportionate costs for
handling the previously discarded ﬁsh (Rihan et al., this volume). This means that
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as a last resort, when despite other efforts to reduce the amount of unwanted catches
such as swaps between Member States and temporal and spatial measures, there still
remains a certain quantity of unwanted ﬁsh, a de minimis exemption can be granted
based on scientiﬁc evaluations, to provide for an outlet and allow for the discarding
of those ﬁsh. Similar for the exemption for high survivability: In case that scientiﬁc
studies clearly show that certain species survive to a certain extent, the decision
maker can grant the exemption for this species from the obligation to land it.
The Omnibus regulation amended the respective paragraph by adding an exemp-
tion for “ﬁsh which shows damage caused by predators”, without specifying details
of what damage means or how it would be controlled. This amendment was only
inserted after the vote in the European Parliament Fisheries Committee during the
trilogue negotiations, which meant there were fewer opportunities to discuss its
implications or to decide on required provisions to guarantee the control of the
new exemption.
On control and enforcement, the Commission’s initial proposal for the Omnibus
regulation foresaw that violating the Landing Obligation would constitute a serious
infringement under the current Control Regulation (EC) 1224/2009. The proposal
was amended by the co-legislators to include a delay of 2 years, meaning that one
could violate the rules of the Landing Obligation for 2 additional years during which
this would not constitute a serious infringement from the Landing Obligation.
Further, the Commission had proposed to delete the threshold of 50kg of species
caught and retained on board for compulsory recording in the logbook. This became
necessary for the reason that Article 15.1 of the CFP required that all catches of
species that are subject to catch limits (or that are subject to minimum sizes in the
Mediterranean) “shall be. . . recorded” and was therefore an essential part of the
legal alignment of new and old legislation. Especially, as with the CFP reform, the
management shifted from landings to catches, the monitoring and control of all
quantities of the latter was fundamental. Nevertheless, Parliament and Council
agreed to reinstate the threshold in their political agreement leading to the ﬁnal
adopted text, maintaining a 50 kg threshold, potentially leaving, if added up across
the EU, large quantities of removals unaccounted for.
Lastly, amendments were introduced by the Parliament which required the
Commission to annually report on the implementation of the Landing Obligation,
based on information provided from Member States and Advisory Councils from
2016 onwards. These reporting requirements were subsequently speciﬁed by the
Scientiﬁc, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries, STECF (STECF
2016b; see Rihan et al., this volume). These reports have provided useful insight
into the process and progress of the implementation of the Landing Obligation.
In summary, despite the pressing timeframe, the co-legislators did not manage to
adopt the required legal changes in the Omnibus Regulation before the ﬁrst phase of
the Landing Obligation came into force in January 2015. Further, the Omnibus
Regulation introduced amendments to the recently reformed CFP and to some key
aspects of the Landing Obligation which weakened the overarching policy that was
agreed only 18 months earlier.
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In summary, one of the elements that weakened the Landing Obligation policy
was the Omnibus regulation (EU 2015/812) which was supposed to legally align
existing legislation such as the ‘Fisheries Control Regulation’ (EC 1224/2009) or the
‘Technical Measures Regulation’ (EC 850/98). It weakened the recently reformed
basic regulation of the CFP by adding additional exemptions to the Landing Obli-
gation in Article 15.
8.3 High Survival – A Concept Undeﬁned by Decision
Makers
Amongst the exemptions from the Landing Obligation was Article 15.4(b), stating
that the Landing Obligation shall not apply to “species for which scientiﬁc evidence
demonstrates high survival rates, taking into account the characteristics of the gear,
of the ﬁshing practices and of the ecosystem”.
Unfortunately, the term ‘high survival’ was not further described or clariﬁed by
the co-legislators in the whole legislative document. The exemption was introduced
by both the Parliament and the Council in their report (European Parliament 2013)
and general approach (Council of the European Union 2013), respectively.
Following the political agreement on the reformed CFP, the STECF was asked in
September 2013 for scientiﬁc support, and the request by the European Commission
already mentioned that “There is currently no objective means to deﬁne ‘high
survival rates’”. The STECF was asked to (i) develop guidelines or identiﬁcation
of best practice for undertaking discard survival studies, (ii) develop an objective
framework to deﬁne high survival which will provide managers with a range of the
likely impacts of different options depending on the deﬁnition used; (iii) assess the
impacts if a proportion of the landed catch that would have been discarded might
otherwise have survived and how this may affect estimates of ﬁshing mortality,
spawning stock biomass (SSB) and associated reference points; and (iv) if possible
deﬁne a predeﬁned list of species and ﬁsheries that could be considered for exemp-
tion on the basis of high survival (STECF 2013).
Following this initial request, a series of STECF meetings provided recommen-
dations on the different requests. Already the ﬁrst report of the September 2013
meeting, the STECF Expert Working Group EWG 13-16, stated “that the term ‘high
survival’ is somewhat subjective”, and that “deﬁning a single value [of survival]
cannot be scientiﬁcally rationalised and therefore EWG 13-16 advises that assessing
proposed exemptions on the basis of ‘high survival’ need to be considered on a case-
by-case basis taking [into] account the speciﬁcities of the species and ﬁsheries
involved”. This important remark was re-iterated in the following years by stating
that “without clear deﬁnitions of the terms, [...] ‘high survival’, there are no
objective scientiﬁc criteria to judge whether any proposed exemptions from the
Landing Obligation are merited.” The STECF therefore assessed the scientiﬁc
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basis for the different exemptions requested, but referred the judgement “whether
such proposals are merited using relevant subjective criteria” back to the decision-
makers, in this case the European Commission – as being responsible for adopting
speciﬁc discard plans through delegated acts (Rihan et al., this volume).
Over subsequent years the STECF provided much needed clarity and scientiﬁc
support to facilitate the implementation of the Landing Obligation. For example,
apart from developing guidelines for survivability studies, the STECF EWG 13–17
recommended guidelines for the regional discard management plans “where an
exemption under high survival is being proposed”. In relation to high survival
exemptions, the EWG recommended speciﬁc information that should be included,
e.g. species name, respected stock(s) and management unit, descriptions of gear
types used, catch composition and other operational characteristics, the discard
proﬁle, selectivity measures developed and effects of the Landing Obligation on
the stocks (STECF 2014a, b).
Nevertheless, when the STECF was requested to evaluate Joint Recommenda-
tions submitted to the Commission by respective regional Member States groups in
the following years, these recommendations seem not to have been taken on board
by Member States.
The STECF in 2015 reports of “inconsistencies in the deﬁnition of the ﬂeets”, “it
is unclear . . . to which ﬂeets such de minimis volumes will be accessible” or that
exemptions “appear to be intended to cover residual discards and as such essen-
tially equate to ‘business as usual’” (STECF 2015b). In many cases, additional
supporting information had to be requested fromMember States after the submission
of the Joint Recommendations to improve the justiﬁcation provided. Still, the
STECF noted in several cases that the additional information provided referred
only to single Member States rather than corresponding to the ﬁshery for which
the exemption was requested.
This situation continued in 2016 when the STECF identiﬁed “a number of
general issues and limitations” in the Joint Recommendations (STECF 2016a).
Even after additional responses were received from Member States and regional
groups, information was often insufﬁcient or lacking. “None of the JR [Joint
Recommendations] received contain any concrete measures for the documentation
of catches”, which was a violation of the requirements of Article 15.1 CFP (see
previous part of this chapter).
Since 2015, discard plans have been adopted for all major sea basins of the
European Union, i.e., the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, North- and South-Western
Waters, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. By 2017, Joint Recommendations
had generally improved, but still contained “limitations in the information provided”
and “often information is provided for one ﬂeet but not for other ﬂeets using similar
gears and which would be also affected”, as noted by the STECF (STECF 2017b).
The number of species and ﬁsheries included in the discard plans and therefore
subject to the Landing Obligation, has increased only slowly. Until June 2017, from
a total number 174 stocks subject to the Landing Obligation, there were still 77 stocks
not covered at all while 97 were either fully or partially included in discard plans.
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The legal wording adopted by policy makers on the Landing Obligation put a lot
of burden on the STECF that was requested to evaluate the Joint Recommendations
submitted by regional Member State groups (Rihan et al., this volume). The STECF
had, from the very beginning, provided guidelines on the information necessary to
conduct a satisfactory evaluation, which provided Member States with the tools and
information for a gradual implementation. Despite the ambitious timeframe, Mem-
ber States could have coordinated data collection in a better way than eventually
happened, especially as every year the STECF provided information on where
information was missing and how the justiﬁcations should be improved which
could have been used for the JR of the next year. Regarding the justiﬁcation
provided, the Commission had to send throughout the years additional requests to
Members States after receiving the respective Joint Recommendations, and even in
these cases, Member States did not always provide sufﬁcient information. Finally,
the number of stocks introduced to the discards plans was increased only at a slow
pace, which will mean that in the ﬁnal year of the implementation of the Landing
Obligation, in 2019, a large number of remaining stocks still have to be implemented
into the Landing Obligation through the respective discard plans.
In summary, the adopted wording in Article 15 of the Common Fisheries Policy
regarding ‘high survival’ had not been deﬁned in the legal text. As it is an important
threshold for whether or not a species can be exempted from the Landing Obligation,
its application had to be discussed. This section reviewed how this was clariﬁed by
respective scientiﬁc bodies, highlighting how these became even more entangled in
the political process.
8.4 The Drafting of Discard Plans
Article 15.6 of the CFP foresees that so-called discard plans containing the speciﬁ-
cations for the Landing Obligation in a speciﬁc sea basin shall be adopted through
delegated acts by the European Commission, following the legislative procedure
outlined in Article 18 of the CFP. Article 18 foresees that in line with the
regionalisation concept, Member States with a direct management interest can
submit Joint Recommendations to achieve the respective objective of the conserva-
tion measure, in this case the Landing Obligation.
In this context, groups of Member States have submitted since 2014 so-called
Joint Recommendations for the respective sea basins, outlining amongst others the
ﬁsheries to include in the discard plans, closures, and their requests for exemptions
from the Landing Obligation and including evidence to justify these exemptions.
As the quality of the justiﬁcations provided should be used by the European
Commission to determine whether exemptions are granted subsequently, it should
be obvious that Member States apply their greatest efforts to provide complete
information based on the best available scientiﬁc advice, and that subsequently the
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European Commission executes the greatest scrutiny when deciding on whether to
grant exemptions (or not) to ensure that the corresponding objective of the CFP, the
avoidance and reduction of unwanted catches, is not unnecessarily and unjustiﬁably
weakened. Member States also should have a strong interest in providing well-
founded Joint Recommendations because the requested exemptions ultimately lead
to facilitating the implementation of the Landing Obligation for their ﬂeets and
ﬁshers.
As outlined above, these joint recommendations are evaluated by the STECF by
scrutinising the supporting information and providing corresponding recommenda-
tions to the European Commission (Rihan et al., this volume). And as documented in
several STECF reports, the underlying data and studies provided were often insuf-
ﬁcient for various reasons (e.g., limited research funding for a well-replicated study).
The question to ask is whether the European Commission has followed the scientiﬁc
recommendations. For example, in cases where the STECF indicated that the
justiﬁcation provided for certain exemptions had been insufﬁcient, why did the
European Commission adopt the discard plans including the respective exemption?
As outlined in the previous section, in several cases the initial information
provided by Member States was insufﬁcient and the Commission had to request
additional information after the meeting of the respective Expert Working Group,
putting additional burden on the subsequent STECF plenary meeting. In addition to
that, less time could be spent analysing the new information, compared to a dedi-
cated stand-alone EWG.
It was also clear that the timing of the subsequent scientiﬁc evaluation and
legislative process required an early submission of the Joint Recommendations to
allow for the discard plans to come into force on January 1st of the following year.
The submission date had been established by the European Commission to be the
end of May every year for the Joint Recommendations of the following year to allow
for sufﬁcient time for both processes. This date was also often not respected and
additional information was sent to the EWG only days before, or in some cases even
during the meeting itself, which further impeded the necessary analysis. Therefore, it
would have been completely justiﬁed to not give Member States the additional
possibility to provide information after the deadline or after the EWG meeting.
Even in 2017, three years after the process of providing supporting information to
justify exemptions had initiated and despite guidelines and templates provided by
the STECF, the European Commission still found it necessary to request additional
information from Member States.
Additionally, the ﬁnal adopted legislative act for a discard plan often granted
Member States the possibility to provide information until May of the following year
to be analysed by the STECF at the following July plenary meeting. See for example
the 2016 discard plans with respect to certain ﬁsheries of hake in south-western
waters (European Commission 2015a) and whiting in north-western waters
(European Commission 2015b); the 2017 discard plans with respect to certain
ﬁsheries of hake in south-western waters (European Commission 2016a) and sole
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in north-western waters (European Commission 2016b), and the 2018 discard plans
with respect to certain ﬁsheries of sole in north-western waters (European Commis-
sion 2018).
Looking into one of these examples in detail, it is important to note that for hake
in south-western waters, additional information was requested twice in subsequent
years and that both requests were for the same ﬁsheries. The report of the STECF
expert group in 2015 stated that that no relevant information as well as limited and
non-quantitative information were presented (STECF 2015b). The following STECF
plenary (STECF 2015a) meeting in July 2015 analysed additional information
provided by the respective Member States upon request of the European Commis-
sion following the process described above, and the report still stated that the
additional supporting information is still “rather generic” and that “further selectiv-
ity studies should be carried out”. Nevertheless, the adopted discard plan for 2016
granted the exemption including the obligation to provide additional information. In
2016, the next STECF expert group (STECF 2016a) was requested to evaluate
whether the required additional information was provided. The STECF concluded
that the information provided related to only one Member State involved in the
ﬁshery and that no speciﬁc information for other Member State ﬂeets was provided
that were (in 2016) and would be (in 2017) subject to an exemption. The report
continued stating that unclear catch information was supplied and that the Joint
Recommendation was missing the level of de minimis. The report concludes that “it
is still not currently possible to evaluate whether the arguments of disproportionate
costs are well founded”. Again, the subsequent STECF summer plenary had to
evaluate the additional information provided by Member States upon request by
the European Commission, and the report again stated that little additional informa-
tion was provided and that additional selectivity information provided does not
contain any additional evidence. In the same procedure as the previous year, the
exemption was granted in the discard plan for 2017 as outlined above, with the
requirement to provide additional supporting information.
This means, that by the end of 2017, for 2 years, a ﬁshery had been granted an
exemption, despite repeated scientiﬁc analysis stated each time that inconsistencies
and insufﬁcient information prevailed, and despite that respective Member States
had multiple chances to provide the missing information.
In hindsight, this example shows that the European Commission could have
applied stricter scrutiny regarding the requirements for Member States to provide
information that supported exemptions. Exemptions should have been adopted only
when the required information was complete. The multiple STECF evaluations
resulting from subsequent weakly supported exemptions not only placed an extra
burden on the STECF, but might have given the impression to Member States that no
serious efforts are necessary to obtain exemptions from the Landing Obligation.
In summary, the Commission seems not to have followed the evaluation by the
STECF when transposing the JRs into discard plans, because justiﬁcations were
often incomplete or information was not provided – despite additional requests or the
possibility to provide information until the following year.
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8.5 Data Collection and Reporting Requirements Under
the Landing Obligation
The CFP states in Recital 46 that “Fisheries management based on the best available
scientiﬁc advice requires harmonised, reliable and accurate data sets” and that
Member States should collect data on discards under exemptions. With regard to the
Landing Obligation, this is further speciﬁed in Article 15.1 that requires that all
catches of species which are subject to catch limits (or that are subject to minimum
sizes in the Mediterranean) “shall be . . . recorded”. With regard to de minimis
exemptions, it is further speciﬁed in Article 15.5(c) (ii) that even though these
catches “shall not be counted against the relevant quotas; however, all such catches
shall be fully recorded”.
This shows that the co-legislators were fully aware of the importance of a
comprehensive data collection system to provide the respective scientiﬁc entities
such as the STECF and ICES with the best available data for scientiﬁc evaluation.
The corresponding provisions to outline the data collection provisions, also referred
in Article 15.5.d (“provisions on documentation of catches”) were supposed to be
included in multiannual plans or, where these were not adopted, in discard plans, as
speciﬁed in Article 15.6.
As outlined previously, quite a number of discard plans have been adopted and
amended since the phasing in of the Landing Obligation in 2015 (19 as of May 2018)
– with no provisions for collecting and recording data. The Joint Recommendations
submitted by regional groups of Member States to the European Commission have
been thoroughly analysed by respective STECF expert groups and plenary meetings.
Before the phasing in of the Landing Obligation, the STECF reported “From a
control perspective, the fact that catches discarded under the de minimis provisions
do not count against quota, creates a signiﬁcant risk of non-compliance around de
minimis” (STECF 2014b). Therefore, stronger legal requirements to fully record
these catches would have been important, especially as the previously discarded
amounts of ﬁsh are added as additional quota (so-called “top-ups”) while deducting
the de minimis amounts.
Looking at the analyses done by the STECF, this seems not to have been the case.
The STECF recognised early in the process, in 2014, in one of the ﬁrst Mediterra-
nean Joint Recommendations, that while a rationale to collect data was mentioned,
the document lacked indication how the data will be collected. In 2015, the assigned
STECF EWG reported a general lack of relevant data associated for ﬂeets and
vessels falling under the Landing Obligation, “which is necessary to estimate of
their relative contribution to the overall catches of the stocks concerned and the
potential volumes of de minimis catches that may be attributed/allocated to them”.
The STECF added that “that no speciﬁc provisions have been included in the JR’s
[Joint Recommendations]” for the recording of de minimis catches and discards. In
2016, the STECF EWG reiterated the missing respective provisions in Joint
Recommendations regarding the requirement to fully record de minimis catches
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following Article 15.5 (c) (ii) of the CFP (STECF 2016a), as did likewise the
respective STECF EWG in 2017 (STECF 2017b). In addition, the 2017 STECF
spring plenary notes that “Member States also indicate a lack of reporting by vessel
operators of ﬁsh discarded under exemptions (i.e., de minimis and high surviv-
ability), discards of ﬁsh currently not subject to the Landing Obligation and
catches of ﬁsh below MCRS” (STECF 2017a), which is iterated in 2018, adding
the remark that “Based on the Member States reports, the quantities of discards
and unwanted catches being recorded in logbooks are extremely low and do not
match information from observer trips or from last observed haul analyses carried
out by inspectors. Inaccurate or incomplete catch data will compromise the
provision of scientiﬁc advice” (STECF 2018).
The consistency outlined in these reports regarding the monitoring requirement
agreed to in the 2013 CFP reform shows that the implementation of the Landing
Obligation has been suffering from a fundamental disrespect and mis-understanding
for the importance of this key aspect. Despite the continuous and annual remarks by
the respective scientiﬁc bodies, Member States seem to not have taken the require-
ment seriously, potentially because it might have shown that actual improvements in
selectivity have not been implemented or achieved to the point necessary to facilitate
the full implementation of the Landing Obligation. Better data collection is of utmost
importance during this time of changing policies to accompany the political process.
Also, the scientiﬁc assessments during this period have potentially suffered. The new
CFP with its paradigm shift from requiring to land previously discarded ﬁsh, requires
adjusting data collection to have the best available scientiﬁc knowledge on how
many ﬁsh area actually returned to sea.
In summary, the change in the policy objective from the requirement to discard
unwanted catches to the obligation to avoid and reduce as far as possible unwanted
catches also came with the requirement to monitor and record the respective amounts
of catches, both for legal and for stock assessment reasons.
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Chapter 9
Muddying the Waters of the Landing
Obligation: How Multi-level Governance
Structures Can Obscure Policy
Implementation
Luc van Hoof, Marloes Kraan, Noor M. Visser, Emma Avoyan,
Jurgen Batsleer, and Brita Trapman
Abstract The 2013 reform of the European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
included an increased drive for regionalisation of the policy implementation and
the introduction of the Landing Obligation (LO). The process of implementing the
LO takes place at multiple levels of governance within the EU. We use the case of
the implementation of the LO in the Netherlands, where policymakers and the
ﬁshing industry cooperate towards a workable policy implementation. In this
paper, we argue that the EU’s complex and unconsolidated implementation structure
hampers a fair and clear implementation process. Three main causes can be distin-
guished: ﬁrst, a lack of a shared understanding of the goal of the Landing Obligation
within and between the different governance levels that are involved in the imple-
mentation process. Second, no meaningful discussions are taking place between
concurrent resource users, resource managers and supporters of the LO regarding the
need and usefulness of the measure, as there is no arena in the governance system for
them to meet. With the introduction of the Regional Advisory Councils in the 2002
CFP reform, a platform for discussion between ﬁshers and NGOs was created, but
this platform has only an advisory role and does not include the Member States.
Third, the relationship between different decision-making bodies is unclear, as is the
manner in which stakeholder input will be included in decision-making about
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implementing the LO. The result of this implementation process has been a diluted
policy where the goal, its execution and its effectiveness remain unclear.
Keywords Common Fisheries Policy · Landing obligation · Multi-level
governance · Regionalisation · Subsidiarity
9.1 Introduction
Since its inception in the 1980s, the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has been
reformed more or less every 10 years (1992, 2002, 2013). The latest reform of the
CFP came into force in 2014 (European Commission 2013). A Green Paper
presented the analysis on which the reform was based (European Commission
2009). That paper described ﬁve main structural failures of the CFP: a deep-rooted
problem of ﬂeet overcapacity, imprecise policy objectives resulting in insufﬁcient
guidance for decisions and implementation, a decision-making system that encour-
ages a short-term focus, a framework that does not give sufﬁcient responsibility to
the industry and a lack of political will to ensure compliance and thus poor
compliance by the industry. Among the proposals to reform the CFP mentioned at
the time (European Commission 2011a) were the introduction of a discard ban; the
application of maximum sustainable yield as a leading principle for the management
of ﬁsh stocks; regionalisation, addressing social issues such as labour conditions,
employment and wages; and the introduction of transferable ﬁshing concessions
(European Commission 2011b).
Starting from these justiﬁcations for reform, the last reform of the CFP introduced
two major changes: the introduction of the Landing Obligation and the
regionalisation of CFP implementation. Article 15 includes the obligation for
European ﬁsheries to land all discards of commercial species for which catch
restrictions apply. The term ‘discards’ refers to catches that are discarded either
because they consist of unwanted catch, or catch that cannot be landed due to rules of
catch composition and minimum landing size, lack of quota or catches that have
(relatively) low or no economic value (Mytilineou et al. 2018; Zeller et al. 2018).
Article 18 of the CFP describes the regional cooperation on conservation measures
(European Commission 2013). Throughout the Regulation, the process of
regionalisation is mentioned as an important instrument in CFP implementation.
In this chapter we will examine how a new policy instrument (i.e. the Landing
Obligation, LO) and a new governance setting (regionalisation) are working in
practice, using the case of Dutch ﬁsheries. The LO is introduced in a complex
process that takes place at multiple levels in the EU governance system: (1) the
general policy has been described in the reformed CFP in Article 15; (2) the details
have to be ﬁlled in at the regional level in multi-annual plans or discard plans by
groups of Member States (such as the ‘Scheveningen group’ for the North Sea);
(3) for each Member State, the implementation process is discussed with
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stakeholders (De Vos et al. 2016), and research projects are performed by national
research institutes to provide the necessary information (van Hoof and Kraus 2017).
These national processes then feed into the regional process, and (4) the regional
discard plans consequently have to be presented to the European Commission and
the Council of Fisheries Ministers for approval (Borges and Penas-Lado, this
volume; Rihan et al., this volume). The regional groups are advised by the Advisory
Councils, representing stakeholders, and attended by members of the ﬁshing indus-
try and NGO representatives.
To analyse this process, we use the case of the introduction of the LO in Dutch
ﬁsheries. We use the perspective of multi-level governance to analyse institutional
changes and the outcomes of the process. The inputs for this study were obtained
from literature analyses, interviews with relevant policymakers, industry represen-
tatives, ﬁshers and NGO representatives, by observing and analysing meetings
between the ﬁshing sector and the government and by attending meetings of the
Dutch Landing Obligation steering group.
In Sect. 9.2, within the context of European ﬁsheries management and its
governance setting, the principle of subsidiarity and multi-level governance will be
introduced. In Sect. 9.3, a short history of the evolution of the Landing Obligation is
presented, in relation to both society’s call to reduce ﬁsh discards and the policy
process leading to the inclusion of the LO into the CFP. In Sect. 9.4, we investigate
how the LO is being operationalised in Dutch ﬁsheries within the context of regional
North Sea cooperation. In Sect. 9.5, we reﬂect on the implementation of the LO and
aspects of multi-level governance, and Sect. 9.6 presents the conclusions.
9.2 Fisheries Management, Subsidiarity and Multi-level
Governance
Fisheries management in the EU is one of only ﬁve areas in which the Commission
has sole competence (Hawkins 2005; van Hoof 2010b). This implies that policy
proposals are developed by the European Commission, and the sole responsibility
of the Council of Fisheries Ministers (hereby referred to as ‘Fisheries Council’) is
to approve or reject the proposal. Since the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, this responsi-
bility has been shared between the Fisheries Council and the European Parliament
(Symes 2012).
This setting stems from the principle of subsidiarity: according to Spicker (1991),
‘subsidiarity’ is based on a view of society in which responsibilities are conditioned
by the closeness of people’s relationships. Intervention at higher levels of society
shall be seen as subsidiary to the obligations of smaller social units. Applied more
narrowly in the context of the EU, subsidiarity refers to a functional division of
administrative responsibilities, although sometimes the principle is referred back to
its wider usage where it implies an emphasis on decentralisation and diversity
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(Spicker 1991). Kickert (2003) deﬁnes subsidiarity as the principle under which the
state shall interfere only if the autonomous lower parts seriously fail to fulﬁl their
tasks. In EU ﬁsheries management, subsidiarity is deﬁned in the European Treaty as
ﬁsheries management being the sole competence of the EU (CFP) (Raakjear et al.
2010; van Hoof 2010a). Hence, for the CFP, the principle of subsidiarity implies that
the EU formulates the general principles of the CFP and is responsible for its general
outline, while the Member States are responsible for the implementation of the
general policies (Frost and Andersen 2006). Consequently under the CFP the
Commission can only command the management level but does not control imple-
mentation (Sissenwine and Symes 2007).
With the 2013 reform of the CFP (EU 2013) and the introduction of Article
18, the institutional setting has changed slightly by introducing the regional level
into the CFP implementation. Article 18 includes the provision that for some of the
conservation objectives (such as the LO), Member States affected by these measures
may present recommendations to the European Commission on how to achieve the
objectives. In the development of their proposal, the Member States are required to
consult the relevant Advisory Council. However, little authority is formally trans-
ferred to the regional level and the stakeholders, as the Commission is not account-
able for how it handles the inputs from the regional Member States, which
themselves are not accountable for how they handle the inputs from the Advisory
Councils (Eliasen et al. 2015:227).
The rather complex institutional setting of European Fisheries management
consists of the Council of Ministers, the European Commission (EC) and the
European Parliament (EP) at the supranational EU level and the Member States at
the national level. Therefore ﬁsheries management is shaped to a large extent during
a continuous process of draft legislation being prepared by the European Commis-
sion, legislative acts being jointly decided by the Council of the European Union and
the European Parliament acting together through the co-decision procedure and
adopted legislative acts being implemented by the EU Member States (Hegland
et al. 2012). One problem with the regionalisation of the CFP, however, is that the
European Treaties (which govern the policy-making conduct of EU) do not recog-
nise regions as part of the executive process (Symes 2012).
European ﬁsheries policies are prepared in a way that resembles neither tradi-
tional international politics nor policy-making by nation-states. The process takes
place in a complex nested setting in which Member States, the European Council of
Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament play a distinct
role. With the concept of multi-level governance, it is possible to capture the shifting
locus of governance from the traditional state level to subnational and supranational
levels. More speciﬁcally, multi-level governance points to sharing policy-making
competencies in a complex system of negotiation. The many actors involved in the
discussion are located at several levels of nested governmental institutions (supra-
national, regional, national and local) as well as private actors (i.e. NGOs, producers,
consumers, citizens, scientists) (van Tatenhove 2003). Using the perspective of
multi-level governance for the analysis of a complex system shows how the EU is
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clearly still a treaty-based polity and its Member States keep the ultimate authority to
approve all decisions (Smith 2004). Nevertheless, responsibility for implementing
the CFP still belongs to the Member States.
Within the realm of the LO, we can distinguish three layers of policy-making,
policy operationalisation and implementation, i.e. the European level, the Member
State level and, in between, the newly created regional level of Member States who
discuss regional implementation of the LO. Using the case of Dutch ﬁsheries, we
will look at how the LO came about and how it is being implemented across this
institutional setting, both from the perspective of the societal call to address
discarding of ﬁsh and the policy process of incorporating the LO into the CFP.
9.3 A Short History of the EU Landing Obligation
In 2007, the EC published a document about the policy to reduce unwanted
bycatches and eliminate discards in European ﬁsheries (European Commission
2007). It suggested a gradual elimination of discards by changing ﬁshers’ behaviour
and technologies, followed by a discard ban, thus placing the discard problem on the
European ﬁsheries managers’ agenda (Borges 2015).
In 2008, a British vessel was captured on camera discarding tonnes of ﬁsh. This
sparked widespread societal awareness of the discard problem. Discarding was
perceived by people as morally reprehensible, leading to a waste of marine resources
and contributing to ﬁsh mortality (Self 2015). This societal call to action, coupled
with the slow rate of implementation of discard reduction, substantially increased
political pressure on the EU to reconsider the discard policy and to promptly address
the discard problem (Borges 2015). Following this development, the EC started
reviewing the CFP by publishing the Green Paper proposal on the CFP reform
(Commission of the Europe an Communities 2009) and launching a public consul-
tation to discuss the proposed reforms (European Commission 2016). The proposal
stated that ‘the future CFP should ensure that discarding no longer takes place’
(Johnsen and Eliasen 2011).
The debate on banning discards took great momentum when British chef Hugh
Fearnley-Whittingstall launched his ‘Hugh’s Fish Fight’ public campaign against
ﬁsheries discards (Fish Fight 2014; Borges 2015). The campaign gained a large
support across Europe from celebrities, major retailers and the public in general; it
also received substantial funding and support of a number of environmental NGOs
(Fish Fight 2014). Just before the start of the ‘Hugh’s Fish Fight’ campaign, the new
EC had been installed, and the new Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisher-
ies, in the process of reforming the CFP, adopted the idea of an LO (Schwägerl
2013). Involved in the ﬁsheries decision-making process for the ﬁrst time (European
Commission 2016), the European Parliament responded to the expectations of the
European public by ‘holding the line and ﬁghting hard in the negotiations... for a
radical overhaul of EU ﬁsheries policies’ (Schwägerl 2013:1–2).
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As a result, the previously dismissed ‘discard ban’ was included in the 2013
reform of the CFP as the ‘Landing Obligation’. The introduction to the CFP 2013
explains some of the aims of this LO. Consideration 26 states: ‘[...] Unwanted
catches and discards constitute a substantial waste and negatively affect the sustain-
able exploitation of marine biological resources and marine ecosystems and the
ﬁnancial viability of ﬁsheries. [...].’ (European Commission 2013:24–25). This we
perceive as a ‘best use perspective’, as the simplest explanation of the obligation to
land in this perspective: one must land unwanted bycatches, therefore making ‘best
use’ of these catches. In addition to the best use perspective, consideration 29 states:
‘[...] In the management of the landing obligation, it is necessary that Member States
do their utmost to reduce unwanted catches. To this end, improvements of selective
ﬁshing techniques to avoid and reduce, as far as possible, unwanted catches must
have high priority. [...].’ (European Commission 2013). This we perceive as a
‘selectivity perspective’. In this perspective, landing discards is a tool to create an
incentive for ﬁshers to improve their species and size selectivity, as landing
unwanted bycatch would be a burden for them.
It must be noted that the intended effect of the Landing Obligation differs
between the two perspectives. In the ‘best use’ perspective, catches are perceived
to be landed and to be used; in the latter, the ‘selectivity perspective’, the burden of
landing ﬁsh is used to stimulate selectivity, through which a decrease in the amount
of discarded ﬁsh is established. The relation between these two intended effects
and/or the hierarchy of these intents is not clear, as consideration 29 gives the
selectivity perspective ‘high priority’: improvements of selective ﬁshing techniques
to avoid and reduce, as far as possible, unwanted catches must have high priority
(European Commission 2013). As for the ‘best use’ consideration, the CFP states
that the discards landed are not allowed to be used for direct human consumption.
Article 15 Section 11 states that for the species subject to the Landing Obligation as
speciﬁed in paragraph 1, the use of catches of species below the minimum conser-
vation reference size (MCRS) shall be restricted to purposes other than direct human
consumption, including ﬁsh meal, ﬁsh oil, pet food, food additives, pharmaceuticals
and cosmetics. Although the intention of Article 15 Section 11 is clear, as the
regulation limits the use of discards to prevent the development of a market for
undersized or over-quota ﬁsh because this could lead to an incentive to catch
undersized or over-quota ﬁsh, it does prevent a large proportion of discards from
being used for human consumption.
Besides the fundamental difference in perception of the core objective of the LO
(best use versus selectivity), some of the discards are a direct result of previous CFP
legislation. Measures such as total allowable catch (TAC) or minimum landing sizes
forbid landing and hence selling over-quota catches (Copes 1986; Poos et al. 2010)
and small ﬁsh (Harley et al. 2000; Rochet and Trenkel 2005). The natural result is
discarding of these catches (Mytilineou et al. 2018; Zeller et al. 2018). Hence, the
LO conﬂicts with certain provisions within current legislation, which lead ﬁshers to
discard ﬁsh that they are not allowed to keep on board (Sardà et al. 2015). To remove
the legal and practical impediments to the LO and ensure a legally sound and
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consistent basis for the introduction of the LO, the EC proposed in 2014 to adjust
eight EU ﬁsheries laws/regulations that were not yet adapted to the Landing Obli-
gation (Popescu 2015; Borges and Penas-Lado, this volume).
Exemplary of this is the debate on the so-called ‘Omnibus regulation’ proposal,
initiated at the beginning of 2014. This debate resulted in Regulation (EU) 2015/812
of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 20, 2015 that amended
several Council and Parliament regulations1 which became in fact a technical road
map for the implementation of the LO. That document reﬂected a period of addi-
tional discussions, meetings and hearings at the EU level on the core objectives and
paths of implementation, separating the involved institutions into different ‘camps’.
Some members of the European Parliament, together with the European Commis-
sion, signalled a desire to put this legal adjustment in place as soon as possible
without undermining the main provisions of the initial CFP. Some other members of
the European Parliament, together with the Council, put forward a number of
changes in the proposal (Naver 2014).
The ‘Omnibus regulation’ is one area where the discourse of the LO reﬂects
differences in opinions on the ‘how’ and ‘when’ of the Landing Obligation. Article
15 of the CFP does include provisions allowing some ﬂexibility under the
LO. Paragraph 4 of the reformed CFP (Art. 15 §4; (European Commission 2013)
speciﬁes exemptions for prohibited species, species having high survival rates after
being discarded, and the so-called de minimis exemption (further elaborated in §5
(c)). The latter implies that 5% of the catch can be discarded, considering that it is
very difﬁcult to improve the selectivity of a gear or when using selective ﬁshing
gear, handling of unwanted catches on board leads to ‘disproportionate costs’.
Interspecies ﬂexibility is allowed to a maximum of 9% (§8) and year-to-year
ﬂexibility is allowed up to 10% (§9). However, ﬂexibilities provided in Article
15 are associated with great uncertainty, particularly about how the provisions will
be implemented in practice: the wording leaves room for subjective interpretation,
e.g. ‘scientiﬁc evidence demonstrating high survival rates’ (Batsleer 2016).
Paragraph 5 (Art. 15 §5) notes that details of the implementation of the Landing
Obligation must be speciﬁed in multi-annual plans (§8–9), in the context of the
Landing Obligation (also called ‘discard plans’). These details include the high
survival2 exemptions and the de minimis exemptions. Between October 2014 and
beginning of 2018, the Commission adopted 15 of these documents in preparation of
the Landing Obligation. Exemptions must be speciﬁed according to the type of
1Council Regulations (EC) No 850/98, (EC) No 2187/2005, (EC) No 1967/2006, (EC) No 1098/
2007, (EC) No 254/2002, (EC) No 2347/2002 and (EC) No 1224/2009, and Regulations (EU) No
1379/2013 and (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards the
landing obligation, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1434/98 (European Commission
2015).
2Fishers should be allowed to continue discarding species which, according to the best available
scientiﬁc advice, have a high survival rate when released into the sea (European Commission,
considerations (27):25; Chaps. 2, 3 and 4).
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ﬁshing (small pelagic, large pelagic or demersal), the species of ﬁsh, the speciﬁc type
of ﬁshing gear and the ﬁshing ground and may apply only for a limited amount of
time. This results in highly detailed plans.
9.4 The Implementation of the Landing Obligation in Dutch
Fisheries
Based on the Landing Obligation proposed by the European Council and agreed in
the Council of June 2012, the Dutch ministry started preparing for the Landing
Obligation in autumn 2012. A large part of the Dutch ﬂeet ﬁshes in a mixed demersal
ﬁshery that involves substantial amounts of discards (Catchpole et al. 2008). Reduc-
tion of discards was therefore seen as a major challenge. The topics that the
government wished to address were thus the economic impact of the Landing
Obligation for the ﬁshing sector and its implications for control and surveillance,
and for the scientiﬁc monitoring of catches.
The Dutch government launched a LO working group (werkgroep
Aanlandplicht). Scientists, NGOs and industry representatives were invited to attend
monthly meetings, together with civil servants from the Ministry and the control
agency. The Ministry deemed it necessary to cooperate with the industry and aimed
to garner industry support for necessary measures. In reality the opposite occurred;
the LO triggered an immense negative response in the Dutch ﬁshing ﬂeet and
resulted in the industry representatives refusing the offer to participate in the
working group (Pastoors et al. 2014).
Internationally, other ﬁshing sectors (EAPO, Europêche and Cogeca) opposed
the plans and developed their ‘alternative proposal’ with a focus on stock sustain-
ability.3 Over the course of 2013, resistance grew in the Netherlands with one of
the two ﬁsheries organisations in the Netherlands, the Vissersbond, launching a
campaign entitled ‘Landing Obligation NO’ with a manifesto.4 The actual content
of the Landing Obligation document was as yet unknown because the European
Parliament was still preparing its opinion regarding the Commission’s CFP pro-
posal. This hindered the Dutch government’s communication regarding the
expected impact. The ﬁsheries representatives and the government did meet to
discuss the draft policy, however. In the summer of 2013, it was decided that
brainstorming sessions would be organised with the ﬁshers, scientists and policy
ofﬁcers to discuss possible ideas for research towards improved selectivity. How-
ever, during the ﬁrst brainstorming session (in Urk on August 31, 2013), the ﬁshers
expressed marked pessimism (Kraan and Verweij in press) because they saw no
3http://nsrac.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Paper-5.1-EAPO-Alternative-proposal-discards-
approach-by-EU-Industry.pdf
4https://www.goeree-overﬂakkee.nl/document.php?m¼46&ﬁleid¼14793&
f¼84374857b90e60c39d03f7a7aef57228&attachment¼0&c¼22055
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ecological and economic beneﬁts resulting from the LO and they feared economic
loss. This precluded a constructive or productive discussion about the LO.
From an ecological perspective, the ﬁshers argued that a large part of the
discarded catch could survive the discarding process. As such, they expected that
by having to land the entire catch under the LO, mortality of the stocks would only
increase, reducing potential future yield. In addition, they feared cascading effects in
the ecosystem to arise as many other (scavenging) species, i.e. birds and benthic
fauna, feed off discards.
From an economic point of view, undersized ﬁsh are not allowed to be sold for
human consumption. In this context, ﬁshers will obtain a low price for such ﬁsh,
lower than the cost of the additional workload of having to handle, sort and store the
unwanted catches on board. In addition, capacity problems in the ﬁsh hold as well as
choke species5 may cause an early cessation of ﬁshing activities resulting in a loss of
potential catches and yield. Both the ecological and economic impacts were still
poorly understood when the Landing Obligation came into force. This lack of
understanding was met with suspicion and fear for the future by the industry. In
turn, this uncertainty led to an attitude towards the LO that was likely to undermine
compliance (Batsleer 2016).
Besides the Dutch ﬁshers’ fear of how the LO would affect the ecosystem, they
also feared the market-driven consequences of landing undersized ﬁsh (Trapman and
Kraan 2015:28). In the 1980s and 1990s, there had been a major black market for
undersized sole, and the ﬁshing sector had fought hard to ban this practice. Many
ﬁshers feared that the LO would bring this practice back. To prevent a black market
from developing, the government had summoned to destroy undersized ﬁsh imme-
diately at the auction by pouring red dye over the ﬁsh.
As a result of the ﬁshers’ resistance to brainstorming about how to cope with a
potential LO, future sessions were cancelled and replaced with sessions where the
Minister explained to the ﬁshers the LO and listened to their concerns. These
meetings, one held in Scheveningen and one in Urk, have been characterised by
Pastoors et al. (2014) as ‘parallel monologues’ with three ‘talking lines’ (Table 9.1).
Table 9.1 Parallel lines of reasoning between ﬁshers and the Dutch government
Fishers Minister
1 The Landing Obligation is impossible to
implement
The Landing Obligation is a fact
2 We want a principled discussion about the
goals and measures of the LO
We will not have a principled discussion about
the goals and measures of the LO
3 Emphasising impossibilities, concerns and
dilemmas
Seeking room to manoeuvre in the implemen-
tation of the Landing Obligation
Source: Pastoors et al. (2014)
5Choke species are species for which quota are so restrictive that quota will be fully exploited at an
early stage in the year, resulting, in a mixed ﬁsheries, that the ﬁshery has to be completely stopped,
although for other species there may well still be sufﬁcient quota.
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The two perspectives inherent in the Landing Obligation (best use and selectivity)
have caused confusion during implementation of LO in the Netherlands. From the
discussions it became clear that ﬁshers and policy ofﬁcers had fundamentally
opposing perceptions of what the ecological consequences of the Landing Obliga-
tion would be (see Kraan and Verweij in press). This disconnect did not become
obvious as the Minister refused to have a principled discussion. The ‘best use’
perspective conﬂicts strongly with the perception of the ﬁshers; they think that the
Landing Obligation will conversely result in massive ‘waste’, as the discards (hardly
reduced) cannot be used and will have to be destroyed on land (Kraan and Verweij in
press). This undermines their willingness to cooperate and think constructively about
how to implement the measure.
The third talking line, however, provided a bridge between ﬁshers and govern-
ment. The government created a research agenda based on all of the (perceived)
impossibilities, concerns and dilemmas the ﬁshers mentioned and provided funding
in 2013 to implement research based on proposals from the ﬁshing sector. The
Minister emphasised from the start that she would seek ‘room to manoeuvre’ for the
ﬂeet. During 2014 and 2015, meetings were organised between the Ministry, ﬁshers
and researchers to discuss research directions and ﬁndings. Research was directed at
developing what was labelled as ‘best practices’ by gaining a better understanding of
amounts of discards of different ﬁsheries, possible gear innovations, the survival of
discarded ﬁsh (and ways to improve survival), camera monitoring on board and
processing and valorisation of discards.
It became clear from interviews with ﬁshers that they thought it was impossible to
prepare for the LO because of the long preparation trajectory, while the ﬁnal details
about the measure itself still remained uncertain. When asked in 2014/2015 about
possibilities to ﬁsh more selectively by the choices they make on where and when to
ﬁsh, ﬁshers expressed uncertainty and indicated that they could not envision how the
(draft) rules would inﬂuence their behaviour (Trapman and Kraan 2015). Again,
their fundamental resistance to the LO was linked to their (lack of) willingness and
ability to think constructively about how to live with it.
In light of deeply entrenched resistance of most Dutch ﬁshers to the Landing
Obligation, the Dutch therefore prepared for it by cooperating between ﬁsheries
representatives, policy ofﬁcers and scientists to search for the best way to implement
the new rules. The participants involved in the process built up interactional exper-
tise (Stange 2017) as they were frequently and directly in contact with each other.
Fisheries representatives combined their knowledge of the ﬂeet and ﬁshing practices
with the knowledge of the political arena and science and thereby thought construc-
tively about what was technically feasible, scientiﬁcally researchable and politically
achievable. A small group of ﬁshers did participate in the cooperative research
projects6 and thus also got some of these insights as well; however, most of the
individual ﬁshers were left out of these developments and their resistance to the LO
remained high.
6See http://cvo-visserij.nl/projecten-2/best-practices/ for some of these projects.
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This development illustrated the need to improve communication with and within
the ﬁshing community, since all discussions and negotiations at the national level had
to be explained and brought to acceptance in the ﬂeet by the ﬁsheries representatives.
The attempts to improve communication were not fully successful, resulting in the
2016 establishment of a ﬁsher protest movement called ‘EMK’ (Eendracht Maakt
Kracht; Unity Creates Strength). EMK opposed the LO as well as other measures
impacting the ﬁshers, such as the development of windmill parks in the North Sea and
the establishment of marine protected areas. EMK has organised annual
demonstrations since 2016: in Rotterdam (August 2016; an armada of 50 vessels
sailed on the Maas to the city centre, in conjunction with ‘World Harbour Day’), in
Brussels (May 2017; EMK delivered a petition to the European Parliament) and in
Amsterdam (June 2018; an armada of 15 vessels and other ﬁshers who came by bus to
deliver a petition to a member of the European Parliament).7 The EMK ﬁshers aim for
repeal of the LO. The ﬁshing industry as a whole (consisting of different organisa-
tions and groups using different avenues) has also tried to bring its opinion on the LO
to different arenas at different levels. The demonstrations of the EMK group were
aimed at the Dutch general public and Dutch EP members; but the Dutch parliament
was also mobilised from time to time, resulting in a motion to the Minister in
December 2015 to go to Brussels to ask for a delay in the implementation of the
Landing Obligation.
Parallel to this development, the Ministry had to (re-)negotiate at the regional
level with the other North Sea Member States in the ‘Scheveningen’ group. In that
process, Member States present their ideas for policy measures in the discard plans at
the Scheveningen group meeting, the Scheveningen group drafts a joint recommen-
dation for the annual discard plans. These are then sent to the STECF7 for evaluation,
who then advises the EC (see Rihan et al., this volume). The EC then sends it as a
Delegated Act to the European Parliament, which then also has to agree before the
plans can be ﬁnally accepted. This is a lengthy process, in which (highly) technical
matters and politics get mixed (see also Stockhausen, this volume). In this process,
the Ministry balances the expectations regarding the other Member States and ‘room
to manoeuvre’ of the ﬁshing ﬂeet in consultation with the ﬁsheries representatives
(ﬁsheries representative June 6, 2018). This results in some policy proposals from
the Dutch ﬂeet representatives being ﬁltered out at national level and no longer
discussed at the regional level.
9.5 The Muddy Waters of Multi-level Governance
Starting from the very beginning of the CFP reform process, considerable disparity
in the views articulated by different European institutions and EU Member States
was observed regarding the LO and its implications (Self 2015). The position taken
7The Scientiﬁc, Technical and Economic Committee on Fisheries of the European Commission, the
highest Scientiﬁc Advisory body for ﬁsheries of the EU
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by the European Parliament, representing the interests of European citizens, was
very much inﬂuenced by public discontent with the ﬁshing practices of discarding
with discards seen as unacceptable behaviour (Frangoudes et al. 2015). The ‘Hugh’s
Fish Fight’ campaign played an important role in portraying the image of waste, and
the image of mature cod being discarded in British small-scale ﬁsheries was instru-
mental. The European Parliament adopted the LO with the aim of changing current
ﬁshing practices. However, they had failed to consider all of the factors driving
discarding (Borges 2015). The driving factors behind the discarding of North Sea
cod (i.e. lack of quota) are completely different than those behind the discarding of
undersized plaice (i.e. CFP regulation; minimum landing size) in a ﬁshery such as
the Dutch mixed ﬁsheries.
In contrast, the Council of Ministers has been much more reluctant to embrace
changes in the CFP (Schwägerl 2013). Among the national governments, there are
differing interpretations of the LO (Viðarsson et al. 2015; Borges et al. 2016) which
results in a situation in which ‘[a]t the level of the Member States, the rules of the
game seemed not yet to be ﬁxed, and open for change’ (de Vos et al. 2016).
The general public, fuelled by ‘Hugh’s Fish Fight’ and its commercial and NGO
supporters, regards discarding as a waste of living resources (Heath et al. 2014;
Borges 2015). During the public consultation process preceding the introduction of
the LO, environmental NGOs strongly supported the principles of a discard ban. To
them, discarding is a wasteful practice that damages marine life and is consequently
an unsustainable practice (Villasante et al. 2016a, b).
The LO has been met with strong resistance by the European ﬁshing industry. The
ﬁshers’ response to the new CFP reform and the LO was initially inﬂuenced by their
exclusion from the decision-making process that preceded introduction of the
Regulation (De Vos et al. 2016). The ﬁshers therefore perceive the introduction of
the LO as a top-down process (SOCIOEC 2013; Frangoudes et al. 2015; De Vos
et al. 2016; Fitzpatrick et al., this volume). Moreover, they do not generally
comprehend the LO’s relevance, its biological meaningfulness nor its overall objec-
tive (Hedley et al. 2015). They also emphasise that there are different reasons for
discarding, including some that result from the very rules of the same CFP (Kraan
et al. 2015; Borges and Penas-Lado, this volume). This has resulted in a lack of
legitimacy and acceptance not only among Dutch ﬁshers but among most European
ﬁshers, weakening their willingness to comply with the LO requirements.
The reform of the CFP met with three major shifts in the governance set-up:
co-decision, regionalisation and the LO. The co-decision procedure for the ﬁrst time
provided a strong voice to the European Parliament in policy development.
Parallel to the implementation of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, using
a regional seas approach in which in drawing up marine strategies for the waters
within each marine region, Member States are required to cooperate closely (van
Hoof and van Tatenhove 2009; van Hoof et al. 2012; Van Leeuwen et al. 2012).
And, due to the 2013 reform, the CFP now has a regional component. This regional
approach creates a new layer in the institutional setting of ﬁsheries policy between
the European institutions and Member States.
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Finally, the LO is a Policy, yet it carries many characteristics of a Directive. In the
CFP, the wider goal of the LO is formulated, but the operationalisation of the policy
into concrete measures is developed over time. This will allow for adaptation of the
LO to local and regional circumstances and practices.
In principle these three developments added to a multi-level governance structure,
contributing to improved subsidiarity; in theory it emphasises decentralisation and
diversity resulting in policy implementation that is as close to ﬁshing practices as
possible (Spicker 1991). However, in practice, bottom-up proposals from stake-
holders to improve policy do not make it up the chain of multi-level governance due
to political considerations (i.e. assessing that the proposals will probably not get
support from the other Member States). Also, as a consequence of this new institu-
tional setting, it becomes clear that there is no one single overarching discourse
steering the operationalisation of the LO. At different levels and across institutions,
the main driver and hence the main objective of the LO (‘best use’ perspective or
‘selectivity’ perspective) are interpreted differently.
From the ‘best use’ perspective, the perspective adhered to by the general public
and the main driver of the anti-discards campaign, human consumption of bycatch
ﬁsh is stimulated. From this perspective, it is hard to understand why the unwanted
bycatches, and hence former discards, cannot be made available for consumption.
Parallel to this perspective is the ﬁshers’ opinion that when unwanted bycatches are
discarded, they still fulﬁl a role in the marine ecosystem, yet once landed, they are
subtracted from the ecosystem. If, after landing, the catches are then destroyed, this
seems to contrast with a ‘best use’ perspective.
From the ‘selectivity’ perspective, ﬁshers ﬁnd it hard to see ways of increasing
selectivity. As a result, we see today that across Europe exemptions are increasingly
sought under the de minimis regulation, ‘high survival’ exemption (Rihan et al.,
this volume) and the Omnibus regulation, to ﬁnd ways to exclude certain ﬁsh species
from the LO. A new discourse seems to present itself in which, at national levels,
efforts are being made to prove that species have a high survival rate after being
caught and discarded.
Hence, instead of developing a clear understanding of the aim of the LO, its
operationalisation and implementation at the most relevant level of the multi-
governance structure of ﬁsheries policy in the EU, it appears that the current
governance setting of the CFP is obscuring the discussion, with different interpre-
tations of the aims at different levels of governance and different perceptions of the
principles behind the LO and of the consequences when implemented.
9.6 Conclusions
The introduction of the LO and regionalisation of the CFP have reshaped the multi-
level setting of ﬁsheries policy-making in Europe. However, when looking at
implementation and operationalisation of the LO, one can wonder whether these
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changes actually have resulted in a more open, transparent and participatory manner
of policy-making. Has it shifted from the subsidiary level to the lowest possible
institutional level?
The debate on the objective of the LO between the ‘best use’ and ‘selectivity’
perspectives, resulting in different interpretations at different levels, obscures the
debate. It highlights the lack of a shared goal of the LO within and between the
different governance levels that are involved in the implementation process.
As we have seen in the case of the Netherlands, this partly stems from the lack of
discussion between opposing resource users and supporters of the Landing Obliga-
tion about the need and usefulness of the measure because there is no arena in the
governance system where they meet. In addition, in the new institutional setting, two
things are unclear: the relation between different decision-making bodies and the
way in which stakeholders’ input will be incorporated in decision-making regarding
the implementation of the Landing Obligation. The multi-level setting of ﬁsheries
policy in Europe has made the debate more opaque instead of more transparent and
open. The result of this implementation process has been a diluted policy whose
goal, execution and effectiveness are all equally muddy.
The multi-level governance setting could have been instrumental using the subsid-
iarity principle of having discussions and decisions made at the most relevant policy
and institutional level. The regional level is added to the Member States and the
European institutions of the Council, Parliament and Commission. The effectiveness
of the setting would have beneﬁtted greatly from clearly deﬁned roles for industry and
other stakeholders at each level of governance. Participation requires a clear platform;
and clearly deﬁning and communicating policy goals are essential to the process.
Besides this lack of a principled discussion about the motivation and objective of
the LO, implementation also appears to be muddled. Testing for high survival rates of
discarded ﬁsh is in fact not so much implementing the LO but trying to escape from the
LO. This can be traced to the inconsistency in interpretation of the objectives of the
LO, a lack of thorough debate linking objectives with ﬁshing practice (i.e. what is
more wasteful – discarding ﬁsh back into the ecosystem with an unclear fate or landing
them and thus clearly choosing for ﬁsh mortality?) and from the lack of reﬂection in an
earlier stage on the driving forces behind the discards.
Surely, the ﬁshing industry does see beneﬁts of reducing unwanted catches, but
does not see any justiﬁcation for having to land all catches of quota-managed
species. Indeed the ‘force’ of the LO has resulted in improved selectivity in
sub-sections of the ﬁshing industry, which otherwise might not had been accom-
plished. However, the ﬁnal goal of a total ban on discards is far from being attained.
Perhaps the major change that is needed to reduce discards requires a transition to a
whole new system of ﬁsheries, including different ﬁshing practices, different ﬁsh
consumption patterns and different ﬁsheries management. Implementing rigorous
mitigation measures, such as the LO, should be supported by a common understand-
ing of the context in which the problem occurs and how best to address it. If not, it
may lead to unexpected and unwanted consequences and undermine acceptance and
compliance. At times, it is clear that a complex multi-level governance structure may
only muddy the waters instead of resolving the debate.
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Chapter 10
The Baltic Cod Trawl Fishery: The Perfect
Fishery for a Successful Implementation
of the Landing Obligation?
Daniel Valentinsson, Katja Ringdahl, Marie Storr-Paulsen,
and Niels Madsen
Abstract The cod ﬁsheries in the Baltic Sea were among the ﬁrst EU ﬁsheries with
a full implementation of the EU Landing Obligation (LO) or so-called ‘discard ban’,
phased in from 2015 onwards. This chapter describes key aspects for the successful
management of Baltic cod such as the long history of scientiﬁc data collection for
stock assessment and cod management as well as a well-documented history of work
aimed at increased selectivity in cod trawls. We then analyse how the scientiﬁc data
used for stock assessment has been affected by the LO and how the knowledge of
Baltic cod selectivity has been used and developed since its introduction. We
conclude that in spite of many good prerequisites, the introduction of the LO in
Baltic cod ﬁsheries has been unsuccessful and has failed to deliver any of the
expected beneﬁts. Data quality for stock assessments has deteriorated, discarding
of cod has not decreased despite a reduced minimum size and there are no indica-
tions of increased gear selectivity in the ﬁshery. Finally, we propose potential
explanations for this failure and recommend actions that may be needed to make
the Landing Obligation more successful.
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10.1 Introduction
Baltic Sea cod was the ﬁrst demersal species with a full implementation of the EU
Landing Obligation (LO) in 2015. The LO meant that the dominant ﬁsheries that use
trawls and nets were phased-in at once, with only a survival exemption for the
negligible cod catches from pots and traps valid between 2015 and 2017 (Commis-
sion Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1396/2014). Catches from cod trawls in the
Baltic, in contrast to other European demersal trawl ﬁsheries, are relatively clean
with only ﬂounder (non-quota species) and some plaice as notable bycatches. In
2017, plaice was also included in the Baltic Sea LO. This could potentially lead to
challenges for some Baltic countries as the relative stability (i.e. the ﬁxed allocation
key of TAC between countries) means that few countries in the Baltic hold a
relatively large share of the total plaice quota. This could potentially be problematic
for the countries with no quota or with a very low quota share if they cannot avoid
plaice in their cod catches.
Because bottom trawls are by far the main gear used to catch Baltic cod and
because both gear selectivity research and discard observers programmes have a
long history in the Baltic, the setting and background of this ﬁshery seem perfect for
a successful LO implementation. This chapter focuses on the prerequisites and
outcomes of the LO in the Baltic trawl ﬁshery targeting cod. Our aim is to describe
the backdrop to the LO implementation and subsequent indications of the outcomes.
We ﬁrst describe the discard sampling using scientiﬁc observers and how these data
are used in stock assessments. We also depict the long history of trawl selectivity
research in Baltic cod trawls and then discuss the outcomes of these aspects in light
of the articulated aims of the Landing Obligation (Anon 2018a), i.e., reduced
unwanted catches, improved quality of scientiﬁc data and industry adaption through
the adoption of more selective ﬁshing practices.
10.1.1 The Baltic Cod Stocks: Stock Development
and Current Status
The Baltic Sea is inhabited by two genetically distinct cod populations, i.e. eastern
and western Baltic cod. There is evidence supporting the difference between the two
populations, based on differences in spawning time, otolith shape (Hüssy et al. 2016)
and genetics (Nielsen et al. 2003; Nielsen et al. 2005). The cod in the Baltic Sea live
in brackish water characterized by low salinity and an oxygenated surface layer with
a hypoxic deeper saline layer that gives a permanent halocline. This inﬂuences egg
buoyancy and thereby egg survival, especially in the more eastern part of the Baltic
Sea. The water volume suitable for egg fertilisation and development of eastern
Baltic cod (i.e., the reproductive volume) is deﬁned as the volume of water with a
PSU >12 and oxygen content >2 ml/l (Köster et al. 2003).
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Cod ﬁsheries in the Baltic Sea have a long history (MacKenzie et al. 2002). More
intensive exploitation only started in the 1950s (Bagge and Thurow 1994; Eero et al.
2007). The cod ﬁshery on the eastern stock increased further in the early 1980s as a
result of increased stock biomass due to favourable reproductive conditions and
strong year classes (Eero et al. 2011). As the ﬁshery intensiﬁed during the 1980s, a
period of low productivity due to deteriorated environmental conditions began
which, together with intensive exploitation, rapidly reduced the stock. In a 10 year
period, the stock size was reduced by more than 85% (ICES 2013), and in 2005 the
spawning stock biomass was estimated to be at a historic low, close to 10% of the
high levels observed in the 1980s. However, after 2005 the stock started to rebuild
again and the positive developments were partly assigned to effective management
measures and increased reproductive success. In 2010, the stock was thought to have
recovered (Eero et al. 2012a). Shortly after, it was evident that although recruitment
was estimated to be good, large cod were missing in scientiﬁc surveys and commer-
cial catches. The nutritional condition of adult cod has been continuously declining
since the 1990s. However, since the mid-2000s, when cod abundance started to
increase again, the proportion of eastern cod with a very low condition index
increased rapidly (ICES 2017a). The reasons for deteriorating nutritional condition
and possibly reduced growth are not fully understood. Different hypotheses are
suggested including: (i) low prey availability in the area where cod are mainly
found (Eero et al. 2012b); (ii) increased size selectivity in commercial ﬁsheries
which may have led to high mortality of large cod, (iii) a greater proportion of
small-sized ﬁsh in the stock and their contribution to density-dependent effects and
(iv) increased extent of low oxygen areas that could affect cod growth either directly
via physiological processes or indirectly via affecting benthic prey availability
(Chabot and Dutil 1999; Svedäng and Hornborg 2014; Eero et al. 2015; Casini
et al. 2016). In 2017 the eastern Baltic cod stock was estimated to be at a very low
level and cod larger than 45 cm were very scarce (ICES 2018).
The western Baltic cod spawns in speciﬁc areas in saline waters deeper than
20–40 m, with the main spawning areas being the Little and the Great Belt, the
Sound and the Kiel and Mecklenburg Bays. The western Baltic cod mixes with both
the eastern Baltic cod stock in the Arkona Basin (Subdivision 24) and with the
Kattegat cod stock in the southern part of Kattegat (ICES 2018). The western Baltic
cod stock has also experienced large ﬂuctuations in stock development over time. In
the mid-1980s, landings were close to 50,000 t in the western Baltic management
area to below 6000 t in 2017. Unlike the eastern Baltic cod, there is no documen-
tation of decreased condition or impairment by reduced growth of western Baltic
cod. The western Baltic cod has experienced high ﬁshing pressure and shown poor
recruitment for several years and was assessed to be well below reference points at
the onset of the LO in 2015. However, although the spawning stock was at a
historically low level in 2016, a new large year class was observed, which is likely
to inﬂuence the development of the stock in the following years (ICES 2018).
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10.2 Data Collection and Assessment of Baltic Cod
Internationally coordinated management of the two Baltic cod stocks stems back to
the early 1970s. Before many of the countries around the Baltic Sea joined the EU,
the management authority was the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission
(IBSFC), which ceased to exist in 2007. The two cod stocks were regulated together
by a total Baltic TAC (total allowable catch) until 2003, but have since then been
regulated separately. The introduction of a TAC in the late 1980s was prompted by
the drastic decline in stock size and catches in the mid 1980s, just after the peak in
stock size when catches exceeded 400,000 t (Bagge and Thurow 1994; Suuronen
et al. 2007). The ﬁrst EU management plan for Baltic cod was introduced in 2007
(Council Reg (EC) No 1098/2007). The cod plan was repealed in the summer of
2016 when a new multi-annual plan for all Baltic stocks of cod, herring and sprat was
introduced (Reg (EU) No 2016/1139).
The assessment of the eastern Baltic cod stock was conducted for many years as a
full age-based analytical assessment. In 2014, however, ICES could no longer accept
the assessment. There were several factors that had changed the prerequisite for the
assessment: Ageing discrepancies between countries, reduced growth and the
unexplained disappearance of larger cod despite the appearances of good recruit-
ment. Therefore, a reliable analytical assessment could not be produced. The advice
since 2015 has been based on the so-called ICES “category three” assessments.
These assessments mainly use trends in an index of spawning stock or total biomass
from research surveys. The current assessment approach for the eastern stock uses
the numbers of cod above 30 cm (as a proxy for Spawning Stock Biomass, SSB)
from the survey where the average abundance for the two most recent years is
divided by the average for the three previous years (“2 over 3 rule”). Thus, the
provision of high quality management advice is challenged by a number of changes
in cod biology and the ecological conditions affecting cod (ICES 2017a). The
change of assessment methodology drastically changed the perception of the eastern
stock and resulted in a large reduction in the advised quota in contrast to quota
increases in previous years. Since 2015 TACs have been set well above advised
quotas but have not been fully utilised (ICES 2018), meaning that quotas have been
non-restrictive in some Member States. Before 2015, individual cod were assigned
to their stock of origin (western or eastern cod) only according to the area where they
were caught. This was changed in 2015 when a split on the cod caught in the
transition area (SD 24) was applied, assigning the individual cod in the transition
area to either stock based on otolith shape analyses and genetics. A consequence of
the split was that it was not possible to use the full time series back to 1970 as before,
but the time series had to be truncated to 1994. In 2013, substantial recreational
catches were also included in the western Baltic cod stock assessment (ICES 2013).
This was one of the ﬁrst stocks in Europe to take recreational catches into account in
ﬁsheries management advice. The western stock assessment is still conducted as a
full age-based analytical assessment, because it is not facing the severe uncertainties,
such as the absence of large cod and impaired growth, observed among eastern cod.
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The quantities of cod discarded by Baltic cod trawlers have been estimated based
on data collected by on-board observers on commercial ﬁshing vessels since 1996
(early from an EU perspective). Since 2002 the monitoring has been done under the
EC data collection regulations (EU No 199/2008, Commission Decision 2010/93/
EU, EU No 2017/1004, Commission Decision 2016/1251/EU). The objective of the
monitoring programme is exclusively scientiﬁc and the observers have no role in
control and enforcement. The observers measure the volume of discarded catches
and species and size composition of all the catch (discards and retained). All relevant
biological information concerning discards is also recorded. Discard estimates for
the eastern Baltic cod stock were included in the assessment of the stock between
2001–2014, until the assessment method changed. Since 2015 discards are included
in the advice as part of the harvest rate and ICES advice is based on total catches
(landings and discards). For the western Baltic cod discard data have been included
in the assessment since 2002.
For a long time the discards of cod in the Baltic were considered relatively low
compared with other areas. The average discard rate in the western Baltic cod stock
was 8% (for the time period 1994–2017), and for the last three years (2015–2017)
has been estimated at lower than 5% (ICES 2018). For the eastern stock, the discard
rate was low at the beginning of the time-series but has increased considerably over
time. In 2017 the discard rate was estimated at 11% (ICES 2018). Moreover, after a
peak in 2013–2014, just before the introduction of the LO, the estimated discard rate
fell but is still above long-term average for the stock (Fig. 10.1). Important to note is
that MCRS (minimum conservation reference size) was reduced from 38 to 35 cm
when the LO was introduced, which is a probable reason for the drop in discard rate
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Fig. 10.1 Weight percentage of cod discarded between 1994 and 2017 for the Eastern and Western
Baltic cod stocks. Catches combined from all gears (passive and active). (Data from ICES 2018)
10 The Baltic Cod Trawl Fishery: The Perfect Fishery for a Successful. . . 201
in 2015. Furthermore, problems in gaining observer access in some countries led
ICES to point out that the discard estimate is highly uncertain and is also considered
to be an underestimate (ICES 2017c).
The observer coverage of at-sea sampling programmes is usually low (Uhlmann
et al. 2014). In the Swedish and Danish programmes, typically only 0.5–1.5% of the
ﬁshing trips are covered. Discard data are also known to be highly variable in terms
of quantities and proportions (Kelleher 2005), which makes estimates of overall
volumes of discarded ﬁsh uncertain. In Sweden, for example, the proportion of cod
below MCRS ranged between 2% and 43% in observed trips during 2012–2017.
10.3 Research to Improve Selectivity in Baltic Cod Trawls
Technical conservation measures have a long history in the Baltic Sea. Documented
scientiﬁc trials with escape windows to reduce catches of young ﬁsh in trawls started
over 100 years ago (Ridderstad 1915), and the Baltic Sea is an area where many
documented selectivity experiments have been carried out (see Madsen 2007).
Improving the yield of Baltic cod by increasing size selectivity (length of ﬁrst
capture) and reducing discards have been a management strategy for decades. A
series of scientiﬁc experiments have followed with the aim of developing and
identifying new concepts to improve selectivity in the trawl ﬁshery. As such, the
L50 (50% retention length) in a traditional diamond mesh codend can be increased
by increasing the mesh size. However, a major focus in the Baltic Sea has been to
make the selection curve steeper, which can be assessed by a lowered selection range
(SR: L75-L25). By lowering SR, the escape of ﬁsh below a deﬁned length (minimum
landing or minimum conservation reference size; MLS or MCRS, respectively) is
increased and the loss of marketable cod is reduced. This is important for the ﬁshers
because they do not want to lose any marketable ﬁsh. Fig. 10.2 illustrates the
inﬂuence of SR for the retention of small and legal sized cod. Furthermore, to
guarantee optimal selection, it is important that the selectivity is stable. The selec-
tivity in traditional diamond mesh codends is normally reduced with increased catch
weight due to closure of the mesh opening (Robertson and Stewart 1988; Tschernij
and Holst 1999).
A common solution to improve trawl selectivity is to ﬁt the net with an escape
window (“window”), i.e., a panel with meshes (type and size) suitable to allow
unwanted catch to escape. Typically, square mesh (netting turned 45) panels are
inserted into the net (mainly in the codend region), which ensures that meshes stay
open in this region. The remaining part of the trawl is most often made of traditional
diamond mesh netting. An advantage of the window is that it can be mounted
directly in the existing trawl at low cost. Several types of windows have been tested
in the Baltic Sea cod ﬁshery over the years (Madsen 2007). The ﬁrst tested selective
codends were equipped with two side windows (known as the “Swedish window”
codend), positioned close to the end of the codend (Tschernij et al. 1996). This
codend had a higher selection factor (SF: 50% retention length L50/mesh size) and
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lower relative selection range (SRA: selection range SR/L50) than a standard
diamond mesh codend (Madsen 2007). This was also true when compared to a
window codend having side windows ending in front of the lifting strop (known as
the “Danish window” codend; Lowry et al. 1995; Madsen et al. 1998). Later
experiments demonstrated that the selectivity is improved when the window is
moved all the way back to the end of the codend (Madsen 2000) and even further
using a codend with a single top window (Madsen 2007). These ﬁndings formed the
basis for the “Bacoma window” (Fig. 10.3) used today. The idea behind the Bacoma
window was to change the selectivity by changing the mesh size in the escape
window only (Madsen et al. 2002). This was expected to make stepwise changes
easier and to reduce costs compared to extensive changes to the entire gear. Exper-
iments indicated that the SF was relatively constant when mesh size was changed in
the window (Madsen et al. 2002). An additional advantage of the Bacoma codend
was that it is more ﬂexible and easier to handle than a full square mesh codend.
However, the knotless netting used in the window is relatively expensive and
difﬁcult to mend (Tschernij and Suuronen 2002).
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
R
et
en
tio
n 
(%
)
Length (cm)
Fig. 10.2 Two hypothetical selection curves with identical L50 (45 cm) but with different selection
ranges (SR). The grey curve has a lower SR (5 cm) and the black one, a higher SR (10 cm).
Minimum size (35 cm) is indicated by the vertical dashed line. The red shaded area indicates
differences in retention of undersized cod (higher retention with higher SR), the orange area
indicates differences in retention of cod just above minimum size (higher retention with higher
SR) and the green area indicates the difference in retention for larger sizes (higher retention with
lower SR)
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During the last decade scientists have focused on the selective properties of T90
meshes in the Baltic Sea cod ﬁshery (ICES 2011). The T90 codend is a very simple
and cheap way to improve the size selectivity of a trawl, because standard conven-
tional netting material can be used. In T90 codends, the standard (T0) diamond mesh
netting is turned 90, which provides a more open mesh under pull (Fig. 10.3). The
netting knot size, netting material and codend circumference will inﬂuence selectiv-
ity (Herrmann et al. 2007; Wienbeck et al. 2011).
In recent years there has been a change in some EU countries where the typical
top-down focus (from managers or scientists) of gear research initiatives has become
less pronounced, and focus has shifted to bottom-up initiatives where the ﬁshing
industry identiﬁes gear issues and develop solutions to better suit their ﬁsheries (see
O’Neill et al., this volume). Some of these initiatives are described in ICES (2017b).
There are several explanations for this trend. Apart from the obvious ones such as
increased transparency, and industry expert knowledge regarding gears and practical
know-how regarding their ﬁsheries and catches, another important factor is changes
in EU policy. Examples are increased regionalisation and the introduction of the
Landing Obligation with its associated choke issues (Borges and Penas Lado, this
volume) and a movement to more results-based management with less prescriptive
legislation in the reformed CFP. Bottom-up initiatives can also increase industry
buy-in and thus help to alleviate some of the mistrust of top-down science and
Fig. 10.3 The standard codend used before introducing selective codends and the T90 and Bacoma
codend used today with a simulated 500 kg catch, tested inside the ﬂume tank in Hirtshals,
Denmark. In the left column the full codend, in the middle column the last part of the codend
where the catch is stored and in the right column the meshes in the area around the lifting strops.
(Details about the codends are found in Madsen et al. 2015)
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legislation and circumvention of rules and recommendations (Suuronen et al. 2007;
Catchpole and Gray 2010; Krag et al. 2016).
Examples of recent or ongoing bottom-up gear related initiatives in the Baltic
region are projects like MINIDISC and FastTrack in Denmark and the Selective
Fisheries Secretariat in Sweden. The MINIDISC project evaluated the effectiveness
of reducing unwanted catches through free gear choice and full documentation
(Mortensen et al. 2017). Interestingly, the study reported that although the chosen
gears indicated a lowered selectivity, the discard ratio decreased due to either higher
landings or lower discards. However, as the technical descriptions of gears and
ﬁshing behaviour was limited, it is possible that changes other than gear selectivity
might have inﬂuenced the results of the study. The FastTrack project and the
Selective Fisheries Secretariat are very similar in terms of objectives, set-up and
work procedures (Valentinsson 2016, www.fast-track.dk). Both involve an initial
selection process of industry ideas where managers, industry and scientiﬁc repre-
sentatives are involved. Accepted projects start with an iterative test and develop-
ment phase of the gear modiﬁcation in commercial practice led by the industry
participants where they collect some data. A second phase is a scientiﬁc trial and
evaluation. The large majority of projects within these two initiatives is focused on
an improvement and documentation of the available toolbox of gears available for
use by ﬁshers to adapt to the LO (Valentinsson 2016).
Three of the projects under the Selective Fisheries Secretariat have focused on
reducing unwanted catches in Baltic cod trawl ﬁshery (Nilsson et al. 2018). One
project was unsuccessful in reducing the catch of small cod; another showed
increased selectivity but included a technically complex gear that cannot be used
due to several conﬂicts with current regulations. The third project studied a modiﬁed
T90 codend (slightly reduced mesh size, increased codend length and increased
circumference). Those results showed that the modiﬁed codend reduced the catches
of undersized cod (Nilsson 2018). Based on these results, a joint recommendation
from BALTFISH in May 2017 to COM suggested allowing this T90 codend as an
alternative. After evaluation by STECF, COM approved the recommendation and
the new T90 codend was introduced February 1st, 2018 (Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) 2018/47).
10.3.1 Technical Conservation Measures – the Baltic History
The intensive research on improving the selectivity in Baltic cod trawls has led to
several legislative changes since 1995. Before that, regulations for cod trawls
stipulated a minimum mesh size of 105 mm and a minimum landing size (MLS)
of 33 cm. In 1994 the IBSFC changed the technical measures, which was followed
by a series of changes over the next decade. From 1995, the baseline mesh size was
increased to 120 mm andMLS to 35 cm in order to protect young cod. By derogation
a 105 mm codend remained allowed if one of two designs of exit windows was used.
This was one of the ﬁrst EU regulations where selective devices were adopted into
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legislation (Council EC regulation No 2250/95; Madsen 2007; Feekings et al. 2013).
The technical descriptions of the two windows (Danish and Swedish) were very
detailed; this was the start of a practice that continued in the following Baltic trawl
speciﬁcations. In 1998 these gear rules were transposed into EU legislation (Council
Reg (EC) No. 88/98). Based on advice from a large international scientiﬁc project
(the Bacoma project, Suuronen et al. 2000), starting in 2002, IBSFC changed both
exit windows with two alternative codends. This meant that either a 130 mm codend
or a new codend with 105 mm mesh size and a knotless square mesh window of
120 mm (i.e., the Bacoma codend) had to be used. Use of the Bacoma codend was
widespread in early 2002 but due to the increased L50 (~10 cm), initial catch losses
for trawlers that used the Bacoma codend were substantial (Tschernij et al. 2004).
Therefore, most trawlers rapidly switched to the alternative 130 mm diamond mesh
codend or manipulated their Bacoma codends to decrease selectivity (Suuronen et al.
2007), with increased discarding as a result. This led to an EU emergency closure of
Baltic cod ﬁsheries in April 2003. When the ﬁshery reopened in August 2003, the
Bacoma panel mesh size was reduced to 110 mm, conventional diamond mesh
codends were prohibited and cod MLS was increased to 38 cm. The changed
mesh size was supposed to better match the new 38 cm MLS (Valentinsson and
Tschernij 2003). In 2005 the current technical regulation (Council Reg (EC) No
2187/2005) was introduced and the 110 mm Bacoma codend was allowed. For a few
years, the 110 mm Bacoma codend was the only legally approved gear. In 2006, a
T90 codend was introduced as an alternative after an evaluation of existing data by
ICES, which did not ﬁnd any difference in selectivity between the 110 mm T90
codend and the 110 mm Bacoma (ICES 2007; Suuronen et al. 2007). The next major
change occurred in 2010 when the mesh size of the T90 codend and the Bacoma
window was increased from 110 mm to 120 mm to further decrease catches of
juvenile cod. The length of the Bacoma window was also extended. The latter
measure was to prevent selectivity from decreasing at high catch rates (Madsen
et al. 2010). A follow-up analysis of Danish discard data demonstrated that these
improvements in selectivity contributed to a reduction of cod discards (Feekings
et al. 2013).
In 2014 the regionalisation within the reformed CFP gave Member States more
power over technical regulations as part of temporary discard plans in accordance
with articles 15(6) and 18(3) of the basic Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 1380/
2013). The Member States around the Baltic Sea, organised in the regional group
called Baltﬁsh, suggested in their ﬁrst joint recommendation to the Commission that
the minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) should be lowered from 38 to
35 cm as an “efﬁcient and speedy way to minimise cod discards” when the Landing
Obligation was introduced 2015 (Anon 2014a). The commission adopted this
proposal in their discard plan for 2015–2017 and prolonged it via a delegated act
from 2018 (delegated regulation No. 2018/306). The new alternative 115 mm T90
codend was introduced on ﬁrst February 2018 after a joint recommendation from
Baltﬁsh (Commission delegated regulation (EU) 2018/47). This was the ﬁrst change
to Baltic cod trawl regulations since 2010.
Expected changes in size selectivity of Baltic cod trawls over the time period
1994–2018 is shown in Fig. 10.4, where the estimated L50 values and minimum
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sizes over time are indicated. The estimated effect from the changes in selectivity is a
continuous increase in L50, giving a total increase of about 15 cm since the early
1990s. This seems to be in conﬂict with the high discard rates reported in recent
years. One reason could be that the estimated selectivity obtained from scientiﬁc sea
trials does not necessarily reﬂect the realised selectivity in commercial practice
because vessel type, engine power, gear choice, design and -conﬁguration may
all inﬂuence selectivity. More information about commercial ﬁshing practice and
compliance is necessary to clarify this. In fact, the manipulation of the selectivity in
trawls by ﬁshers has been documented (ICES 2017c). Another potential reason is the
considerable change in size structure of (mainly Eastern) Baltic cod; small individ-
uals now dominate the stock and very few individuals are larger than 45 cm (ICES
2018). Thus, although the trawls used may be size selective, the catches still have a
large proportion of small cod due to the truncated size structure of the ﬁshed
population.
10.3.2 Technical Conservation Measures – Since
the Introduction of the Landing Obligation
The dynamic period of many changes regarding technical measures for Baltic cod
trawls in the 2000s was followed by a calmer period after 2010 (Fig. 10.4). However,
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renewed calls for changes to the technical measures emerged with the LO introduc-
tion for Baltic cod in 2015. Industry representatives in the Baltic Sea advisory
council have repeatedly declared that the current detailed gear measures have
hampered the implementation of the LO, and that a new technical framework with
more ﬂexibility is urgently needed (BSAC 2017). In 2015 industry representatives of
the Baltic Sea Advisory Council (BSAC) had already recommended amending Reg.
2187/2005 by deleting the reference to the speciﬁcations of Bacoma and T90 to
allow the use of 105 mm codends as under pre-1995 law (BSAC 2015). Despite all
of the existing science and historical regulatory changes, gear measures are still
today hotly debated in regional forums and Member States, especially in light of the
Landing Obligation and unabated discarding. As mentioned above, information
from the industry and observers suggests that trawls are being modiﬁed to reduce
selectivity, leading to catching a higher proportion of smaller ﬁsh (ICES 2017c).
This is not a new phenomenon in the Baltic (Valentinsson and Tschernij 2003;
Suuronen et al. 2007). ICES (2007) also mentioned that considerable differences in
opinion prevailed among Member States and that scientiﬁc arguments have gotten
lost in a largely emotional debate. This may be one explanation for the lack of
cooperation on this issue. Strikingly, in spite of >3 years with the LO and its
increased mandate for regional proposals via discard plans, only one joint recom-
mendation for an alternative trawl has been proposed. For control and documenta-
tion measures, joint recommendations are equally scarce from the Baltﬁsh regional
group of Member States.
A new technical framework regulation is now being negotiated in the
EU. Available draft texts seem to consolidate the current two codends (120 mm
Bacoma or 120 mm T90) as minimum requirements, with options to adopt joint
recommendations from regional groups for alternative gear measures, provided they
are at least equivalent in terms of limiting unwanted catches as compared to the
baseline gears. In essence, the revision of the technical measures framework does not
represent a great change, as regional gear proposals (and control measures) have
already been possible via discard plans since the introduction of the LO (art. 15(6) of
Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013).
10.4 Effects of the Landing Obligation on Scientiﬁc Data
for Stock Assessments
When the Landing Obligation went into effect, it was expected to generate more accurate
data because all catches of species that came under this obligation should have been
documented and landed. During the years preceding the LO, there were even discussions
about whether scientiﬁc sea-sampling programmes would still be needed (Anon 2014b;
STECF 2014), as it appeared to be more cost-efﬁcient to sample landed catches than board
vessels at sea. Proper documentation and landing unwanted catches was also the underlying
assumption for increased quotas, as landing quotaswould be turned into catch quotas, based
on historical discard estimates.
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In reality, however, 3 years of the LO in the Baltic Sea trawl ﬁsheries for cod
indicate that a majority of the unwanted catches of cod are neither brought ashore nor
documented properly. In Sweden, for example, 2–4% of the total cod landings in the
ﬁsheries statistics were reported as cod below MCRS (recorded as below minimum
size or ‘BMS’ in log books) between 2015 and 2017 (Fig. 10.5a). The estimated
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Fig. 10.5 Relative size composition of cod catches from Swedish Baltic trawl ﬁsheries between
2012 and 2017 from (a) reported catches (logbooks and sales slips) and (b) data from the scientiﬁc
observer programme. Size 1–3 are cod with an individual weight > 2 kg, size 4 are cod in the range
of 1–2 kg and size 5 are cod with an individual weight between 0.3 and 1 kg. 5b are cod with a
length 35–37 cm. BMS are cod smaller than the minimum conservation reference size (MCRS)/
minimum landing size (MLS). MLS was 38 cm until 2015 and MCRS 35 cm from 2015 onwards
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discard rate from the at-sea sampling programme was 15–18% (Fig. 10.5b), indi-
cating substantial underreporting of BMS cod. In reality, seagoing observers noted
that most of the BMS cod were discarded. Similarly, 0.5–1.5% of the total landings
in Denmark are reported as BMS for the eastern Baltic cod (Fig. 10.6a) and less than
1% for the western Baltic cod (Fig. 10.6b). Average discard rates from observer trips
for the same years vary between 23 and 9%, respectively, indicating that most of the
BMS cod is discarded and is also unreported by Danish vessels. Several reasons may
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Fig. 10.6 Relative size composition of cod catches from Danish trawl ﬁsheries based on logbooks
and sale slips between 2012 and 2017 in the (a) Eastern and (b) Western Baltic Sea
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explain why the BMS fraction of the catch may not be landed: resistance to changing
well-established commercial ﬁshing practices (i.e. from legally discarding to being
forced to land small ﬁsh); and primarily economic reasons, because it is illegal to sell
the BMS ﬁsh for human consumption purposes and valorisation options may be
underexplored (see also Iñarra et al., this volume). Other reasons may include a lack
of buyers and inconvenient handling processes of small cod. In some ﬁsheries, high-
grading is still considerable. In these ﬁsheries it seems rather unlikely that the BMS
fraction will be landed as long as the enforcement is weak. In the Baltic, however,
high-grading has not been considered to be a major problem because there is a
market for smaller cod.
The amount of unwanted catches of cod decreased somewhat after the LO was
introduced in 2015 (Fig. 10.5b). This decrease is partly a consequence of the
reduction in MCRS from 38 cm to 35 cm that occurred at the same time (the
35–38 cm cod is labeled as ‘size 5b’ in Fig. 10.5b). Landings of the commercial
sizes of cod from the Swedish observer trips are also shown. Failure to land
unwanted cod catches and report them is widespread and observed far beyond
Sweden and Denmark. The proportion of BMS cod landings as reported to ICES
by all countries was less than 1% (0.7% for eastern Baltic and 0.5% for western
Baltic cod). The assessment working group could thereby not rely on these reported
ﬁgures as total catches and have therefore used data on unwanted cod from observer
programmes instead (ICES 2018).
The European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) coordinates the Member States
in a control monitoring programme (i.e. last haul; see Nuevo et al., this volume). The
objectives are to evaluate compliance with the LO, to compile catch composition
data for use in a risk management strategy and to provide information about where
and when discards are expected in a particular ﬁshery. Last haul data are not easily
available for scientiﬁc use. Data acquired from the last haul inspections do not
provide all needed biological information and vessels are not selected at random.
However, last haul data are an important source of catch information that can be used
to validate data from the scientiﬁc observer programmes (e.g. by ICES WGBFAS).
Better availability of detailed last haul data is therefore needed for scientiﬁc pur-
poses. In both Sweden and Denmark, the observed catches below MCRS from the
last haul controls have been similar to those estimated from the observer
programmes. For example, Swedish last haul data for 2016/17 indicated 12.5%
unwanted catches of cod, which is similar to the estimate from the observer data
(Fig. 10.5b). Note that both these estimates are considerably larger than self-reported
BMS catches by ﬁshers (Fig. 10.5a). Data obtained from the last haul inspections are
not easily available nor are they made public due to the conﬁdentiality and potential
implications of compliance breaches. Knowledge of unwanted cod catches and
exploitation pattern on the stock thereby still heavily rely on data from the scientiﬁc
sea-sampling programmes that are publically available, primarily through different
scientiﬁc reports (STECF 2017; ICES 2018), but which may suffer from a signiﬁcant
observer bias (see below).
The introduction of the Landing Obligation has impacted the quality of scientiﬁc
observer data as well. EU vessels are legally required to allow observers on board. In
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practice, however, scientiﬁc observers only board vessels after permission by the
skipper when minimum safety standards are met. In Sweden, the initial response
from the ﬁshing industry was strongly opposed to the policy in 2015 when Baltic cod
was phased into the LO. This opposition led to denial of observer access to many of
the vessels. Sweden was only able to conduct 5 out of 24 planned observer trips on
cod trawlers in the Baltic (Anon 2015), leading to the ﬁrst time that discard estimates
could not be provided to ICES. In response, in 2016 the Swedish Agency for Marine
and Water Management (the responsible agency) changed the national legislation to
ﬁne vessels selected for sampling since 2016 if they refuse to take observers without
a valid reason. Denmark did not have the same problem as Sweden initially but the
sensitivity of the skippers’ willingness to take observers became apparent after a
national media debate during early 2018. A news story reported on the discrepancy
between quantities of landed and self-reported BMS cod by ﬁshers in contrast to
those from scientiﬁc observer estimates from Danish trips (Anon 2018b). The
examples from both countries highlight the risks for scientiﬁc data collection.
STECF has expressed concern that increased refusal rates are causing a deterioration
in data quality for scientists, and has requested more information on observer refusal
rates from Member States (STECF 2016).
Introduction of the LO might introduce other types of biases than restricted access
to all active vessels. Before 2015, discarding was not only legal but also even
mandatory for undersized catches. When this act became illegal in 2015, the role
of observers thus changed from documenting a legal act to documenting an illegal
act. This could lead to an increased observer effect, i.e. that ﬁshers change their
behaviour when observers are aboard (Kelleher 2005; Anon 2014b; STECF 2016).
Fishers can change their behavior in the presence of an observer in several ways: by
changing ﬁshing grounds for places were small ﬁsh occur less frequently; by
changing gear; and by not discarding ﬁsh that they normally would discard. Intro-
duction of the LO thereby requires more validation of observer data to control for
these potential biases.
10.5 Conclusions – Lessons from the Landing Obligation
in the Baltic Cod Trawl Fishery and Future Prospects
We have described that the intentions and expected beneﬁts of the EU Landing
Obligation have not been fulﬁlled after more than 3 years of the LO in the Baltic cod
trawl ﬁshery:
(i) Discarding of unwanted catches still occurs at rates roughly comparable to the
years before the Landing Obligation, in spite of a lowered MCRS at the onset of
the LO in 2015. In fact, there are even indications that discarding may have
increased.
(ii) Coupled to the continued discarding of cod, there is also an important element
of bad timing and bad luck. The timing of the introduction of the Landing
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Obligation for Baltic cod was ﬁxed in the basic Regulation (Reg (EU) No 1380/
2013) but coincided with a period of negative developments for the larger
eastern Baltic cod stock. The reduced growth and condition and a truncated size
distribution without larger cod forced the ﬁshery to target cod around the
minimum size. This inevitably resulted in unwanted catches due to the inherent
selection range in trawls. The western cod stock was also in a depleted state
with continuous TAC reductions since before the LO introduction in 2015.
These factors have caused severe economic implications for the ﬁsheries,
affected the industry perspective of the future, and thus most likely complicated
the LO implementation for the Baltic cod stocks.
(iii) The aim of improved data quality for stock assessment has not been met. The
required documentation and landing of unwanted catches is at least an order of
magnitude lower than estimated volumes from independent estimates by sci-
entiﬁc observer programmes and last haul inspections. Fishermen consistently
underreport catches, thus the stock assessments done by ICES cannot rely on
ofﬁcial catch data only, but needs to include observer data. At the same time,
the role of observers has most likely changed with the LO as they are now
supposed to observe and quantify an illegal act. This change has resulted in data
shortages due to increased refusal rates of access to vessels and may also have
changed the representativeness of the estimates due to a changed observer
effect. These trends therefore indicate that scientiﬁc data quality has not
improved but rather worsened. As unwanted catches are underreported, con-
tinued catch sampling from scientiﬁc observers is a prerequisite for reliable
data. Given the uncertainty of observer data in the LO context, the EFCA last-
haul inspections can potentially also provide independent information of
unwanted catches although care must be taken due to certain limitations of
the sampling methods. The data from these inspections are not easily available
however, even for scientiﬁc purposes. This needs to change: to make evalua-
tions of observer data possible, to (potentially) increase the quality of stock
assessments, and to make the best use of limited public funding. One issue
related to stock assessment quality effects of the LO is also the untimely
discovery of major biological uncertainties for the eastern stock that negatively
affected preparedness for the LO. The uncertainties led ICES to downgrade the
assessment from a full analytical assessment to an index based assessment,
which also changed the perception of stock status (and advised TAC) nega-
tively just when the LO was introduced in 2015. The discontinuation of the
analytical assessment negatively affected the understanding of stock status and
development (including year class variability). Furthermore, the index based
assessment currently applied does not use discard data, although these are still
important for the catch advice from ICES. Large research initiatives are cur-
rently occurring in the Baltic countries in order to understand the biological
uncertainties and to enable a rollback to full analytical assessment for eastern
Baltic cod (ICES 2017a). The western stock assessment is still conducted as a
full age-based analytical assessment. Still, implementation of the LO was most
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likely aggravated by reduced TACs, due to several years of reduced stock size
and poor recruitment, before and after the onset of the LO in 2015.
(iv) There are no indications of increased gear selectivity since the introduction of
the LO. In fact, there are even anecdotal reports of gear manipulation by ﬁshers
to reduce selectivity (ICES 2017c). The increased regional mandate to propose
modiﬁcations to the current detailed and prescriptive gear regulations via joint
recommendations has only been used once so far. This is surprising given the
long and voluminous history of scientiﬁc selectivity trials, the more recent
bottom-up gear research initiatives on Baltic cod trawls, the heated debate
around continued discarding and the persistent criticism of current trawl spec-
iﬁcations. More constructiveness and responsibility from Member States and
regional groups is needed to create positive change and to facilitate the industry
to adapt their trawls to the LO requirements. As mentioned above (Conclusion,
ii), the lack of larger cod has resulted in increased unwanted catches due to the
selection range in trawls. If selectivity (as reported) is further negated by gear
manipulation to reduce losses of legal sized cod in this ﬁshery, that struggles
with economic viability, this of course further increases the unwanted catches.
(v) So what is needed to make the Landing Obligation work? The expectation that
the LO would encourage ﬁshers to avoid unwanted ﬁsh is based on an elegant
idea but will most likely remain a pious hope until enforcement and incentives
are aligned with that goal. The theoretical mechanism behind the expectation is
that the LO will result in less unwanted catch via increased gear selectivity
(or avoidance) based on the idea that unwanted catches costs quota and are less
lucrative than wanted catch. The cost of unwanted ﬁsh is thereby supposed to
be internalised for the ﬁsher (Catchpole et al. 2017). This internalisation of
costs will, however, not be realised if the risk of being caught discarding
remains as insigniﬁcant as it is today. One of the key challenges is thus to
shift the control and monitoring focus to what actually happens at sea, includ-
ing the use of technologies like remote electronic monitoring (EM; see James
et al., this volume). However, given that available control resources are not
inﬁnite, it is also essential to develop strong incentives to encourage best
practice mitigation methods or behaviours (see Kraak and Hart, this volume).
Based on the Baltic experiences so far, the calls for increased ﬂexibility to allow
ﬁshers to choose gear solutions probably need to be coupled to increased
documentation responsibility for ﬁshers that opts in on freer gear choice
(cf. Mortensen et al. 2017). An example of a sound supportive incentive
could be to create a twin-tier structure and only allocate the estimated discard
share of the quota to vessels that opt to use gears with a proven higher
selectivity or that have full documentation via EM, and at the same time
subtract the estimated discards from the quota for vessels that opt out of these
measures. Such a structure would also be in accordance with Member States’
responsibilities for the allocation of quotas in the basic regulation (art. 17 of
Reg (EU) No 1380/2013). Other forms of incentives worth exploring may be to
stimulate uptake of trawls with desirable selectivity by granting exclusive
access to ﬁshing locations (e.g. Real Time Closures RTCs and/or permanent
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areas) or time periods for ﬁshers who opt to increase selectivity (Madsen and
Valentinsson 2010; Condie et al. 2014). Experiences from other areas with
discard bans indicate that such additional management measures are required to
incentivise a move towards more selective ﬁshing under a discard ban (MRAG
2007; Condie et al. 2014).
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Chapter 11
Creating a Breeding Ground
for Compliance and Honest Reporting
Under the Landing Obligation: Insights
from Behavioural Science
Sarah B. M. Kraak and Paul J. B. Hart
Abstract Fisheries regulations aim to maintain ﬁshing mortality and ﬁshing
impacts within sustainable limits. Although sustainability is in the long-term interest
of ﬁshers, the regulations themselves are usually not in the short-term interest of the
individual ﬁsher because they restrict the ﬁsher’s economic activity. Therefore, as is
the case with all regulations, the temptation exists for non-compliance and dishonest
reporting. In the EU and elsewhere, top-down, complex regulations, often leading to
unintended consequences, with complex and non-transparent governance-science
interactions, may decrease the credibility and legitimacy of ﬁsheries management
among ﬁshers. This, in turn, may decrease the motivation to comply and report
honestly. The Landing Obligation may make things worse because following the
regulation to the letter would often strongly and negatively impact the individual
ﬁshers’ economic situation. Behavioural science suggests factors that may inﬂuence
compliance and honesty. Compliance is not necessarily a function of the economic
beneﬁts and costs of rule violation: compliance may be more or less, depending on
intrinsic motivations. An increased level of self-decision may lead to greater buy-in
to sustainable ﬁshing practices and voluntary compliance to catch limits and the
Landing Obligation. All else being equal, people in small and self-selected groups
are inherently more likely to behave “prosocially”. In this chapter, some key
recommendations based on behavioural science are given for changes in institutional
settings that may increase voluntary compliance and sustainable ﬁshing practices.
However, transition to a system allowing for more freedom from top-down regula-
tion, with more self-governance, may be difﬁcult due to institutional and cultural
barriers and therefore may take many years.
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11.1 Introduction
Prior to the Landing Obligation, the main instrument to control ﬁshing pressure in
the European Union (EU) has been the setting of total allowable landings quotas
(which have been called Total Allowable Catches, TACs). This instrument has
allowed for implementation error because landings quotas do not limit catches.
Under landings quotas, unlimited over-quota catches are allowed as long as they
are not landed; in other words, they must be discarded at sea. The implementation
error occurs because, when over-quota ﬁsh are caught and discarded dead, the
intended level of exploitation set by the quotas is overshot, sometimes by large
and often unknown amounts (Kelleher 2005). Reasons for discarding may be:
1. Fish smaller than the minimum landing size (MLS) have been caught and are not
allowed to be landed.
2. Fishers may discard lower-quality ﬁsh and utilise their landings quota to land
better-quality and higher-priced ﬁsh (high-grading) – this practice is forbidden in
the EU since 2002, but no offenders have been caught and sanctioned (Schou
2015).
3. In mixed ﬁsheries, ﬁshers may catch over-quota ﬁsh when they continue ﬁshing
for other species whose quota is not yet exhausted – these ﬁsh, which may be
(unavoidable, incidental) bycatch species or part of the targeted assemblage, must
be discarded at sea (see BBC 2007; Borges and Penas-Lado, this volume).
The Landing Obligation, with total allowable catch quotas (limiting actual
catches rather than only landings), attempts to make an end to the implementation
error caused by the landings quota system. However, it is expected that the EU will
experience problems in fully implementing the Landing Obligation if the incentives
for discarding continue to exist. For example, although the MLS is abolished under
the Landing Obligation, ﬁsh smaller than a minimum conservation reference size
(MCRS) are not permitted to be sold for human consumption and thus have a lower
value. Therefore, incentives for illegally discarding ﬁsh below MCRS and high-
grading may continue to exist. In addition, in several ﬁshing areas, the problem of
“choke species” may arise in mixed ﬁsheries or ﬁsheries with unavoidable bycatch
(Prellezo et al. 2016; Fitzpatrick et al., this volume). In such cases the ﬁshery for
important commercial species is “choked”, i.e. must be closed, before its quota is
ﬁshed up, because the quota for another species caught in the same ﬁshery is already
exhausted. This situation creates incentives to illegally discard over-quota catches of
the choke species and continue ﬁshing.
220 S. B. M. Kraak and P. J. B. Hart
Thus, the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) can only be fully implemented if
the Landing Obligation is fully complied with and catch limits are not exceeded.
However, it is not yet clear how to achieve this: it is not speciﬁed how the catch
limits and Landing Obligation will be enforced and how catches will be veriﬁed. The
regulation leaves the documentation and compliance monitoring to the Member
States (EU 2013, Article 15.13):
For the purpose of monitoring compliance with the Landing Obligation, Member States shall
ensure detailed and accurate documentation of all ﬁshing trips and adequate capacity and
means, such as observers, closed-circuit television (CCTV) and others. In doing so, Member
States shall respect the principle of efﬁciency and proportionality.
Assuming that catches cannot be completely observed, counted, documented and
veriﬁed, the regulation leaves room for implementation error, in two ways:
1. Directly: Fishers may still catch (and discard) in excess of the quotas.
2. Indirectly: Removals will be known to stock assessment scientists with a certain
degree of uncertainty. This will lead to imprecise estimates, advice and manage-
ment measures, for example, too low or too high a TAC. Prior to the Landing
Obligation, this has been commonly the case. Scientists have attempted to
estimate the removals (including discards) through sampling trips with observers
on board. Problems of reliability and representativeness of the samples may,
however, increase under the Landing Obligation, because ﬁshers may fear that
when scientists are aware of law violations this information will be passed on to
the enforcement authorities. To mitigate this problem, data collection for science
(i.e. stock assessment) should be kept strictly separated from data collection for
enforcement purposes (Mangi et al. 2013). For example, it has been found that
Norwegian ﬁshers report bycatch of rare species in scientiﬁc programmes, but not
in their logbooks, although such reporting is obligatory (J. Vølstad, personal
communication).
The implementation error can only be avoided if full trustworthiness or full proof
of the catches can be ensured. Full documentation (i.e. proof) of the catch can be
achieved by Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM or EM) systems such as camera
and sensor systems (for more details, see James et al., this volume), leading to a fully
documented ﬁshery (FDF), but these systems are costly, and ﬁshers are often averse
to being watched. Some EU Member States also expressed a dismissive attitude
towards the use of cameras for monitoring purposes, presumably fearing to turn an
anti-FDF-minded sector against their ministry.
Persuading ﬁshers to follow regulations has been one of the toughest problems to
be solved in ﬁsheries. In an effort to deal with the difﬁculty, co-management has
been introduced and become more common than it once was (Jentoft 1998; Wilson
et al. 2003; Jacobsen et al. 2012). Co-management allows ﬁshers to contribute to the
formulation of regulations and gives them a say in how they are applied. Studies in
behavioural economics have shown that a feeling of ownership encourages partic-
ipants to value more highly something that they have put effort into achieving
(Norton et al. 2012). Unfortunately, at the level of the EU, the co-management
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approach is not yet widespread, and the implementation of the Landing Obligation is
a top-down regulation that requires ﬁshers to follow a rule that can result in
economic outcomes for the individual that could lead to resistance.
11.2 The Commercial Pressures Inﬂuencing Fisher
Decisions
If management agencies want their rules to be followed, then it is essential that those
rules are devised with regard to the commercial pressures on ﬁshers. Rules are more
likely to fail if they make it difﬁcult for a ﬁsher to make ends meet ﬁnancially. This is
why the TAC approach, when applied to a mixed ﬁshery, often failed. If her/his trawl
emerges from the depths with a catch of a species for which she/he has no quota, then
a ﬁsher can be faced with a dilemma. Under the old TAC system, if the ﬁsh have
market value as is shown in Fig. 11.1, this situation creates the temptation to keep the
ﬁsh and sell them illegally, and this temptation would be particularly acute if the
ﬁsher’s economic situation is poor (Booker 2007; BBC 2007). Recognising that
under the old TAC system ﬁshers could be regularly faced with this dilemma does
not prove that many ﬁshers submitted to the temptation, but gathering evidence for
illegal sales of non-quota ﬁsh is difﬁcult by its nature although the problem of illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) ﬁshing has been extensively examined (Le Gallic
and Cox 2006; Sumaila et al. 2006). In certain parts of the world, there is no doubt
that illegal ﬁsh are landed and sold, and there is also evidence that this happens
within EU waters (Couper et al. 2015). Under the new Landing Obligation, the ﬁsher
has to stop ﬁshing, even if she/he has quota left for other species, and this will also
have economic consequences. For this reason, both management regimes are vul-
nerable to abuse if the ﬁsher’s economic circumstances are poor. It may be necessary
in this situation to ﬁnd alternatives to top-down regulations, which would focus on
giving ﬁshers greater power to devise regulations.
11.3 Behavioural Economics: A Discipline Providing
Guidance for Addressing the Problem
In the rest of this chapter, we aim to give some guidance on how ﬁshers can be
encouraged to stay within the catch limits and to report catches accurately by using
insights from the behavioural sciences, speciﬁcally the discipline of behavioural
economics. Behavioural economics studies the effects and consequences of psycho-
logical, social, cognitive and emotional factors on the economic decisions of indi-
viduals and institutions, challenging the assumption of human rationality that
prevails in classical economic theory (Dhami 2016). Behavioural economics is an
empirical science based on experimental work: the behaviour and choices of human
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Fig. 11.1 An example of how, under the old TAC system, ﬁshers could be tempted to land illegally
dead ﬁsh which could not legally be landed. (From Fishing News, UK)
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subjects are observed under controlled experimental conditions. The value of
behavioural economics in the creation of policy has been given its highest proﬁle
by Thaler and Sunstein (2009). They used the terms “nudge” and “nudging” to
characterise measures they proposed to encourage people to make decisions that
comply with policy or achieve long-term goals. They made suggestions, for exam-
ple, for how to design procedures to encourage people to submit their tax returns on
time or to save more for retirement. The British Government in 2010 was so
impressed by the approach that it set up the Behavioural Insights Team which is
tasked to “. . .use insights from behavioural science to encourage people to make
better choices for themselves and society” (Behavioural Insights Team 2018). In
2015, Barack Obama, then US president, established the Social and Behavioral
Sciences Team charged with a similar task (Congdon and Shankar 2018). Much of
what we offer in this chapter is in the same vein.
To ﬁnd ways of improving the chances of ﬁshers following the rules, we discuss
how the following selection of ideas from behavioural economics could contribute to
better compliance to the Landing Obligation:
• Determinants of honesty and respect for the law
• Crowding out of voluntary compliance
• The effects of being watched
• Loss aversion
11.3.1 Determinants of Honesty and Respect for the Law
In most countries, the standard approach to obtaining ﬁsher compliance is to deter
rule violations through investments in enforcement activities, including at-sea
patrols, dockside monitoring and observer programmes (see also James et al., this
volume). This approach is built on the assumption that the occurrence of ﬁshery
offences is solely a function of the perceived beneﬁts and costs of an offence, such as
the gains derived from rule violation, the likelihood of detection and the severity of
the penalties (Becker 1974; Hart 1997). However, modern criminology (e.g. Tyler
2006) and behavioural economics (Mazar et al. 2008) recognise that many people
comply with rules because they believe it is the right thing to do. In this context, tax
compliance is much higher than deterrence models would predict (Frey and Torgler
2007). Individuals are also much inﬂuenced by the majority view of the group they
are part of (e.g. Aronson and Aronson 2012). When we witness unethical behaviour,
our own morality erodes (Ariely 2012). Cheating can be socially contagious (Gino
et al. 2009; Mann et al. 2014): as long as we see members of our own social groups
behaving in ways that are dishonest, it is likely that we too will recalibrate our
internal moral compass and adopt their behaviour as a model for our own. Tax
compliance, for example, varies widely across European countries, and a high
correlation has been found between perceived tax evasion and tax morale (Frey
and Torgler 2007). Similarly, experimentally measured, individual intrinsic honesty
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is stronger in the subject pools of countries with lower levels of corruption, tax
evasion and fraudulent politics than in those of countries where the latter are higher
(Hermann et al. 2008; Gächter and Schulz 2016). Individuals may even feel pride
about breaking the rules. A study among Danish ﬁshers (Nielsen and Mathiesen
2003) reported that they “feel they are taken hostage by an illegitimate management
system, and thus feel it is morally correct not to comply”. Within a ﬁshery where
crews know each other through the use of a common port, it may be possible to
enhance compliance by fostering pride (see Panagopoulos 2010; Harth et al. 2013)
about sustainable ﬁshing practices by publishing stories in the ﬁshing press about
ﬁshers that have complied.
In laboratory experiments, Mazar et al. (2008) found that (1) the amount of
dishonesty is largely insensitive to either the expected external beneﬁts or the
costs associated with the deceptive acts; (2) causing people to become more aware
of their internal standards for honesty by moral priming decreases their tendency for
deception; and (3) increasing the “degrees of freedom” that people have to interpret
their actions increases their tendency for deception. For instance, Mazar et al. (2008)
found that nonmonetary crime targets (i.e. property rather than money) can increase
economically incentivised dishonesty in a laboratory setting. Similar laboratory
studies by Mead et al. (2009) found that mental tiredness also increases cheating.
These two studies suggest that violation of ﬁshing regulations could at least in part
be exacerbated by a lack of moral reminders, the opportunity to “steal” a
nonmonetary asset (i.e. ﬁsh) and the mental tiredness of ﬁshers. A further compli-
cation in a ﬁshery is that the ﬁsher and his crew are often on their own at sea, so that
social pressures regarding compliance are distanced from the act of disobedience.
Mazar et al. (2008) suggest that understanding dishonesty has important implications
for designing effective methods to curb it. The costs of obtaining a particular level of
ﬁsheries compliance through enforcement could potentially be reduced through
increased investments in activities that improve voluntary compliance.
Studies (e.g. Mazar et al. 2008) have indicated that honesty can be enhanced by
moral reminders, such as simply asking people to sign a statement in which they
declare their commitment to honesty before taking part in a task rather than after
(e.g. signing the honesty statement on the income tax declaration form at the top
rather than at the bottom). In ﬁsheries this ﬁnding could be applied by making ﬁshers
sign the logbook just before logging the information (Kraak et al. 2015). The e-log
system could have a conﬁrmation screen which requires the operator to acknowledge
that they are ﬁlling the form out accurately before the electronic system can receive
data input.
A recent experiment showed how priming can affect honest reporting by ﬁshers
(Drupp et al. 2016). Using a coin-tossing task, the authors tested whether truth-
telling of German ﬁshers, who are known to dislike their EU regulator, is affected by
various treatments. Fishers misreported coin tosses to their economic advantage
more strongly in a treatment where they were faced with the EU logo. Fishers were
more honest in an additional treatment where the source of research funding,
namely the EU, was revealed. These apparently contradictory ﬁndings suggest
that lying is increased towards a disliked regulator, but perhaps decreased when it
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is made clear from whom the money is “stolen”. The implication is that regulators
can affect truth-telling behaviour by the nature and communication of their policies.
11.3.2 Crowding Out of Voluntary Compliance
Compliance with the rules is more likely when ﬁshers, whose behaviour is to be
regulated, buy-in to those rules. Fisheries management is in many cases a top-down
bureaucratic process with centralised control (Daw and Gray 2005). The regulations
are viewed by the ﬁshers as opposing rather than supporting their interests, and this
manifests itself as a reduced compliance to “the letter” as well as “the spirit” of the
regulations (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Hatcher et al. 2000; Nielsen 2003; Nielsen
and Mathiesen 2003; Kraak 2011). Evidence suggests that the willingness to obey
regulations voluntarily depends on whether one is controlled or not (reviewed in
Bowles 2008; Richter and van Soest 2012). Counterintuitively, the control imposed
by an outside institution undermines – “crowds out” – any intrinsic motivations an
individual may have to comply voluntarily. As a result, there is a hidden cost of
control, as pointed out by Falk and Kosfeld (2006). The implication is that control
can “crowd out” intrinsic motivations, calling for even stronger control, leading to a
vicious cycle of mistrust and strong controls. Behavioural economics has established
that regulations that are chosen by the individuals (e.g. via voting) are obeyed more,
as they are perceived to be more legitimate (Vyrastekova and van Soest 2003). It is
apparent from the work of Ostrom that self-imposed rules, self-imposed monitoring
and self-imposed sanctions work better (Ostrom 2009). One of the reasons is that
control by an outside institution signals mistrust, which directly affects motivational
factors, such as cooperation, reciprocity or being a good citizen.
Indeed, ﬁsheries systems can be characterised by mutual mistrust, between
regulators and ﬁshers, between scientists and ﬁshers and among ﬁshers themselves.
Fishers have lost respect for the rules and regulations because many of them do not
seem to make sense (including the Landing Obligation), seem too complex, seem
contradictory or seem to provide perverse incentives (Jentoft 1998; Jacobsen et al.
2012). At the same time, ﬁshers are usually not expected to voluntarily take action to
ﬁsh more sustainably as this would be perceived to reduce rather than maximise
catches. Often the institutional set-up is such that ﬁshers are perceived as the
adversaries of the management establishment. The key challenge for European
ﬁsheries is how one can “crowd in” desirable behaviour by establishing trusting
relationships. The problem seems to be how to make such a transition from the
current situation – rebuilding of mutual trust cannot be done simply on a short time
scale.
Large group size and anonymity may be among the causes of the apparent lack of
trust. Social capital, trust and intrinsic motivation to cooperate tend to be higher in
small groups of people who regularly interact with each other in non-anonymous
ways (Henrich 2004). For example, in mixed ﬁsheries, where vulnerable bycatch
species effectively become the choke species, it is advantageous to join in groups
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and share the individual small bycatch quota (Holland and Jannot 2012; O’Keefe
and DeCelles 2013). In the case of the US West Coast (Holland and Jannot 2012),
groups of ﬁshers pooling their quotas can set their own rules, not necessarily
encoded in law. These people were not necessarily connected in communities
before; they came together because they have a common problem that can best be
solved by collective action. Also in Europe there are examples of ﬁshers voluntarily
pooling their quotas: in a Danish village, boat owners and ﬁshers have established a
cooperative company where they have bought quotas jointly, with the aim of
securing the community of its present and future catch rights (Schou 2011). In that
way, the cooperative company replaces the Danish state as provider of ﬁshing rights.
In Toyama Bay, Japan, some of the inshore ﬁshers pool their catches and their costs,
others do not. Experiments demonstrated that the ﬁshers who pooled costs and
catches were more likely to show cooperative behaviours in laboratory experiments
than were the ﬁshers who did not share ﬁshery costs and catches (Carpenter and Seki
2011). Several economic experiments have established that group choice is a key
point to facilitate cooperative behaviour. If individuals can self-select into groups,
there is a larger tendency to act in the group’s interest and also to coordinate on a
common cooperative strategy (Brekke et al. 2011; Gürerk et al. 2006).
Operating in groups/cooperatives may be more or less attractive to ﬁshers: a
perceived advantage may be the sharing of risk but a perceived disadvantage may be
that the individual surrenders her/his own decision-making for the sake of demo-
cratic group decision-making. Kraak et al. (2015) proposed that ﬁsheries manage-
ment could set up a structure in which several levels of organisation are offered to
which individual ﬁshers can opt in (e.g. voluntary pooling of quotas); each level has
its beneﬁts and costs, but because the individuals can choose themselves, there
would be greater acceptance of the disadvantages of the chosen setting. There are
signiﬁcant costs of managing a group/cooperative that need to be covered. To the
extent that social behaviour of ﬁshers in small groups decreases the negative
externalities to society, e.g. those caused by non-compliance, policies can be
designed that effectively subsidise those groups/cooperatives. This can be done in
the form of setting aside a portion of the Member State’s quota for such social
initiatives or else by ﬁnancial instruments.
Fishers often distrust managers and scientists and vice versa. The co-management
movement which has been taking hold in various locations, particularly for small-
scale ﬁsheries, is designed to address this lack of trust between ﬁshers, scientists and
policy-makers (Wilson et al. 2003; and see papers in Chuenpagdee 2011). To
varying degrees, co-management arrangements involve ﬁshers in gathering data,
translating their local ecological knowledge to a form which can be incorporated into
stock assessments, determining policy and setting regulations. These systems give
the ﬁsher a sense of belonging and break down the barriers between the ﬁsher and the
regulator. In order to build mutual trust between ﬁshers and scientists, industry-
science collaborative projects could be established (e.g. Mangi et al. 2018), for
example, in which ﬁshers could try new practices and scientists explore the conse-
quences. In the USA as well as in Europe, various scientist-facilitated initiatives are
arising where scientists process and display information that ﬁshers provide to share
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among themselves, for example, on CPUE hotspots or bycatch rates of species that
need to be avoided so that ﬁshers can catch their quotas at a lower impact to the
ecosystem (e.g. O’Keefe and DeCelles 2013; Hetherington 2014; Eliasen and Bichel
2016). In collaboration with scientists, the ﬁshing industry can create ﬁshery man-
agement plans which comply with management policies. In the Netherlands and the
UK, ﬁshing organisations have started to hire scientists that were previously
employed by the government to help them check assessments and advice and
develop plans.
There are also initiatives to improve the knowledge of ﬁsh biology, ﬁshery
science and policy-making in ﬁshers, which may further contribute to a more trusting
relationship between ﬁshers on the one hand side and regulators and scientists on the
other. For example, in the UK, Fishing into the Future (2018) is run by ﬁshers and,
among other things, is running courses to broaden the education of ﬁshers. A similar
project has run in the Netherlands (Wageningen University and Research 2018),
where ﬁshers set up “knowledge groups” around themes and then interacted with
ﬁsheries scientists to access scientiﬁc knowledge. In the USA, the Marine Resource
Education Programme, run by the Gulf of Maine Research Institute in Boston,
similarly runs courses in ﬁshery science for ﬁshers.
The “crowding out” hypothesis does not only state that control may undermine
intrinsic motivations to comply, but also that monetary incentives may undermine
such motivations. In experiments and in the ﬁeld it has been found that sometimes
ﬁnancial incentives induced more self-interested behaviour, even after they were
withdrawn (Bowles 2008). For example, in a study by Cardenas et al. (2000),
experiments were run with people in rural Colombia who are confronted with a
common pool problem in their daily life. In the experiment subjects were asked to
decide how much timber to extract from a forest. The scenario presented was that
harvesting had an adverse effect on water quality (as is actually the case in the study
region), posing a cost to everyone in the group. The game was played ﬁrst without
any regulations in place, while at a later stage, an extraction norm was introduced
that was enforced by a mild probabilistic ﬁne. Cardenas et al. (2000) found that
subjects reduced their extraction level immediately after the regulation was intro-
duced but started extracting more aggressively after realising that consequences
were rather mild. Strikingly, in the last rounds, extraction levels were higher with
the regulation than without. As a result, payoffs were signiﬁcantly lower when
individuals were confronted with a formal rule than in its absence; the weak ofﬁcial
rule interacted with the internal norms of the subjects and destroyed their intrinsic
motivation to cooperate (Cardenas et al. 2000). Richter and van Soest (2012)
reviewed similar experiments, such as the one where imposing a ﬁne on parents
arriving late to collect their children at day care increased the number of late-coming
parents or the one where small honoraria for seminar speakers may increase the
probability of declining the invitation. More generally, in experiments investigating
the psychological consequences of money, subjects exposed to the concept of money
subsequently showed a more self-reliant but also more self-centred approach to
problem-solving than subjects exposed to neutral concepts (Vohs et al. 2006).
These results suggest that the application of nonmonetary incentives in ﬁsheries
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management should be explored, along with other factors enhancing intrinsic com-
pliance motivation such as moral reminders, non-anonymity, small group size and
face-to-face communication. Nevertheless, Bowles (2008) and Richter and van
Soest (2012) warn that the loss of social capital may, to a large extent, be irreversible
and that from the reviewed experiments, it cannot simply be concluded that regula-
tions or sanctions should be abolished.
11.3.3 The Effects of Being Watched
Technologies have recently emerged for monitoring ﬁshers, such as AIS (automatic
identiﬁcation system), VMS (vessel monitoring system) and drones (Toonen and
Bush 2018), but also Electronic Monitoring with cameras on board as a tool for a
fully documented ﬁshery (FDF) (James et al., this volume). As mentioned above,
some EU Member States expressed a dismissive attitude towards the use of cameras
for the purpose of monitoring. The aversion to being watched is in agreement with
the notion that too much monitoring may have the result that individuals feel they are
not trusted and as a consequence become less trustworthy (Ostrom 1998). In
contrast, it has been well documented that people will be more likely to behave
“prosocially” (e.g. cooperate, comply, be honest) when being watched in
non-anonymous situations (reviewed in Kraak 2011). This occurs because it opens
possibilities of direct and indirect reciprocity as well as reputation building – the
psychological mechanism may be that good behaviour instils pride or, conversely, it
can be driven by the fear of social exclusion when damaging one’s reputation
(Ouwerkerk et al. 2005). Recent investigations have shown that subtle cues of
being watched, such as two stylised eye-like shapes on a computer screen sufﬁce
to change human behaviour and reduce selﬁshness; these eye-shaped cues seem to
elicit unconscious, biologically hardwired reactions (Milinski and Rockenbach
2007). Perhaps a way to exploit this human propensity, without the disadvantage
of eroding trust due to too much monitoring, is to display a picture of “watching
eyes” on the e-logbook screen (Kraak et al. 2015) or anywhere on the vessel.
To persuade ﬁshers to deploy a fully documented ﬁshery, its advantages could be
emphasised more clearly to the ﬁshers. Full documentation of the ﬁsh supply chain
(from net to plate) could bring strong market incentives through information on
sustainability of the species, traceability and documentation on how the ﬁsh has been
caught and treated on board (Mangi et al. 2013). The concepts of traceability and
transparency could also be used in more innovative ways. As mentioned above,
humans are not only subject to an aversion of being watched, but people may also
like being watched when they are proud of what they are doing within the context of
a peer group. In the UK, the Moshi Moshi sushi restaurant chain labels ﬁsh dishes
with Quick Response (QR) codes printed with squid ink on rice paper so that
customers can see where the MSC-certiﬁed ﬁsh comes from (SeafoodSource
2018). In Canada an organisation called This Fish (This Fish 2018) is setting up a
system whereby consumers can use QR codes to identify the ﬁsher who caught the
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product that is just about to be purchased or eaten. In other markets (meat products),
this form of information promotes trust from the consumer, but in the ﬁsheries case,
it may also promote compliance from the ﬁshers by instilling in them a greater sense
of ownership of the ﬁnal product (Kraak et al. 2015).
Further research on the “being-watched” effect should be done with experiments
that are relevant to the speciﬁc settings encountered in ﬁsheries management.
11.3.4 Loss Aversion and the Use of “Carrot” or “Stick”
Approaches
In some Member States, pilot projects offered extra quota to participating ﬁshers in
return for providing full documentation of their catches for monitoring purposes
(fully documented ﬁshery) (van Helmond et al. 2015; Needle et al. 2015; Mortensen
et al. 2017). This could be extended in, for example, a tiered approach stipulating
that the ﬁshers opting for a fully documented ﬁshery would be subjected to less
prescriptive rules and hence have more perceived freedom and ﬂexibility in running
their business, while the ﬁshers opting for less stringent monitoring would have to
bear the burden of more uncertain catch documentation and be subjected to more
restrictive rules and/or a larger reduction of their quotas (Prellezo et al. 2016). Such
approaches are framed as a “carrot”, where a reward is given for the desired
behaviour. The approach, however, can also be framed as a “stick”, where a penalty
is given when the desired behaviour is not chosen (e.g. where quota would be
deducted or restricting rules would be imposed if ﬁshers do not take up the fully
documented ﬁshery option). The response to “carrots” versus “sticks” should be
carefully considered (Kubanek et al. 2015). Human beings are known to be subject
to loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1991): it is thought that the pain of
losing is psychologically about twice as powerful as the pleasure of gaining; “losses
loom larger than gains” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). According to the expecta-
tion of loss aversion, the “stick” may be the stronger motivator than the “carrot”
(Imas et al. 2017). The recent EU pilot projects with catch quotas and a fully
documented ﬁshery have used the “carrot” (van Helmond et al. 2015; Needle et al.
2015; Mortensen et al. 2017). On the other hand, the EU cod plan (EU 2008) used
the “stick” of effort reductions to motivate (groups of) ﬁshers to take up cod
avoidance measures, but this was not well received by the ﬁshing sector (Kraak
et al. 2013). Since 2018, Germany offers a mobile app to small-scale ﬁshers in the
Western Baltic with which they can document where they are ﬁshing. Only when
they can prove that they are ﬁshing in water less than 20 m deep are the small-scale
ﬁshers allowed to ﬁsh in a seasonally closed area (BLE 2018). The provision is
formally phrased as a “carrot” (when using the app, they gain the right to ﬁsh in the
otherwise closed area during the cod spawning season). However, some ﬁshers
perceive it as a “stick” (losing the opportunity to ﬁsh in the area unless using the
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app) because the area closure had never been sufﬁciently well enforced in previous
years.
Kraak et al. (2016) suggested that a “stick” approach may induce a negative
emotional response to management regulations, which may in turn induce reduced
compliance (see also Imas et al. 2017). Accordingly, a potential trade-off might exist
between the higher management effectiveness of a “stick” approach and reduced
compliance with regulation. In order to ﬁnd out what kind of framing would lead to
highest uptake of the desired behaviour (e.g. a fully documented ﬁshery and
compliance), directed research on the response of ﬁshers to “sticks” and “carrots”
is needed.
11.4 Conclusions
In conclusion, much of the past implementation error has been caused because the
complex top-down control and lack of trust have undermined potential intrinsic
motivation to ﬁsh sustainably. Compliance is not necessarily a function of the
economic beneﬁts and costs of rule violation: compliance may be more or less,
depending on intrinsic motivations and the economic circumstances of the ﬁsher. An
increased level of self-decision may lead to more buy-in to sustainable ﬁshing
practices and voluntary compliance to catch limits and the Landing Obligation. All
else being equal, people in small and self-selected groups are inherently more likely
to behave in a “prosocial” manner (Ostrom 1990, 2001). However, transition to a
system allowing for more freedom from top-down regulation, with more self-
governance and self-regulation, may be difﬁcult. Some key recommendations are
given below, several of which can be characterised as “nudges” as deﬁned by Thaler
and Sunstein (2009):
• Increase regulators’ trust of ﬁshers through a fully documented ﬁshery.
• Increase ﬁshers’ trust of regulators by designing simpler legislation, with
non-contradictory rules, which do not lead to perverse incentives.
• Increase ﬁshers’ trust of scientists and scientists’ trust of ﬁshers by setting up
industry-science partnerships and collaborative research.
• Increase ﬁshers’ mutual trust and their intrinsic motivations to ﬁsh sustainably by
facilitating and encouraging ﬁshers to organise themselves in small groups with
common interests.
• Allow for several levels of organisation to choose from, and allow for self-
selection of group membership.
• Incentivise the organisation of ﬁshers into groups through the provision of, for
example, extra quota and relative freedom from top-down regulation or through
ﬁnancial instruments.
• Allow small groups of ﬁshers to make their own decisions, where their own rules
and sanctions do not necessarily have to be coded in law.
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• Incentivise uptake of a fully documented ﬁshery, but carefully consider whether a
“stick” or a “carrot” should be used.
• Allow groups of ﬁshers to decide themselves on the methods of implementation
of a fully documented ﬁshery.
• Do not only rely on monetary incentives and monetary penalties; these may
“crowd out” intrinsic motivations.
• For groups of ﬁshers who know each other, publish examples of cooperative
behaviour in the local press. Publishing the good behaviour of named ﬁshers may
be a nonmonetary incentive because it fosters pride of being a sustainable (good)
ﬁsher.
• Establish QR codes (Quick Response codes) that link a product to an individual
ﬁsher to foster a sense of being watched as well as ownership and pride in being a
sustainable ﬁsher.
• Use moral reminders in the e-log software, such as a requirement to sign a
statement of accurate reporting at the start of their e-log session (instead of at
the end), and pictures of watching eyes on the screen.
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Part IV
Tactical and Technological Options for
Reducing Unwanted Catches
Chapter 12
A Marine Spatial Planning Approach
to Minimize Discards: Challenges
and Opportunities of the Landing
Obligation in European Waters
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marine biological processes, as well as ﬁshing conditions at a deﬁned spatial scale.
Mathematical models that analyze the spatio-temporal conditions of selected ﬁshing
areas allow the deﬁnition of different scenarios where discards are minimized by
avoiding ﬁshing for unwanted species and/or illegal specimens. Here we show some
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12.1 Introduction
The FAO Fisheries Glossary describes discards as
“the proportion of the total organic material of animal origin in the catch, which is thrown
away or dumped at sea, for whatever reason. It does not include plant material and post-
harvest waste such as offal”.
Additionally, FAO also deﬁnes bycatch as
“the part of a catch of a ﬁshing unit taken incidentally in addition to the target species
towards which ﬁshing effort is directed. Some or all of it may be returned to the sea as
discards.”
The discards may be dead or alive, depending on the selectivity of the ﬁshing gear
and the injuries and stress suffered by ﬁshing. Although some species have high
survival chances, many of the discards are dead or dying when rejected.
The “discards problem” is a key point in ﬁsheries management around the world
(Karp et al., this volume). It is not an easy issue, as it occurs at the core of ﬁshing
operations, both from economic, legal and biological points of view. It is basically a
decision-making process, i.e. the decision to reject or retain a ﬁsh. However, there is
usually a common perception from all sides (the public, NGOs, ﬁshing sectors,
policymakers, scientists, etc.) that discards are generally negative and that a better
solution should be found.
Discarding unwanted catches has many assumed negative environmental and
economic effects, especially since very few discarded ﬁsh will actually survive.
Some of these effects are summarized below:
• Discarding juveniles means lower future catch opportunities and reduced
spawning biomass.
• Discarding mature individuals weakens the stock’s productivity both in the short
and long term.
• Discarding ﬁsh, crustaceans, sea birds, sea mammals and non-targeted species
undermines the balance of the marine ecosystem.
• Some vulnerable species can become severely depleted even in the absence of
any directed ﬁshery (e.g., certain sharks and rays).
• For ﬁshers, discarding is a waste of time and effort in the present, as well as a
serious potential loss of future income.
The European Union has recently reformed the Common Fishery Policy (CFP;
EU 2013). One of the most important changes in the new CFP is the focus on what is
caught rather than what is landed, as well as the introduction of a Landing Obliga-
tion, which has been progressively implemented. It is expected that full enforcement
of the Landing Obligation will have a direct impact on discard reduction through
more responsible and selective ﬁshing.
On the other hand, Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) is also related to the imple-
mentation of the Landing Obligation. Fisheries management needs to consider the
spatial dynamics where the natural stocks and ﬂeet interact. Life always occurs in a
deﬁned space and time and ﬁshing exploits marine living resources. For instance, a
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sensible approach to minimize discards is to simply avoid areas or seasons where
unwanted catch is more likely (O’Keefe et al. 2013; Vilela et al. 2015; Paradinas
et al. 2016).
The implementation of a Marine Spatial Planning approach to discard manage-
ment requires the understanding of marine biological processes, as well as ﬁshing
conditions at a deﬁned spatial scale. However, quantifying the ﬁshery importance in
an area is a challenging task because of a lack of information due to the inherent
constrains of sampling at sea. Mathematical models that analyze the spatio-temporal
conditions of considered ﬁshing areas allow the deﬁnition of different scenarios of
the ﬁshing activity where discards are minimized by avoiding ﬁshing undesirable
species and/or illegal specimens (Hobday and Hartmann 2006; Pennino et al. 2014).
Here we show some examples of how particular spatial models can be used for
advice on MSP for discards. We introduce a geoserver GIS platform developed to
produce maps of discard probability by using a Fishing Suitable Index. This platform
is designed to help ﬁshers locate areas where they can maximize yield while
minimizing unwanted catch. We also provide an example of simulating virtual
ﬁshing closures. This was done to test different possibilities of spatial planning for
a purse seine ﬁshery off the Southern Spanish Mediterranean coast.
The inclusion of a Marine Spatial Planning approach to implement the Landing
Obligation will bring some new challenges and opportunities. Finally, we discuss
and suggest some recommendations for its effective and successful implementation.
We conclude that the Landing Obligation should be accompanied by other measures
such as improvements in controlling ﬁshing effort, better ﬁshing selectivity, spatio-
temporal ﬁshing restrictions for vulnerable sizes and/or areas, effective enforcement
and ﬁnally the agreement, commitment and support from the ﬁshing sector to
comply with the rules and regulations.
12.2 Marine Spatial Planning Approach to Minimize
Discards
MSP aims to manage the different and shared uses in a marine area. This is typically
referred to as “Ecosystem services”, deﬁned according to Wikipedia as “the many
and varied beneﬁts that humans freely gain from the natural environment and from
properly-functioning ecosystems” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosystem_
services.)
Marine Spatial Planning is a public process of analyzing and allocating the spatial
and temporal distribution of human activities in marine areas to achieve ecological,
economic, and social objectives that usually have been speciﬁed through a political
process (http://msp.ioc-unesco.org/about/marine-spatial-planning/). It is important
to note that MSP is not only conservation planning, although it considers environ-
mental protection and the sustainability of the marine environment for future gen-
erations as one of its main objectives. MSP seeks to balance economic development
and environmental conservation, and not focus only on the goals of conservation or
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protection. Additionally, characteristics of Marine Spatial Planning also include
ecosystem-based, area-based, integrated, adaptive, strategic, and participatory
procedures.
The concept of multi-uses MSP is a relatively new approach to marine manage-
ment. Actually, the ﬁrst MSP workshop was held by UNESCO in 2006 in Paris,
which makes this a recent movement considering the slow inertia and complexity to
develop, establish and implement such a management system. However, since the
beginning of its formulation there has been worldwide agreement on the need for
such an approach. There are thus already a number of MSP applications in various
regions (Maxwell et al. 2015; Pennino et al. 2017).
Although it varies greatly between countries, we may ﬁnd many different uses of
marine areas in Europe. This includes:
1. Extraction of non-renewable and renewable resources, including aquaculture.
2. Transit of people and merchandise, which are ruled by both national and
international law.
3. Coastal zones are areas of residence and enjoyment.
4. Areas subject to new uses in the future, such as renewable energies, new methods
for extraction of minerals, oils, new ﬁshing grounds, etc.
This shared use can cause conﬂicts between the different users of ecosystem
services. Particularly, in ﬁsheries, there are many conﬂicts over the use of space:
1. Conﬂicts between different ﬁshing gears: There are restrictions on some areas to
certain ﬁshing gears, for instance depth limits for trawlers or purse seiners.
2. Marine Protected Areas: There are many different types of protection, the most
severe of which restrict all ﬁshing, some others restrict speciﬁc ﬁshing gears or
limit the number of ﬁshing boats, and others offer only seasonal protection.
3. Vulnerable species: Some species may have high levels of protection as they are
considered sensitive and vulnerable. They can be scarce or conﬁned to a partic-
ular habitat, threatened or their populations are at low levels.
4. Essential Fish Habitats: Some particular areas are protected due to the presence of
juvenile ﬁsh, which can result in high levels of ﬁshing discards and unwanted
catch.
A Marine Spatial Planning approach can provide further insights in ﬁshery
management, considering the spatial information on where natural populations and
ﬁshing occur. It is well-known that spatial patterns, local movements, migration
patterns, and more general geographical scenarios are thought to play an important
role in the dynamics of ﬁsheries resources (Warren 1998; Fogarty and Botsford
2007).
However, to get reasonable estimations and predictions of abundance, including a
description of variability, models must describe the relevant species interactions,
effects of environmental conditions and ﬁshing effort by gear at appropriate spatial
and temporal scales (Sims et al. 2008; Elith and Leathwick 2009; Vilela and Bellido
2015). There are obvious relationships between ﬁshing effort, habitat properties,
catchability and ﬁshing mortality, and all these features have to be considered in
order to enhance ﬁsheries management in the framework of a MSP approach.
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A key point to reduce discards and achieve more environmentally responsible
ﬁshing is to minimize ﬁshing operations in inappropriate areas. It is quite obvious
that any management of unwanted catches should consider measures to avoid areas
or periods with high abundances of bycatch and discards. Bellido et al. (2011)
numbered the three main pillars to reduce discards and unwanted catch:
1. Avoid ﬁshing in areas of higher discards, related to improving ﬁshing strategies
by an adequate selection of the ﬁshing grounds.
2. Better selectivity of ﬁshing gears, allowing avoidance and escape of unwanted
catch to increase survivability.
3. Valorization of the unwanted catch, with a progressive positive input of ﬁsh
processing technology and adding value. This is complimented by research to
provide new ﬁsh products when needed (burgers, nuggets, etc.) as well to use ﬁsh
material for other uses (pharmaceutical, cosmetic, aquaculture feed producers,
biomedical, etc.).
MSP is totally related to the ﬁrst pillar. With that aim, sensitive areas for
particular species or early life stages should be identiﬁed, as well as the derivation
of areas of special protection for mobile gears and the classiﬁcation of more suitable
ﬁshing areas for “mobile” and “non-mobile” ﬁshing gears according to habitat and
ﬁsh community characteristics. This research may allow a better understanding of
spatial and temporal distributions and abundances of discards, together with an
online handling and updating of information, to assess the health of the ecosystem
on a spatial basis.
Although scientiﬁc advice is indeed essential for an appropriate MSP implemen-
tation, MSP scientists should show awareness, support and openness to advice. They
should support stakeholders and policymakers by providing knowledge on every
speciﬁc spatial scale and provide tools to transfer research to advisory products for
better spatial planning. For example, a quite accessible and useful outcome is to
provide maps and indicators that help managers and users with better decision-
making when considering a space-time scenario.
MSP scientiﬁc advice is mainly based on the application of mapping tools
together with a set of different statistical models and other computational techniques,
all on a spatio-temporal basis (Fig. 12.1). Unfortunately, these tools have often been
ignored in ﬁsheries management, mostly due to both a lack of appropriated knowl-
edge of ﬁsheries researchers to apply these tools and a lack of involvement of spatial
researchers to provide technical advice for the quantitative and qualitative spatio-
temporal analysis.
Here we provide two examples of how to apply these techniques to provide
scientiﬁc advice for MSP, particularly related to Landing Obligation issues. The ﬁrst
one is related to the establishment of an online GIS platform to inform ﬁshers of
areas where they can maximize yield by minimizing discards. The second one is a
simulation of spatial ﬁshing closures to test different MSP scenarios for a purse seine
ﬁshery in South East Spain. The ﬁndings and applications of these two case studies
can help ﬁshery managers make decisions to mitigate discards in European waters.
This work was developed in the framework of the iSEAS LIFE+ project,
“Knowledge-Based Innovative Solutions to Enhance Adding-Value Mechanisms
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towards Healthy and Sustainable EU Fisheries”. iSEAS WP3 was totally devoted to
applying spatial models to reduce discards and increase efﬁciency and these case
studies are an example of that approach.
12.2.1 An Online GIS Platform to Mitigate Discards
Over the past decades, a branch of IT (Information Technologies) has gradually
evolved, speciﬁcally dedicated to mapping and spatial analysis. This technology is
usually referred to as Geographical Information Systems (GIS), though it has also
been called geo-data systems, spatial information systems, digital mapping systems
and land information systems. A GIS comprises a collection of integrated computer
hardware and software which together is used for inputting, storing, manipulating,
analyzing and presenting a variety of geographical data. Applications of GIS to
marine ﬁshery resources, or indeed to any marine applications, have been very
limited, being mostly conﬁned to peripheral areas such as coastal zone management,
pollution modeling and controls, mariculture and shoreline mapping (Meaden 2000).
One of the objectives of our work was to develop a fully-operative GIS tool that
integrates predictive models of suitable ﬁshing areas for Northeast Atlantic ﬁsheries
(Fig. 12.2). This is a real time modeling technique, which could help ﬁshers avoid
areas or periods with high probability of unwanted bycatch/discards (Vilela and
Bellido 2015). Such a model aims to minimize discards/bycatch throughout the
study area through ﬂexible real-time modeling of recent catches and discards,
which produces maps as ﬁnal results, i.e., outputs that are easy to interpret by ﬁshers
(see Fig. 12.3). The ﬁnal aim is to provide additional info to skippers to carry out
their ﬁshing strategies taking into account which species are in the area and in which
GIS + 
statistics
Distribution
Fishing patterns
Relationships
environmentand 
abundance
Biology of 
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Ecology
Fig. 12.1 Possibilities of spatial techniques in MSP, how to integrate different statistical models
and other computational techniques, all on a spatio-temporal basis
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Fig. 12.2 Schematic of the automatic procedure for data acquisition and main page of the GIS
platform. (http://iseas.cesga.es/)
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Fig. 12.3 Model results forMerluccius merluccius in area ICES VIII-west and area ICES IXa: FSI
annual probability (upper image), with the best ﬁshing areas in green; catch probability (bottom
left), with higher probabilities of positive catch (i.e. distribution area of the species) in dark green;
discard probability (bottom right), with higher probabilities of discard rates of more than 20% in
orange
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catch composition, and as a consequence, the kind of discards/bycatch to be
expected.
Fishery data are provided for the ﬁshing vessels in an automatic way (Fig. 12.2).
The participation of ﬁshing vessels is voluntary, but only ﬁshing vessels providing
data can beneﬁt from the online results. As a result, ﬁshing vessels will act as online
sensors that continuously provide real data from the daily activity of ﬂeets both to the
models, as well as to the GIS platform. This fact will make models more accurate and
precise (in terms of predicting target species/discards) for ﬂeets working in a given
area, while reducing costs because previously this task was done by specialized
observers on oceanographic and research vessels.
Once the user logs into the GIS platform, the general layer information is
displayed in a small, interactive box. The modeling process starts when the user
performs a query which generates a temporal ﬁshing data subset extracted from the
general SQL database stored in the system. This temporal ﬁshing data subset collects
information regarding the latitude, longitude, and species-speciﬁc information on the
weight caught and weight discarded of each ﬁshing operation performed by the ﬂeet
in the selected area and time period. Explanatory variables used for the analysis
include bathymetry, slope, distance to the coast, sea bottom characteristics, Sea
Surface Temperature and Chlorophyll-a concentration. Other important explanatory
variables, such as the season, ﬂeet characteristics, etc., are intrinsic and self-
contained in the ﬁshing data used to perform the modelling.
The model estimates the Fishing Suitability Index (FSI) for a given operational
unit (métier), time period and marine area. It is deﬁned as the probability of a
location to have low discards, i.e. below a deﬁned threshold discard rate, based on
its environmental characteristics and previous ﬁshing activity information (Vilela
and Bellido 2015). The script, developed in R open statistical software, reads the
temporal data subset and transforms catch and discard data for each record into a FSI
binary variable according to the maximum admissible discard rate (threshold). The
script also reads the environmental variables for each ﬁshing location from a
2  2 km grid loaded in the working space of R and transfers the variables to the
temporal subset with the ﬁshing data.
The models are based on the Breiman-Curtis algorithm (Random Forest; RF) and
do not have any methodological assumption to be checked prior to the analysis,
except the independence among observations, making it a strong method for an
unsupervised and automatic model. Although RF is not a suitable tool for hypothesis
testing, it is a robust non-parametric statistical method for data analysis that makes
no distributional assumptions about the predictor or response variables (Cutler et al.
2007), thus making it an ideal candidate for inclusion in a ﬂexible and fully
automated ecological prediction system. It is worth noting that Crisci et al. (2012)
concluded his review of different machine learning algorithms over rocky benthic
communities by highlighting the properties of RF as, “one of the most efﬁcient
learning algorithms in terms of prediction accuracy”.
Model results are projected for the whole area using the 2  2 km grid, and
resulting maps are stored in a vectorial GeoJSON format in a local folder of the
server. The maps and a text ﬁle with information regarding the performance and
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information about the ﬁshing data processed (i.e. number of records with catch,
number of records with discards, percentage discarded, average FSI, mean catch, and
mean discards) are available.
In the last step, the geoportal shows the GeoJSON vectorial image in a
web-mapping service and shows the user a measure of the model performance,
according to predeﬁned probability values (FSI index):
• Between 0 and 0.5: Red zone, less suitable areas for ﬁshing (high discard
proportion).
• Between 0.5 and 0.8: Orange zone, intermediate areas for ﬁshing (medium
discard proportion).
• Between 0.8 and 1: Green area, the most suitable areas for ﬁshing (low discard
proportion).
Results vary between species, areas and métiers, achieving good results with less
than 50 records for target species, while poor predictions are obtained for those
bycatch species less inﬂuenced by environmental factors. Some examples of the map
tool generated for hake (Merluccius merluccius) are presented in Fig. 12.3.
These prediction tools help ﬁshers avoid areas or time periods with high proba-
bilities of obtaining unwanted bycatch/discards since they produce maps as ﬁnal
results, i.e., outputs that are easy to interpret by ﬁshers (Vilela and Bellido, 2015).
Also they are able to perform both short term and long term predictions, adapt to any
species, area and ﬁshing operational unit and they are quick, i.e., results can be
visualized by the user in seconds. These prediction models provide a good predictive
accuracy and offer an assessment (or goodness of the ﬁt) about the reliability of the
prediction visualized to the user.
This GIS platform is accessible to the public from http://iseas.cesga.es/ where
some of these maps and results are displayed.
12.2.2 MSP to Reduce Discards in a Small Pelagic Fishery off
South East Spain
Along the Spanish Mediterranean coast, the purse seine ﬁshery mainly harvests
small pelagic ﬁsh (Fig. 12.4). The most common type of ﬁshery operates during the
night and mainly targets anchovy (Engraulis engrasicolus) and sardine (Sardina
pilchardus). Purse seine ﬁsheries are characterized by actively searching for ﬁsh
using echo acoustics. This makes it a reasonably selective ﬁshery with generally
lower discard rates than trawlers, gillnetters and longliners, thus attracting fewer
studies related to discards.
However, despite relatively low mean discard rates in purse seiners, a huge variabil-
ity per haul is present ranging from 0% to 100% of the catch being discarded (Borges
et al. 2001). This high variability is inﬂuenced by the electronic equipment used to
identify and target ﬁsh schools, failing to correctly determine the species composition or
size of a school and can lead to the whole volume of the haul being discarded.
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We explored the Spanish Mediterranean purse seine reference ﬂeet with respect to
discards to identify potential discard driving patterns. We simulated different ﬁshing
closures and explored how they can affect catch compositions and discard patterns.
This study is based on data collected by the SpanishMediterranean on-board observers
program, for which the purse seine reference ﬂeet is located in the Northern Alborán
Sea (GSA01). The Alborán Sea has 11 ports, although the data set covers the two main
sub-areas of the Northern Alborán Sea (Almería and Málaga). The data set comprises
108 ﬁshing trips and a total of 173 ﬁshing operations from 7 different vessels during a
3 years period (2009–2011). It also contains information on the location, time, depth,
and moon phase of each haul, as well as characteristics of the vessel such as gross
registered tonnage (GRT), length and power (HP).
As usual in ﬁsheries, the abundance of discards in purse seiners is characterized
by a relatively high number of zeros. In these cases, data modeling has to take into
account both zero and non-zero observations. Models able to do so are known as
zero-inﬂated models. However, most of these models have been developed for
discrete data and cannot be implemented for continuous data, such as discard
volumes. Data with this characteristic are known as semi-continuous data. In the
present analysis we have applied a 2-stage model to simulate the semi-continuous
behavior that characterizes discards of the Spanish Mediterranean purse seiners. We
ﬁrst ﬁtted a Bayesian generalized linear mixed model (GLMM, Muñoz et al. 2012)
to model the occurrence (presence/absence) of discards according to technical and
Fig. 12.4 Depiction of ﬁshing locations in the purse seine ﬁshery in South Spanish Mediterranean.
Dots represent hauls in the two main ﬁshing grounds, Bay of Málaga (western area) and Bay of
Almería (eastern area)
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environmental factors that characterize discard occurrence. Then, conditional to
presence, we modeled the abundance of the discards using Bayesian geostatistics.
In this case, log-transformed discards were used to down-weight extreme values and
ensure a better ﬁt of the models.
Regression models such as generalized linear models (GLM-GLMM) and gen-
eralized additive models (GAM) were selected as the main candidate approach to
uncover the relationships between the amount of discards, expressed in kilos, and
some independent covariates. A stepwise approach, based on the estimation of the
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Deviance Information Criteria (DIC)
value for each model, was applied to select the ﬁnal model. This study did not aim to
estimate the differences among vessels, so we introduced vessel as a random noise
effect in every model. This way, we expected it to absorb the variability that
encompasses different purse seine discarding behaviors for each vessel, which can
occur due to various technical, social and/or economic reasons.
In addition to discards, a couple of complementary models were ﬁt. First, a
Poisson GLM model was designed to ﬁt the relationship between the number of
species caught and bathymetry. Additionally, two linear regression models were ﬁt;
one for the retained fraction of the catch and the other for the discarded fraction.
Fisheries management has used a wide range of different ﬁshing closures. Some
are used as general regulatory principles, such as minimum depth and proximity to
land, and others are usually applied on a more regional scale, such as spatial,
temporal, and spatio-temporal closures. Here we present a fast, simulation-based
approach to easily quantify the impact of applying any such ﬁshing closures in terms
of efﬁciency, in this case lowering discards. Assuming that the available data is
representative of the local purse seine ﬁshery, we ﬁrst simulated a ﬁshing closure and
removed all observed hauls that fell into that ﬁshing closure window. Then, we
resampled the resulting hauls with replacement and calculated the mean. We then
repeated the process N times and compared the results with the whole population.
This process was applied to both Almería Bay (simulating 6 ﬁshing closures) and
Málaga Bay (simulating 7 ﬁshing closures).
All sampled hauls summed up to 249 tonnes of retained catch and 25.1 tonnes of
discarded ﬁsh, of which 15.8 tonnes were non-regulated species under the Landing
Obligation. The mean discarding ratio of the ﬁshery is 12.3%, with a bootstrap
conﬁdence interval between 9.6% and 15.2%. Discard ratios were higher in Málaga
than in Almería for both the whole discarded fraction and the non-regulated fraction
(Fig. 12.5). Discarding behavior was very variable; we found differences within
Málaga and Almería that showed evidence of heterogeneity of discarding at this
regional mesoscale.
Results showed that the most signiﬁcant variable explaining discards was depth
for both areas. The model found a negative relationship between depth and the
occurrence probability of discards, i.e., a higher occurrence in shallower waters
(< 50 m) and a lower occurrence in deeper waters. Also, the number of species
caught and discarded decreased with depth (Fig. 12.6), and retained weight per haul
increased with depth, up to approximately 130 m. Discarding behavior was also
shown to vary signiﬁcantly between vessels, suggesting individual skipper’s ﬁshing
preferences may also inﬂuence the catch composition of each haul.
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Regarding simulation of ﬁshing closures, both bays show the same pattern and we
found no signiﬁcant differences among ﬁshing closures both in Málaga and Almería
(Fig. 12.7). This can be explained by the stable pattern of ﬁsh occurrence in both
bays as well as a similar discard behavior along the bays. The removal of hauls in
every virtual ﬁshing closure is rapidly compensated with hauls in the non-protected
areas, generating approximately the same discard level. Hence, the most important
spatial effect is therefore bathymetry, and that should be the criteria for any MSP
approach to this ﬁshery. As a summary for this ﬁshery, we recommend better
enforcement of the purse seine ﬁshery ban in shallow waters (< 35 m), which is
currently ignored by many skippers, as the best strategy to minimize purse seine
discards in this area.
12.3 Challenges and Opportunities of MSP
Fisheries management is a challenging discipline where biological, social and
economic factors converge to form a complex web of interactions, all occurring in
a deﬁned geographical scenario. Hence, Marine Spatial Planning presents an intui-
tive, complementary and natural approach to enrich ﬁsheries management towards
more sensible and effective strategies.
MSP requires a profound knowledge of ﬁshing grounds, and not just focused on
target species. The monitoring of ﬁshing operations faces formidable technical
challenges due to the combination of a target that varies in space and time and a
mobile exploitation activity. In many exploited ﬁsheries, the large number of species
involved, the high number of ﬁshing gears employed, and the widely dispersed
Fig. 12.5 Predicted log-kg of discards in the Bay of Málaga (upper) and Bay of Almería (bottom).
Maps show mean (left) and the standard deviation (right) of the predictions
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landing ports make monitoring, enforcement and compliance measures extremely
difﬁcult (Williams and Corral 1999). As a consequence, huge costs and workload are
entailed on already overburdened institutions, not always with the required or
expected results. In other words, monitoring actions are not as exhaustive as
required, in the sense that they are not implemented in every vessel all the time.
Technology could help to implement MSP. To monitor, control, and document
full catch and discard information, several alternative data sources are available:
inspectors, Electronic Monitoring with video, monitoring via GPS and sensors,
naval and air patrols, reference ﬂeets, landing controls, satellite tracking with
VMSs (Vessel Monitoring Systems), and the ﬁshers’ self-reporting (including
Fig. 12.6 Upper left: presence/absence of discards against depth; in black, the percentage of hauls
that present discards every 20 m depth stratum. Upper right: heterogeneity of hauls versus depth; in
red, the mean number of species per haul every 20 m depth stratum. Bottom left: discard ratios of
each haul versus depth at the location of the haul, differentiated by vessel. Bottom right: mean total
retained weight per haul versus depth at the location of the haul, differentiated by vessel. Also
shown is the mean retained weight per 20 m depth stratum (i.e. 0–20 m, 21–40 m...), missing data
for stratum 120–140 m
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logbooks, landing declarations, and sales notes). It must be noted that novel tech-
nologies for ﬁsheries monitoring do not replace traditional control and surveillance
methods, such as inspections onboard vessels or on shore. However, used correctly,
the new technologies should help to better target actions and therefore cut costs and
increase effectiveness (James et al., this volume). By crosschecking data collected
using the different systems, ﬁsheries authorities can apply risk based control strat-
egies and detect illegal activities that could otherwise go unnoticed.
Fig. 12.7 Estimated discards (kg) for every virtual ﬁshing closure for Bay of Almería (top panels)
and Bay of Málaga (bottom panels)
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When fully implemented the main beneﬁts of this system will include:
1. Quasi real-time monitoring (depending on when catch information is transmitted)
of catches by all ﬁshing vessels operating in EU waters and of ﬁsh quotas.
2. Protection of valuable commercial ﬁsh stocks by appropriate stock assessments
based on real catch data.
3. Efﬁcient and effective data interchange between agencies engaged in ﬁsheries
monitoring and control across the European Union.
4. Reduced requirements for manual entry of logbook data into central databases.
The deﬁned area, time scale, and review period may not be the same for different
legal obligations, policy and management goals, and operational objectives. The
validity of the goals and objectives should be assessed by SMART criteria (Speciﬁc,
Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound).
Policy approaches can be top-down (imposed by government), bottom-up (meet-
ing popular demands from end users), or a combination of the two. The balance
between these policy approaches will give an indication of how likely end-users will
be to follow enforcement laws.
A real challenge is to avoid duplication of effort by different public agencies and
levels of government in MSP activities. It is necessary to provide a rational basis for
setting priorities, as well as to direct resources to where and when they are needed
most. If resources are limited, then a prioritization exercise could be undertaken to
consider the relative importance of ecological, social, economic, and other opera-
tional objectives.
A quite useful product to design and start a MSP approach is the UNESCO Step-
by-Step guide (Ehler et al. 2009). This guide is directed towards professional marine
managers, and it provides a complete view of MSP and describes a logical sequence
of steps that are required for successful MSP implementation.
Additional initiatives aimed at progressing towards MSP are underway. MESMA
(www.mesma.org) was an EU-FP7 project on monitoring and evaluation of Spatially
Managed Marine Areas. One of the main outcomes of this project was the elaboration
of a roadmap to implement MSP. SinceMESMA has ﬁnished, theMSPmovement has
been gathering throughout the European MSP Platform (http://msp-platform.eu),
which provides information and tools for MSP in different European sea basins.
12.4 Summary and Policy Recommendations
The best discard mitigation measure occurs at sea; not catching unwanted bycatch.
The key aspect should be better ﬁshing practices to avoid unwanted catch.
A better marine spatial planning approach is needed for ﬁshery management.
These types of measures can be more ﬂexible and dynamic in response to spatial and
seasonal restrictions related to ﬁshing. Depending on the population, the measures
can differ, for instance we suggest spatio-temporal ﬁshing restrictions for vulnerable
sizes and/or areas. Regarding spawners, they could be protected through planning
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for temporal (seasonal) closures. These temporal closures should be applied to all
métiers at the same time.
In the cases studied here, depth ﬁshing restrictions appear to be one of the best
management measures, and they are totally based in MSP. There are several pro-
hibitions that are essential to our knowledge and should be maintained and, in some
cases, better enforced. These are the prohibition on purse seine ﬁshing shallower
than 35 m or over sensitive habitats, the prohibition on trawl ﬁshing shallower than
50 m or over sensitive habitats, and the prohibition on all ﬁshing beyond 1000 m.
The Landing Obligation should be accompanied by other measures for its suc-
cessful implementation. Some of these measures are improvements in ﬁshing effort
controls, effective enforcement, and ﬁnally an agreement from the ﬁshing sectors to
comply with rules and regulations.
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Chapter 13
The Best Way to Reduce Discards Is by Not
Catching Them!
David G. Reid, Julia Calderwood, Pedro Afonso, Pierre Bourdaud,
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Abstract Under the Landing Obligation (LO) ﬁshers will need to reduce or land
ﬁsh that were previously discarded. In this chapter we look at how they might be able
to do that by summarising a number of studies conducted in various European
regions. We start by describing a series of “challenge” trials where ﬁshers tried to
reduce their discards by whatever (legal) means they thought best. In some cases,
they were able to reduce unwanted catches, in others they were less successful. We
also interviewed ﬁshers not involved in the trials to ask them what they thought they
could do. We explore their approaches which generally fell into three categories:
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more selective gear; tactical and strategic changes; and management changes.
Scientiﬁc data (surveys, landings, and observers data) can also be valuable to help
ﬁshers to decide where and when to ﬁsh to best avoid unwanted catches and
maximise opportunities to catch their quotas. We provide some examples of this
type of approach, and also how these can be adapted for use as interactive online
apps that ﬁshers can use in planning or whilst at sea.
Keywords Challenge trials · Decision support tools · Discard avoidance · Fine scale
mapping · Fish distribution · Fishers · Fishing strategies · Hot-spot maps
13.1 Introduction
Under the Landing Obligation (LO) ﬁshers will need to reduce or land ﬁsh that were
previously discarded. In this context, understanding how ﬁsheries operate is central
to understand how to manage them (Hilborn 2007; Eliasen et al. 2014). An obvious
way by which ﬁshers can reduce discards is via improved gear selectivity (O’Neill
et al., this volume). Beyond that, the tactical choices made by ﬁshers on “where,
when and how to ﬁsh” can play a central role in reducing discards (Rijnsdorp et al.
2012; Dunn et al. 2011). This can be implemented in terms of top down control
(e.g. closed areas). However, the need for management to provide bottom-up
incentives to reduce discards is also well established (Rochet et al. 2014; Condie
et al. 2014; Little et al. 2015; Pascoe et al. 2010).
In parallel, the ongoing improvements in data availability open for new and more
precise knowledge. Analysis of discard observers’ information (e.g. Anon 2011;
Viana et al. 2011) provides a better understanding of spatio-temporal patterns of
discarding. Catch locations and landings per unit of effort can be determined at ﬁne
spatial scales from Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) and logbook data
(e.g. Gerritsen and Lordan 2011), and increasingly from Electronic Monitoring
(EM) data (Plet-Hansen et al. 2017). Bottom trawl surveys can be used to map the
locations of species (Fraser et al. 2008), spawning aggregations (Nash et al. 2012)
and size structure (Shephard et al. 2011). This information can help ﬁshers to decide
where and when to ﬁsh to avoid having to catch unwanted ﬁsh.
In this chapter we look at how ﬁshers themselves may be able to change the way
they operate in order to reduce discards, based on a series of recent studies performed
in several European ﬁsheries in the frame of the EU research project DiscardLess
(www.discardless.eu). We start by describing a series of ‘challenge’ trials where
several individual ﬁshers tried to reduce their discards by whatever (legal) means
they thought best. We also interviewed other ﬁshers not involved in the trials to ask
them what they thought they could do. Their approaches generally fell into three
categories: more selective gear; tactical and strategic changes; and management
changes (Reid 2017). After a description of the trials and their results, we look at
other tools to help ﬁshers decide where and when to ﬁsh to best avoid unwanted
258 D. G. Reid et al.
catches, and maximise their opportunities to catch their quotas. At the time of writing
this summary, a number of the individual studies presented here were still ongoing
and/or unpublished, but a more detailed description of the methods used and
preliminary results has been reported in Reid and Fauconnet (2018).
Management changes are beyond the scope of this chapter but are addressed in
other chapters of this book.
13.2 What Can Fishers Themselves Do to Reduce Their
Discards?
In a series of “challenge experiments”, individual vessels and crew were challenged
to reduce their discards by whatever legal means available. Intuitively, this could be
by (for example) changing the ﬁshing gear, or by changing their ﬁshing tactics,
perhaps by shifting areas or seasons. Each vessel ﬁshed ﬁrst with their normal
approach (control) and then with the modiﬁed approach (test) with the aim of
minimising discards over a predetermined period (challenge trial). They reported
the adjustments they made and why. Skippers were asked to set themselves a target
for discard reduction between the test and the control trips, and this was the core of
the “challenge”. The targets could have been in terms of reducing discards of TAC
species in general, or of those that represent the major ‘choke’ species in their
ﬁshery, i.e. the species for which the available quota is exhausted (long) before the
quotas are exhausted of (some of) the other species that are caught together in a
(mixed) ﬁshery (Zimmermann et al. 2015). Scientists were sometimes placed
on-board to collect catch data, and also to train crews in self-sampling. The catch
data were then analysed by scientists to determine the degree of success at reaching
these targets.
Challenge trials were done in three different countries and across a number of
ﬁsheries. The approach was slightly different in the three countries:
• Ireland – one demersal trawl vessel targeting whiteﬁsh (cod, haddock and whit-
ing) and one targeting Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus) with additional
catches of the same ﬁsh species (Calderwood et al. 2016).
• Denmark – 12 demersal trawl vessels mainly ﬁshing cod and saithe, with three
vessels targeting Norway lobster. The vessels towed a mix of single and twin
trawl rigs, and were distributed between the North Sea, the Skagerrak, and the
Baltic Sea. (Mortensen et al. 2017).
• France – three vessels targeting a mix of species including cod, whiting, squid,
cuttleﬁsh and some pelagic species. The vessels were all demersal trawlers, two
< 18 m, and one > 18 m in length (Balazuc et al. 2016).
In Denmark, the main option explored by ﬁshers was gear modiﬁcation, and the
data were mostly collected by the ﬁshers themselves, supplemented with Fully
Documented Fishery (FDF) methods (including Electronic Monitoring (EM) with
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cameras). In Ireland and France, the approaches included both gear and tactical
modiﬁcations, with full observer coverage.
13.2.1 Gear Based Changes Used in the “Challenge Trials”
Changes to the ﬁshing gear ﬁgured strongly in ﬁsher‘s choices in all challenge trials.
This was the main thrust of the Danish study, where the ﬁshers used a variety of
different gear modiﬁcations. These included:
• Changing mesh size in the codend of the net, usually to a larger mesh size, but in
the Baltic Sea some vessels trialled reduced mesh sizes
• Inserting escape panels or separator panels into the net (with two codends for ﬁsh
going above or below the panel)
• Topless trawl or modiﬁed mesh in an escape panel
In the French trials gear changes consisted of:
• The inclusion of a larger mesh cylinder in the extension (CMC)
• Separator panels with two codends
• Increased mesh size in the codend and extension, and T90 mesh
The only gear change in the Irish example was that one of the Irish vessels (the
Nephrops targeting vessel) used a quad rig Nephrops net, with large mesh square
mesh panels (SMP) in all four extensions.
The outcomes of these trials were somewhat mixed. In the Danish trials, nine
vessels were able to reduce the discard ratio (Discards/Discards + Landings by
species by weight) using the tested modiﬁcations (three in the North Sea, three in
Skagerrak and three in the Baltic Sea), while two vessels (from the North Sea)
actually increased their discard ratio and one North Sea vessel showed no difference.
The improvements ranged from less than 2% for four of the vessels, 2–7% for four
others, and, in one case, a 17.6% improvement (Fig. 13.1).
In the French trials, there was insufﬁcient time after making the gear changes to
collect sufﬁcient data to analyse their performance. However, the vessel using the
mesh cylinder (CMC) approach reported little loss of commercial catch volume, and
in some cases reductions in discard volume. The separator panel with two codends
could not be evaluated, but the skipper was still very positive and felt it had value. In
general, the ﬁshers did not feel that the changes in codend meshes achieved the
results they had hoped for small ﬁsh, and there were concomitant losses in commer-
cial sized ﬁsh (Balazuc et al. 2016).
In the Irish trials the use of the SMP in the quad rig allowed the vessel to keep
ﬁshing signiﬁcantly longer before choking on the cod that was the main choke
species during the control phase of the study. The results are shown in Fig. 13.2, and
the reduction in over quota cod is clear, although there was an increase in over quota
Nephrops.
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13.2.2 Tactical and Strategic Changes Used in the Challenge
Trials
Tactical and strategic changes to ﬁshing to reduce discards were mainly tested in the
Irish and French Challenge trials. In the Irish trials, the whiteﬁsh targeting vessel
used changes in both the time of day and also in the depths of ﬁshing. The vessel also
tried to move between management areas to maximise the time ﬁshing for the month.
The main issue for this vessel in the control period was a very early choke on cod and
haddock in all management areas. The combination of area and behavioural changes
allowed a small change in choke time across all areas from 4 to 9 days. There was
some evidence that the skipper was actually trying to avoid discards during the
Fig. 13.1 Bar chart showing the average overall discards per haul from each area and the average
discards per haul of individual species in each area. Error-bars signify standard error. Note that
y-axes differ between areas. (From Mortensen et al. 2017)
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control periods as well – he had somewhat higher discards in the months prior to the
trials than in the control month during the trials. This may have impacted on the
outcomes from the changes he made. The Nephrops vessel, while focused on the
gear changes outlined above, also used movement between management areas to
successfully reduce the choke problem (Fig. 13.3).
The strategic changes made by the French vessels were mainly focused on the
potential for avoiding “sensitive” areas based on traditional ecological knowledge,
characterised by high catch rates of quota species under MCRS. The outcomes
suggested that the large vessel already did this in its normal practice, and that
scope to do any more was limited. For the smaller vessels, their main operating
area with high discards was within the three mile zone along the Channel coast,
where almost 70% of their catch was usually discarded (Fig. 13.4). Avoiding this
area would clearly help with their landing obligation (LO) requirement. The key
issue was that, while discards are high in this zone, it is also their main area of
operation. These are small, artisanal vessels, and this area is both close to their home
ports and also sheltered from bad weather. As a consequence, the skippers were
reluctant to avoid this area during the trials. However, it remains a potential valuable
tool for discard mitigation under the LO, and ways to encourage the avoidance of
this area should be explored.
Whiting
July August
Plaice
Nephrops
Megrim
Ling
S
p
ec
ie
s
Vessel 1
Total Catch (tonnes)
Hake
Haddock
Cod
Black sole
Angler
5 10 15 20 25 5 10
Within Quota
Over Quota
15 20 25
Fig. 13.2 Total catch of quota species for the Nephrops vessel during the 2 months of the trial, with
a distinction between within quota landings (light blue) and over quota/< MCRS (over Minimum
Conservation Reference Size) landings (dark blue). (From Calderwood et al. 2016)
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13.2.3 Conclusion
The use of modiﬁed gears to improve selectivity and reduce the scale of discarding
showed some promise during the challenge trials. In all three cases, the use of added
panels, changes in codend mesh size and conﬁguration, modiﬁcations to the exten-
sion, and the use of separator panels with twin codends showed some improvements.
However, it should be noted that these improvements were often quite small and
would probably not solve all the problems ﬁshers would face under a full imple-
mentation of the LO. Additionally, these were the ﬁshers’ own trials, and could not
always be fully substantiated in a scientiﬁc context. One positive approach that could
be taken, would be to enhance the institutional paths for a “fast-tracking” of such
bottom-up initiatives (O’Neill et al., this volume).
The challenge trials showed that there was some scope for the use of both more
selective gear and changes in behaviour, both locally, and in moving between
management units, to reduce discards, and mitigate the impacts of the LO on ﬁshing
viability. Fishers in all the trials did believe that these changes could make some
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Fig. 13.3 Total catch of quota species for the white ﬁsh vessel during the 2 months of the trial, with
a distinction between within quota landings (light blue) and over quota/below Minimum Conser-
vation Reference Size (< MCRS) landings (dark blue). The vessel was able to reduce his over quota
whiting catch, but could make little change in his over quota cod or haddock catches. (From
Calderwood et al. 2016)
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difference, even if they did not work as well as expected in the limited context of the
challenges. It should be noted though, that even when the trials were able to reduce
discarding or the impact of choke species, the improvements were generally quite
small. So, while such changes may help ﬁshers comply with the LO by reducing
discards, they are still not sufﬁcient to avoid signiﬁcant impacts on economic
viability. Notwithstanding this, we consider it desirable to continue working with
ﬁshers on both gear and behavioural based responses to the challenges implicit in the
LO. The trials were all successful in terms of the level of collaboration and in some
of the outcomes, so such approaches should continue.
13.3 Where and When to Fish to Avoid Unwanted Catches
– How the Scientists Can Help
Based on the challenge trials and interviews with ﬁshers (Reid 2017), it was clear
that tactical changes could help avoid unwanted catches, and we believe that more
information would help ﬁshers achieve this. We then looked for ways to provide the
detailed knowledge that can come from using scientiﬁc data to illustrate the spatial
and temporal distributions of the ﬁsh, catches and discards.
Fisheries institutions have access to a range of data. These include research vessel
surveys showing abundance distributions, observer data showing detailed catch
Fig. 13.4 Map showing Intensity Indices (II) of 13 trawlers under 18 meters over the period June–
September 2013. (Source: CRPMEM NPdC-P and Gis Valpena)
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(landings plus discards) by commercial vessels, landings and vessel monitoring
system (VMS) data showing where and when catches are made, and Fully
Documented Fisheries pilot studies showing full details of complete ﬁshing opera-
tions. We set out to use this information to develop the potential to assist ﬁshers in
making strategic choices to avoid discard. This included ﬁne-scale, real-time map-
ping of catches and activity data, discards hotspots, juvenile surveys, etc. One aim
was to provide Decision Support Tools (DST) to assess the role of “choke” species
at the local scale. The role of the scientist here is as an advisor to ﬁshers, about
where and when they might ﬁsh to reduce choke problems and avoid unwanted
catches.
No single approach was possible across all the examples shown below, and
indeed was probably not desirable, as each had its own speciﬁc issues and context.
These arose from a combination of how ﬁsh were distributed i.e. in discrete areas, or
widely spread, and on the nature of LO requirements, e.g. avoidance of particular
species or size classes, and the limitations in ﬁshing imposed by geography and other
legislation drivers.
DST can take many forms. At their simplest, these can be maps of where ﬁsh are
found (from surveys), caught and discarded (from observers). However, more
detailed analyses can be used to analyse spatial patterns and their variation, how
discards and catches of numbers of species co-occur in space and time, or not. The
information can also be represented in an interactive form using web-based apps. But
the DST process can also simply be the provision of understanding discarding and its
drivers, e.g. quota management rules, or about the interaction of economic proﬁt-
ability with discarding – is it economically better not to discard? We present
examples of all these types of Decision Support information. These cover case
studies from the North Sea, through North East Atlantic (European western waters)
to the Mediterranean Sea. They cover many different metiers and ﬂeets, from single
to multi-species, using a wide variety of ﬁshing gears.
13.3.1 Decision Support Tools Using Survey Data
Fisheries surveys are carried out across the EU and provide valuable data. The use of
survey data in helping ﬁshers to decide where and when to ﬁsh is illustrated with an
example from the Balearic Islands (in the western Mediterranean Sea). The surveys
were used to model the spatial patterns of species abundance for the main commer-
cial species. The results from this were a series of maps of species distributions
above and below MCRS, species overlaps, ﬁshing grounds, discard hotspots etc. An
example showing the density and persistence of thornback ray Raja clavata is
presented in Fig. 13.5. In a second example, the degree of species overlap is
presented in Fig. 13.6, illustrating where more than one species is likely to be caught
together. Other data products from this study also made use of observer data to
supplement the surveys.
In the Azores, habitat suitability models for 10 species of deep-water sharks and
rays were developed based on survey data (Fauconnet et al. 2018). Deep-sea sharks,
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even if only occasionally taken as bycatch of the deep-water longline ﬁsheries in the
Azores, could rapidly choke the ﬁsheries of this Portuguese outermost region, as
many of those species are currently managed under a zero TAC. Maps predicting
occurence by species and combined occurence of all species at the range of the
whole Azores EEZ were developed using data from demersal bottom longline
surveys carried out from 1996 to 2017 (Fauconnet et al. unpublished data), to help
ﬁshers identify areas they should avoid to limit the risks of catching those species
(Fig. 13.7). Composite maps combining the distribution of the main shark species
caught by the bottom longliners, and by the deep-water drifting longliners were also
created to better highlight the main areas to be avoided for those two groups of
ﬁshers. This information was completed using ﬁne-scale information on deep-water
shark spatial and vertical movements derived from acoustic telemetry data from
2 species: kiteﬁn shark (Dalatias licha) (Fig. 13.8) and bluntnose sixgill shark
(Hexanchus griseus). Telemetry data helped identify potential essential habitats for
those species. The study highlights that areas to avoid ﬁshing and limits in ﬁshing
depths at some time of the day could be promising mitigation measures for ﬁshers to
implement to avoid some species of deep-water elasmobranchs – but not for all.
Fig. 13.5 Maps of density (N individuals/km2; above) and persistence (P, fraction of years; below)
of thornback ray individuals from the Balearic Islands under (< L50) and over (L > 50) the size at
ﬁrst maturity (73 cm)
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Fig. 13.6 Map of the number of species overlapping (S) in the mixed bottom trawl ﬁshery from the
Balearic Islands; S was obtained considering the Minimum Landing Size (MLS) of each species and
a persistence level of 0.5
Fig. 13.7 Deep-water elasmobranchs hotspots distribution overlap based on presence/absence
distribution of the 10 selected species. Uniform light grey represents areas with no data. (Fauconnet
et al. 2018; Fontes et al. 2015)
13.3.2 Decision Support Tools Using Observer Data
Observer data come from on-board observers on commercial ﬁshing vessels, and,
like surveys, similar coverage is carried out across the EU. Their primary task is to
record discards, but they also record ﬁsh that go to landings. Thus they represent
very detailed information on catches, landed and discarded. It is only possible to
deploy observers on a small proportion of all ﬁshing trips, but we were able to
combine observer data from France, Ireland and the UK for the Celtic Sea to provide
a larger dataset to work on, and some of the results are shown here. Two different
approaches are presented as examples of what information can be produced.
13.3.2.1 Where Are Discards Clustered Together?
This study is the ﬁrst multispecies, ﬁne scale, spatial analysis of landings and
discards in mixed ﬁsheries across a multinational context. The core aim was to use
observer data to identify where commercial ﬁsh were landed and discarded and with
what other species. Multivariate analysis (Principal Component Analysis PCA and
hierarchical clustering) on combined observer data from Ireland and France between
2010 and 2014 grouped cells of space characterized by homogeneous species pro-
ﬁles in terms of discards (or landings). Each cluster was then plotted on a map with a
Fig. 13.8 Graphical representation of the movement ranges of individual kiteﬁn sharks tagged with
acoustic transmitters at the south of the Faial-Pico channel and monitored using deepwater acoustic
receivers in the islands’ slopes and neighbouring seamounts; boxes represent the number of sharks
undertaking a particular movement. (Fauconnet et al. 2018)
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colour code. It provides a global overview of discards and landings locations by
species in the central region of the Celtic Sea. What was found was a highly
structured ﬁshing ground, with some of the clusters only found in a smaller part of
the whole Celtic Sea. For instance, in the map shown in Fig. 13.9, there is a notable
patch of the dark blue cluster 10 in the middle of the area. This cluster mainly
represents observed discards of Norway lobster and spurdog (Squalus acanthias).
But the more widely spread red cluster 13, was mainly composed of mackerel
(Scomber scombrus) and sprat (Sprattus sprattus). While some discard clusters
corresponded well to landings clusters spatially, this was less common than cases
where no obvious common pattern was found. This result suggests that in the central
Celtic Sea, landings proﬁles in terms of species may not predict discards species
composition.
13.3.2.2 Mapping Catch Hot Spots to Avoid Unwanted Catches
A valuable support tool for ﬁshers would be to have access to maps showing species
abundance hotspots – that is, areas where there would be a high probability of
catching a given species, above or below MCRS. This was carried out using a
Fig. 13.9 Cluster maps of French and Irish discards. The same colour code was assigned to each
30*30 square belonging to the same cluster. This analysis was for TAC species only
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detailed analysis of observer data from Ireland, France and the UK used as an
indicator of the catches taken in the Celtic Sea. The analysis focused on mapping
hot spots of CPUE and catch proportion for three key species; cod, haddock and
whiting, and over and under MCRS. The analysis can be extended to any species,
both commercial and non-commercial. The maps were based on consistent obser-
vations of particular catch rates, so only those locations where one would consis-
tently (over 5 years) see high or low levels for these categories were used. The data
were then interpolated to provide regional coverage (Fig. 13.10). The maps were
then drawn together into a web-based app (discussed below).
13.3.2.3 Detailed Haul-by-Haul Mapping Using Electronic
Monitoring Data
Another option to monitor catches is the use of Electronic Monitoring (EM) systems
with video on board vessels that can monitor the haul-by-haul catch remotely. Such a
system has been trialled in Denmark since 2008 (Bergsson et al. 2017; Ulrich et al.
2015). The analysed footage provides detailed information on discards, covering
more trips and hauls compared to observer trips, for vessels carrying the system. An
example is shown in Fig. 13.11.
Fine-scale information on landings and discards by haul can be combined with
the landing price for the trip to map trade-offs between high-value and high-discard
ﬁshing spots, which can potentially complement the ﬁsher’s implicit knowledge on
the best ﬁshing locations (Plet-Hansen and Ulrich 2018). An example for a single
vessel for which such a detailed information is available is presented in Fig. 13.12.
Fig. 13.10 Diagram showing the steps in the map production process. (A. Individual binned maps
created for each year; B. Amalgamated map for all years identifying grid cells within consistent
binned categories over multiple years; C. Final interpolated map (using inverse distance weighted
interpolation)
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13.3.2.4 Combining Surveys and Commercial Catch Data to Provide
Year-Round Abundance Distributions
Data from scientiﬁc surveys are not available for all times of the year but provide
consistent yearly and spatially resolved abundance indices. On-board commercial
data cover the whole year, but generally provide a biased perception of stock
abundance. The combination of scientiﬁc and commercial catches per unit of effort
(CPUEs), standardized using statistical methods (in this example a delta-generalized
linear model), allows the description of the spatial and temporal (monthly) dynamics
of ﬁsh distributions in the Eastern English Channel (Bourdaud et al. 2017). Using the
scientiﬁc survey as a baseline, the degree of reliability of commercial CPUEs was
assessed with survey-based distributions using the local overlap between
Fig. 13.11 Map of 2016 EM discard data for cod, hake, saithe, whiting and haddock from
12 Danish vessels (sampled hauls with video footage reviewed representing 29% of all their
hauls that year). Cyan areas have low total discards in kg, purple areas have higher total discards.
Each grid cell is an ICES rectangle. The x-axis shows the ICES rectangles’ longitudinal ID, the
y-axis shows the ICES rectangles’ latitudinal ID. The number of sampled hauls conducted in each
ICES rectangle by the 12 vessels is written together with the discard in kg (D), and the average
discard rate (Discards/Catch) for the 5 species per haul (in %). (From Bergsson et al. 2017)
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distributions. The broader spatio-temporal estimated distribution of the species
agreed with qualitative information from the literature, especially for cuttleﬁsh,
and this is illustrated in Fig. 13.13. Fine scale consistency (using cells of
0.3*0.3) between survey and commercial data was signiﬁcant for half of the
19 tested species (e.g. whiting, cod). For the other species (e.g. plaice, thornback
ray), the results were inconclusive. The approach allowed a more representative
mapping of the abundance distribution across the year, that can then be used in both
targeting, and avoidance in the context of the LO.
13.4 Web-Based Apps to Help Fishers Plan Where
and When to Fish to Avoid Unwanted Catches
In many of the analyses in this chapter, the scientists concerned have been able to
produce information, usually in map form, that has the potential to help ﬁshers target
their activity to avoid unwanted catches. To make this practically useful, and
useable, scientists have started developing a range of web-based apps both to present
the information, but critically, to allow the ﬁshers to work with it in their own way. In
three of the examples given in the above descriptions, such apps have been devel-
oped and are, or will be, reﬁned with ﬁshers to make them as useful as possible.
One example developed in the Balearic Islands is presented in Fig. 13.14. The app
allows ﬁshers to choose the species and ﬁshing ground of interest. They can then see
Fig. 13.12 Gridded map of the landing value per haul for a single Danish trawler. The red colour
represents the greatest value per haul. The yellow triangles represent the areas of high discard
volumes. The discard hotspot areas often coincide with high value hauls but importantly, there are
also other high value areas without such high discard levels. (From Plet-Hansen and Ulrich 2018)
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observer or survey data, as well as discard information, length and maturity data, and
other information on the species and the ﬁsheries.
A second example, developed for the Celtic Sea ﬁsheries, is presented in
Fig. 13.15, where the ﬁshers can choose the species (or size class) of interest, and
Fig. 13.13 Monthly spatial abundance distribution estimated from on-board commercial observa-
tions (OBSMER program in France) and scientiﬁc surveys (CGFS, Channel Ground Fish Survey)
for cuttleﬁsh. The crosses in the white squares (X) represent areas where no cuttleﬁsh was ever
ﬁshed during a month. (Figure from Bourdaud et al. 2017)
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Fig. 13.14 Snapshot of the Shiny App produced as a decision support tool to assist ﬁshers in the
Balearic Islands to make choices of ﬁshing location to avoid discards. Density map (number of
individuals per km2) of hake discards (individuals under the MLS ¼ 20 cm) is shown
Fig. 13.15 A screenshot of the Shiny App developed to allow stakeholders to select the size,
species and quantity of ﬁsh they would like to target and/or avoid during different seasons. The
resultant map displays layers allowing ﬁshers to balance trade-offs of target and non-target to
optimise catch composition.
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then map CPUE or catch proportion at the selected level of intensity. They can also
map a number of species or sizes together on one map, and change the levels, to help
choose the best places to avoid or to ﬁnd particular species or sizes. The app
represents a DST for ﬁshers, and is still under development, but it is planned to
incorporate additional species as well as discarding hotspots. The app is a prototype
and will be developed working with individual ﬁshers to best ﬁt it to their needs.
The ﬁnal example is for the ﬁshery in the Eastern English Channel discussed
earlier. Again, the app offers the ﬁsher a variety of choices for presentation
(Fig. 13.16). They can choose the species, gear and ﬂeet, and look at landings,
discards or survey data. As in the Celtic Sea example, ﬁshers can deﬁne a maximum
or minimum proportion of a given species in the landings that he is willing to accept
depending on the objective i.e. avoiding or targeting the species. The time scale over
which the maps are presented can also be controlled, either for a year, quarter or month.
13.5 Conclusions
The original idea we stated in the title was “The best way to reduce discards is by not
catching them!” The work presented in this chapter shows some of the ways that this
could be achieved.
Fig. 13.16 An example of the web-based app for the English Channel showing a variety of ways to
present information to avoid discards
13 The Best Way to Reduce Discards Is by Not Catching Them! 275
Gear based changes in selectivity remain the most common, default, way to do
this, and we present here some of the broad range of such approaches available.
Many of these have been developed by gear technologists, but many also by working
ﬁshers or netmakers. In many of our studies, we found that ﬁshers remain innovative
and willing to explore the use of different gears to reduce unwanted catches.
Behavioural changes by ﬁshers, i.e. tactical changes in where and when to ﬁsh,
are a second route to avoiding unwanted catches that have attracted less attention
than gear-based approaches. In the challenge trials described here, ﬁshers attempted
both gear and behavioural changes in their ﬁshing practices. In some cases, these
changes reduced unwanted catches but not in all. One of the reasons for this
advanced by several ﬁshers involved in the work was that they lacked the informa-
tion needed to help them choose where and when to ﬁsh to minimise the unwanted
component.
It is beyond doubt that ﬁshers know their own ﬁshing activity far better than any
scientists could. They are, after all, observing it on a daily basis over many years.
But, equally, scientists have information that ﬁlls in the wider picture on distribu-
tions and abundances of ﬁsh, both wanted and unwanted. Taken together, ﬁshers’
and scientists’ “knowhow” can give the working ﬁsher the best chance to reduce, or
possibly eliminate, unwanted catches. We have shown here how surveys, observers’
information, landings data, etc. can provide useful information on where the ﬁshers
are likely to encounter a given species or size class of that species, as well as those
ﬁsh commonly encountered together. It needs to be emphasised that this information
should be seen as providing a probability of encounter or not, rather than a certainty.
The take-home message from this is that there is more chance of approaching the
objectives of the landing obligation by combining ﬁshers’ and scientists’ knowledge
than by working apart.
Another key message is that we can identify several different approaches that
could help reduce discarding, but they all tend to be speciﬁc to local conditions. It
should be possible to export the approaches to other ﬁsheries, but only in broad
terms. Essentially, the causes of discarding are common, but the solutions tend to be
local and speciﬁc.
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Chapter 14
Discard Avoidance by Improving Fishing
Gear Selectivity: Helping the Fishing
Industry Help Itself
Finbarr G. O’Neill, Jordan Feekings, Robert J. Fryer, Laurence Fauconnet,
and Pedro Afonso
Abstract To address the challenges of the Landing Obligation, ﬁshers need to be
able to adjust the selective performance of each ﬁshing operation in response to what
they observe on the ﬁshing grounds and to what they bring on board. This will
include strategies on where and when to ﬁsh but also on how to ﬁsh, which we
examine here. In particular, we focus on ways to encourage and support ﬁshers to
design, develop and test selective gears that will avoid unwanted catches in the ﬁrst
place. To this end, we highlight the necessity to increase awareness of existing
solutions, the importance of understanding the capture process and how ﬁsh react to
ﬁshing gears, and the need to evaluate the economic implications of new gears. We
examine the success of science-industry collaborations and emphasise the beneﬁts of
a ﬂexible regulatory environment. Looking ahead, the ﬁshing industry needs to keep
up-to-date with new technologies that can be used to observe the interaction of ﬁsh
and their gears and with new approaches to modifying selectivity.
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14.1 Introduction
Fishing with selective gears has long been used as a management measure to
promote the sustainable exploitation of commercial ﬁsheries. In the European
Union and many other jurisdictions, there are measures based on the technical
speciﬁcations of the gears deployed. For example, minimum mesh size, maximum
twine thickness and the use of devices such as square mesh panels and sorting grids
have been prescribed in demersal trawl ﬁsheries (Broadhurst 2000; Graham 2010);
beam size and number of dredges in beam trawl and dredge ﬁsheries; net height,
length and hanging ratio in gill net ﬁsheries (He and Pol 2010); hook size, shape and
type of bait in longline ﬁsheries (Løkkeborg et al. 2010); and escape gap dimensions
and number of traps in creel and pot ﬁsheries (Thomsen et al. 2010).
The concern of these gear based technical conservation measures has generally
been the selectivity or capture of just one or a small number of species. This was
usually the main target species but in some instances was a protected species or a
marine bird or mammal. The advent of the EU Landing Obligation (LO) brings with
it a need to consider the selective performance of a ﬁshing gear in relation to all of
the species in the catch to which the Landing Obligation applies.
To develop the range of gears that will be capable of dealing with the speciﬁc
challenges posed by the Landing Obligation, will require input from ﬁshers, net and
gear makers, ﬁshing gear technologists and ﬁsh behaviourists. Fishers, in particular,
have developed many ﬁshing techniques and ﬁshing gears throughout the world.
They can be broadly classiﬁed as either active gears, which are towed or are
encompassing (Fig. 14.1a, b and c), or static gears, which trap, entangle or hook
(Fig. 14.1d, e and f). The design and deployment of these gears are very diverse and
depend on ﬁsh behaviour, the ﬁshing grounds and the resources available to ﬁshers.
Here, rather than review the many different ways the selective performance of
these gears can be improved, we set out a loose framework of initiatives and
measures that we believe would support the ﬁshing industry to develop their own
selective gears. To facilitate these efforts, we highlight the need for ﬁshers and gear
manufacturers to be made aware of existing solutions, to have an understanding of
the capture process and an appreciation of how ﬁsh react to their gears. We also
consider how to encourage the successful development and implementation of more
selective gears, the measures that need to be put in place to maximise the likelihood
of success of science-industry collaborations, and the beneﬁt of having a ﬂexible
regulatory environment. Furthermore, the ﬁshing industry needs to keep up-to-date
with technological advances that can be used to observe the interaction of ﬁsh and
their gears and with new approaches to modifying selectivity.
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14.2 Making Best Use of Existing Information
There have been many studies of how design changes to ﬁshing gears can alter the
size and species proﬁle of the catch. Although these studies may only focus on a
limited number of species and the gears tested may only have a local or regional
relevance, very often the principles applied have a general signiﬁcance. Accord-
ingly, there is a lot to be learned from the results of previous trials, and an obvious
Fig. 14.1 (a) A pair trawl team towing a single demersal trawl. (b) A purse seine net. (c) Three
scallop dredges being towed on a single beam. (d) Different types of pots and creels. (e) A gillnet.
(f) A longline (Taken from Galbraith et al. 2004)
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starting point in the development of a selective gear is a thorough review of trials that
have already taken place.
The reporting, however, of these studies is varied. Some go unreported, some are
reported locally or regionally, while some may be reported internationally
(in scientiﬁc conferences and peer-reviewed publications). There is also great vari-
ation in the level of detail presented: in some cases, it may be only the conceptual
idea or a brief design description along with overall results, while in others detailed
gear speciﬁcations and full haul-by-haul catch data are supplied. To make best use of
this information, it needs to be available in an easily accessible way, and, where
appropriate, the results should be consolidated and synthesised.
Initiatives such as the DiscardLess factsheets (O’Neill and Mutch 2017, http://
www.discardless.eu/) (Fig. 14.2) and the Gearing up project (https://gearingup.eu/)
describe and summarise many of the catch-comparison and selectivity trials that
have taken place in the North East Atlantic and adjacent seas and present the results
in a searchable format. These initiatives provide an invaluable repository to help
ﬁshers, gear manufacturers and ﬁshing gear technologists ﬁnd practical solutions to
the problems they face. However, there is a need to continue to build on them, extend
their geographic range and broaden their scope to more gear types (to date they are
almost entirely for towed demersal gears). In the ﬁrst instance, this could be done by
linking them to the factsheets that have been produced in some of the regional gear
development studies, which have taken place in many countries. There is also a need
to ensure the longer-term support and survival of these databases and to secure
commitments from relevant bodies (such as ICES, International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea or the FAO, United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organi-
sation) to resource them beyond the life of the projects within which they have been
developed.
Where sufﬁcient data exists, there may be scope to combine the results from a
number of trials to explore a broad range of selective gear options for use in a ﬁshery.
Madsen (2007) carried out such an analysis for cod (Gadus morhua), Perez Comas
and Pikitch (1994) for a range of gadoid species and ICES (2007) for Norway lobster
(Nephrops norvegicus). Another study estimated the proportion of several species
that enter a trawl above or below a given height, which will be very useful in
designing species selective gears such as low headline or raised footrope trawls
(Fryer et al. 2017) (Fig. 14.3). A meta-analysis of target and bycatch species in
longline ﬁsheries shows that the performance of circle hooks versus J-hooks is
species dependent with higher catch rates of some species with circle hooks and
higher rates of other species with J-hooks (Reinhardt et al. 2018), and another
assessed the performance of a wide range of bycatch reduction devices in relation
to the capture of sharks and rays and the target species (Favaro and Côté 2015).
These types of analyses can be very powerful because they incorporate results
from trials where typically only one or two parameters are tested to produce
empirical models that predict selection across a wide range of gear parameters,
leading to a better understanding of the relative inﬂuence of all of these parameters.
A meta-analysis of haddock (Melanogrammus aegleﬁnus) selectivity describes the
selective performance of trawl codends in terms of the mesh size, the number of
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Fig. 14.2 Two examples of the DiscardLess factsheets summarising gear trials in Scotland and
Turkey (Taken from O’Neill and Mutch 2017)
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Fig. 14.2 (continued)
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meshes in circumference, the twine diameter of the codend and the position and
mesh size of the square mesh panel. It also identiﬁed a seasonal dependence on the
effectiveness of the panel, which it suggested was related to ﬁsh condition (Fryer
et al. 2016) (Fig. 14.4).
Underpinning all selective improvements is an understanding of how ﬁsh react
both close to, and inside, a ﬁshing gear. In addition, for static and baited gears, there
is a need to understand how ﬁsh search for and catch food (Løkkeborg et al. 2014).
Many of the insights into how ﬁsh behave during the capture process have come
from visual observations by divers (Main and Sangster 1981), underwater camera
footage (Piasente et al. 2004; Jones et al. 2008; Bryan et al. 2014; Anders et al.
2017), high frequency acoustic cameras (Rose et al. 2005; Williams et al. 2013),
acoustic tracking (Handegard et al. 2003), laboratory experiments (Glass et al. 1993;
Breen et al. 2004; Utne-Palm et al. 2018) and from experimental ﬁshing trials at sea
(Engås et al. 1998; Ingólfsson and Jørgensen 2006; Ryer et al. 2010).
Again, much of what is known is limited to a few key species, and there is a need
to obtain information on how all of the species subject to the Landing Obligation
react to ﬁshing gears. There are many comprehensive synthesis and review articles
(e.g. Wardle 1993; Broadhurst 2000; Ryer 2008; Winger et al. 2010; Thomsen et al.
2010, Løkkeborg et al. 2010) but often these are aimed at a scientiﬁc audience. This
information needs to be distilled and presented in a way that is accessible to
nonspecialists. O’Neill and Mutch (2017) produce a brief summary of the different
Fig. 14.3 The proportion of ﬁsh that will enter a trawl gear above a given height. The vertical red
lines indicate the proportion of each species that would enter above a height of 1 m (Fryer et al.
2017). The trawl gears on the right illustrate how net makers can make use of this type of
information to inﬂuence the species proﬁle entering a gear by altering the height and position of
the headline. The top net is a standard trawl, the middle one is a low headline trawl and the bottom
one is a cutaway trawl (Taken from O’Neill and Mutch 2017)
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stages of the ﬁsh capture process of towed demersal gears, highlighting how
different parts of the gear may inﬂuence selection and identifying possible design
changes which may alter the selectivity of the gear. Their intention was to increase
awareness of the possible modiﬁcations that can be made to gears so that ﬁshers and
net makers can design and develop gears with a selective performance suitable for
their particular ﬁshery.
14.3 Obtaining New Insights and Enhancing the Capacity
to Make Real-Time Decisions
As camera technologies have improved and become miniaturised and less expensive,
they are more frequently being used by researchers and ﬁshers to obtain footage of
ﬁsh reactions to their gears (Struthers et al. 2015). The cheapest and most easy-to-use
systems record footage which can be viewed subsequently when the gear is
retrieved. Some ﬁshers have made these investments themselves, but in some
areas, there are schemes where cameras, speciﬁcally designed to be attached to
ﬁshing gears, can be borrowed or leased (http://www.fast-track.dk/). The ability to
view their own gears, to observe how ﬁsh react to them and to see the effects of
design changes will enable ﬁshers to ﬁnd tailored solutions to the speciﬁc catch and
quota restrictions they are subject to under the LO.
There are also systems which provide real-time footage, but these require trans-
mission cables to the surface which can be difﬁcult to handle and are more expen-
sive. Nevertheless, such an ability would allow ﬁshers to make real-time decisions
Fig. 14.4 One of the outputs of a meta-analysis of haddock codend selectivity data (Fryer et al.
2016). The panel contact probability, which characterises the effectiveness of the square mesh
panel, was shown to vary seasonally. This was out of sync with the average North Sea water
temperature but corresponded well with periods of high and low ﬁsh condition, suggesting that the
selective performance of square mesh panels is related to ﬁsh condition
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regarding their ﬁshing operation. These could be as simple as deciding to continue or
stop ﬁshing, based on observations of what ﬁsh are on the ground or entering their
gear; or they could be used in conjunction with remotely controllable instruments
that, for example, open/close a codend or operate ﬂaps/doors that direct ﬁsh into
different compartments of a ﬁshing gear.
Current developments in camera technology and image processing will improve
the ability to make direct observations of ﬁsh and ﬁshing gears. 3D camera systems
employing methods such as stereo imaging (Rosen and Holst 2013) or ‘time of
ﬂight’ (which measures the time taken for a light pulse to reach the object and return)
are being improved and developed (https://www.utoﬁa.eu/) and may soon permit
position and size measurement, even in turbid environments. These systems allied to
advances in image analysis, artiﬁcial intelligence and machine learning will allow
real-time species identiﬁcation and automatic analysis of acquired images, permit-
ting the skipper or a control system to make real-time decisions (http://
smartﬁshh2020.eu/; https://www.deepvision.no/).
Acoustic systems have been used in pelagic ﬁsheries, from estimating the size and
density of ﬁsh schools to tracking individuals, and more recently, to differentiate
between and within species (Trenkel et al. 2016). Such developments are likely to be
particularly useful for catch identiﬁcation during the early hauling stages of purse
seine ﬁsheries. At present direct methods such as hand-lining and dip-netting are
used to determine the species and size proﬁle of the catch, but these can often only be
used during the latter stages of hauling, when overcrowding may have occurred and
the survival of released catches is likely to be low (Marçalo et al., this volume).
Sampling methods, which can be used during the early stages of a haul, such as
shooting a ‘mini-trawl’ into a purse seine (Isaksen 2013) or deploying ROVs ﬁtted
with some of the camera systems mentioned above are currently being developed.
Another way of obtaining new insights into gear technology is through the
analysis and modelling of data collected in trials. Mixed models are well suited for
analysing these data because they estimate the effects of practical importance while
accounting for the different sources of variation in the data. The past decade has seen
many advances in the statistical methods and software available for ﬁtting mixed
models, and they are now routinely used to analyse standard gear trials, such as
estimating the selection of a trawl from a covered codend or paired tow experiment,
or to compare the catch of one gear with that of another (Millar et al. 2004; Holst and
Revill 2009). They also offer exciting possibilities for analysing the data from
nonstandard trials, and recently, Browne et al. (2017) used a multinomial mixed
model to analyse a quad-rig catch-comparison trial where four test codends were
ﬁshed simultaneously. The main purpose of the trials was to assess the catch
performance of the quad-rig, which is increasingly used in Irish Nephrops ﬁsheries.
However, the trials, and the methods for analysing them, suggest how more efﬁcient
experiments might be designed in the future, with multiple codends being ﬁshed in
each haul. Mixed models are also a standard approach to synthesising the results of
multiple trials and were used, for example, in the meta-analysis of haddock described
in the previous section. A challenge moving forward is to make better use of sparse
data, particularly for choke species. In single trials, simplifying assumptions are
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often needed to get models to converge and the power to detect effects can be low.
One possibility might be to combine data across multiple trials and to exploit or
assume correlations in selection between a data-sparse species and data-rich species
that have similar behavioural or morphological characteristics.
14.4 Successful Development and Implementation
Innovative selective gears are much more likely to be taken up by the ﬁshing
industry if ﬁshers are involved at every stage of the development process, from the
conceptual design and experimental reﬁnement through to commercial trials
(Kennelly and Broadhurst 2002). In recent years, most industry-science collabora-
tions in Europe have taken such a bottom-up approach (Armstrong et al. 2013;
Mortensen et al. 2017), and a number of gears such as the netting grids in the
Scottish Nephrops ﬁshery (Kynoch et al. 2012; Drewery et al. 2012) have been
successfully introduced. This type of approach creates a sense of ownership and
control over the gears developed and often results in a range of technical solutions,
all of which may achieve the same objective (Feekings et al. submitted). In contrast,
when gears are imposed and introduced into legislation in a top-down approach, with
little or no involvement of the ﬁshing industry, there can be a reluctance to use the
gear effectively, and indeed, additional alterations may even be made to compromise
the selective improvement of the new gear (Krag et al. 2016).
In some cases, incentives have been offered to encourage participation in indus-
try-science collaborations. These can be in the form of ﬁnancial support for gear
construction, or additional effort or quota to offset losses that are incurred during
trials or commercial operations (O’Neill et al. 2014). There have also been
nonmonetary incentives where maybe a prize is offered, such as the WWF Smart
Gear competition (https://www.worldwildlife.org/), or where the publicity or recog-
nition for being involved is considered sufﬁcient reward.
Fishing is an economic activity and uncertainty surrounding the costs and beneﬁts
of gear modiﬁcations may make vessel owners reluctant to make gear changes due to
potential losses in time and revenue both during trial periods and when the gear is
being used commercially. Hence, it is very important that ﬁshers can evaluate the
ﬁnancial implications of developing and using more selective gears. To help vessel
operators make these assessments, Seaﬁsh (a UK Non-Departmental Public Body)
has developed a Best Practice Guidance and a Financial Assessment Spreadsheet for
industry-led gear trials (http://www.seaﬁsh.org/). A ﬁsher can input his own data
(on fuel and crew costs, etc.), the cost of the gear modiﬁcations/changes and catch
data from the corresponding gear trials to assess the ﬁnancial consequences to his/her
business, of testing and introducing new and modiﬁed gears.
To develop and introduce selective gears, ﬁshers need to be able to operate in a
much more ﬂexible environment. The regulatory regime, in many jurisdictions, is
prescriptive, rigid and difﬁcult to change. This can be a serious impediment to gear
development as often new or modiﬁed gears may not comply with legislation,
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although they may be more selective than what is currently prescribed. Furthermore,
to fully address the challenges brought about by the Landing Obligation, ﬁshers will
have to be able to react to what they see on the ﬁshing grounds and to modify the
selective performance of their gears accordingly. An optimal regulatory approach
would be one which is output rather than input driven, that is, one that focusses on
what is landed on deck rather than on how it is caught. This would give ﬁshers
ﬂexibility to develop and use gears that best suit their speciﬁc circumstances (Eliasen
et al. 2019).
14.5 Alternative Technologies to Improve Species and Size
Selectivity
While a lot can be done to develop more selective gears with existing technologies
and knowledge, it is also important to consider alternative approaches and new
developments. The selective performance of a ﬁshing gear depends on design
parameters such as mesh and hook size, and on the response of the species under
consideration to the various optical, acoustic, magnetic, electric, hydrodynamic
and/or chemical stimuli the gear generates (Popper and Carlson 1998; Jordan et al.
2013; Løkkeborg et al. 2014). In recent years, due to technological developments
which can generate and/or modify these stimuli, and an improved understanding of
how ﬁsh react to them, there has been an increasing focus on harnessing such stimuli
to modify ﬁshing gear selectivity.
Light has long been used by ﬁshers to capture squid and pelagic species (Arimoto
et al. 2010; Ben-Yami and Pichovich 1988) and, with the onset of robust
low-powered LED light sources, it is being considered again in many contexts.
Bryhn et al. (2014) increased the catch efﬁciency of larger cod (Gadus morhua) in
pots by using green lights, while Nguyen et al. (2017) improved the catchability of
snow crab (Chionoecetes opilio) by using LED lights in their traps. In trials on the
west coast of the USA, Hannah et al. (2015) were able to reduce the capture of some
ﬁsh species by up to 90% with no loss of ocean shrimp (Pandalus jordani) by
placing LED lights on the ﬁshing line of their shrimp trawls. There have also been
successful trials with luminous netting materials, ﬁbre optic cables and lasers to
direct ﬁsh into or within a trawl (Karlsen et al. 2018; O’Neill et al. 2018; Hreinsson
et al. 2018). To fully exploit the potential of light to improve the selective perfor-
mance of commercial ﬁshing gears, more research needs to be done on how
parameters such as the wavelength, intensity, polarisation and strobing of light can
be used to modify the behavioural reaction of ﬁsh (Ben-Yami 1976; Marchesan et al.
2005; Arimoto et al. 2010; Königson et al. 2002).
Sound has been used to guide, ranch, condition and aggregate ﬁsh in ﬁshing
operations (Yan et al. 2010). It has also been used to deter and repel ﬁsh and marine
mammals from water intake pipes and ﬁshing gears. In gillnet ﬁsheries, active
devices such as pingers, which emit an acoustic signal, have been attached to
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gears to reduce the bycatch of cetaceans by alerting them to the presence of the gear
(Rihan 2010). There have been many advances of parametric sound technology
where a ‘beam’ of sound is transmitted directionally and focused at high intensity on
to a relatively small area (Gan et al. 2012). These developments open up the
possibility of creating ‘walls’ or surfaces of sound which could be used to direct
and herd ﬁsh and marine mammals in a more focussed way. There are also passive
approaches where the acoustic reﬂectivity of the gear is enhanced by treating the
netting material or attaching acoustic reﬂectors to the gear so that they are more
easily detected by echo-locating species (He and Pol 2010).
In longline ﬁsheries there have been attempts to take advantage of elasmo-
branchs’ ability to detect weak electromagnetic ﬁelds to reduce their capture by
using electropositive metals and magnets (Robbins et al. 2011; Kaimmer and Stoner
2008; O’Connell et al. 2014). While success has been limited thus far, and there are
issues related to manufacturing costs, deterioration in water and large-scale deploy-
ment (Favaro and Côté 2015), there is the possibility that alternative metals and
compounds will offer cheaper and cost-effective solutions (O’Connell et al. 2014).
In trawl ﬁsheries, electricity has been used to increase catchability by stimulating
benthic species from the seaﬂoor, to direct and aggregate ﬁsh so that they can be
caught more easily by conventional means and to improve the performance of
selective devices by exploiting species and size differences in their behavioural
responses (Polet 2010). In the southern North Sea ﬂatﬁsh ﬁshery, electrodes produce
an electric ﬁeld which induces a cramp response that bends ﬁsh in a U-shape, making
it easier for the ground gear to get underneath them so they enter the trawl (van
Marlen et al. 2014; Depestele et al. 2018). Other examples of using electricity in
trawl ﬁsheries include the Belgian and Chinese shrimp ﬁsheries (Polet et al. 2005;
Yu et al. 2007) and the razor clam (Ensis spp.) ﬁshery in the West of Scotland
(Murray et al. 2016).
There are a number of examples where the hydrodynamics of towed gears have
been exploited to improve selectivity. Veil nets in shrimp ﬁsheries, rising panels in
codend extensions and the ﬂex deﬂector modify the ﬂow in the gear to direct ﬁsh and
crustaceans onto or closer to grids and square mesh panels (Graham 2003; Santos
et al. 2016). The Hydrodredge deﬂects a water ﬂow on to the seabed to raise great
scallops (Pecten maximus) from the seabed (Shephard et al. 2009), and Jordan et al.
(2013) suggest that water jets directed downwards, ahead of a trawl gear could elicit
an early response from elasmobranchs, allowing them to avoid capture. There is also
potential to create regions of low ﬂow behind screens and bluff bodies and turbulent
regions which, if the associated vortices are an appropriate strength and size, can be
used to encourage ﬁsh to hold station and perhaps increase their probability of
contact with a selectivity device (Liao 2007; Laird et al. 2016).
The gustatory and olfactory senses are of particular importance in baited gears
and Løkkeborg et al. (2010) and Thomsen et al. (2010) highlighted the potential of
artiﬁcial baits, longer-lasting baits and a better understanding of species-speciﬁc
differences in bait performance to improve the selective performance of longline and
pot ﬁsheries. Gilman et al. (2008) have shown that using ﬁsh instead of squid for bait
reduced shark bycatch in pelagic longlines, while Stroud et al. (2014) have shown
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that a necromone produced from putreﬁed shark tissue was 100% repellent to
competitively feeding Caribbean reef sharks (Carcharhinus perezi) and blacknose
sharks (Carcharhinus acronotus).
It is evident that there is great scope to make better use of all the senses that target
and bycatch species have. Again, it is very important that this information is relayed
to ﬁshers, gear manufacturers, gear technologists and ﬁsheries managers in a readily
accessible way. Jordan et al. (2013) provide a very useful summary table which
identiﬁes new and existing technologies that should undergo further testing for use in
elasmobranch bycatch mitigation. They classify potential solutions for a range of
gear types in terms of the sensory modality that the ﬁsh will use and which we
reproduced here (Table 14.1) as an example of what could be very usefully extended
to other species.
14.6 In Summary
The speciﬁc challenges posed by the Landing Obligation will depend on the catching
performance of the ﬁshing gears, the total allowable catches and the size proﬁle and
spatial distribution of the stocks. Hence, not only will the issues that arise vary from
year to year and from ﬁshery to ﬁshery, they will most likely vary from vessel to
vessel and from trip to trip. As a result, the most practicable way forwards is one
where each ﬁsher is in a position to adjust the selective performance of each ﬁshing
Table 14.1 Technologies that may be useful in elasmobranch bycatch mitigation by gear and
sensory modality
Sensory modality
Baited hook and line
(longline) Gill net Trawl Purse seine
Olfaction Surfactants,
semiochemicals
Surfactants,
semiochemicals
Remote
attraction/
bait
stations
Bait type
Dead sharks
Hearing Not recommended
Vision Light sticks: wavelength
and ﬂicker
Net illumination Flashing
lights
Bait colour Net colour
Leader type/colour Predator models
Dead sharks
Mechanosensory
lateral line/pit
organs
Water jets
Electrosensory Magnets, lanthanide
metals, battery-powered
electric devices
Powered electric ﬁeld
‘barrier’ Magnetic
ﬁeld ‘barrier’
Electric
pulse
generators
Other Pre-net fence (tactile)
Taken from Jordan et al. (2013)
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operation. This will include strategies on where and when to ﬁsh, as addressed by
Reid et al. (this volume), but also, on how to ﬁsh, as is set out here in this chapter. In
this regard, ﬁshers need to be able to modify the selective performance of their
ﬁshing gear in response to what they observe on the ﬁshing grounds and to what they
bring on board. They need to be made aware of existing solutions and have an
appreciation of how their gears catch. This includes understanding the mechanistic
aspects of their gear’s performance (and its dependence on parameters such mesh or
hook size, etc.) and an awareness of the sensory stimuli generated by ﬁshing gears
and the corresponding responses of the species they catch. They need to operate in a
regime which encourages their participation in a meaningful way and in a regulatory
environment that permits them to develop and use new and modiﬁed gears.
Ultimately, ﬁshers are best placed to identify the challenges brought about by the
landing obligation, and in collaboration with gear makers, ﬁshing gear technologists
and ﬁsh behaviourists, are those most likely to ﬁnd solutions that are both acceptable
and effective.
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Chapter 15
Mitigating Slipping-Related Mortality from
Purse Seine Fisheries for Small Pelagic Fish:
Case Studies from European Atlantic
Waters
Ana Marçalo, Mike Breen, Maria Tenningen, Iñigo Onandia, Luis Arregi,
and Jorge M. S. Gonçalves
Abstract The release of unwanted catches (UWC) from purse seines, while the
catch is still in the water, is known as “slipping”. Once thought to be a benign
process, compared to discarding UWC overboard from the ﬁshing vessel, it is now
recognised that “slipping” can lead to signiﬁcant mortality in the released ﬁsh if done
inappropriately. In this chapter, we examine purse seining and slipping operations,
and discuss what drives slipping and potential mitigation measures to reduce slip-
ping mortality. We use three examples of purse seine ﬁsheries for small pelagic
species in the North-east Atlantic; from Norway, Portugal and Spain. The ideal
solution (identifying and avoiding UWC before the net is set) requires the develop-
ment of tools to enable ﬁshers to better characterise target schools in terms of key
selection criteria, e.g., with respect to species, individual size and catch biomass.
Such tools are being developed, based primarily on hydro-acoustic technology.
However, some UWC in purse seine catches are inevitable, and operational improve-
ments in slipping practices have been shown to signiﬁcantly reduce stress and
mortality in the released UWC. We conclude with a discussion on the challenges
currently facing the implementation of the European Union (EU) Landing Obliga-
tion with regards to minimising slipping related mortality.
Keywords Bycatch and slipping mitigation · Delayed mortality · Pelagic ﬁsh ·
Purse seine
A. Marçalo (*) · J. M. S. Gonçalves
Centro de Ciências do Mar-CCMAR, Universidade do Algarve, Faro, Portugal
e-mail: amarcalo@ualg.pt
M. Breen (*) · M. Tenningen
Institute of Marine Research (IMR), Bergen, Norway
e-mail: michael.breen@hi.no
I. Onandia · L. Arregi
AZTI, Txatxarramendi ugartea z/g, Sukarrieta, Bizkaia, Spain
© The Author(s) 2019
S. S. Uhlmann et al. (eds.), The European Landing Obligation,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03308-8_15
297
15.1 Introduction
Purse seining is a ﬁshing method for targeting large (e.g. tunas) and small species
(e.g. mackerels, sardines and anchovies) that school or aggregate close to the surface.
It has been the most productive ﬁshing method throughout the world for the past six
decades, accounting for approximately one third of the global catch by weight
(Watson et al. 2006). Incidental catches of dolphins ﬁrst raised awareness of
bycatch issues in tuna purse seine ﬁsheries; although unwanted catches (UWC) of
some species and sizes of teleosts, including undersized tunas and some species of
elasmobranchs, are also common for these ﬁsheries (Hall et al. 2000; Kelleher 2005;
Megalofonou et al. 2005; Hall and Roman 2013). Purse seine ﬁsheries target catches
of low species and size diversity, which contributes to a sporadic occurrence of
UWC (Broadhurst et al. 2006; Borges et al. 2008), but reported rates of UWC are
usually low, and spatially and temporally variable (i.e., 3.5% for tuna ﬁsheries,
Gilman et al. 2017; and 1.6–27% for small pelagic ﬁsheries, Kelleher 2005; Borges
et al. 2001).
Purse seines, particularly for small species, are generally considered to be a
non-selective ﬁshing gear once a target school has been encircled, primarily because
of the small mesh sizes used in the main body of the net, typically < 20 mm.
Therefore, the release of UWC generally happens in one of two ways: ﬁrstly, by
“slipping” all or part of the UWC out of the net while it is still in the water; or
secondly, by “discarding”, when the catch is taken aboard and any unwanted
components are removed and returned to the sea alive or dead. As with other
ﬁsheries, “discarding” is associated with an array of potentially fatal stressors for
the affected animals, and the likelihood of survival is generally assumed to be low
(e.g. Davis 2002; Breen et al. in review).
Conversely, because the catch never leaves the water, “slipping” was once
assumed to be a benign method of releasing UWC from the net, without harming
it. However, experiments have demonstrated that “slipping” of small pelagic species
like mackerel (Scomber scombrus) (Lockwood et al. 1983; Huse and Vold 2010),
herring (Clupea harengus) (Tenningen et al. 2012), sardine (Sardina pilchardus)
(Marçalo et al. 2006; Marçalo et al. 2010) and sardinops (Sardinops sagax) (Mitchell
et al. 2002) may result in unacceptably high rates of mortality. Some of this research
has shown that during the ﬁnal phase of the capture process, the catch can become
highly crowded, with densities >250 kg.m3 (Tenningen et al. 2012), and can be
exposed to potentially fatal stressors, including hypoxia, exhaustion and physical
injury from contact with the net and catch. This established that the mortality of
slipped ﬁsh is directly related to their treatment within the net, with mortality
increasing with increasing crowding densities and crowding time (Lockwood et al.
1983; Tenningen et al. 2012; Marçalo et al. 2010). This concern about slipping-
related mortality has led to recent regulations in some European ﬁsheries that ban the
practice of slipping, unless the released ﬁsh can survive [e.g. EU Landing Obligation
(EU 2013); Norwegian Seawater Fisheries Regulations (NSFR 2014].
298 A. Marçalo et al.
In this chapter we review purse seine ﬁshing targeting small pelagic species in the
North East Atlantic, with reference to mitigating slipping-related mortality. We will
use three different purse seine ﬁsheries (Norwegian coastal and offshore; Spanish
Cantabrian Sea and North-western waters; and Portuguese sardine ﬁshery) as case
studies to explore the following topics:
• Case study overviews including ﬁshing operations and slipping practices;
• Mitigation measures to minimise slipping related mortality; and
• Challenges currently facing the implementation of EU Landing Obligation with
regards to minimising slipping related mortality.
15.2 Purse Seine Fishing Targeting Small Pelagic Species
in the Atlantic
15.2.1 Overviews of Case Studies
Three case studies of purse seine ﬁsheries for small pelagic species in the NE
Atlantic are brieﬂy reviewed here.
15.2.1.1 Norwegian Inshore and Offshore Fisheries
Close to 400 purse seine vessels operate in Norway (Table 15.1), which account for
about 30% of Norway’s total annual landings (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries
2018). Most of the vessels are relatively small coastal purse seiners (15–55 m
length), but about 65% of the catch is taken by 73 large ocean-going purse seiners
(Table 15.1). Mackerel, herring and capelin (Mallotus villosus) are the main target
species, and in 2017 about 800,000 tonnes were captured (of which 63,000 t taken in
the EU Zone) with a landed sale value of €490 M.
15.2.1.2 Spanish Cantabrian Sea and North-West Fisheries
Purse seine landings in this ﬁshery are estimated at 170,450 tonnes, representing
37% of the total landings by the ﬂeet operating in EU waters (STECF 2017), with a
value of more than €140 M. Purse seining employs 6276 ﬁshers out of a total of
28,078 employed in ﬁsheries in Spanish waters (MAPAMA 2017). Five main
Spanish purse seine ﬁsheries can be identiﬁed in the ﬁshing area, here we focus on
the purse seine ﬁsheries in the Cantabrian Sea and North-west targeting small
pelagics (Table 15.1).
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15.2.1.3 Portuguese Sardine Fishery
The Portuguese sardine ﬁshery accounts for about 50% by weight of catches landed
in the country’s mainland ports (DGRM. DATAPESCAS 2017). The ﬁshery is
coastal (operating within the continental shelf), and the ﬂeet is comprised of 180 ves-
sels (Table 15.1). Sardine is the target species and accounts for more than 90% of
total catch weight and value (Silva et al. 2015). Horse mackerel (Trachurus
trachurus), chub mackerel (Scomber colias) and anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus)
account for a smaller part of the landings (Stratoudakis and Marçalo 2002; Feijó
et al. 2018). Landings in 2017 were 45,488 tonnes with a value of more than €51 M
(DGRM. DATAPESCAS 2017).
15.2.2 Purse Seine Fishing Operations
Once a potential target school has been located, typically using hydro-acoustic ﬁsh
detection technology (e.g. sonar and echo-sounders), it is quickly surrounded by a
wall of netting. The net is supported at the surface with a ﬂoat-line, while at the
bottom, a heavy, “leaded” rope and a series of heavy metal rings (“purse rings”)
ensures the net sinks quickly around the catch (Fig. 15.1a). The purse seine is
typically set rapidly (~10 mins) by a single vessel, although in Portugal a small
auxiliary vessel (“skiff”; 6–7 meters) assists in the operation. When the net has been
fully deployed, or “set”, a wire rope, or “purse line”, that passes through the purse
rings is then pulled into the vessel, closing the net beneath the school to prevent the
ﬁsh from diving and escaping (Fig. 15.1b). The net is then gradually hauled in using
hydraulic winches (e.g. a Triplex Power block), which progressively reduces the
volume contained by the net, and crowds the catch into the bunt end (Fig. 15.1a)
until the density becomes sufﬁciently high to inspect what is in the catch. In Portugal
and Spain this ﬁnal stage of hauling, as the ﬁsh are crowded in the bunt, is often done
manually (i.e., with the crew hauling the net aboard the vessel by hand). After the
catch is inspected, if the decision is made to harvest it, it is then transferred into the
boat; either by brailing (i.e., using large dip nets called brails in Portugal and Spain)
or using ﬁsh pumps (in Spain and Norway), while the rest of the catch is left in the
water.
There are substantial differences between ﬂeets with respect to individual catch
sizes, as well as vessel and gear dimensions (Table 15.1). Catches in the Spanish and
Portuguese ﬁsheries are typically around 3–5 tonnes, but can exceed 10 tonnes,
while in the Norwegian ﬁsheries they are typically much larger (50–500 tonnes) and
can exceed 1000 tonnes. The most striking difference between the ﬂeets is the size
range and hold storage capacity of the vessels, with the Norwegian offshore ﬂeet
dwarﬁng those of the other ﬂeets. In contrast, differences in net dimensions among
ﬂeets are comparatively small.
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15.2.3 Slipping Practices – Drivers and Methods
As with many ﬁsheries, UWC in purse seine ﬁsheries can result from a variety of
economic (i.e., catch quality, market price/demand) and regulatory (i.e., quotas,
sizes, protected species) drivers that may result in the catch being slipped. In
addition, due to the dimensions of the net and the nature of the target species to
form large and sometimes dense schools, purse seining can take catches far in excess
of the holding capacity of the ﬁshing vessel. This issue is particularly relevant for
smaller vessels, which may only have the capacity to retain a proportion of the catch
in the net (Table 15.1).
Float-line
Shoulder Main Body
Wing
Purse-
line
Purse-ring
© 2010 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
Setting and hauling a purse seine
a
b
Bunt
Fig. 15.1 Diagram of a purse seine net: (a) principal components) and (b) purse seining operations:
setting the net and hauling
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15.2.3.1 Norwegian Fisheries
In Norway, it is legal to release viable UWC from purse seine, but the vessels have
individual transferrable quotas (ITQ) to purposely reduce regulatory pressures to
discard (Gullestad et al. 2015). Furthermore, all pelagic ﬁsh sales are controlled by a
single authority (“Norges Sildesalgslag”), so landings (including bycatch) from
individual boats are closely monitored and controlled. While economic drivers
may also inﬂuence slipping practices, it is generally felt that at present the main
driver for slipping in the Norwegian ﬂeet is catch size, particularly amongst the
coastal ﬂeet. However, there are currently no reliable estimates of the magnitude or
frequency of these slipping events.
With regard to slipping practices, ﬁshers’ behaviour is now, in principle, driven
by regulations governing such practices in Norwegian and EU waters. Before the
introduction of these regulations, unwanted or excessive catches were released late
in the capture process, when the catch was very crowded, by slipping over the ﬂoat-
line, or by partially opening the bunt-end as the net was hauled aboard (Fig. 15.2a).
In 2014, regulations were introduced to manage slipping practices in mackerel
ﬁsheries in Norwegian waters. The regulations prescribe that the seine must be
prepared for release of UWC (i.e. bunt-end opened) before 7/8 of the net length is
Fig. 15.2 Slipping operations in different purse seine ﬁsheries: (a) Norwegian; (b) Portuguese; (c)
Spanish
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hauled (marked by a visible ﬂoat), and UWC must be released through an opening
sufﬁciently large to permit the ﬁsh to swim out freely (NSFR 2014; Rule §48a).
Following the introduction of the EU Landing Obligation (LO), slipping practices in
EU waters were regulated from 2015 by Commission Delegated Regulations
(CDRs), for both North-Western Waters and the North Sea (EU 2014a, b). These
enact High Survival Exemptions (HSE) to the LO (see Chap. 3 for more details;
Rihan et al., this volume) for herring and mackerel ﬁsheries, provided the catch is
released before a certain proportion of the net is hauled, referred to as the “point of
retrieval”, (also marked by a visible ﬂoat); where the limits are 80% of the net for
mackerel; and 90% for herring. Furthermore, the vessel and purse seine should be
equipped with electronic instruments to document when, where and the extent to
which the purse seine has been hauled.
15.2.3.2 Spanish Fisheries
In the Cantabrian and NW Spanish waters, anchovy is slipped due to the low market
price of small-sized individuals and ﬁsh under the Minimum Conservation Refer-
ence Size (MCRS), while mackerel and horse mackerel are slipped when their quotas
are exhausted. On the other hand, sardine (ICES divisions 8a, b and d) and Atlantic
chub mackerel have no quota limitations, but they may be discarded due to low
market prices. From observer data in these ﬁsheries, the frequency of slipping events
was estimated to be 8.3% (17 slipping events in 204 sets) (Arregi et al.
unpublished data).
The South Western Waters’ purse seine ﬁsheries (Portuguese, Spanish and
French) are permitted to slip several species (mackerel, horse mackerel, and
anchovy) under a High Survival Exemption (HSE) in the EU Commission Delegated
Regulation (CDR) for South Western Waters (EU 2014c; Rihan et al., this volume).
Furthermore, the conditions of this HSE recognise the small-scale nature of purse
seine operations in these ﬂeets and is far less prescriptive in its conditions for
slipping practices, stating: “[. . .] catches may be released, provided the net is not
fully taken aboard”. The slipping method differs from other ﬁsheries, where ﬁshers
will roll the ﬁsh over the headline. Here, the bunt and the ﬁrst 5 to 10 pursing rings
are detached and the catch is released before it becomes too crowded (Fig. 15.2c).
Catches from this ﬂeet are used fresh, for human consumption, so quality is an
important factor. This inﬂuences how the ﬁshers handle the catch, where crowding
density is kept under about 80 kg of ﬁsh per cubic metre to avoid abrasion and
crushing of the catch.
15.2.3.3 Portuguese Sardine Fishery
The Portuguese sardine ﬁshery is currently affected by a historically low spawning
stock biomass for the southern-Iberian stock, which is below safe biological limits
(Silva et al. 2015). This led to strict management measures (e.g. seasonal ban and
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daily quotas per vessel), which have been applied by the Portuguese government
since 2012 (Silva et al. 2015) and ICES recommending a zero TAC since 2018
(ICES 2018). As with Norway, all landings and sales are handled through a single
national authority (DocaPesca). So, during the sardine ban, ﬁshers are targeting other
pelagic species, including Atlantic chub mackerel and horse mackerel; and slipping
sardine, if caught. Conversely, during the open sardine season there is an increased
slipping of other species (due to the high market prices for sardine), but also excess
sardine, because daily sardine quotas are very small (usually around 1.5–2.0 tonnes
per vessel). However, neither sardine nor chub mackerel are currently listed amongst
the species in the HSE for SW waters (EU 2014c). Other drivers for slipping in this
ﬁshery may be: vessel capacity the presence of non-commercial species, undersized
ﬁsh, or a mixture of species, which will devalue the catch at auction (Stratoudakis
and Marçalo 2002; Marçalo 2009; Feijó et al. 2018). The slipping practice typically
occurs at the very end of the ﬁshing operation and involves rolling the ﬁsh over the
ﬂoat-line (Fig. 15.2b).
15.3 Mitigation Measures to Reduce Slipping Related
Mortality
To effectively reduce slipping-related mortality, it is necessary to release any
unwanted catch as early in the capture process as possible, before the ﬁsh become
fatally stressed. To do this the ﬁsher requires tools and methods to: (a) characterise
the potential catch so that the decision to take or release it can be made as early in the
capture process as possible, ideally before the net has even been set; and, (b) where
slipping is unavoidable, release any unwanted catch in a controlled way with
minimal stress to the ﬁsh (Breen et al. 2012; Breen et al. in review; CRISP 2018).
Here, we describe research in three main areas of development that aims to provide
such tools: (1) pre-catch identiﬁcation of ﬁsh schools (with respect to species,
quantity and ﬁsh size) using hydro-acoustic methods to prevent catching unwanted
ﬁsh; (2) monitoring the catch and net during the haul to provide information on the
catch density, ﬁsh size and quality at an early stage in the haul, while slipping is still
acceptable; and (3) modiﬁcations to purse seine design and practices to promote the
survival of slipped ﬁsh (Fig. 15.3).
15.3.1 Pre-Catch Identiﬁcation – Minimize the Need
for Slipping
Skippers use experience and knowledge about the behaviours of different species to
evaluate school size and species based on received echoes on their sonar and echo-
sounder screens. However, having accurate quantitative estimates of school charac-
teristics will further improve catch estimation and reduce UWC. Furthermore,
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avoiding UWC can have signiﬁcant economic beneﬁts for ﬁshers, through reduced
fuel costs and improved catch quality and prices (Larsen and Dreyer 2013). Infor-
mation about the species in a school, school morphology and geographical distribu-
tion can, to some degree, be estimated using multi-frequency echo-sounders (Horne
2000; Korneliussen et al. 2009). The echo strengths at different frequencies are
species-speciﬁc, due to variation in ﬁsh morphology (e.g. presence or absence of a
swimbladder) and the relative frequency response r(f), i.e. the ratio of the
backscattered energy at frequency f to that at 38 kHz, can be used to distinguish
between some species. Individual ﬁsh size within a school can also be estimated
using a high resolution broadband echo-sounder, if individual targets can be detected
(CRISP 2018). In recent years, signiﬁcant progress has also been made in using
multi-beam sonars to quantify ﬁsh school sizes (Nishimori et al. 2009; Vatnehol
et al. 2017) and behaviour (Gerlotto and Paramo 2003; Holmin et al. 2012). In
Norway, research and development in hydro-acoustic pre-catch identiﬁcation is a
well-functioning cooperation between research institutes, the ﬁshing industry and
companies delivering ﬁsheries instrumentation (e.g. CRISP 2018; LSSS 2018;
DABGRAF 2018; SEAT 2018).
15.3.2 Early-Catch Monitoring
Nevertheless pre-catch identiﬁcation is not always accurate, especially when schools
are large and dense. So, it is also necessary to have tools to monitor and characterise
the catch early in the capture process before the ﬁsh become too crowded in the net.
However, monitoring a school inside the net is challenging, even using acoustic
Fig. 15.3 The three-stage strategy to provide purse seine ﬁshers with the tools and methods
necessary for avoiding unwanted catches and reducing slipping-related mortality. (From Breen
et al. 2012)
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technologies. Omnidirectional sonars are usually retracted into the hull during purse
seining to avoid damage, making them unsuitable for monitoring schools during
capture. But multi-beam sonar, mounted on a research vessel, has been used to
monitor and describe the behaviour of schools captured by purse seine (Tenningen
et al. 2017). Multi-beam sonars on ﬁshing vessels, with side-looking transducers are
now commercially available (e.g. Kongsberg Maritime SN90) so work is in progress
to obtain a better understanding of ﬁsh behaviour, densities and school biomass
inside the seine (Fig. 15.4).
Multi-beam sonar has also been used to describe purse seine shape and volume
during seine hauling (Tenningen et al. 2015). This work has provided a better
understanding of how the volume available for captured ﬁsh schools varies under
different ﬁshing conditions and the impact that may have on the survival of
slipped ﬁsh.
In addition to acoustic methods, efforts have been made to develop tools for
obtaining sub-samples of catches, monitoring the catch visually and collecting data
on environmental conditions in the net. However, this is technically challenging
because the seine is large and dynamic, making it difﬁcult to attach any monitoring
instruments to it directly. Examples of promising methods include: a small sampling
Fig. 15.4 Image from the Simrad SN90 sonar (Kongsberg Maritime AS) of a school of North Sea
herring in a purse seine, with the wall of the net clearly visible. Left panel – horizontal view; right
panel – vertical view
15 Mitigating Slipping-Related Mortality from Purse Seine Fisheries for. . . 307
trawl, deployed using a pneumatic canon (Isaksen 2013; Peña et al. 2018); a
monitoring probe deployed in the same way and equipped with cameras and
instruments for measuring oxygen, temperature and depth (Breen et al. in prep);
and measuring the size frequency distribution inside the catch with a stereo-camera
(see SINTEF FKiN Project 2018).
15.3.3 Late Capture and Release
Research has demonstrated that slipping unwanted catches from the purse seine can
be a responsible catch control practice, if done before the captive ﬁsh become too
crowded and in a way that maintains their ordered behaviour. For example, in
controlled experiments, mackerel could tolerate moderate crowding densities
(~88 kg m3 for up to 1 h) and relatively low oxygen concentrations (~40%
saturation) without signiﬁcant mortality (as observed up to 8 days after stressor
treatment) (Handegard et al. 2018). Furthermore, preliminary observations suggest
that such conditions do not develop in commercial catches until late in the haul-back
phase, particularly in slipped catches (Breen et al. in prep; Fig. 15.5). In addition,
changes in behaviour have been observed at sub-lethal and potentially lethal
crowding densities that could be used as potential indicators of stress in the catch,
but practical challenges for effectively monitoring such indicators remain (Breen
et al. in review).
Amongst our case studies, there are several examples of research demonstrating
the effectiveness of good slipping practices in reducing stress and promoting sur-
vival in released catches.
Fig. 15.5 An example from a single commercial purse seine cast showing that crowding density
(blue line; ordinal score) and dissolved oxygen concentration (red line; % saturation) (top), and
behaviour (below), changed over time (Behaviour summarised in 1 min bins). (From Breen et al. in
prep)
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15.3.3.1 Norwegian Fisheries
A practical code of “best practice” for conducting slipping operations was developed
in collaboration with the ﬁshing industry and Norwegian Fisheries Directorate (Vold
et al. 2017). This “best practice” includes recommendations for using the bunt-end of
the net to form a controllable release opening (with minimum dimensions,
i.e. length > 18 m), from which the ﬁsh can be allowed to swim freely. The
effectiveness of this “best practice” was assessed in context with the regulation,
which require that ﬁsh swim freely from the net. So, the behaviour of the released
catch (herring and mackerel) was observed during slipping, in relation to the
dimension and form of the release opening, as well as other operational parameters.
It showed that initially the ﬁsh were reluctant to leave the net but eventually, once the
catch began to swim out of the net, they typically retained an ordered schooling
behaviour. However, some disordered behaviour was observed as well, and this
typically occurred later in the slipping process and was more likely to be seen in
larger catches (Vold et al. 2017).
15.3.3.2 Spanish Cantabrian and NW Fisheries
To assess whether different components of UWC could be released without a
signiﬁcant slipping mortality, the survival of several species (mackerel, horse mack-
erel, anchovy, sardine and Atlantic chub mackerel) was assessed after exposing them
to different crowding periods (0–50 min) during commercial purse seine operations.
Several experiments were done (in 2013/14) aboard vessels that alternated purse
seine with pole and line targeting tunas during summer. These vessels were equipped
with several large water tanks (~10m3, water replacement rate 400 l.min1) specif-
ically designed to maintain live bait (caught with the vessel’s purse seine gear) and
thus provide a useful facility for this research. Sub-samples of the catch, using a ﬁsh
pump, were taken at different time intervals after the catch had been crowded in the
bunt, and then behaviour and survival of the ﬁsh was monitored in the “live-bait”
tanks for between 2 and 6 days. The results generally showed high survival rates
(horse mackerel: 89.7–100%; anchovy: 54.2–97.8%; sardine: 83.9–100%; and
Atlantic chub mackerel: 100%); but for mackerel a large range: 3–100%. These
results were presented as supporting evidence for a successful application for a HSE
(STECF 2014; EU 2014b). However, there was considerable variability, particularly
with respect to species, crowding time, crowding density and catch size (Fig. 15.6).
Furthermore, following advice from the ICES Workshop on Methods for Estimating
Discard Survival (WKMEDS; ICES 2016) work is ongoing to substantiate these
results with experiments using longer monitoring periods (up to 20 days), to avoid
underestimating mortality (ICES 2018; in press; see also Rihan et al., this volume).
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15.3.3.3 Portuguese Sardine Fishery
Previous research in this ﬁshery showed that survival of released sardines was likely
to be greater during earlier stages of the hauling phase, when crowding was less
(Marçalo et al. 2010). During meetings with ﬁshers to discuss practical methods to
mitigate the slipping problem, it was suggested that during the closed season,
sardines could be released from the remainder of the catch through an opening
created by putting weights over the ﬂoat-line. This utilised differences in the
behaviour of different species in the catch to selectively release the sardines. That
is, sardines when in a mixed catch with other small pelagic species, usually swim
close to the surface, while other species (e.g., chub mackerel) swim down in the net.
Experiments were done to assess the effectiveness of this method in promoting the
survival of slipped sardines, compared to the standard method of rolling the ﬁsh over
the ﬂoat-line and a control (non-slipped and non-crowded sardines) (Fig. 15.7;
Marçalo et al. 2018). After transferring samples of released and control ﬁsh to
onshore aquaria, survival rates were monitored in captivity for 28 days. Survival
(at asymptote) of sardines in the three replicates from the standard slipping was low
(12.8%; 8.9–15.2 at 95% CI), however the modiﬁed slipping procedure did signif-
icantly improve survival (survival at asymptote of 44.7%; 39.3–50.1% at 95% CI),
which was comparable to the control ﬁsh (survival at asymptote of 43.6%;
38-0–49.3 at 95% CI).
Fig. 15.6 Post-crowding survival of ﬁve small pelagic species (mackerel, horse mackerel, chub
mackerel, anchovy and sardine) subsampled from Spanish purse seines after different time intervals
(0–50 min). (From Arregi et al. unpublished data)
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15.4 Challenges for the Landing Obligation in Regulating
Slipping in Purse Seine Fisheries
In this chapter, we have reviewed slipping in three NE Atlantic purse seine ﬂeets
operating in small pelagic ﬁsheries. This has shown that there are several issues
driving slipping practices, including economic (e.g., market value) and regulatory
(e.g., quotas, MCRS) pressures. For purse seine ﬁshing, there is an additional driver,
i.e., the capacity for vessel to hold excessively large catches. Furthermore, there are
substantial differences across the described ﬂeets with respect to individual catch
composition and sizes, vessel power and capacity. The Norwegian offshore ﬂeet is
characterised as having relatively new and large vessels and has invested consider-
ably in the latest ﬁsh ﬁnding (hydro-acoustic), gear handling and catch storage
technologies, compared to the smaller vessels in the Norwegian (coastal), Portu-
guese and Spanish ﬂeets. This diversity in ﬁshing practices, resources and invest-
ment, as well as regional economic and social difﬁculties, will differentially affect
slipping practices and has been cited as a major challenge for introducing the
Landing Obligation in some EU Member States (Veiga et al. 2016; Maynou et al.
2018).
Various operational and technological solutions are described in this chapter
(some still being developed) which have the potential to promote the survival of
unwanted catches released from purse seine ﬁsheries. As with many ﬁsheries, the
ideal solution for dealing with UWC is to avoid catching it in the ﬁrst instance (see
O’Neill et al., this volume; Reid et al., this volume). In purse seining, this means
providing the ﬁsher with the tools to characterise the catch (in terms of species
composition, quality/size range and catch volume) before setting the seine, or at least
early in the capture process. For this, hydro-acoustic technologies are being exam-
ined as the most promising technological solution, with the potential for describing
species composition, size frequency distribution and catch biomass. However, we
also identiﬁed several novel methods (e.g., the canon-deployed sampling trawl) that
Fig. 15.7 Diagram of sampling at sea for the control, modiﬁed and standard slipping techniques in
the Portuguese purse seine MINOUW case study (in Marçalo et al. 2018)
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could provide “low tech” and more affordable solutions for at least partly
characterising the catch before it is fully crowded next to the boat.
In most ﬁsheries at present it is not until the catch is inside the net, and at least
partially crowded, that the ﬁsher has enough information to be able to decide to bring
the catch on board or not. If the ﬁsher is legally obliged to take the catch onboard,
even if it entirely or partly consists of UWC, this can present him/her with several
challenges, particularly if the vessel is small. Firstly, assuming the vessel has the
capacity to take the catch onboard, storage space may be limited making it difﬁcult to
keep the UWC separate from the marketable catch, as required by the LO (Villasante
et al. 2016a, b). Furthermore, there is currently no on-shore infrastructure for
accommodating and processing the UWC – at least in most southern European
Member States (Veiga et al. 2016; Maynou et al. 2018). More critically, if a vessel
does not have the capacity to take all of the catch on board, the ﬁsher is presented
with a serious dilemma that could threaten the safety of his/her vessel and crew.
There are examples of ﬁsheries where the catch in such cases is shared between
nearby vessels (e.g., in Portugal and Spain; Feijó et al. 2018). However, the delay
associated with transferring the catch to other vessels has been linked with a
substantial reduction in catch quality, and hence price (Digre et al. 2016). Thus,
this presents the manager with the challenge of how to regulate/incentivise such
practices to ensure the vessel receiving the excess catch is suitably compensated.
Several studies in this chapter have shown that, provided that the catch does not
become too crowded, it can be released in a viable state with a high likelihood of
survival. Each of these methods relies on providing a suitably large opening in the
net to allow the ﬁsh to swim out before they become too crowded and for too long
(Fig. 15.8). Furthermore, in the case of the Portuguese ﬁshery, it was also shown that
sardine could be released selectively, while retaining other components of the catch,
because of behavioural differences between species when captive in the net (Marçalo
et al. 2018). If the whole catch is to be released, this is a relatively simple operation,
as demonstrated in the Spanish ﬁshery, whereby the bunt end/wing is opened and
several purse rings are released. However, if only a proportion of the catch is to be
released, more control over the opening and release process is required. Furthermore,
there is likely to be a critical point during the slipping process, after which the ﬁsh
have become too stressed and their survival will be compromised. How this release
process can be effectively and safely monitored and controlled to ensure that only
viable ﬁsh are released remains a considerable challenge.
The EU Landing Obligation (LO) recognises that regional and ﬁsheries speciﬁc
differences in UWC will require tailored solutions, which can be facilitated through
Commission Delegated Regulations (CDRs), and include exemptions like the High
Survival Exemption (HSE) (Rihan et al., this volume). Particularly relevant to the
slipping problem is the HSE, because if a ﬁshery can demonstrate to the EU
Commission that any released UWC has a high likelihood of survival, it may be
exempted from the LO. Comparable regulations also apply in Norway (Karp et al.,
this volume). Unfortunately, there are disparities in some of these regulations that
present ﬁshers with some considerable challenges. For example, in the EU CDR for
pelagic ﬁsheries in SW waters (EU 2014a, b, c), a HSE has been granted to release
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unwanted catches of anchovy, mackerel, horse mackerel and jack mackerel.
Excluded from this exemption is sardine, despite data being available when the
HSE was ﬁrst proposed, which demonstrated high survival (83.9–100% up to 6 days
post-treatment; Arregi et al. 2014). The spawning stock biomass for sardine in
Cantabrian Sea and Atlantic Iberian waters (ICES divisions 8.c and 9.a) has been
below safe biological limits since 2009, with ICES currently advising a zero TAC
(in 2018) and Portuguese ﬁsheries having at least a partial (seasonal) ban on catches.
Therefore, although it would clearly be beneﬁcial for this stock, ﬁshers who respon-
sibly release catches of sardines would be in breach of the LO. In another example,
the EU CDR for pelagic ﬁsheries in NW waters and the North Sea (EU 2014a, b)
permits the slipping of mackerel and herring provided the release is completed
Fig. 15.8 View from
beneath the vessel as a
school of herring swims out
of a purse seine during
slipping. [Source: IMR]
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before 80%/90%, respectively, of the net has been hauled (“the point of retrieval”).
This contrasts with the Norwegian regulations for the mackerel ﬁshery, which
(following consultation with ﬁshers and researchers) stipulate that the release open-
ing must have been prepared before a comparable “point of release” (87.5% [7/8th]
of the net) but that the release may continue beyond this point; enabling the ﬁshers to
assess their catch and control the slipping operation. In addition, the Norwegian
regulations stipulate how the catch should be released, i.e. through an opening
sufﬁciently large to allow the released ﬁsh to swim out freely (NSFR 2014; Rule
§48a). These are practices that are already used in the Norwegian inshore purse seine
ﬁshery for transferring catches into holding cages (Breen et al. 2012) and that have
been shown in work reviewed in this chapter to promote survival.
Another major challenge, shared by many ﬁsheries, is monitoring ﬁshing prac-
tices and ensuring compliance with the regulations (discussed in detail by Nuevo
et al. (this volume)). Reliable estimates of slipping rates and any associated mortality
would enable ﬁsheries managers to account for this additional ﬁshing mortality in
stock assessments and any resultant advice on catch limits (e.g. Breen and Cook
2002; Mesnil 1996), as well as monitor the effects of slipping regulations on ﬁshing
practices. However, there are currently no known monitoring programmes targeting
slipping practices. Furthermore, slipping practices will prove particularly challeng-
ing to monitor, because the catch is not taken aboard the vessel before it is released.
Effective monitoring is likely to require on-board observers and/or electronic mon-
itoring (EM). Even then methods for reliably characterising the status and species
composition of the released catch are still to be developed. With regards to EM, the
EU CDRs for pelagic ﬁsheries in NW waters and the North Sea (EU 2014a, b)
stipulate that all slipping operations should be monitored with an electronic record-
ing system documenting when, where and the extent to which the net has been
hauled. Interestingly, no commercially available technology currently exists to
monitor purse seine hauling, effectively prohibiting all slipping operations in NW
waters and the North Sea. Most concerning of all with regards to compliance, is that
many ﬁshers are yet to fully appreciate the implications of the LO (Maynou et al.
2018), although many do voluntarily take steps to avoid unwanted catches (Marçalo
et al. 2018).
15.5 Conclusion
Management strategies and regulations currently attempting to address the slipping
problem are, in reality, still in early development. Therefore, as we gain more
knowledge in this area, management strategies are likely to require modiﬁcations
to better suit the ﬁsheries they are regulating. Furthermore, it is recognised that the
successful implementation of ﬁshing regulations is best done in close consultation
with all stakeholders to ensure that what is prescribed is practical, safe, economically
viable, effective and something that the ﬁshers will actually implement (Karp et al.,
this volume). In terms of policy and research, priority should be given to avoiding
314 A. Marçalo et al.
UWC; avoidance is the most effective way of reducing slipping mortality and is
likely to increase proﬁtability for the ﬁsher and therefore implementation. However,
some level of UWC in purse seine ﬁsheries for small pelagic species is inevitable.
Methods for releasing UWC that promote high survival for the slipped catch must
continue to be developed in collaboration with ﬁshers to ensure they are practical,
effective and implemented.
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Chapter 16
Onboard and Vessel Layout Modiﬁcations
Jónas R. Viðarsson, Marvin I. Einarsson, Erling P. Larsen, Julio Valeiras,
and Sigurður Örn Ragnarsson
Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to discuss challenges that the EU Landing
Obligation presents to the onboard handling of unwanted catches and how vessel
layout modiﬁcations can be applied to meet these challenges. The key challenge the
industry is facing is having to bring ashore catches of little or no value, which
requires signiﬁcant effort to handle and takes up valuable space that is, in many
cases, not available. Considering that 85% of EU ﬁshing vessels are under 12 metres
long and 97% are under 24 metres, it is evident that the majority of the EU ﬂeet has
limited options when it comes to handling and stowage of catches that would have
been discarded prior to the implementation of the Landing Obligation. The Landing
Obligation only applies to species subject to catch limits, which means that the
current set-up on vessels can, for the most part, accommodate the ﬁsh of legal size
that needs to be landed. The main challenge is catches of undersized ﬁsh that are not
permitted to be used for direct human consumption. For those catches, the simplest
approach is to handle them as targeted catch, which will allow them to be used for
higher-value products such as pet food, pharmaceuticals, food supplements, etc. This
is, however, not applicable for the majority of the ﬂeet, due to a lack of space and the
labour effort required. Solutions such as bulk storage and simple silage preservation
are alternatives that are being explored for smaller vessels. The larger vessels have
more options, such as full silage production, ﬁsh protein hydrolysate and ﬁsh meal
production.
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16.1 Introduction
Discards have been a part of ﬁshing practices in most ﬁsheries around the world
since ﬁsheries began. Fishers have selected what ﬁsh to keep and what to release or
throw back into the sea long before quotas and catch limits were invented. The
introduction of catch limits has, however, created new incentives for discarding, as
ﬁshers try to maximise the value of their catches under quota regimes. Unwanted
catches (UWC), such as low-value bycatches, undersized ﬁsh, catches exceeding
quotas and catches of target species that are unlikely to attain premium prices are
thrown back, and much of these catches are dead or dying. This has been the practice
in European ﬁsheries under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European
Union (EU). European ﬁshers have annually discarded more than 1.5 million tons of
ﬁsh in order to maximise the value of their catch and to meet with regulations
(EC 2011). This practice has been the subject of increasing levels of debate (Borges
and Penas Lado, this volume). As a result, the European Commission has introduced
a Landing Obligation as a part of the 2013 reform of the CFP (EC 2013). This means
that all catches of species subject to catch limits, i.e. where total allowable catches
(TAC) have been set and in the Mediterranean catches of species subject to mini-
mum sizes, will have to be landed and will be counted against quotas. The obligation
is gradually implemented. The ﬁrst ﬁsheries were subject to this Landing Obligation
in the beginning of 2015, and by 2019, all EU ﬁsheries are required to land the entire
catch of all species subject to catch limits.
The Landing Obligation presents a number of challenges for the European
seafood sector. Fishing strategies of individual ﬁshers will have to be enhanced;
selectivity of ﬁshing gear will need to be improved; onboard handling, sorting,
storing and monitoring of compliance will need to be reconsidered; land-based
processing will have to adjust to different supplies; and markets will be affected.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss challenges that the Landing Obligation
presents to the onboard handling of unwanted catches and how vessel layout
modiﬁcations can be applied to meet with these challenges.
16.2 Challenges
In recent years, the main focus of the EU authorities, researchers and the seafood
industry working on the implementation of the Landing Obligation has been on how
to avoid unwanted catches (see Reid et al., this volume; O’Neill et al., this volume)
and how to facilitate efﬁcient monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of
unavoidable unwanted catches (see also James et al., this volume; Nuevo et al.,
this volume). There has, however, been much less attention given to what to do with
the unwanted catches which, prior to the implementation of the Landing Obligation,
would have been discarded after being caught. Exceptions to the Landing Obligation
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and limits on permitted uses of the unwanted catches do have to be taken carefully
into consideration when contemplating onboard handling and stowage. Species not
covered bycatch limits, species where high survivability can be demonstrated and
catches falling under the de minimis exceptions can still be discarded under the
Landing Obligation; but everything else will need to be landed. In addition, catches
under minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) need to be landed but cannot
be used for direct human consumption. With all this in mind, it is clear that space for
classiﬁcation, proper handling and stowage will become an issue for much of the EU
ﬁshing ﬂeet when the Landing Obligation is fully implemented. The available
alternatives for addressing that challenge are scarce and are generally only applicable
for larger vessels – but 85% of the EU ﬂeet are under 12 metres long and 97% are
under 24 metres (EU 2016), which severely reduces available solutions.
Catches falling under the Landing Obligation can be broken into two basic
groups, i.e. catches under MCRS that cannot be used for direct human consumption
and catches above MCRS that can be used for human consumption. Bycatch of
species not subject to catch limits (or minimum size in the Mediterranean) can still be
discarded as before. The main challenges for onboard handling are connected to
catches under MCRS, as the larger ﬁsh destined for human consumption can, for the
most part, simply be diverted to the traditional onboard handling processes that are
already available. However, stowage of low-value species with catch limits can have
an effect on the duration of ﬁshing trips, as stowage space is limited. The MCRS
catches have to be recorded and stowed separately from the catches intended for
human consumption (EU 2015/812), and vessels greater than 12 metres in length
overall also have to place their catches in boxes, compartments or containers
separately for each stock, just as with any other catches (EC 1224/2009). This
basically means that any mixing of species during stowage onboard is prohibited.
Vessels will therefore need to have two separated compartments for stowage, i.e. one
for < MCRS catches and another for human consumption catches; vessels greater
than 12 metres in length will need to sort everything into boxes, tubs or other such
compartments. It is therefore evident that signiﬁcantly more space will be required
for onboard classiﬁcation, handling and stowage, in addition to added labour.
There are, however, a number of available alternatives for adapting onboard
handling to the Landing Obligation, and some of them require modiﬁcations of the
vessels and their equipment. These are highly dependent on each ﬂeet type. The
main challenges and available alternatives for each ﬂeet type are discussed below.
16.2.1 Small Coastal Vessels
About 85% of the EU ﬁshing ﬂeet consists of vessels that are under 12 metres in
length (EU 2016). Unlike larger vessels, they do not have the necessary space
onboard to handle and stow their catch (Viðarsson et al. 2016). The catches of
these vessels are however generally quite limited, as they are most often counted in
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kilogrammes or hundreds of kilogrammes per ﬁshing trip. These catches are almost
solely landed on the day of capture, which is why the lack of proper bleeding,
cleaning, chilling, sorting and storing is often not of major concern. These vessels
are allowed to stow their catches without sorting each species into boxes or other
such compartments, which makes it much easier to ﬁt everything onboard (EC 1224/
2009). They are, however, required to record and stow < MCRS catches separately
from other catches (EU 2015/812). The Landing Obligation as such should therefore
not create major challenges for this ﬂeet sector in regard to onboard handling, as all
< MCRS can simply be stored in bulk in boxes or larger containers. The problem is
that the < MCRS catches being landed after each ﬁshing trip are so small that they do
not create enough incentives for buyers to source them (Viðarsson et al., 2017).
Special solutions will therefore have to be implemented to aggregate these catches so
that they become large enough to attract the attention of potential buyers. This is a
subject discussed in another chapter of this book (Iñarra et al., this volume).
16.2.2 Small- and Intermediate-Sized Vessels
About 12% of the EU ﬂeet are vessels between 12 and 24 metres in length (EU 2016).
This is a highly diverse ﬂeet targeting most commercial species in European waters,
such as crustaceans, molluscs, groundﬁsh and pelagics. They use a range of ﬁshing
gears, including dredges, bottom trawls, pots, gill nets, longline, handline, Danish
seine and purse seine. The space onboard these vessels is limited when it comes to
onboard handling of unwanted catches (Viðarsson et al. 2016). As these vessels are
generally at sea for several days, it is important that all catches are properly handled,
i.e. bled, gutted, cleaned, chilled, sorted and stowed, in accordance to the need of each
species. These vessels are required to sort catches according to species into boxes and
to stow catches < MCRS separately from catches intended for human consumption.
The challenge for these vessels is therefore twofold, i.e. to ensure proper onboard
handling of all catches, including sorting by species and intended utilisation (< MCRS
or human consumption), and to appropriately stow all species. Due to the limited space
onboard vessels of this size, both on the processing deck and in the hold, this can
present major challenges. It is therefore likely that in some cases, the Landing
Obligation will result in the need for investment in new equipment on the processing
deck, e.g. storage boxes for separating between species and sizes, increased through-
put capabilities of bleeding and cleaning tanks and increased numbers of stowage
boxes, which should preferably be of different colours depending on intended usage
(< MCRS or human consumption). Separation panels in the hold so that storage of
< MCRS catches are clearly separated from other catches are also advised. Such
separation panels could be adjustable so that the space required for each type of
catches would not have to be ﬁxed. Finally, it is likely that the Landing Obligation
will require increased numbers of crew or longer working time because of the
additional handling requirements and that the ﬁshing trips will be shortened due to
the lack of stowage space.
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There are limited alternatives for small vessels to handle unwanted catches
beyond what has been described above (Viðarsson et al. 2017). There are, however,
options available which may need special permission from authorities to implement,
or even changes in regulations. One such option is bulk storage of < MCRS catches,
i.e. to store all catches below MCRS mixed in large boxes or compartments. The
sorting would then have to be done after landing. These options are already being
explored, for example, AZTI Tecnalia in Spain has been working on the develop-
ment of an automatic system for the quantiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of catches
landed in bulk (Melado et al. 2018), and the life iSEAS project has been looking into
similar solutions (iSEAS 2018). Such systems, if approved by the authorities, would
allow for bulk landing of < MCRS catches, or even entire catches. This solution
could be a major contributor to solving the main challenges associated with a lack of
space and human capital onboard this sector of the ﬂeet. It may also reduce the cost
that the ﬁshers have to pay for renting boxes. It is however not permitted at the
moment according to current EU regulations (EC 1224/2009).
Another option is to produce silage from < MCRS catches onboard the vessels
(Viðarsson et al. 2017). Simple and relatively compact equipment can be ﬁtted
onboard vessels of this size that produces basic silage. What is needed is a powerful
mincer, acid dispenser and a tank for storage. The ﬁsh are minced and mixed with
organic acid in a storage tank. Around 2–3% of 85% formic acid is most commonly
used, i.e. 20–30 kg of acid per ton of raw material. The acid lowers the pH of the
silage, which gives it an extremely long shelf-life. Silage of this type is, however, not
very valuable. But in any case, this option currently contradicts EU legislation that
requires catches to be placed in boxes, compartments or containers separately for
each stock (EC 1224/2009). It may also prove difﬁcult to validate what is actually in
the silage, as ﬁshermen may claim that catches not subjected to the Landing
Obligation have been used as raw material for the silage. For similar reasons, it
may also contradict the EU regulation that requires < MCRS catches to be stowed
separately from other catches (EU 2015/812).
There are, however, examples where onboard silage production has been permit-
ted within CFP ﬁsheries. For example, some Danish ﬁshing vessels have been ﬁtted
with silage equipment, and the Danish authorities have given them an exemption
from the regulations, with the condition that what goes into the silage is recorded via
camera (FiskerForum 2008; Fiskeritidende 2016; FiskerForum 2017).
In 2016, the Danish ﬁshing trawler Juli-Ane RI-568, from the ﬁshing port of
Hvide Sande, was renovated and extended to 23.95 metres overall length
(Fiskeritidende 2016; FiskerForum 2017). In connection with the renovation, it
was decided to install a silage system with grinder, automatic dosing of formic acid
and storage tanks with the capacity of 16 tons – all done in acid proof steel. CCTV
was installed to monitor and document the catch, according to speciﬁcations from
the authorities. The system has been tested but has never reached the level of
continuous day-to-day use, mainly because of management problems, and the
hardware has been exposed to more strain than expected (Larsen 2018).
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Previous to the trials onboard Juli-Ane RI-568, the 40 metre Danish ﬁshing
trawler Tobis HG-306, from the harbour of Hanstholm, ran similar experiments in
2008. The vessel was equipped with a silage system and 20 ton storage tanks, which
was supposed to be a practical full load for a lorry (FiskerForum 2008). The system
was tested in the Baltic and North Sea, but the results were not as positive as hoped
for, especially because the quality of the silage was poorer than expected and the
transportation cost was higher than anticipated. As a result, the system was uneco-
nomic and was therefore taken out of use.
The ﬁgure below shows upper and lower deck of a Danish ﬁshing boat that is
around 25 metres in length and has been ﬁtted with a basic silage system. The
handling on the upper deck ensures proper bleeding and cleaning, as well as sorting
what goes in to silage preservation. On the lower deck is the target catch sorted and
iced into boxes. There is also an option to stow unwanted catches in bulk storage in
differently coloured tubs.
The steel tank on the lower deck is an ice slurry machine that produces slurry to
use during cleaning on the upper deck and can also be used in the boxes on the lower
deck. The machine next to it produces ﬂake ice that is used on the target catches
stowed in boxes. The different coloured tubs are intended for bulk storage of
unwanted catches, and the intermediate bulk container (IBC) stores the silage. It is
then simple to replace tubs with IBC, or vice versa, if necessary.
The silage tanks used in the experiments onboard Juli-Ane and Tobis were able to
carry 16 and 20 tons of silage and only had to be emptied or replaced when they had
been ﬁlled, which could take several ﬁshing trips. The tanks were ﬁtted on the upper
deck of the vessels, and the weight therefore had an effect on the stability of the
vessels, in addition to taking up considerable space. Silage tanks of that size can be
ﬁtted below deck where they have less impact on stability, e.g. instead of oil or water
tanks, but they must then be made of stainless steel and be easily emptied and
cleaned. In the ﬁgure above (Fig. 16.1), the silage is stored in 1000 litre IBC in the
hold of the vessel, which can be easily replaced after each ﬁshing trip. The ofﬁcial
discard rates of the Danish bottom trawl ﬂeet operating in the North Sea prior to the
implementation of the Landing Obligation was 0.9% (STECF 2015) which indicates
that one IBC tank should easily be enough to stow the silage produced in a single
ﬁshing trip. The average discard rates in Skagerrak and Kattegat are, however, much
higher, which is primarily explained by high discard rates in the Nephrops ﬁshery.
The Danish silage trials have shown that the quality of the silage is the dominant
factor that determines if this solution is economically viable or not.
The experiences from these two trials have not been very promising. The solu-
tions have met with opposition from crew members for taking up too much space,
and the value of the silage has not been as expected. The conclusion of one of the
skippers on these trial vessels was that modiﬁcation of an older ﬁshing vessel to
accommodate silage production is a signiﬁcant challenge and that a vessel that is
purpose-built for silage production from the start would be more likely to be
successful (FiskerForum 2017).
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The main potential buyers of ﬁsh silage are either the ﬁshmeal and ﬁsh oil sector or
feed producers, e.g. mink feed or pig feed (Iñarra et al., this volume). The ﬁshmeal
and ﬁsh oil producers do not have a positive view of silage because their equipment
is, in most cases, not made from acid proof steel. They need to add a base to the silage
to bring the pH to 7.0. This is an additional cost in the production both in manpower
and chemicals. Feed producers for mink and pig farms prefer fresh or frozen ﬁsh over
silage, especially when the silage is of the variable quality shown in the Danish trials.
Fig. 16.1 Upper and lower deck of a medium-sized Danish seiner. The handling on the upper deck
ensures proper bleeding and cleaning, as well as sorting what goes in to silage preservation. On the
lower deck is the target catch sorted and iced into boxes. There is also an option to stow unwanted
catches in bulk storage in differently coloured tubs
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16.2.3 Larger Fresh Fish and Factory Vessels
Options for onboard handling of unwanted catches increase with increasing size of
the vessels (Viðarsson et al. 2016). The bleeding, gutting, cleaning, chilling, sorting
and stowing of unwanted catches require signiﬁcant space and labour effort if it is to
be done properly; and the same applies if additional onboard handling is applied
such as silage or ﬁshmeal production. Investment in onboard solutions and the
ability to add crewmembers also become more applicable as space and throughput
increase. Solutions that increase automation also usually require signiﬁcant through-
put in order to be economically sensible. Larger vessels with high throughput can be
equipped with automatic species and size grading equipment (Skaginn 3X 2018a).
These solutions are already on the market and use computer vision for identifying
species and sizes. Flowline graders are also used for size grading onboard some
ﬁshing vessels (Marel 2018). Using such equipment can obviously increase through-
put, reduce labour costs and make grading more accurate. This is already being done
on bottom trawlers in Iceland (Skaginn 3X 2018b).
One option for larger vessels is to equip them with silage production units
(Viðarsson et al. 2017). These units in their simplest form consist of a mincer, acid
dispenser, two primary silage tanks and secondary silage tanks. The mincer shreds the
material apart, which is then pumped into the primary silage tanks. In these tanks,
commonly referred to as day tanks, formic acid is mixed in proportions with the raw
material and heated up to 25–30 C to speed up the digestion and to create a more
uniform product. Each tank has a pump for constant circulation of the material to
prevent settling of bones and other particles. When the material has been kept under
these conditions for approximately 24 hours, it is pumped into secondary storage tank
(s), which can be located at any place where space can be found onboard the vessel, as
long as they can be easily emptied and cleaned. This type of silage has a high water
content, which requires considerable space, and the value per cubic metre is rather
low. By modifying the equipment, it is possible to separate the oil from the rest of the
silage and then remove some (and in some cases most) of the water by evaporation,
reducing the need for storage space and increasing the value of the ﬁnal product(s).
An example of such a mechanism on a 40 m bottom trawler is shown in Fig. 16.2.
Silage tanks full of silage are heavy and will therefore have an effect on the stability
of the vessel. Locating the storage tanks as far below deck as possible will help in
reducing those effects, but it is very important that safety issues concerning stability
are taken into consideration when developing silage units for ﬁshing vessels.
Production of ﬁsh protein hydrolysis (FPH) is another option, where hydrolysis is
used to separate the bones from the rest of the ﬁsh (Viðarsson et al. 2017). The bones
are then ﬁltered out and what’s left is a “soup” to which enzymes are added. The
addition of those enzymes allows oils, proteins and amino acids to be extracted,
which can be of high value as ingredients to animal feed or human food supplements.
However, this requires complicated and expensive machinery, and it is therefore
unlikely it will be a suitable solution for many vessels. The Norwegian freezer
trawler Molnes M-69-G was recently equipped with such FPH system. This was
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part of a major renovation that was done on this 66-metre-long and 14-metre-wide
bottom trawler. The results on the long-term economic viability of the investment for
Molnes are still unknown.
Fig. 16.2 Overview of a concept prospecting deck of a 40 metre bottom trawler with silage
production. No.1 – Target catch (only bled) / not bled. No.2 – Target catch (bled in seawater / not
to be gutted). No.3 – Target catch (bled in seawater / to be gutted). No.4 – Path for UWC/MCRS.
No.5 –Gutting. No.6 – Path for viscera. No.7 – Rotary cooling / cleaning tank. No.8 – Slurry ice buffer
tank. No.9 – Fish buffer tank with slurry ice. No.10 – Elevator down to hold. No.11 – Silage unit. The
primary (day tanks) are located on the processing deck, but the evaporators and the storage tanks can be
located elsewhere
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The largest ﬁshing vessels, particularly factory vessels, can be equipped with
compact onboard ﬁshmeal or ﬁsh protein plants (Amof-fjell 2018; Haarslev 2018;
Héðinn 2018; Viðarsson et al. 2017). This is a solution that has been used onboard
factory vessels for decades and has been proven to be a practical and cost-efﬁcient
alternative. The plants that are available today are relatively compact and require
little manpower. The products do, however, require signiﬁcant storage space, and the
investment cost can be substantial. With regard to the Landing Obligation, the issue
of documenting what is in the ﬁshmeal might also be an issue, as with silage
production.
16.3 Discussion
Very little progress has been achieved with regard to vessel modiﬁcations to meet the
requirements of the Landing Obligation. The available solutions are generally not
applicable for the EU ﬂeet, the potential products are low value and require signif-
icant manpower, and the space onboard vessels to accommodate these low-value
catches is scarce or not available. Vessel owners are reluctant to invest in technology
that is unlikely to be economically viable, and enforcement by authorities has been
undertaken in such a manner that places little pressure on the vessel owners to react.
At the moment, it seems that the most applicable short-term solution for most
vessels is to either get permission to land unwanted catches in bulk, where the
classiﬁcation will then take place at ofﬁcial weighing stations on land; for larger
vessels, and where there is an economic beneﬁt, silage systems or ﬁshmeal plants
may be appropriate. More complicated solutions need to be investigated in the long
term, including FPH systems (Iñarra et al., this volume).
Many consider the production of pet food, cosmetics, food supplements and even
pharmaceuticals, when discussing potential products derived from unwanted
catches. And there are, in fact, opportunities in such products, but they depend on
the landed catch being of the highest quality and with the ﬁsh being processed
onshore. The raw materials used for such products are generally speciﬁc parts of the
ﬁsh, and not the whole ﬁsh. For such products, the only onboard modiﬁcations
necessary are therefore to make sure that all catches are properly handled, i.e. bled,
cleaned, chilled, sorted and stored. This has been the process in other countries with
long experiences of discard bans, such as Iceland, Norway and the Faroe Islands,
where the emphasis has been on landing all catches at sufﬁcient quality so that the
land-based processing can make as much value from them as possible (Karp et al.,
this volume). To begin with, the economic returns for the ﬁshermen were insignif-
icant, but as the volume increased, processes improved and markets established, the
returns to the ﬁshermen have grown.
By the end of 2017, around EUR 30 million of the European Maritime and
Fisheries Fund (EMFF) had been committed to projects related to the Landing
Obligation across ten member states (EC 2018). Most of the funding had been
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allocated to projects focusing on gear selectivity and MCS, as well as investment in
ports and processing. Very little had been allocated to ﬂeet investment, but countries
such as Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands and Italy have allocated some funds to
such projects for 2018 and onwards. In the coming years, it is therefore likely that
more focus will be on onboard handling and vessel modiﬁcations to meet the
requirements of the Landing Obligation.
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Chapter 17
What to Do with Unwanted Catches:
Valorisation Options and Selection
Strategies
Bruno Iñarra, Carlos Bald, Marta Cebrián, Luis T. Antelo,
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Abstract The European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has established a landing
obligation (LO) and the need for proper management of bycatches without
incentivising their capture. Food use is the priority option but only unwanted catches
(UWC) above minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) can be used for direct
human consumption. As a result, other options, such as animal feeds, industrial uses
or energy, should be considered to valorise landed < MCRS individuals. Two
approaches have been developed to help select the best available option for
processing UWC. The ﬁrst methodology is based on a multi-criteria decision
analysis (MCDA) using an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) that considers techni-
cal, economic and market criteria. As a sample case, we chose the Basque ﬂeet
ﬁshing in the Bay of Biscay, developed within the H2020 DiscardLess project. The
second approach is based on the simultaneous analysis of both economic and
environmental aspects. This was applied to the case of Spanish bottom trawlers
operating in ICES sub-Divisions VIIIc and IXa. Finally, various food products and
bio compounds from typical UWC biomass were obtained in a pilot food processing
plant developed within the LIFE iSEAS project.
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17.1 Introduction
In 2013, the European Commission introduced a Landing Obligation (LO) or ‘dis-
card ban’ which stated that all catches of species subject to catch quotas and/or
minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) must be landed and will be counted
against quota. The LO is being gradually implemented from 2015 to 2019 for all
regulated species across the EU. In the meantime, various strategies are needed to
mitigate any potential negative impacts of the LO on ﬁshing-dependent industries
and communities.
Even after implementation of strategies to reduce bycatches a fraction of
unwanted catches (UWC) may still be caught and will have to be landed. These
UWC may not be used or sold for human consumption, thus other appropriate
valorisation options are needed.
When choosing the most suitable use of UWC, one must ﬁrst consider the reason
for discarding these fractions. For those UWC that are >MCRS and of adequate
quality for direct marketing, but which were discarded due to lack of fresh market
demand, new (transformed) food products must be developed to prevent ﬂooding the
fresh ﬁsh market. For those UWC > MCRS of insufﬁcient quality for human
consumption or for UWC < MCRS, whose use for direct human consumption is
forbidden by LO, a wide range of available technological alternatives exist. Not all
of them may be equally feasible, however.
The Waste Framework Directive of the EU Parliament (2008) (Fig. 17.1) has
established a hierarchy of management options for any food waste or by-product.
The preferred choice is always prevention and reduction. In the case of ﬁsheries
discards, this is represented by reduction of bycatches via increased gear selectivity
and optimisation of ﬁshing strategies (see e.g. O’Neill et al., this volume; Reid et al.,
this volume). Second, the food by-product should be kept in the food chain as either
fresh ﬁsh or transformed products (subject to legislation) or by the production of
food ingredients. Third, bio-products (i.e., valuable compounds or biomolecules for
food, cosmetic or other uses) should be obtained if possible. Fourth is the production
of feed for aquaculture, pet-food and other animal feeds. The production of ﬁshmeal
is the most common use of ﬁsh by-products, used mainly for aquaculture, and is a
straightforward option for the treatment of UWC if a ﬁshmeal plant is located
nearby.
Other lower-value options can also be imagined and evaluated, such as products
for industrial uses, the production of energy, composting or incineration. A ﬁnal
option, putting UWC in a landﬁll, is not considered a valorisation option.
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To select the most suitable valorisation solution in a speciﬁc scenario, many
criteria must be considered at the same time. This complicated task requires a
suitable systematic methodology. All aspects that may determine the feasibility of
a valorisation option can be classiﬁed into four main categories:
1. Characteristics of raw material which determine logistics needs and potential end
products:
• Variability, seasonality and geographic dispersion of landings
• Physicochemical and microbiological characteristics of landed catches
2. Technical parameters, related to the technical feasibility of a solution, such as:
• Maturity of the production process
• Ratio, quality and purity of the product obtained
• Availability of technology and equipment at an industrial scale
• Feasibility of modiﬁcations on board vessels
• Availability of shore-based facilities for storage, preservation, logistics, and
processing
3. Market aspects that affect product characteristics and their marketability:
• Compliance with health, environmental and other speciﬁc regulations for each
use
• Existence of potential users or market acceptance for new products
• Existence of a gap in the market or of demand for an existing product
• Competitors and analogues
• Quality requirements and volume of available product to satisfy demand
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Fig. 17.1 Fish waste management hierarchy adapted from the European waste framework directive
and the United States Environmental Protection Agency
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4. Economic aspects are the factors that affect the economic feasibility of the
solution such as:
• Minimum volume of raw material for viable production
• Final value / price of product
• Expected cost-beneﬁt ratio
• Efﬁcient use of existing infrastructures
In many cases, it is almost impossible to collect all the information needed to
evaluate all the options, and feasibility studies are quite expensive and time con-
suming. Instead, we ﬁrst identify more than 30 products from valorisation options in
this chapter. Two methodologies for the selection of valorisation options have been
developed with the aim of creating a common, systematic and objective pathway for
addressing the decision process.
17.2 Potential Uses of Unwanted Catches
Existing valorisation options and their resulting products were reviewed and com-
piled. Then, following the waste management hierarchy (Fig. 17.1), these products
were classiﬁed as follows: food applications, bio-products, animal feed, industrial
uses, energy production or agronomic uses (Table 17.1). This prioritisation does not
refer to the value of the product, as different markets or uses can strongly affect
value.
There is a global trend towards increased demand for ﬁsh for human consumption
compared to other uses. Fish protein contributes an average 17% of the total animal
protein intake globally and in some countries up to 23% (FAO 2017). For
UWC > MCRS, there are many solutions in the area of food product innovation.
Global consumer trends in industrialised countries show opportunities for new
product developments in the categories of processed and ready-to-eat food. Fish
pulp, obtained from ﬁsh muscle as a basis for making restructured products or surimi
derivatives, are intermediate products that can be good options when a critical mass
is available and the freshness of the raw material is guaranteed.
When UWC cannot be used for direct human consumption, there are many
alternative uses that are gaining in importance and may lead to important revenue
streams. A brief description is given below, and more detailed data sheets can be
found in Iñarra et al. (2018).
Seafood contains a variety of high-value biomolecules that can be used in food,
pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, such as in the animal feed industry (pet food,
aquaculture and cattle).
1. Bioactive Peptides: come from the extensive enzymatic hydrolysis of ﬁsh
protein. They present biological activities, such as antihypertensive,
antibacterial, anticoagulant, anti-inﬂammatory or antioxidants, which make
them valuable for food, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and feed products.
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2. Polyunsaturated fatty acids (PUFAs): come from the puriﬁcation of ﬁsh oil,
obtained from viscera or from fatty ﬁshes, and are fats with more than one
unsaturation (double bonds) present in their chain. PUFAs include important
compounds such as essential fatty acids that are correlated with human cardio-
vascular health.
Table 17.1 Main valorisation
options of unwanted catches
by product category
Category Valorisation option
Food Applications New ﬁsh products
Surimi
Fish pulp
Bio-products Bioactive peptides
Polyunsaturated fatty acids
Enzymes
Chondroitin sulphate
Fat-soluble vitamins
Minerals
Astaxanthin
Collagen
Gelatine
Sterols
Insulin
Protamine
Hyaluronic acid
Chitin/chitosan
Phospholipids
Peptone
Squalene
Animal feed Fishmeal
Fish oil
Mink feed
Marine beef/bait
Direct pig feed
Protein concentrate
Protein hydrolysate
Silage
Insects growth medium
Industrial uses Leather
Fish oil
Minerals
Chitin/chitosan
Pearl essence
Energy Biogas
Biodiesel
Agronomic uses Fertilisers
Compost
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3. Proteases and proteolytic enzymes: are extracted from by-products, especially
viscera, that contain a substantial proportion of digestive enzymes, with differ-
ent speciﬁc functions. These include collagenases, trypsin, pepsin, chymotryp-
sin, elastase, and carboxypeptidase. These enzymes extracted from ﬁsh are
active at low temperature and pH. Proteases play a key role in a wide variety
of physiological processes, biotechnology, food processing and other industries.
4. Chondroitin sulphate: is obtained by an enzymatic or chemical hydrolysis
process to deproteinise cartilage phases from the skeleton of cartilaginous ﬁsh,
sharks and rays, followed by successive puriﬁcation steps. Chondroitin sulphate
gives cartilage its mechanical and elastic properties and gives it a large part of its
resistance to compression. Chondroitin sulphate is used as a dietary supplement
with anti-inﬂammatory properties, to ease arthritis symptoms.
5. Fat-soluble vitamins: are obtained by solvent extraction of vitamins from ﬁsh
oil. Vitamins are classiﬁed as either fat soluble (vitamins A, D, E and K) or water
soluble (vitamins B and C) depending on how they act within the body. Fish
liver oil, rich in vitamins A and D, is used in pharmaceutical, cosmetic and food
applications.
6. Minerals (Calcium, CaCO3, hydroxyapatite): are obtained from ﬁsh bones and
shells of bivalve molluscs (mussels, clams, etc.). They can be used as mineral
supplements in nutraceutical products (for human or animals) as food ingredient
and in technically lower value applications such as soil improvers or mineral
fertilisers.
7. Dye/pigments (Astaxanthin): is extracted mainly from crustacean shells. It is
used as a pigment in aquaculture, in ﬁsh and crustacean feed and as antioxidant
in nutraceutical formulations.
8. Collagen: is obtained by an acid or base treatment of spines, scales and skin. The
amino acid content of collagen differs from other proteins because of their high
content of proline and hydroxyproline. Collagen is widely used in the pharma-
ceutical and cosmetic industries and as food supplement.
9. Gelatine: is obtained from the partial hydrolysis of collagen. There are two main
types of gelatines: Type A is obtained from the acid hydrolysis procedure and
Type B from the alkaline hydrolysis procedure. Gelatine is used as gelling agent
in food, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. Fish gelatines are preferred for low
temperature gelling needs.
10. Sterols: are obtained from either plants or animals. Phytosterols, which have
received considerable attention in recent years due to their cholesterol-reducing
properties, can be found in marine organisms whose diet is mainly made up of
phytoplankton. An important source of phytosterols is bivalves (ﬁltering organ-
isms). Phytosterols are increasingly demanded as functional ingredients in the
food and beverage industry.
11. Insulin: is extracted from the viscera of various ﬁsh. Insulin is a peptide hormone
produced by beta cells of the pancreatic islets, and by the Brockmann body in
some teleost ﬁsh. Insulin regulates the amount of glucose (sugar) in the blood
and is required for the body to function normally. It is used for treating diabetes.
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12. Protamine: is a puriﬁed mixture of simple proteins obtained mainly from wild
salmon sperm. Protamine is a protein (molecular weight around 4–5 kDa) which
works to maintain and protect DNA from being damaged. It is used in pharma-
ceuticals as a drug that reverses the anticoagulant effects of heparin by binding
to it.
13. Hyaluronic acid: is a glycosaminoglycan present in skin, bones and joints. It is
obtained by successive extraction and puriﬁcation steps. Its function is to give
elasticity to skin, bones and joints. It is used in regenerative skin cosmetics, in
cosmetic surgery injections or in the recovery of joint injuries.
14. Chitin/Chitosan: Chitin is obtained by deproteinisation and discoloration of the
exoskeleton of arthropods. Chitosan is obtained by further deacetylation of
chitin by chemical-enzymatic processes. Chitosan, in various modiﬁed forms
and different degrees of purity, can be used in a wide range of applications. It is
used in food applications, in edible ﬁlms or in microencapsulation of ingredi-
ents; in pharmaceuticals, in nutritional supplements as fat binder; in aquaculture
and ruminant feeding to reduce infections and improve yield; in medicine as
material in histocompatible tissues and contact lenses; and in cosmetics in
foams. One of its main applications is as a food-grade ﬂocculant in water
treatment and in paper manufacturing.
15. Phospholipids (PLs): are extracted from ﬁsh oil using different procedures.
Marine PLs contain essential omega-3 PUFAs, some of which are only present
in marine sources. PLs are used as emulsiﬁers in the food industry, or as
emollients in cosmetics, antibacterials or in drug delivery.
16. Squalene: is extracted mainly from shark liver. A hydrocarbon compound,
isoprenoid, is intermediate in the synthesis of cholesterol, hormones and vitamin
D. It is used in cosmetics as a lubricant and in pharmacy or dietary supplements
as an immunostimulator.
17. Peptones: are produced by controlled enzymatic hydrolysis of proteins. Pep-
tones are a mixture of polypeptides and amino acids formed during the enzy-
matic degradation of proteins. They are the main source of nitrogen in the
organic media for bacterial culture. They are used in the manufacture of culture
media for microbiology and biotechnology (industrial fermentations).
The most common use of ﬁsh by-products is the production of ﬁshmeal and ﬁsh oil
that is mainly used for animal feed. This alternative may also be of major interest for
the processing of UWC as there are many infrastructures available that are generally
close to harbours. However, many other valorisation options focused on animal feed
can be considered.
18. Fishmeal: is obtained from any ﬁsh or ﬁsh by-products. After a thermal process
to coagulate the protein and separate the oil, ﬁshmeal is a brown powder rich in
protein. The colour is affected by the ﬁsh species, particle size, fat and moisture
content. Fishmeal is mainly used in animal feed with aquaculture consumption
accounting for >60%, pigs 25%, and poultry 8%.
19. Fish oil: is obtained in the same process as ﬁshmeal production. Fish oil is a
liquid product composed mainly of fatty acids that are highly unsaturated, with
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variable amounts of phospholipids, glycerol ethers and wax esters. Fish oil has
different uses that can vary depending on its composition. About 80% of ﬁsh oil
is used in aquaculture and ~13% is destined for human consumption. When it
does not meet feed quality standards it can be used in technical applications as
solvent for painting or in biodiesel production.
20. Protein concentrates: Are dehydrated and ground products with a variable
protein content, which may or may not taste or smell of ﬁsh, depending on the
production method used. The aim is to achieve a stable product with a protein
concentration higher than that of ﬁsh muscle. This type of product can use
species that are not appropriate for direct consumption as well as the waste from
ﬁsh processing industries. These concentrates are used for animal feed but due to
their high nutritional value they can also be used for human consumption or as a
protein source in the elaboration of different foods.
21. Protein hydrolysates: are prepared from the protein fraction of whole ﬁsh,
by-products or processing waters. Hydrolysates are produced by chemical or
enzymatic hydrolysis and consist of mixtures of amino acids and peptides
(fragments of protein) of varying sizes depending on the degree of hydrolysis.
Protein hydrolysates provide different technological properties such as
ﬂavouring or texturising agents. Their biological activities are also being studied
scientiﬁcally.
22. Silage: Is a liquid protein hydrolysate made from whole ﬁsh or from processed
residues. The hydrolysis is carried out by endogenous proteolytic enzymes
located in the viscera and in the meat of the ﬁsh under acidic conditions. Acid
conditions limit the growth of degradative bacteria. It is used mainly as a protein
supplement in animal feed (cattle, poultry and aquaculture) and as a base to
produce ﬁsh sauce.
23. Mink feed: any ﬁsh or ﬁsh by-product can be used to feed mink for the fur
industry.
24. Marine bait: discarded species can be used as effective pot bait in the crab
ﬁshery.
25. Insect meal and oil: are obtained after rearing insects on a ﬁsh substrate to
increase protein content. Insect meal can be used for animal feed.
At the bottom of the valorisation hierarchy are other technical options such as energy
production and agronomic uses:
26. Pearl essence: is extracted from ﬁsh scales. Guanine is an iridescent substance
that is found in the epidermal layer and scales. The suspension of guanine in a
solvent is called “essence of pearls”. It was formerly used in cosmetics and
paints.
27. Fish leather: is the cured and tanned skins of ﬁsh. Fish leather can be used to
make a wide variety of items such as jewellery, accessories, belts, wallets, bags
and in shoes. It can also be used for a wide variety of crafts.
28. Biogas: is produced through the anaerobic digestion of organic matter. This is a
complex biological process in which anaerobic bacteria decompose organic
matter in environments with little or no oxygen. The process produces biogas
(55–65% methane, 35–45% carbon dioxide, and other gases) used as energetic
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source for heating or producing electricity. A digested substrate is produced that
can be used as fertilizer.
29. Compost/fertilisers: are obtained by an aerobic decomposition process carried
out by the microorganisms of the organic matter. Compost made from ﬁsh
usually consists of ﬁsh waste, sawdust, wood-bark chips and is covered with
leaf compost to make a compost pile. The compost is used as a soil amendment
or fertiliser. Fish protein hydrolysates can also be used as fertiliser.
Many of these processes of UWC valorisation can be run concurrently in a
bioreﬁnery scheme. For instance, when producing a food product, a ﬁrst bioreﬁnery
step takes place when ﬁsh meat is separated from viscera, heads and bones. The latter
can then be further processed to obtain other valuable products. Bioreﬁnery is the
integrated sustainable process that transforms a biological raw material (animal or
plant material) into a spectrum of marketable products (e.g. food, feed, materials or
chemicals) or energy (e.g. fuels, power and heat).
The simplest bioreﬁnery scheme is to obtain ﬁshmeal and ﬁsh oil where, when
using a good stickwater recovery system, all the treated raw material provides
marketable products. A simpliﬁed processing scheme is shown in Fig. 17.2. In
brief, the raw material (UWC or ﬁsh by-product) is thermally treated and coagulated
protein and oil are then separated and recovered.
17.3 Simpliﬁed Methodology for the Selection
of Potential Uses
The methodology for the selection of the potential uses for UWC in a speciﬁc
scenario has been developed within the H2020 DiscardLess project (Grant Agree-
ment n 633,680) and is based on a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) using
an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) method. MCDA provides a reliable framework
for procedures to rank alternative options and prioritise, based on their assessment
across selected criteria, and such methods have been widely and effectively applied
in different environmental areas (San Martin et al. 2017).
AHP was introduced as the most appropriate method, because it allows the
problem to be partitioned into smaller decision sets that are addressed one at a
time. The ﬁrst step is to deﬁne and evaluate the criteria, which must be done case by
case, as it is adapted to the subject of the study and stated by consensus.
Fish discards 
and/or
by-products
Cooker Press Decanter Centrifuge Fish oil
Dryer Fishmeal
Fig. 17.2 Simpliﬁed stepwise schema of a ﬁshmeal and oil production process
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Principles applied to the selection criteria to evaluate the main parameters
involved in the process are:
• systemic principle: a criteria system should reﬂect the essential characteristic and
the whole performance system
• measurability principle: the criteria should be measurable in quantitative values
or qualitative criteria should be transformed into numbers
• comparability principle: criteria must be either comparable or normalised.
For the ﬁnal evaluation, the selected criteria have been divided into three groups:
Case Study (CS) dependent, technical and economic criteria (Table 17.2).
“Available raw material” is the amount of UWC that can be processed in
this way.
The existence of “available facilities” and local infrastructures in the region
should be positive.
“Yield” criteria represent the result of the proportion of ﬁsh that can enter this
valorisation option as well as the yield of the process for the production of the
valuable compound or ﬁnal product.
“Technology maturity” refers to the industrial feasibility and necessary invest-
ment cost for implementing the solution. Maturity generally implies technical
feasibility (availability of the technology) and lower implementation costs.
“Value of the product” stands for the market value of the product or compound.
“Potential market” is an indicator of demand for the product to be marketed.
“Production costs” account for the different costs involved in the production of
the product.
“Competing companies” reﬂects the quantities produced or the size of the
competitor companies.
The methodology has four main steps:
1. Data gathering for each valorisation option (including new options when
identiﬁed)
2. Evaluate the facilities available for each option
3. Evaluate the amount of UWC available for each option
4. Complete the evaluation and prioritisation table
Table 17.2 Categories and
Criteria for the MCDA
Category Criteria Units
CS dependent A: Available raw material T/year
B: Available facilities N facilities
Technical factors C: Yield %
D: Technology maturity
Economic factors E: Value of the product €/kg
F: Potential market Kg/year
G: Production costs €/kg
H: Competing companies Kg/year
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For the ﬁrst step – data gathering for each valorisation option – an exhaustive list
of valorisation options according to the end-product have been assembled in a single
sheet that allows a preliminary evaluation of the proposed solutions to be obtained
(Iñarra et al. 2018). Further available options can be added to this list and can be
weighted during the evaluation.
Second, the evaluation of existing and available facilities is carefully done in each
case study. The selection of an option that is already industrialised has a great
advantage and can be a straightforward and short-term solution.
Third, historical discard data or UWC landing data are used to determine and
evaluate the amount of raw material available for each option. When using historical
discard data, a careful evaluation becomes essential. It cannot be supposed that
100% of discards will be landed due to selectivity gear improvement, better ﬁshing
strategies or minimal applications.
After estimating the amount of UWC landed and considering the species and
quality, the amount of raw material for each option can also be estimated, keeping in
mind that catches under minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) cannot be
used for direct human consumption.
A table linking the species with their possible valorisation options has been made
(Iñarra et al. 2018). Table 17.3 shows the part of that table used for the Bay of Biscay
case study (for details, see Sect. 17.5.1). The selected options are based on the
species composition (Froese and Pauly 2018).
The quantitative values obtained in the ﬁrst step of the methodology for each
evaluation criterion and for all the valorisation options are then evaluated jointly.
Subsequently, average ranges are established to deﬁne different levels for each
criterion prioritisation (Table 17.4). Each range is then assigned a score. The more
favourable the evaluation, the higher the score (Table 17.5); this is usually 5, 3, 1 and
0. This allows small differences to be highlighted in following calculations. Con-
siderations are that some factors have a negative effect (competing companies and
production costs) and therefore have a high qualitative factor if their quantitative
factor is low.
A weighting coefﬁcient has been assigned to each prioritisation criterion and each
valorisation option will obtain a score (a value between zero and one) based on the
following equations:
VCS ¼ x1 •Aþ x2 •Bð Þ= 5 • x1 þ x2ð Þð Þ
Vtech ¼ x3 •Cþ x4 •Dð Þ= 5 • x3 þ x4ð Þð Þ
Veco ¼ x5 •Eþ x6 •Fþ x7 •Gþ x8 •Hð Þ= 5 • x5 þ x6 þ x7 þ x8ð Þð Þ
Where VCS is the score obtained for the case study-dependent criteria, Vtech is the
score of the technical criteria and Veco is the score of the economic criteria. x1 to x8
are the weighting coefﬁcient values assigned to each criterion for the prioritisation
and A, B, C, D, E, F, G, the score normalised from 0 to 5 for each criterion as shown
in Table 17.5.
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Weighting coefﬁcient values, x1 to x8 (Table 17.6) should highlight the impor-
tance of each criterion in the ﬁnal decision and are usually values between 1 and 10:
• Key/critical factor: 10 points
• Very important factor: 7 points
• Factor with some relevance: 3 points
• Factor with small relevance: 1 point
The ﬁnal score or priority value (Vp) for each solution comes from the product of
the technical and economical score.
Table 17.4 Normalisation of range values of prioritisation criteria
Category Criteria Units High Medium Low Null
Case study
dependent
A: Available
raw material
t/year > 2000 1000–2000 500–1000 < 500
B: Available
facilities
N
facilities
> 2 2 1 0
Technical C: Yield % > 50 10–50 < 10 < 0.05
D: Technology
maturity
– High Medium Low Experimental
Economic E: Value of
the product
€/kg > 50 5–50 0.5–5 < 0.5
F: Potential
market
t/year > 1000 100–1000 5–100 < 5
G: Production
costs
€/kg > 50 5–50 0.5–5 < 0.5
H: Competing
companies
t/year > 500 100–500 < 100 0
Table 17.5 Assignment of numerical scores to each value range
Category Criteria 5 3 1 0
Case study
dependent
A: Available
raw material
High Medium Low Null
B: Available
facilities
Many
and/or
nearby
Not many
and/or far
away
Experimental
and/or pilot
Null
Technical C: Yield High Medium Low Null
D: Technology
maturity
High Medium Low Experimental
Economic E: Value of the
product
High Medium Low Null
F: Potential
market
Big Medium Small Null
G: Production
costs
Very low Low Medium High
H: Competing
companies
Low-none Medium High Saturated
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Table 17.6 Prioritisation evaluation of valorisation options for the Bay of Biscay case study
CS dependent
Technical
parameters Economical parameters
Criterion A B VCS C D Vtech E F G H Veco Vp
Weighting coefﬁcient 10 7 10 7 3 7 10 10 7 1 3
New ﬁsh products 5 5 1.00 5 5 1.00 3 5 3 1 0.73 0.96
Surimi 5 0 0.59 3 5 0.72 3 3 1 1 0.49 0.62
Fish pulp 5 5 1.00 3 5 0.72 1 5 5 5 0.71 0.86
Bioactive peptides 5 1 0.67 3 3 0.60 5 3 1 3 0.64 0.64
Polyunsaturated fatty acids 5 3 0.84 3 5 0.72 3 5 3 1 0.73 0.78
Enzymes 0 0 0.00 1 1 0.20 1 1 1 1 0.20 0.10
Chondroitin sulphate 0 3 0.25 1 3 0.32 5 3 1 1 0.63 0.33
Fat-soluble vitamins 5 0 0.59 1 3 0.32 3 5 1 1 0.63 0.50
Minerals 5 1 0.67 3 5 0.72 1 5 5 3 0.70 0.69
Astaxanthin 0 0 0.00 1 5 0.44 5 3 1 3 0.64 0.25
Collagen 5 3 0.84 1 5 0.44 3 3 3 1 0.59 0.66
Gelatine 5 3 0.84 1 5 0.44 3 3 3 1 0.59 0.66
Sterols 5 0 0.59 1 1 0.20 3 3 0 3 0.45 0.43
Insulin 5 0 0.59 3 1 0.48 3 1 0 0 0.29 0.50
Protamine 0 0 0.00 1 3 0.32 5 1 1 1 0.49 0.18
Hyaluronic acid 0 0 0.00 1 3 0.32 5 3 1 1 0.63 0.21
Chitin/chitosan 0 0 0.00 1 5 0.44 5 3 3 1 0.73 0.26
Phospholipids 5 0 0.59 1 3 0.32 3 3 1 3 0.50 0.48
Peptone 5 1 0.67 3 5 0.72 1 1 3 1 0.30 0.63
Squalene 0 0 0.00 1 3 0.32 5 3 1 1 0.63 0.21
Fishmeal 5 5 1.00 5 5 1.00 1 5 5 1 0.69 0.95
Fish oil 5 5 1.00 5 5 1.00 1 5 5 1 0.69 0.95
Mink feed 5 3 0.84 5 3 0.88 1 1 5 3 0.41 0.79
Marine beef/bait 5 1 0.67 5 3 0.88 1 1 5 3 0.41 0.71
Direct pig feed 5 1 0.67 5 3 0.88 1 3 5 3 0.56 0.73
Protein concentrate 5 3 0.84 5 5 1.00 3 5 3 3 0.74 0.88
Protein hydrolysate 5 3 0.84 5 5 1.00 3 5 3 3 0.74 0.88
Silage 5 0 0.59 5 5 1.00 1 3 5 3 0.56 0.73
Insect growth 5 0 0.59 5 1 0.76 1 3 5 5 0.57 0.65
Leather 0 3 0.25 1 5 0.44 3 1 3 5 0.47 0.35
Fish oil 5 5 1.00 5 5 1.00 0 5 5 0 0.61 0.94
Minerals 5 3 0.84 3 5 0.72 0 3 5 3 0.49 0.74
Chitin / chitosan 0 0 0.00 3 5 0.72 1 3 3 1 0.44 0.32
Pearl essence 5 0 0.59 1 5 0.44 1 1 3 3 0.31 0.50
Biogas 5 1 0.67 1 3 0.32 1 3 3 1 0.44 0.51
Compost 5 1 0.67 3 3 0.60 0 3 5 1 0.47 0.62
Fertilisers 5 1 0.67 3 5 0.72 1 3 5 1 0.54 0.67
A Available raw material, B Available facilities, C Yield, D Technology maturity, E Value of the
product, F Potential market, G Production costs, H Competing companies, VCS: case study score,
Vtech technical score, Veco economic score, Vp priority value
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Vp ¼ y1 •VCS þ y2 •Vtech þ y3 •Vecoð Þ= y1 þ y2 þ y3ð Þ
Where y1 to y3 are the weighting coefﬁcient values assigned to each category
(Table 17.6).
The weighing coefﬁcient value for each prioritisation criterion and category was
assigned through consensus within the DiscardLess project expert team. As an
example, the availability of raw material (criterion A) was considered a critical
factor and was therefore assigned a weighing coefﬁcient value of 10.
The current values were used considering the present situation where the LO is
being implemented, and thus the preferred options are those building on existing
infrastructures (high Vcs weighting coefﬁcient). These coefﬁcients can be changed
for a long-term solution by increasing the weighting coefﬁcient of Veco.
This methodology not only allows simultaneous evaluation of all the criteria but also the
technical and economical evaluation of each valorisation option separately, and evaluation
of the weight of the case study dependent criteria. However, only a preliminary diagnostic is
provided which should be discussed further with stakeholders.
The implementation of any selected valorisation option resulting from this meth-
odology will need a more detailed feasibility study.
In Table 17.6, the example of the prioritisation analysis for a speciﬁc case study is
presented, i.e. the discards of the Bay of Biscay.
17.4 Methodology for the Selection of Inland Management
Alternatives Based on Economic and Environmental
Impacts
When selecting the optimal processing routes of the different potentially available
biomasses in terms of sustainability, both the economic and environmental objec-
tives must be considered simultaneously. A common approach in the scientiﬁc
literature There is a major tendency in the scientiﬁc literature to apply different
optimisation strategies to study the trade-off between these two conﬂicting objec-
tives. The optimisation of processing routes integrating both criteria was for example
applied to the case of bio-reﬁneries involving different feedstock types (Martinez-
Hernandez et al. 2013; Murillo-Alvarado et al. 2013; Bernardi et al. 2013;
Santibanez-Aguilar et al. 2014; Antelo et al. 2015).
In a second case study below, we deﬁne an optimisation screening approach adapted to
the particularities of marine biomass discarded in trawling ﬂeets of Galicia (NW Spain)
operating in ICES areas VIIIc and IXa. These ﬂeets are characterised by highly mixed
catches where determined levels of discards are very signiﬁcant.
To simplify and systematise the selection of optimal valorisation pathways, we
have deﬁned a simpliﬁed general network (Fig. 17.3) to represent these valorisation
alternatives. In this approach, developed in the framework of the LIFE iSEAS
project (LIFE13 ENV/ES/000131), each layer of the above-mentioned
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superstructure is constituted by s input products (i.e., skins, bones, viscera, muscle,
entire specimen, etc. – vector qIN) that can be processed by a set r of deﬁned
processing technologies to obtain v ﬁnal or output products (i.e., bioactive peptides,
ﬁsh protein hydrolysates, chitin/chitosan, gelatine, etc.) This formulation allows
easy connection of L layers (when further pre-processing or downstream processing
is required) by considering the ﬁnal products of a given layer l the raw material of the
next processing network/layer l + 1. We call this the technology model.
Our case study describes a situation where 100% of all currently discarded
biomass must be landed. Changes in the composition of the considered target
ﬁsheries as well as the uncertainties of future legislation might lead to signiﬁcant
variations in the proposed case. In addition, the economic assessment includes costs
of the main processing utilities. Water use and CO2 emissions were considered in the
environmental assessment. Installation and personnel costs, as well as solid residues
derived from processing (considering that these are sent to ﬁsh meal production at
zero cost), were not included in the analysis. The reason for these assumptions is the
increasing complexity of the network and the uncertainty regarding the available
data in the case study.
To evaluate the optimal/best pathways for achieving an integral valorisation of
discarded biomass in practice, both economic (Jeco) and environmental (Jen) objec-
tives are considered and evaluated through a multi-objective approach. The aim is to
maximise the economic objectives while minimising environmental impacts.
The ε-constraint approach was used to convert multi-objective problems into a
set of single objective problems (by incorporating one of the objectives as an
inequality constraint) to obtain uniform distributed Pareto fronts – due to their
easy implementation and capability. In this case, we considered that ε varies between
0 and 700. Computing the Pareto-optimal set can be challenging due to the highly
constrained and nonlinear nature of processing systems. This drawback can be
addressed by using suitable global optimisation (GO) methods. Therefore, the
i = 1 i = 2 … i = s
k = 1 k = 2 … k = v
j = 1 j = 2 … j = r
INPUTS/RAW MATERIAL (qIN)
OUTPUT PRODUCTS (qOUT)
TECHNOLOGIES 
(PROCESSES)
LAYER L
Fig. 17.3 General superstructure of the technology model
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optimal solution of the proposed optimisation problem was calculated using scatter
search (eSS) as implemented in the MEIGO toolbox (Egea et al. 2014).
This optimisation problem can be mathematically represented as:
maxXJ ¼ Jeco Xð Þ ¼ Jsales Xð Þ  JPC Xð Þ
Subject to:
Jenv Xð Þ ¼ JCO2 Xð Þ þ Jw Xð Þð Þ  ε
qOUT lþ 1ð Þ  Mo Plant capacityð Þ
Xlower  X  Xupper
where X is the decision vector to be found by means of the optimisation problem
(in this case, the set of fractions or percentages of raw material qIN processed by a
given technology j) and Xlower, Xupper are the lower and upper bounds for the
decision variables, respectively.
The economic part of the objective function represents the proﬁt of the process,
which is deﬁned by product sales (Jsales) minus production costs (JPC).
The environmental impact of each process was characterised by the ecological
footprint (EF). This is an indicator that considers the energy and raw material ﬂow
into and out of any particular system, converting them into the spaces of land or
water needed by nature to produce and/or assimilate these ﬂows. In this case,
environmental criteria for process selection included CO2 emissions (from electricity
and fuel consumption – JCO2 ) and water consumption (Jw). The calculation of EF
implies the conversion of units for these ﬂows to space units, usually hectares (ha).
For that purpose, values of energy intensity as well as natural and/or energy
productivity are required.
The main results show that in general the most optimal processing routes corre-
spond to the production of high value-added products (biopeptides, enzymes and
chondroitin sulphate), not only due to high sale prices, but also for the lower
environmental impact associated with their production processes as compared to
other products (ﬁsh meal, ﬁsh oil, chitin/chitosan or gelatine). However, chondroitin
sulphate production should be considered with caution, as the production obtained
was much lower than the plant production capacity. In this case, more biomass (from
other ﬁshing métiers or ﬁsh-processing industries) would be necessary to guarantee
the economic feasibility of the valorisation schemes. Fish meal and ﬁsh oil, chitin
and gelatine were not preferred, mainly due to the high CO2 emissions and water
consumption associated with these processes.
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17.5 Case Studies
The selection of potential uses and solutions must be made in each case study. The
simpliﬁed methodology described is shown for the case studies of Bay of Biscay
(BoB), while the methodology based on economic and environmental parameters is
applied to the Galician ﬂeet.
17.5.1 Basque Fleet in the Bay of Biscay
The information needed for the application of the simpliﬁed methodology for the
selection of valorisation options was gathered within the H2020 DiscardLess project.
The Bay of Biscay (BoB) is a highly productive ﬁshery zone, in which the Basque
ﬂeet operates bottom trawlers (Prellezo et al. 2016).
Data related to main UWC, that represent over the 95%, are presented in
Table 17.7.
From these data two problems arise:
1. Mackerel and horse mackerel >MCRS but with low value account for ~ 2200 t/
year. Blue whiting, with an important quantity of ~300 t/year, can be included in
this group.
2. Hake < MCRS account for ~300 t/year
From the study of the infrastructures in the Basque country, there are different
facilities that can be of interest for the valorisation of these products:
• The Cofradía (ﬁsher associations) of Bermeo has facilities for ﬁsh mince
production.
• There are several ﬁsh processing industries in the surrounding areas.
• There is a ﬁsh by-product valorisation facility that produces ﬁsh meal and ﬁsh oil.
• In all harbours, freezing facilities are available for conserving UWC.
Table 17.7 Main unwanted catches in the Bay of Biscay bottom-trawl ﬁshery estimation (data
2014)
Discards (t) Catch (t) Landed
Species 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Anglerﬁsh 3 0 5 197 178 254 194 178 249
Black-bellied angler 11 3 10 147 215 415 136 212 405
Blue whiting 117 439 226 250 488 282 133 49 56
Hake 217 309 365 2916 2401 2370 2698 2092 2005
Horse mackerel 3049 2091 1467 3227 2317 1618 178 226 151
Mackerel 3339 1620 990 3728 1693 1035 389 73 45
Megrim 5 1 8 176 210 306 170 209 298
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Following the standard methodology for valorisation option selection, discard
data were used to obtain scores for criteria A (available raw material) as shown in
Table 17.6. Also, the infrastructures available in the Basque Country and surround-
ing areas were evaluated to complete column B (available facilities).
The valorisation options with the best scores for the main discarded species are:
• Mackerel and horse mackerel study: new food products (96%) or ﬁsh pulp (86%)
have the higher score. This option can also be taken into consideration for blue
whiting (~300 kg/year) if not < MCRS.
• Due to legislation, hake (< MCRS) cannot be directed to food products so the next
options are: ﬁshmeal and ﬁsh oil, with a score of 95% or ﬁsh protein hydrolysate,
with a score of 88%. This last option could score higher if hydrolysates were
focused on human consumption as a ﬂavouring agent.
• This option is also the main possibility when quantities of other UWC are too low
for more speciﬁc solutions.
As stated above, these results are preliminary. More detailed evaluation of the
solution implementation was performed to corroborate their technical and economic
viability. Pilot tests for producing a mackerel hamburger and hake FPH were
performed to assess the full value chain and verify its proﬁtability. In both processes,
the by-products (e.g. bones) were diverted to the ﬁshmeal processing plant in a
bioreﬁnery scheme.
17.5.2 Assays at Pilot Plant Level of Some of the Proposed
Alternatives
The pilot plant studies were developed in the framework of the LIFE iSEAS project.
Their aim was to establish a so-called bionode or iDVP (Integral Discards
Valorisation Point) that applies a bioreﬁnery concept for this important quantity of
marine biomass that has to be managed or processed quickly and efﬁciently to avoid
wasting it. The plant is divided into three rooms: (i) Chilled room storage; (ii) Food
processing area (iDVP1, Fig. 17.4 and; (iii) Non-food products area (iDVP3,
Fig. 17.5). Production lines to be implemented in the iDVP1 are based on the use
of the muscle (ﬁsh mince) for food purposes, including a line of restructured
products (Fig. 17.6). In addition, the iDVP3 (Fig. 17.5) includes a line for ﬁsh
protein hydrolysates and bioactive peptides as well as several production lines to
obtain valuable bio-compounds such as collagen, chondroitin sulphate or hyaluronic
acid, among others (Fig. 17.7). iDVP1 ﬁsh by-products and undersized specimens of
ﬁsh species subject to TAC regulation (mainly hake and megrim) are used as raw
material. They may be complemented with industrial by-products such as tuna skins,
blue shark skin and head, etc. from ﬁsh processors nearby.
The production of ﬁsh mince using a ﬁsh fraction separator (Fig. 17.4), working
with initial loads of 50–100 kg of headless and eviscerated fresh ﬁsh per batch, was
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Fig. 17.4 iDVP1 ﬁsh fractions separator
Fig. 17.5 iDVP3 located in the Port of Marín (Spain)
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successful for all the discards evaluated: pouting, mackerel, sea robins, grenadier,
blue whiting, hake, red scorpion ﬁsh, etc. Yields and chemical properties of ﬁsh
mince blocks (Fig. 17.6) were extensively reported (Blanco et al. 2018). The rest of
the heads and skin/bones were then processed in iDVP3. Different processed and
restructured foods (burgers, nuggets and ﬁngers) were formulated and satisfactorily
tested on various tasting days organised for the food industry. The response of diners
to the panels of evaluation (scoring the organoleptic, taste and presentation features)
was always ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ for all the products prepared.
Fig. 17.6 Fish mince blocks obtained in the iDVP1
Fig. 17.7 Biocompounds obtained in the iDVP3
354 B. Iñarra et al.
Another process studied was the production of ﬁsh protein hydrolysates (FPH)
generated by commercial proteolytic enzymes (alcalase or esperase) using whole ﬁsh
or by-products from discards (heads and skin/bones). Initially, batch enzyme prote-
olysis was performed in 5 L vessels and was subsequently validated in 500 L pilot
plant reactors (iDVP3). The scheme of FPH-production is shown in Fig. 17.8.
Unpublished results indicated that in all substrates hydrolysis (digestion of organic
material) was complete. Bioactivities of peptides (anti-oxidant and antihypertensive)
were analysed and the potential application of FPH as marine peptones for the
formulation of low-cost media for microbial bioproduction is currently being eval-
uated. In the case of fatty ﬁsh species, ﬁsh oil was recovered from liquid FPH by
centrifugation using a tricanter and the fatty acid proﬁles were determined. In
addition, the chemical characterisation and application of mineral fraction obtained
(clean ﬁsh bones) are also being studied.
Processes for production of other high-added value biocompounds from ﬁsh
discards and ﬁshing by-products were optimised at a laboratory (1 to 5 L per
batch) and then tested at a pilot plant (iDVP3). The isolation of glycosaminoglycans,
such as hyaluronic acid (AH) from ﬁsh vitreous humour and chondroitin sulphate
(CS) from ﬁsh cartilage was done using materials from the eyes of tuna, blue shark
and swordﬁsh and cartilage from catshark, blue shark and ray. In both cases, the
steps to produce those polysaccharides are generally based on the combination of
enzymatic proteolysis, protein electrodeposition, chemical selective precipitation
and re-dissolution of carbohydrates, membrane puriﬁcation and drying (Murado
et al. 2012; Blanco et al. 2015; Murado et al. 2010; Vázquez et al. 2016). Despite
these efforts, the yields of hyaluronic acid from vitreous humour are lower than those
observed by fermentation with Streptococcus zooepidemicus bacteria (Vázquez et al.
2010). Condroitin sulphate was obtained from catsharks (Scyliorhinus canicula)
discarded by Galician ﬁshing ﬂeet. These were processed in iDVP3 (50 kg of
cartilaginous material). Chondroitin sulphate from the heads of blue shark (Prionace
glauca) and head-skeletons of ray (Raja clavata) was also successfully produced at
Fish discards 
and/or
by-products
Crush Enzymatic hydrolysis Tricanter
FishbonesPre- FPHThermal inactivation
Aquaculture 
feed 
Ingredient
FPH
Marine 
peptones
Fish Oil
Spray-dryer
Bioactivities
Ultrafiltration 
Nanofiltration
Bioactive 
peptides Fermentation
Microbial 
bioproductions
Fig. 17.8 Simpliﬁed scheme of ﬁsh protein hydrolysates (FPH) process
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pilot plant scale (loads of 40–60 kg). The resulting tailored and well-characterised
glycosaminoglycans are in most cases non-existent in the chemical and clinical
product market. This successful trial has led to a large number of collaborative
projects with Spanish and foreign universities (IBEROS, BLUEHUMAN and
CVMar+I) for the formulation of micro and nanodevices for tissue engineering
and biosensor applications (Novoa-Carballal et al. 2017; Valcarcel et al. 2017;
Ferreira et al. 2018).
Regarding the puriﬁcation of gelatins, skins of several ﬁsh discards (pouting,
mackerel, etc.) have been studied. Following an optimised set of stages based on
different washes in acid and alkaline solutions, thermal extraction, adsorbent and
membrane puriﬁcation and ﬁnal drying (Sousa et al. 2017), the extractive yields
were low and not very satisfactory. Moreover, the strength of the gelatins was not
remarkable. Only the skins of catsharks led to acceptable yield and viscosity values.
However, skins obtained from processing ﬁsh by-products such as tuna (Thunnus
albacares) and blue shark proved to be the best materials to produce high strength
gelatine, pure collagen and derivatives (Blanco et al. 2017). Productions at pilot
plant volume (50–100 kg of substrates) improved upon yields observed at lab scale
(1–3 kg). Potential applications for our gelatins in the formulation of different foods
and tissue regenerative biomaterials is currently under study.
Finally, the production of chitin and subsequent deacetylation to chitosan was
optimised using two types of substrates: crustacean exoskeletons (Vázquez et al.
2017a) and squid gladius (pens) (Vázquez et al. 2017b). In the ﬁrst case, enzymatic
deproteinisation, acid demineralisation, alkaline hydrolysis and thermal/alkaline
deacetylation were sequentially performed obtaining chitosan with more than 90%
deacetylation degree (DD). The validation of this methodology at the pilot plant was
tested on crab (Polybius henslowii) discards. In the second approach, endoskeletons
by-products from Illex argentinus were valorised in a simpliﬁed protocol combining
deproteinisation using proteases and deacetylation by alkaline solutions at high
temperature. High purity chitosans (DD > 93%) with molecular weights
(143–339 kDa) were produced. In general, the proposals of valorisation developed
in IIM-CSIC were validated using iDPV1 and iDPV3 equipment. A schematic view
of the biocompounds generated in iDVP3 plant is displayed in Fig. 17.8. Energy and
mass ﬂows calculations, LCA and process integration lines studies will complete
these results to optimise our ﬂexible and integral multipurpose pilot plant under the
concept of Integral Marine Bioreﬁnery.
17.6 Conclusions
Unwanted catches can be valorised in many different ways, depending on their
composition. Not all of those ways are always feasible, however. A well-structured
systematic methodology is therefore needed to help choose the best potential
valorisation route. A ﬁrst approach, based on a multi-criteria decision analysis
(MCDA) using an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) method, was applied to the
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case of the Basque ﬂeet in the Bay of Biscay. The best options identiﬁed for these
discarded species were new ﬁsh products based on ﬁsh mince; ﬁshmeal and oil; and
protein hydrolysates. A second approach, based on the analysis and optimization of
economic and environmental parameters, was applied to the highly mixed discards
of the Galician ﬂeet. Here, the preferred options were ﬁsh mince blocks, protein
hydrolysates with bioactive peptides and chondroitin sulphate. For both approaches,
pilot trials were performed to demonstrate their feasibility. The good results obtained
in both cases indicate that both methodologies can be useful when developing
valorisation strategies for UWC in other regions.
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Part V
Control, Monitoring and Surveillance
Chapter 18
Tools and Technologies for the Monitoring,
Control and Surveillance of Unwanted
Catches
Kelly M. James, Neill Campbell, Jónas R. Viðarsson, Carlos Vilas,
Kristian S. Plet-Hansen, Lisa Borges, Óscar González,
Aloysius T. M. van Helmond, Ricardo I. Pérez-Martín,
Luis Taboada Antelo, Jorge Pérez-Bouzada, and Clara Ulrich
Abstract A key requirement for the successful implementation of the Landing
Obligation is the need to monitor and regulate unwanted catches at sea. This issue is
particularly challenging because of the large number of vessels and trips that need
to be monitored and the remoteness of vessels at sea. Several options exist in theory,
ranging from patrol vessels to onboard observers and self-sampling. Increasingly
though, technology is developing to provide remote Electronic Monitoring
(EM) with cameras at lower costs. This chapter ﬁrst provides an overall synthesis
of the pro’s and con’s of several monitoring tools and technologies. Four EM
technologies already trialled in EU ﬁsheries are then summarised. We conclude
that it is now possible to conduct reliable and cost-effective monitoring of unwanted
catches at sea, especially if various options are used in combination. However,
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effective monitoring is a necessary condition for the successful implementation of
the Landing Obligation but insufﬁcient unless it is implemented with a high level of
coverage and with the support of the ﬁshing industry.
Keywords Compliance · Electronic Monitoring · Observers · Unreported discards ·
Video
18.1 Introduction
Discarding in ﬁsheries is driven by a combination of economic and regulatory
factors. Fishers may choose to discard ﬁsh which are small, damaged, or of
low-value to free up space on their vessels for more valuable catches, or they
may lack sufﬁcient quota to legally land a species, resulting in them being obliged
or incentivised to discard that part of their catch. Global studies have systemati-
cally estimated high levels of discard rates in many European ﬁsheries in the North
East Atlantic (Kelleher 2005; Zeller et al. 2018). Catchpole et al. (2017) estimated
that prior to the establishment of the Landing Obligation, discards of demersal
species regulated by quota represented on average 30% of the catch. Of these,
small ﬁsh (under Minimum Conservation Reference Size) represented only
30–40% of the total discards, highlighting that most discards in Atlantic EU
countries are due to quota restrictions and/or are market driven. The scale of the
issue demonstrates that there are strong incentives to discard when the practice is
unregulated. Thus, a key challenge of the Landing Obligation is adequate enforce-
ment, with two purposes: i) to force selectivity improvements and reduce incen-
tives to discard and ii) to provide reliable catch statistics, since bias in catch
estimation has a direct and negative impact on the precision of stock assessments.
A number of approaches are in theory available to conduct MCS (Monitoring,
Control and Surveillance) activities. “Monitoring “is deﬁned as the collection of
data on catch and ﬁshing effort;” Control “as the regulations and legislation
required to stop illegal discarding, and “Surveillance” is deﬁned as the tools
available to measure compliance with the Landing Obligation.
This chapter aims ﬁrst at reviewing the currently available and emerging
options for the MCS of discarding of unwanted catches. Many approaches have
been applied in a variety of ﬁsheries for decades and their pro’s and con’s are
therefore well-established. Then, this chapter focuses on a more in-depth review
and analysis of the recent experiences gained in Europe with Remote Electronic
Monitoring (REM –or simply EM) by summarising the main technologies
currently available in European ﬁsheries, and their use so far.
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18.2 Available and Emerging Measures for MCS
A literature review for the various MCS options was conducted and synthesised. The
options are brieﬂy presented sequentially, and their advantages and disadvantages
are summarised in Table 18.1.
Table 18.1 The associated advantages and disadvantages of tools used to monitor and control
ﬁshing activities
Advantages Disadvantages
Aerial and
patrol vessel
surveillance
High visibility deterrent whilst in sight Only a short-term deterrent
Can collect data on ﬁshing effort Cannot collect data on discards, or
any other types of biological data
If vessels are seen to be partaking in
illegal activity, they can be prosecuted
Illegal ﬁshing activity can take place
when surveillance vehicle is not in
the vicinity
UAV/USVs have lower operational
costs
High costs
Can observe non-national vessels Can be adversely affected by weather
Discarding can still occur illegally
VMS Offers 100% coverage of ﬁshing vessel
movement if installed on all ﬁshing
vessels
Only transmits data every 1–2 h so
cannot offer detailed information of
vessel trips
Can identify and record non-compliant
spatial behaviour
Non-compliant behaviour can still
occur between GPS transmissions
Functions in poor weather and requires
no housing of an observer
Cannot collect data on discards, or
any other types of biological data
Can provide data on vessel speed in
which ﬁshing effort can be calculated
from
Vessel speed may not be an indica-
tion of ﬁshing activity taking place
There is no self-interest of data Can be switched off or otherwise
interfered with (though ﬁnes may
occur)
Discarding can still occur illegally
Observers There is a high conﬁdence in data col-
lected and detailed biological samples
can be taken (otolith, gonads, etc.
samples).
They can seldom sample the entire
trip due to working time restrictions,
tiredness, poor weather and illness.
Observers can play a role in compliance Data gathered at sea cannot be quality
assured directly
They provide a strong link between
ﬁsheries and industry
There can be a safety risk for
observers at sea
Observers are able to detect rare and
protected species
Sampling is very costly
Observer and deployment effects
Self-sampling A large amount of data can be available
at a low cost
Enthusiasm may drop with time
Data has often been found to be high in
quality, and consistent with observers
Data may be biased, or even fabricated
and therefore data quality needs to be
ensured
(continued)
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18.2.1 Aerial and Patrol Vessel Surveillance
The use of aircraft (airplanes, helicopters) and patrol vessels for the MCS of ﬁshing
activities is a conventional method used in a variety of modern ﬁsheries (Mangi et al.
2015). There are a number of advantages and disadvantages associated with both
aerial and patrol vessel surveillance (European Union 2011; Course 2015). With
regards to advantages, both act as a high visibility deterrent for ﬁshing vessels, and it
has been observed that discarding is unlikely to occur whilst aerial or vessel patrols
are in the vicinity. Also, both are able to observe non-national vessels which may
partake in illegal ﬁshing, providing ﬁshers with a “level-playing ﬁeld “where all
boats in the area are under equivalent surveillance. Finally, they are able to monitor
ﬁshing on vessels of all sizes, including small ones.
There are however a number of disadvantages. Both aerial and patrol vessels have
limitations in the monitoring of discarding, as they only supply data regarding
ﬁshing effort and not catch quantities or composition. Even then, data is limited,
as coverage is extremely low. In the UK for example, aerial surveillance only
monitored 0.026% of ﬁshing effort (hours at sea) in 2013, and patrol vessel surveil-
lance 0.05% of ﬁshing effort (Course 2015). With such a small level of surveillance,
this tool may only provide a short-term deterrent as there is no assurance that ﬁshers
will continue to comply when vehicles leave the area. A further disadvantage is the
Table 18.1 (continued)
Advantages Disadvantages
Sense of ownership of data, ﬁshers feels
that they are trusted by the authority and
scientists. Feel involved in the data
collection process
Extensive training may be required
May not work well for rare or
protected species
Discarding can still occur illegally
Electronic
Monitoring
with video
Can identify and record non-compliant
behaviour and therefore is an effective
deterrent
Non-compliant behaviour can still
occur around the cameras
Species identiﬁcation can be done by
shore based analysis.
The technology cannot provide some
biological data and reviewers require
at least 2 weeks training and auditing
process
Historical videos can be reviewed if a
risk of non-compliance is detected
The technology requires signiﬁcant
support to maintain and manage
equipment
Can function in poor weather and
requires no housing of an observer
Cameras may not be suitable for
monitoring catch in high volume
ﬁshing gears (such as trawl and seine)
Transmits GPS signals every 10 s There is potential for the technology
to be tampered with
There is no self-interest of data Can be a considerable investment to
get the equipmentLength data can also be collected
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high cost associated with aerial and patrol vessel surveillance. It was estimated in
2011 that the Norwegian government spent £86 m a year for the coastguard, which
used 70% of their time to enforce its discard ban (European Union 2011). Despite
this, patrol vessel surveillance remains at the heart of the control activity deployed by
EU Member States together with the European Fisheries Control Agency EFCA
(Nuevo et al., this volume).
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, or drones) and unmanned surface vessels
(USV) offer a cheaper mechanism for the surveillance of unwanted catches (Miller
et al. 2013; Selbe 2014; Linchant et al. 2015). High-resolution optical cameras
mounted on drones or USVs enable their operators to visually observe discarding
in a range of weather conditions and during both day and night. Drones can also be
used to monitor the bycatch of marine mammals. However, lacking a crew, USV’s
are unable to intervene if an illegal activity is observed, and can be vulnerable to
hostile acts from vessels engaged in illegal activities. Furthermore, the legal position
of USVs is unclear in some situations and operating a USV inside the national waters
of another country could be considered a hostile act (Selbe 2014).
18.2.2 Vessel Transmitted Information and Vessel Detection
Systems
Vessel-transmitted information is a general term for all routinely collected control
data transmitted from ﬁshing vessels to relevant on-shore authorities. The most
common information covered is positional, such as Vessel Monitoring System
(VMS) data - a well-established tool used in ﬁsheries management and surveillance
globally. The installation of VMS transmitters on ﬁshing vessels is mandatory for all
EU vessels above 12 m in length.
VMS data is transmitted via satellite from ﬁshing vessels on a variable timescale,
often between 30 min and 2 h intervals. In addition to location, transmissions can
provide information regarding a vessel‘s speed and direction. The data transmitted
through VMS can be used to infer spatial distribution of ﬁshing effort (Needle and
Catarino 2011) which then has a wide range of scientiﬁc and monitoring applications
(e.g., Murawski et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2010; Aanes et al. 2011, ICES 2017).
VMS systems are present and active on ﬁshing vessels at all times, and therefore
represent a long-term deterrent to illegal ﬁshing in closed areas (Davis 2000; Needle
and Catarino 2011; Skaar et al. 2011). Additionally, VMS offers a less expensive
alternative to surveillance vehicles, and the data provided are entirely autonomous
from the skipper. But their utility remains nevertheless limited, since VMS does not
provide information on catch. This is further reduced by infrequent transmissions,
resulting in low resolution of spatial data and the potential for illegal ﬁshing activity
to take place between transmissions.
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Electronic catch reporting (e-log) is another widely applied MCS tool. Catches
are entered by the vessel’s skipper into an electronic logbook system and transmitted
to control authorities on a daily or haul-by-haul basis. This means that accurate catch
records can be made available to inspectors in advance of boarding and preliminary
ﬁgures for catches aboard a vessel in advance of dockside inspection, reducing the
potential for misreporting and high-grading. However, a key issue with e-log is the
lack of incentive to accurately report discards at sea, if not constrained by other
regulatory frameworks auditing them (Ulrich et al. 2015), so discard reporting must
be framed in a dedicated self-sampling program (see Sect. 18.2.4 below).
The coupling of both sources of information (VMS and e-log) represents a
powerful tool for the ﬁne-scale mapping of catch patterns (e.g. Bastardie et al.
2010; Gerritsen et al. 2012; Hintzen et al. 2012; Ducharme-Barth et al. 2018;
Russo et al. 2018), which can thus inform discard reduction strategies in real time.
Such an approach was taken by the Scottish “real-time closures” scheme as one part
of the North Sea cod recovery program, which aimed to establish a rolling set of
closures and effort-penalised areas. These areas were based on the CPUE of cod,
calculated from VMS-based effort and electronic catch reports made by ﬁshers, at a
spatial resolution of one quarter of an ICES statistical rectangle (Bailey et al. 2010).
Non-compliance with this scheme, monitored through VMS, resulted in vessels
losing the additional time at sea which they were granted for participating.
A further tool available to monitor ﬁshing vessels is satellite surveillance tech-
nology and Vessel Detection Systems (VDS). VDS can detect vessels at sea under
most weather conditions and information can be cross-checked with VMS positions
to identify the vessel. Fishers are unable to detect VDS whilst at sea, and therefore
VDS systems may be a long-term deterrent to ﬁshing in prohibited areas. However,
the coverage remains limited because of the high costs associated with satellite
imaging. An alternative approach to spatial monitoring is the use of automatic
identiﬁcation system (AIS) data. AIS is an automatic tracking system installed on
ships and initially developed by vessel trafﬁc services as a collision avoidance
mechanism. Vessels ﬁtted with AIS transceivers can be tracked by base stations
located along coast lines and when out of range of terrestrial networks, through a
number of satellites ﬁtted with specialised AIS receivers.
An advantage of AIS over other VMS-approaches is that since its primary
purpose is navigational, the data are freely available and emitted more frequently.
AIS data have been used by academics and NGOs (e.g. Natale et al. 2015; Russo
et al. 2016; ICES 2017) to study ﬁshing patterns and demersal impacts. A hindrance
in its use as a discard monitoring tool is that it does not monitor catches nor provide
information on gear used. Furthermore, as the system is based upon VHF radio
transmissions, the range from land over which it is reliable is variable, but often
around 60 km. Finally, a disadvantage is that much of the ﬂeet is not required to carry
AIS. The International Maritime Organization’s International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea requires AIS to be ﬁtted aboard vessels larger than 300 GT, and
all passenger ships regardless of size. Therefore the usefulness of AIS in monitoring
compliance with discard regulations is overall limited.
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18.2.3 Onboard Observers
Onboard observers are a key part of both MCS and scientiﬁc data collection in
ﬁsheries globally (Kennelly and Borges 2018; Fernandes et al. 2011). Observers
usually remain on a vessel throughout a trip and collect data on the quantities and
composition of the catch, discard rates, biological characteristics (such as length,
weight and age), ﬁshing effort (Cotter and Pilling 2007; Mangi et al. 2015), and
collect tissue samples and otoliths. Observers may also have a role in enforcing
ﬁshery regulations, by increasing compliance trough changing ﬁsher’s behaviour or
by documenting any illegal ﬁshing activities taking place during the trip (Porter
2010). But in many jurisdictions, there is a clear regulatory distinction between
scientiﬁc and control functions of observers.
Observers are arguably the most valuable source of data on catch and ﬁshing
effort, and data collected by observers programs have been used extensively in
ﬁsheries management (Benoit and Allard 2009). For example, near real-time man-
agement of discarding in Alaskan ﬁsheries is achieved using the high-quality data
recorded through a full coverage observers program (Kennelly 2016). Data may also
be used to monitor the bycatch of vulnerable species (Piovano and Gilman 2017).
Observers can also act as a bridge between science and industry (Mangi et al. 2015),
which may contribute to increased compliance with legislation such as the Landing
Obligation.
Onboard observers are thus an appropriate tool for the MCS of unwanted catches
and the precision of observers data is generally high. However, the main issue is the
often-limited coverage of observers programs due to high costs, lack of human
resources and/or safety concerns, among others. Observer programs in Scotland
and England for example only covered 0.3% of the ﬁshing ﬂeet in 2013 (Course
2015) and observer programs in Fiji only covered 16.7% of the long-line ﬁshery
(Piovano and Gilman 2017). A low coverage may not guarantee that the data
collected is representative of the whole ﬂeet. Additionally, there is evidence that
ﬁshers may exhibit a change in behaviour when observers are onboard (known as
observer’s effect), leading to bias in the data collected (Liggins et al. 1997), and
observed in Europe particularly since the LO came into force (Borges and Dalskov
2018). This can also happen if the data collected by onboard observers is to be used
to inform future quota decisions and management. This was documented in the
North Paciﬁc Groundﬁsh Observer Program, where ﬁshers avoided areas of high
bycatch because data collected by observers are used to extrapolate bycatch rates for
quota deduction (Faunce and Barbeaux 2011).
Additionally, with observer coverage on only a sample of the ﬂeet, non-random
deployment effects may occur (Benoit and Allard 2009; Faunce and Barbeaux
2011). In Europe, efforts are made to avoid this by designing statistically sound
sampling programs in the frame of the EU Data Collection Framework (European
Union 2016; Rodríguez-Gutierrez et al. 2018).
Whatever the purpose of the observers program, when working under discard
reduction measures such as the Landing Obligation, observers should be strongly
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protected (by having safety training and procedures in case of emergency, adequate
regulatory framework, successful prosecutions when interfered, among others), as
they inevitably are perceived by ﬁshers to have an enforcement role. In Europe, with
the majority of the industry having negative views towards the Landing Obligation
(Mangi et al. 2015; Plet-Hansen et al. 2018), there is potential for increased hostility
from ﬁshers towards onboard observers (Porter 2010). Ultimately, if the programme
coverage is low, an effort should be made to increase the sampling levels. This is not
only to guarantee observers safety but to avoid bias in the data collected (Kennelly
and Borges 2018).
18.2.4 Self-Sampling
Another solution for the MCS of unwanted catches is the use of data collected or
sampled by ﬁshers. Information collected and reported are typically related to catch
(total catch and catch composition) and ﬁshing activity (location, duration of ﬁshing
activity). Fishers may also be required to take samples, such as tissue samples and
otoliths, from the catch (Pennington and Helle 2011). Data may be recorded elec-
tronically or on paper and entered into a database upon return. This information can
then be processed and incorporated in stock assessments and management purposes,
therefore having a role in the control of ﬁshing activity.
Self-sampling and recording by ﬁshers is a technique used for data collection in a
variety of ﬁsheries, and may be mandatory through legislation. In principle, EU
ﬁshers have been legally required to document discards over 50 kg since 2011,
although this measure has largely not been enforced (Ulrich et al. 2015). However,
the self-reporting may also be voluntary. In the Norwegian purse-seine ﬁshery,
ﬁshers are paid to measure a sub-sample of ﬁsh from selected catches as well as
collect otolith, stomach and genetic samples (Pennington and Helle 2011).
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of
self-sampling for the MCS of unwanted catches (Lordan et al. 2011; Kraan et al.
2013). The major attraction of self-sampling for data collection is that a signiﬁcant
increase in sampling coverage can be achieved at little cost. Many studies have
found that ﬁshers welcome being involved with the data collection; although enthu-
siasm may drop over time (Mangi et al. 2014, 2015). Such engagement with the
management process is a key ingredient to success in many ﬁsheries. Additionally,
ﬁshers do not need to provide extra accommodation or room on vessels for outside
observers. If correctly executed and following unbiased sampling protocols, data
collected through self-reporting can be of high quality and used in stock assessment,
as in the New Zealand rock lobster potting ﬁshery (Starr 2000).
Though self-sampling is an effective, low-cost method, there are many disadvan-
tages associated with the sampling technique. With negative attitudes towards the
Landing Obligation widespread in the ﬁshing industry, non-compliant behaviour
may be common and self-reported data may be biased by non-random sampling or
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even fabricated (Ticheler et al. 1998; Graham et al. 2011; Mangi et al. 2016; Gray
and Kennelly 2017). Data precision may also be below the level required for stock
assessments. Data collected by ﬁshers must therefore be quality assured and it is
unlikely that self-sampling could be used as a stand-alone tool for monitoring
compliance with the Landing Obligation.
18.2.5 Electronic Monitoring with Video
Electronic monitoring with video (EM) has been praised by many as a practical,
innovative, and applicable solution for MCS in ﬁsheries (Mangi et al. 2015; Course
2015; Mortensen et al. 2017). Through the combination of video cameras (initially
analogue and closed circuit (CCTV), now mainly digital), GPS and sensor data, EM
can be used to collect information regarding spatial ﬁshing effort and catch data,
which can then be used for monitoring and compliance. EM is already used in many
ﬁsheries in the world, as a full MCS program in North America and Australia, but
with numerous trials also ongoing in South America and the Paciﬁc. In EU, EM has
been trialled in a number of ﬁsheries since 2008, mainly associated with the Cod
Catch Quota Management with fully documented ﬁsheries (FDF) (Kindt-Larsen
et al. 2011; Needle et al. 2015; Ulrich et al. 2015), but also to observe protected
species (Kindt-Larsen et al. 2016).
EM with video meets most of the criteria necessary for the MCS of unwanted
catches and has important advantages (McElderry 2006; Mangi et al. 2015; Course
2015). EM records from many sensors and at a much higher frequency than VMS or
AIS (usually several times a minute). This information provides very rich granularity
to distinguish speciﬁc vessel behaviours (e.g., gear setting, hauling, haul back, catch
stowage, transit, etc.). EM offers thus the opportunity for 100% surveillance of
ﬁshing activities. Furthermore, EM has the ability to monitor illegal discarding, with
video covering upper deck and lower deck discharge chute(s). Detection of illegal
activity could potentially be used in prosecution (McElderry and Turris 2008;
Diamond and Beukers-Stewart 2011). With EM systems recording vessel location
and behaviour throughout a ﬁshing trip, the technology is considered a plausible
long-term deterrent to non-compliant behaviour (Course 2015).
EM is also suitable for monitoring unwanted catches, providing detailed data
such as catch composition and length frequencies through video analysis (Needle
et al. 2015; Sandeman et al. 2016). Such data can then be used for quota management
or for the control of unwanted catches, for example, by closing ﬁshing grounds if
catches appear to be comprised of a large percentage of juveniles, vulnerable, or
otherwise non-target species. Finally, while initial purchase and installation costs
can be signiﬁcant, running costs are low, and the amortized cost over the life of the
equipment is thus very low as compared to human observers.
EM is however not without shortcomings. The main concern is the usually strong
reluctance of ﬁshers to accept onboard cameras that can be watched by the
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authorities. This lack of support from the industry is a major threat against the
successful implementation of all MCS tools (Lordan et al. 2011; Kennelly 2016;
Plet-Hansen et al. 2018). Incentives have been used to gain support by offering
e.g. increased quota, days-at-sea, access to ﬁshing grounds or more ﬂexible gear use.
In the cases where EM has been successfully implemented as full MCS programs,
EM was ﬁrst introduced offering incentives, and later made mandatory to all.
An older concern regarding the use of video footage was that data quality could
be inconsistent. A meta-analysis by Wallace et al. (2013) found that, in almost all of
the 59 EM studies reviewed, data quality was either poor or missing for a proportion
of the study. However, modern technology including digital cameras has signiﬁ-
cantly improved data quality, so these issues are now less of a concern (Bergsson
et al. 2017). Nevertheless, monitoring through video may remain challenging on
vessels in mixed ﬁsheries catching high volumes and with a diverse species com-
position (van Helmond et al. 2015). Considerations must thus be made regarding
camera type and set up, and changes to conveyor belt layout may be necessary to
reduce the volume of ﬁsh per video frame.
Another concern is about data quantity. If ﬁsheries were to widely apply EM for
the collection of catch data, this would represent a very large volume of data. If
inspection is conducted manually by ﬁsheries inspectors, a large onshore team of
video viewers would need to be trained and employed to analyse such data.
Viewing strategies and technology are therefore required to overcome this. First,
viewing time can be reduced by selecting a representative sample of the ﬁshing
trips rather than all hauls. Second, video review involving machine learning and
artiﬁcial intelligence to automatically analyse video footage is advancing (French
et al. 2015; Bergsson et al. 2017).
In any case, even if only a portion of video recordings is reviewed, a key element
of EM is that the awareness that everything is recorded and can be inspected anytime
is expected to have an effective deterrent effect and increase compliance by ﬁshers
(Ulrich et al. 2015).
18.3 Overview of the EM Technology Trialled in EU
Several EM trials have been done in several EU countries since 2008, for different
purposes and with different technologies. Initial trials used the EM Observe™
technology developed by Archipelago Marine Research (Canada), but new software
was later developed within the EU. We brieﬂy summarise the main features and
technical characteristics of four systems: The EM Observe™ system (now operated
by Marine Instruments since 2017), the Black Box developed by Anchor Lab K/S
(Denmark), the Electronic Eye developed by Marine Instruments (Spain), and the
iObserver system developed by CSIC (Spain) (Table 18.2).
The EM Observe™ is the ﬁrst commercial EM system in the world and is used in
several national monitoring programs with 100% ﬂeet coverage of ﬂeets comprising
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Table 18.2 Overview of four EM systems tested in European countries since 2008
Black box video
system EM observe iObserver Electronic eye
Company Anchor Lab K/S
(Denmark) http://
www.anchorlab.
dk/EFM.aspx?
tab¼About
During the EU
trials: Archipel-
ago Marine
Research Ltd.
(Canada). Since
2017, operated
by Marine Instru-
ments
http://www.archi
pelago.ca/ﬁsher
ies-monitoring/
electronic-
monitoring/
CSIC (Spain)
http://lifeiseas.eu/
iobserver/
Marine Instru-
ments (Spain)
http://www.
marineinstruments.
es/monitoring-sys
tems/electronic-
eye/?lang¼en
Applications
in EU
Denmark:
(i) Danish trial for
Catch Quota
Management
(CQM).
12 Demersal
trawlers, Danish
seiners and gill-
netters (2014–
2016) 2.836
hauls audited for
5 gadoids spe-
cies.
(ii) Minimizing
discards in Dan-
ish ﬁsheries
(MINIDISC pro-
ject). 12 Danish
seiners and
trawlers (2014–
2015). 1.018
hauls audited for
7 species. (iii)
The Black Box
R2 version of the
system, is used
for the sensor
system required
for all vessels
ﬁshing for com-
mon mussels
(Mytilus edulis)
in Denmark.
Denmark: Danish
trial for CQM
(2008–2014).
24 demersal
trawlers, Danish
seiners and gill-
netters. Danish
trial on docu-
mentation of har-
bour porpoise
bycatch by gill-
netters (2010–
2011).
England: Several
English CQM tri-
als on otter
trawls, gill nets,
long liners, beam
trawlers, small
vessels (2010–
2015)
Germany: Ger-
man North Sea
CQM Trial
(2011–2016)
Scotland: Scot-
tish CQM Trial
(2008-present).
Sweden: Swedish
trial on gillnetters
bycatch docu-
mentation
(2008).
The Netherlands:
Dutch North Sea
cod CQM (2011–
Spain: Trials
performed
onboard Spanish
oceanographic
vessels, not com-
mercial vessels.
Trials on board
two oceano-
graphic vessels.
10 surveys in the
regions ICES-
Spain; ICES-
West Ireland; and
NAFO, were
performed with a
total number of
270 days at sea in
which the
iObserver was
used in 780 hauls,
taking over
170,000 pictures.
Trials on board
two commercial
vessels. 9 sur-
veys, with a total
number of
36 days at sea,
were carried out
so far in ICES-
Spain regions
VIIIc and IXa.
The iObserver
was used in
162 hauls taking
around 35,000
Spain: System
installed and in
operation in more
than 20 Spanish
tuna purse seiners
and supply vessels
operating in the
Atlantic and Indian
Ocean with auto-
matic image cap-
ture for ﬁshing
monitoring and
bycatch control
on-board,
according to the
standards set by
the corresponding
Regional Fisheries
Organizations
(ICCAT
and IOTC).
Scotland: System
installed and in
operation on
8 Scottish scallop
dredge vessels to
comply with the
regulations and
control set by
Marine Scotland.
(continued)
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more than 200 vessels. It has been trialled by North Sea countries during various cod
catch quota trials in the period 2008–2016 (see references in Table 18.2). Data are
recorded on high capacity hard drives which are manually retrieved and replaced
when the ﬁshing vessel returns to port. The data are analysed using the EM Interpret
software.
The AnchorLab Black Box system was developed to further support the EM trials
in Denmark and has been used in a diversity of ﬁsheries. Its main feature is the
improvement of video storage and data transmission, where EM data are transmitted
to the data receiver via GSM, Wi-Fi, 3G, 4G/LTE, LTE-A or satellite. The analyser
software has a number of features facilitating length measurements including grid
overlay and measuring line. A low power version to suit small-scale vessels and
automated species identiﬁcation for the system are under development.
The Marine Instruments’ Electronic Eye eEYE™ is in operation on a number of
Spanish tuna purse seiners mainly to monitor the bycatch of endangered, threatened
and protected species. It is also installed on some Scottish scallop dredgers. Data are
stored in an internal hard drive and can be downloaded via USB or Wi-Fi. The
cameras can also be visualised from the bridge.
The iObserver system has been developed by the scientiﬁc institute CSIC in
Spain, but is not yet in operation onboard commercial vessels. It is not a full EM
system as it does not observe the ﬁshing deck, but is mainly focused on developing
algorithms for robust automatic species recognition and size estimation of ﬁsh
passing on the conveyor belt.
The four systems are quite different in their set up and operation and offer
different capabilities. In their current state of development at the time of writing,
they are not fully automated and still require human intervention for footage
Table 18.2 (continued)
Black box video
system EM observe iObserver Electronic eye
2015). Dutch sole
REM trial with
beam trawlers
(2015)
pictures.
17 species
already included
in the catalogue.
Published
Scientiﬁc
references
Bergsson et al.
(2017);
Mortensen et al.
(2017); Plet-
Hansen et al.
(2018) and van
Helmond et al. (n.
d.)
French et al.
(2015); Kindt-
Larsen et al.
(2011), (2016);
Mangi et al.
(2015); Needle
et al. (2015);
Ulrich et al.
(2015) and van
Helmond et al.
(2016, 2015,
2017)
Vilas et al.
(2018a,b)
Ruiz 2013, Ruiz et
al. (2014, 2016)
374 K. M. James et al.
viewing, and their base price (system alone) is in the order of 6000–10,000 EUR per
vessel. A direct comparison is however not possible as the systems have not been
trialled on the same vessels and for the same purposes.
Additionally, a number of other EM systems are used throughout the world, but
have not been trialled in Europe.
18.4 Discussion
18.4.1 Comparison of EM with Other MCS Options
This chapter has reviewed the pro’s and con’s of available and emerging approaches
to the MCS of unwanted catches. All tools have advantages and disadvantages, but
the potentials of EM technology seem nevertheless to surpass those of other more
conventional tools presently used. With over 25,000 ﬁshing days at sea monitored by
EM studies, the conclusion is that such technology can be efﬁcient and a practical
method for the MCS of ﬁshing activities (McElderry 2006; Course 2015). Compared
to VMS it is obvious that EM offers much higher resolution information. VMS alone
only enables the monitoring of geographical location, speed and direction. Com-
pared to aerial and patrol vessel surveillance, the major beneﬁt of EM with video is
the potential coverage (i.e. amount of monitoring) that can be achieved. While
surveillance through aerial and water-borne vehicles can only cover a small percent-
age of the ﬁshing ﬂeet and activity, EM has the potential for 100% surveillance of
ﬁshing activities, including catch monitoring, and at much lower cost.
Compared to onboard observers, while these can also offer full coverage, EM
represents only a fraction of the cost (see below). Another major beneﬁt of EM to
onboard observers is its potential to offer 24/7 coverage, as it is not affected by
differences in working times or by weather and is also less intrusive than accom-
modating an extra person onboard. On the other hand, EM cannot collect certain
types of data otherwise provided by onboard observers, including tissue samples,
weight measurements and otoliths. Onboard observers will therefore always be
necessary if such data is required (Kennelly and Borges 2018). EM can neither
provide a bridge between science and industry, improving communication and
understanding.
Compared to self-sampling, a major advantage of data collected through EM is
that data is anticipated to not be biased. Though research has found that information
from self-sampling often reﬂects that from the EM videos, there is a lack of
conﬁdence in data collected when no surveillance and auditing is present (Ulrich
et al. 2015). EM allows for the quality of self-reported data to be checked, and
quality assured.
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18.4.2 EM Costs
A number of studies have compared the costs of EMwith observers. In the early days
of development, McElderry and Turris (2008) stated that EM could be provided at a
quarter of the daily cost of observers, Ames et al. (2007) a third and Kindt-Larsen
et al. (2011) a tenth. Start-up and installation costs have remained high because of
the limited consumer market and the speciﬁc requirements for the technology.
However, operating and amortized costs are low and it takes only short time for
the cumulated investment to become comparatively cheaper than observers (Needle
et al. 2015). Improved technology using 3G/4G networks rather than hard disks and
ensuring better connectivity between boat and shore (and reverse) has already
contributed to reducing transmission costs (Mortensen et al. 2017).
A cost that has remained important in EM concerns data analysis. Video footage
still needs to be manually reviewed and this may appear as a tedious and often
expensive procedure. However, trials conducted over several years have contributed
to the development of efﬁcient analysis software and streamlined procedures that
have signiﬁcantly reduced review time. Bergsson et al. (2017) estimated that the
catches of ﬁve gadoid species in a standard demersal trawl haul could be viewed and
analysed in about 20 min. In the near future, it can be expected that technical
advances involving computer learning and automatic image analysis will further
reduce analysis costs.
Ultimately, the most important element in estimating analysis costs remains thus
the number of hauls to be viewed and the amount of data to be collected. These
depend on the design of the MCS program, its objectives and the required accuracy
and precision of estimates. To reduce costs, EM can be used in combination with
self-reporting. Self-reported catch data from ﬁshers can be in broad agreement with
EM analysis, provided that protocols are clear and that there is regular quality control
and follow-up with ﬁshers. EM can thus be used not as the main source of catch data
but only to audit self-reported data, like black boxes used in trucks and airplanes. In
doing so, a smaller amount of footage would be analysed, reducing costs of onshore
viewers. For example, Needle et al. (2015) estimated that to obtain accurate esti-
mates of all discarded species in a Scottish mixed demersal ﬁshery from video
footage alone, around 40% of footage must be reviewed. But other studies have
found that in order to audit self-reported data, reviewing only 5–10% of hauls was
sufﬁcient (Roberts et al. 2015; Stanley et al. 2015).
18.4.3 Combination of Tools for Successful MCS Programs
Design
Successful MCS programs have in reality involved a combination of tools. For
example, in the Canadian Ground Fish Hook and Line Catch Monitoring Programme,
dockside monitoring is used in conjunction with self-reported data and EM or onboard
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observers. This program is unique as ﬁshers are offered a choice between EM and
onboard observers, though observers are rarely used. Both EM and observers’ data are
used to audit self-reported data, with full dockside monitoring providing further
validation of data regarding catch (Stanley et al. 2015). This combination of tools
results in the increased reliability of self-reported data, and gives the ﬁshers some
buy-in because they are collecting the data (both logbook and audit data) themselves,
which gives them more ownership.
Iceland provides a different example. For a long time, compliance with the
discard ban has been performed using patrol vessel surveillance combined with
logbooks and catch comparisons (European Union 2011). Fish are monitored
throughout the whole supply chain. Data from the electronic logbooks, ofﬁcial
weighings at harbour scales, purchasing receipts /receipts from ﬁsh auction,
reweighing by processors, processing arrangement slips/production reports, sales- /
export reports are all sent to the Directorate of Fisheries, which is then able to
monitor for consistency in the mass balance (Óskarsdóttir and Gunnlaugsson 2015).
Similar regulations are in place in some other countries where electronic data sharing
and transparency is well advanced e.g. Faroe Islands and Norway. This type of
monitoring is efﬁcient in combination with other MCS tools and gives the authorities
an indication of where they need to focus extra attention. The success of the discard
ban in Iceland is also attributed to changes in social perception, with ﬁshers
themselves having the opinion that discarding is unacceptable and even reporting
others if they are seen discarding (Karp et al., this volume). Nevertheless, none of the
countries referred above have an independent large scale at-sea monitoring program,
where discards quantities can be audited and veriﬁed. It is therefore noticeable that
Iceland is currently moving towards introducing EM in its MCS programme. At the
time of writing, the Directorate of Fisheries is considering a regulation which will
require all commercial ﬁshing vessels to be equipped with EM with video to
remotely and electronically monitor potential discarding (Karp et al., this volume).
Drones may also be introduced.
18.5 Conclusions
In conclusion, there are existing options to appropriately monitor and control the
Landing Obligation, and the increased experience with their use together with
technological developments will contribute to enhancing their capacity and reducing
their costs. Nevertheless, MCS technology is only a tool and will not solve the
discard issue alone. The crucial elements for the successful implementation of the
Landing Obligation remain the MCS coverage level and compliance from the ﬁshing
industry. If the industry support remains low, there will always be ways to render
MCS programs ineffective, especially if their coverage is low. Moving forward, this
means that MCS is a necessary but insufﬁcient tool for the successful reduction of
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discards, and MCS programs must thus be integrated into a broad mind shift within
the ﬁsheries and seafood sectors towards better accountancy, transparency and
sustainability, and/or implemented with a high level of coverage.
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Chapter 19
Monitoring the Implementation
of the Landing Obligation: The Last Haul
Programme
Miguel Nuevo, Cristina Morgado, and Antonello Sala
Abstract The collection of catch composition data during inspections at sea by EU
Member States occurs under the framework of joint deployment plans (JDP). It is
known as “the last haul” (LH) programme and has been a fundamental tool in allowing
the estimation of discards and the derivation of indicators of compliance with the
landing obligation (LO). During sea inspections, measures of quantities of ﬁsh below
and above the minimum conservation reference size and grade categories of the legal-
size catch are used to derive estimates of discards. The methods to estimate discards
assume that the relative catch composition (discard ratios) obtained with the data
collected during LH inspections reﬂects the true catch composition of the ﬂeet segment
operating with the same gear and mesh size and in that area. The comparison between
these discard ratios and with what is reported in ﬁshers’ logbook is then used to
estimate the discard component. The background of the LH programme, the method-
ologies for deriving discard ratios using LH data and the statistical analysis of the data
are explained in this chapter.
Keywords Catch composition · Compliance · Inspections · Joint deployment plans ·
Risk assessment
19.1 Introduction
The landing obligation (LO) introduced under Article 15 of the latest reform of the
EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, adopted in 2013 (EU No 1380/2013), constituted a
signiﬁcant policy change and presented a number of challenges for control author-
ities working towards ensuring its uniform and effective implementation across all
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EU Member States (MS). With the obligation to land all catches of quota species
being progressively implemented from 2015 to 2019, the whole approach of mon-
itoring what was landed, for the purpose of ﬁsheries control, had to change to
monitoring catches at sea to detect possible illegal discards.
The European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) considered that a coordinated
implementation of the landing obligation using common methodologies was a
prerequisite to ensure efﬁciency, effectiveness and a level playing ﬁeld for the
ﬁshing industry. EFCA, in accordance with its multiannual work programme, and
in its role supporting MS and the European Commission in the implementation of the
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) requirements, carried out a technical reﬂection on
the deﬁnition of procedures and systems for monitoring the implementation of
discard plans. This reﬂection was driven by the goal of assisting MS and the
European Commission to develop simple and cost-efﬁcient methods for monitoring
implementation and evaluating compliance with the obligation to land all catches.
Joint deployment plans (JDPs) are one of the EFCA main instruments to ensure
effective enforcement and equal treatment for all those involved in a particular
ﬁshery. They are the vehicle through which the Agency organises the deployment
of MS’s human and material means of control and inspection pooled together. Two
criteria have to be met before a JDP can be devised: the ﬁsh stock(s) concerned must
be subject to a long-term recovery plan or a multiannual management plan, and a
speciﬁc control and inspection programme, adopted by the European Commission,
must be in place.
EFCA has no mandate to formulate ﬁsheries policy, which is the responsibility of
the European Commission. Nevertheless, it is within the Agency’s mandate to make
technical recommendations in the context of providing assistance to MS regarding
the range of compliance tools which could be employed to help meet their obliga-
tions vis-a-vis both Article 15 of the CFP and existing control provisions.
Some key objectives of these recommendations were:
• To ensure compliance with the requirements for accurate recording of discards
• To assist MS in the development of practical control and monitoring tools for the
enforcement of the landing obligation through the detection of discarding
practices
• To support the development of speciﬁc discard plans with suggested guidelines to
facilitate the controllability of the landing obligation
The controllability of the landing obligation is also complicated by exemptions
built into the various regional discard plans (see Borges and Penas Lado, this
volume; Rihan et al., this volume). These complexities give rise to a high level of
risk of a non-uniform implementation of the LO, both within and across regions. It is
for this reason that efforts to ensure a level playing ﬁeld in terms of the implemen-
tation of the LO became imperative for EFCA. Compliance with the LO is likely to
be improved if ﬁshers observe a common approach to inspection in all the areas in
which they operate. Indeed, a common point raised by the ﬁshing industry, through
fora such as the EU Advisory Councils, is the need for a level playing ﬁeld in terms
of control and enforcement. Experience with the phased implementation of the LO
has already highlighted the importance of this issue.
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Considering the EFCA recommendations and conclusions agreed during a
stakeholder seminar in January 20141, the launching of a so-called “last haul”
(LH) project was endorsed, an inspection programme coordinated by EFCA in
the framework of the JDPs with the main aim to obtain estimates of discards for
control and compliance purposes. It focused initially in the Baltic Sea, Western
Waters (Pelagic) and Mediterranean Sea (Adriatic) JDP areas, as the species
covered by these JDP areas were the ﬁrst to be subject to the LO from 1 January
2015. This dedicated project was put in place in close cooperation with MS. The
underlying driver for this initiative is the need to maintain a level playing ﬁeld,
which should be achieved by developing a harmonised and standardised
approach to inspections focused on the LO. The LH programme is now being
implemented throughout the main JDPs and integrated in routine sea inspection
procedures.
The LH inspection programme as a speciﬁc monitoring scheme on the imple-
mentation of the LO was introduced following a timeline according to the active
JDPs in each area and to the phased introduction of the LO:
• June 2014: Baltic Sea (cod, salmon, herring and sprat) and Adriatic Sea (anchovy
and sardine)
• August 2014: Pelagic ﬁsheries in Western Waters
• May 2015: Demersal ﬁsheries for cod, sole and plaice in the North Sea
• May 2016: Demersal ﬁsheries for other demersal species in the North Sea
To implement the LH programme in areas without a JDP, such as for other
demersal species in the North Sea in addition to cod, sole and plaice, cooperation
with regional bodies occurred through the EFCA PACT (Partnership, Accountability
(compliance), Cooperation and Transparency) concept. This allowed assistance to be
given by EFCA to the MS. EFCA cooperated with the control expert groups (CEGs)
of the main regional bodies created in the framework of regionalisation, such as
BALTFISH, Scheveningen, SWW and NWW CEGs, and enlarged its assistance in
areas and for species where there is no legal mandate via the speciﬁc control and
inspection programmes (SCIP) in place and thus not covered by the JDP framework
(i.e. demersal ﬁsheries in Western Waters).
The LH inspection work has now been encompassed within the JDPs routine
control and inspection effort and target sea inspections by amending the respective
JDPs and introducing this speciﬁc objective in some campaigns. These speciﬁc
actions are planned according to the results of the regional risk assessment
performed by EFCA in cooperation with relevant MS. A methodology was devel-
oped by EFCA to derive discard ratios from the LH data using different methods
according to the discarding characteristics (see Sect. 19.4).
1https://www.efca.europa.eu/en/content/pressroom/efca-coordination-new-cfp-provisions
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19.2 Conducting LH Inspections and Processing the Data
The LH inspection programme consists of inspections at sea with catch data being
collected by MS inspectors. The catch composition of the last observed haul of the
inspected vessel is recorded in terms of live weight per species and quantities above
or below the minimum conservation reference size (MCRS). These data are recorded
on a template form, which is then submitted to EFCA for compilation and analysis.
The LH concept considers the differences between quantities of catches observed
during the sea inspections and quantities of ﬁsh reported in the logbook. These
differences are used to derive the true discard ratio. With the entry into force of the
LO, the difference between the quantities of ﬁsh by species subject to the LO below
the minimum size (BMS) observed during the LH inspections and the quantities
reported in the logbook can be used as an indicator of illegal discarding practices.
The LH data are considered as reference data and provide knowledge on the catch
composition (number of ﬁsh above and below MCRS deﬁned at EU level and ratio
of different species) in the sampled hauls.
Additional data are also recorded during LH inspections by some MS on more
detailed size compositions of legal-size catches (LSC), i.e. ﬁsh above the MCRS. In
these cases, additional to the species catches quantities above and below the MCRS,
the quantities of ﬁsh above the MCRS are recorded by commercial size grade
(mainly for cod). The differences between the grades declared in the sales and the
grades recorded during the LH inspections provide an indication of the discarding of
LSC, also designated as high-grading (see Method D, described in Sect. 19.4.4).
To facilitate LH classiﬁcation and the data analyses, the ﬁsheries within a JDP
were categorised in several ﬂeet segments according to gear, mesh size, area and
species caught (see example in Annex 19.2). This categorisation by ﬂeet segment
was developed by EFCA in close cooperation with MS, within the JDP steering
groups (SGs) and the regional control expert groups (CEGs) constituted in the
framework of the CFP regionalisation. The analysis of the LH data and subsequent
estimation of discards are conducted at ﬂeet segment level.
Categorising the ﬁsheries within a JDP area into ﬂeet segments assumes implic-
itly that the catch proﬁle of the ﬁshing trips using the same gear and mesh size and
operating in the same areas, i.e. belonging to the same ﬂeet segment, is similar.
However, there are variations in the proportion of undersized ﬁsh depending on the
areas, the type of gear and time of year. In order to have a qualiﬁed knowledge of
these variations and their interdependencies, it is necessary to obtain a large number
of samples to have representative reference data.
19.3 Data and Analysis
The data are collected through the LH inspections together with the declared catches
by category (i.e. discards, landed catches below and above the minimum conserva-
tion reference size, BMS and LSC, respectively). EFCA compiles these data
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provided by the MS concerned, which allows completing and updating a matrix of
discard ratios by segment and by period, which serves as a baseline for future
analysis.
In combination with the LH data collected during inspections, the datasets from
each ﬂeet segment are compiled based on information on annual quantities reported
in logbooks provided by MS and aggregated by:
(a) Month: from January to December.
(b) Fleet segment: ﬂeet deﬁned based on the gear, mesh size and area of ﬁshing
activity. In some case the target species is an additional component to deﬁne the
ﬂeet segment.
(c) Areas: area of ﬁshing activity.
(d) Species: the species caught.
19.3.1 Weighted Mean and Standard Deviation of the BMS
Ratios
In the LH inspections, the following quantities are collected by species:
BMSLHRET : quantity (in kg) of the ﬁsh retained below MCRS
LSCLHRET : quantity (in kg) of the ﬁsh retained above MCRS
Considering the BMS ratio derived from the LH, rBMSLHRET , the percentage of
ﬁsh below MCRS in relation to the total catch (BMS + LSC), for each LH, the ratio
rBMS is:
rBMSLH ¼ BMS
LH
RET
BMSLHRET þ LSCLHRET
ð19:1Þ
The LH rBMS mean, weighted by the catch of the respective haul, is then calculated.
Whereas weighted means generally behave in a similar way to arithmetic means,
they do have a few counter instinctive properties.
Considering the weight (wi) for each ith observation (or LH) the total catch
(BMS + LSC), the LHs with higher catches contribute more than the LHs with
lower catch quantities:
rBMS LHRET f , s ¼
Xn
i¼1
wf , s, i  rBMSLHRET f , s, i
 
Xn
i¼1
wf , s, i
8f , s i ¼ 1; . . . ; nf g; n2N0
ð19:2Þ
where f and s deﬁne a speciﬁc ﬂeet segment and species, respectively, and n is the
number of LHs for that speciﬁc segment.
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The weighted standard deviation (sdw) of the mean rBMS is therefore:
sdw
LH
RET f , s ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃXn
i¼1
wf , s, i 

rBMSLHRET f , s, i rBMS LHRET f , s
2h i
n
0  1 Xn
i¼1
wf , s, i
n0
vuuuuuuuut
8f , s i ¼ 1; . . . ; nf g; n2N0
ð19:3Þ
where n’ is the number of non-zero weights and rBMS is the weighted mean of the
LH observations for a speciﬁc ﬂeet segment (f) and species (s).
19.3.2 Standard Error and Conﬁdence Limits of the Mean
One of the best ways to assess the reliability of the precision of a measurement is to
repeat the measurement several times and examine the different values obtained.
Without variation, all the repeating measurements should give the same value, but in
reality the results deviate from each other. Statistics treats each result of a measure-
ment as an item or individual (i.e. each LH) and all the measurements as the sample.
All possible measurements, including those which were not done, are called the
population. The basic parameters that characterise a population are themean, μ, and
the standard deviation, σ. The latter indicates the variation or dispersion of the
values around the mean. In order to determine the true μ and σ, the entire population
should be measured, which is usually impossible to do. In practice, measurement of
several items is done, which constitutes a sample. Estimates of the mean and the
standard deviation are calculated based on data from sampling and are denoted by x
and s, respectively. The values of x and s are used to calculate the conﬁdence
interval (CI), which is a range of values which is likely to contain the population
parameter of interest. The formula for a conﬁdence interval for a population with
unknown standard deviation is therefore given by the formula:
CI ¼ x t∗n1  s=
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ð19:4Þ
where t∗n1 is the critical t
*-value from the t-distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom
(where n is the sample size). The plus-or-minus ﬁgure usually is called margin of
error and expresses the statistical uncertainty or the maximum expected difference
between the true population parameter and a sample estimate of that parameter. To
be meaningful, the margin of error should be qualiﬁed by a probability statement
(often expressed in the form of a conﬁdence level). The conﬁdence level informs
how sure the value is. It is expressed as a percentage and represents how often the
true percentage of the population lies within the conﬁdence interval. For example,
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the 95% conﬁdence level (which is usually used) means the population parameter
will be within that range with 95% certainty. The 95% conﬁdence interval for the
mean is calculated as:
Lower limit : LL ¼ x t:95  sM Upper limit : UL ¼ xþ t:95  sM
The standard error of the mean is designated as σM. It is the standard deviation of the
sampling distribution of the mean, which is σM ¼ σ=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
where σ is the standard
deviation of the original distribution and N is the sample size (the number of scores
each mean is based upon). When s is used as an estimate of σ, the estimated standard
error of the mean is sM ¼ s=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
. The larger the sample size, the smaller the standard
error of the mean. More speciﬁcally, the size of the standard error of the mean is
inversely proportional to the square root of the sample size (Fig. 19.1).
19.3.3 Evaluating the Effect of the Number of LH Samples
The mean of a sample of measurements, x, provides an estimate of the true value, μ,
of the quantity we are trying to measure. However, it is quite unlikely that x is exactly
equal to μ, and an important question is to ﬁnd a range of values in which we are
certain that the value lies. This range depends on the number of measurements done
and on the question of how certain we want to be. The more certain we want to be,
the larger the range we have to take.
Fig. 19.1 Example of an effect of the sample size on the standard error for a standard deviation
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The larger the number of experiments done, the closer x is to μ, and a smaller range
has to be taken for the same percentage of certainty. The error in the estimate of the
mean is proportional to the standard deviation of the sample, s, and the sample size, n.
It can be visualised by plotting the mean and its 95% conﬁdence interval (CI95). To
calculate the sample mean

x

is likely to be anywhere in the shaded region of the
graph in Figure 19.2a, which shows the variation of the conﬁdence interval around the
mean rBMS or

x

for different sample size (n).
Fig. 19.2 Representation of the 95% conﬁdence region (a) around a mean rBMS of 30.4% (bold
line) contrasted with sample size (number of observations). Effect of the sample size (b) on the
margin of error, e.g. statistical uncertainty of the mean
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For sufﬁciently large number of samples, n, both the curve of the Uncertainty
(Fig. 19.2b) and of the Standard Error (see Fig. 19.1) level off. To know the mean
with a required certainty, there is a need to choose the right size of sample, i.e. the
right number of repeated experiments, n.
After a critical analysis of the LH data, it was decided to look at the rate of
variation of the Statistical Uncertainty (e.g. variation of the Margin of Error), hereby
named as dMoE and set an arbitrary reference or threshold of dMoE¼ 2.5 % (see the
green line in Fig. 19.3) to identify the most appropriate number of samples (or LH),
n, limit beyond which it would not be convenient to increase the sample size (e.g.
number of LH).
Mathematically, the tax of variation of a certain variable is called derivative, and
the ofﬁcial deﬁnition is:
f
0
xð Þ ¼ lim
h!0
f xþ hð Þ  f xð Þ
h
ð19:5Þ
Thus, for the example reported in Fig. 19.3, the experiment would have had at
least 92 samples to achieve the threshold of dMoE ¼ 2.5 %, noteworthy additionally
LHs would not have brought further “Certainty” (or less uncertainty) to the mean
estimation of rBMS.
Fig. 19.3 Example of the variation of the margin of error (dMoE) contrasted with the sample size
(number of observations). The arrow shows the appropriate number of samples (e.g. n ¼ 92 LH)
based on the reference threshold of dMoE ¼ 2.5%
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19.4 Discarding and Methods to Derive Discard Ratios
There are several reasons for discarding, and usually discarding is a combination
of several factors, either legal or economic (Pascoe 1997; Hall et al. 2000;
Catchpole et al. 2015; Damalas et al. 2015). To estimate discards there is a need
to understand the reasons why discarding takes place, so that it becomes possible
to identify more appropriate data and methodologies to be used. The decision tree
below identiﬁes the methodology to be used according to the main reason for
discarding (Fig. 19.4).
Method A: Discards of ﬁsh below minimum conservation reference size
(MCRS) not subject to the landing obligation (LO).
Method B: Discards of ﬁsh below MCRS subject to the LO.
Method C: Discard of ﬁsh species subject to the LO below and above the
MCRS, but without reference data on ﬁsh size structure. The proportion of the
species composition in the catch is used as reference information.
Method D: Discard of ﬁsh species subject to the LO below and above the
MCRS, with reference data on ﬁsh size structure. This method is a combina-
tion of Method B, to estimate the discard of the catches below the MCRS, and
the estimation of high-grading, i.e. discarding of ﬁsh of legal size (legal-size
catch, LSC).
Method E: Discard of species subject to the LO with quota limitation (choke
species). This method is similar to Method C but should take into account a
component of temporal variability, since discarding could be higher when
close to quota exhaustion.
Method F: Discard of species subject to the LO with exemption cases. This
method provides discard estimates based on either Method B or C (depending
on the main discarding motive).
In Sect. 19.4.1, the calculations used in each method to estimate the discard
ratio are described (see also Annex 19.1 for an overview of these methods).
Method A is applied for species not subject to the LO, while all the other methods
concern species subject to the LO. Further details are provided here on when the
use of each method is appropriate. The quality of the discard estimates depends on
the quality and representativeness of the reference data used and the validity of the
assumptions.
Note that in some cases in the literature, the term “discard rate” is used instead of
“discard ratio”. The latter is the appropriate terminology because a “ratio” represents
the proportion of two quantities measured using the same units (e.g. weight in
tonnes), while “rate” represents the proportion of two quantities measured in differ-
ent units (e.g. speed in km/hr is a rate). Nevertheless, the term “rate” is very often
used to denote the proportion of discarded ﬁsh in relation to the total catch.
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19.4.1 Method A: Discard of BMS Catches for Species Not
Subjected to the Landing Obligation
This method is applicable to estimate the discard ratio for species not subjected to the
LO. To apply this method, reference data are needed on the catch size composition of
the species being analysed. These data are obtained during detailed inspections on
board (LH).
Is the species 
subjected to 
LO?
Yes
Are there 
fisheries with 
exemptions?
Method F
No 
exemptions?
Is fish size the 
trigger for 
discarding?
Yes
BMS discard?
Method B
High grading?
Method D
No
Quota 
limitation/ 
choke species?
Method E
Low market 
prices?
Method C
No
Method A
Fig. 19.4 Decision tree of the several methodologies used to estimate the discard ratio using
reference data
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During LH inspections, catch data on unwanted and wanted catch quantities are
collected. If a given Species A is not subjected to the LO, the unwanted catch
component is discarded (DIS), and the wanted component is retained (LSC).
The method assumes that there are no high-grading practices, i.e. all the LSC are
landed. The method, as all the other methods, also assumes that the LH data of a given
ﬂeet segment is a representative of that ﬂeet segment. Therefore, the catch composition
Species A of the LHs is the same as all the other ﬁshing trips within a given ﬂeet
segment. The information of “other ﬁshing trips” is obtained in the declared discards
and landings in logbooks. Note that there are two components of the discards: declared
DISLBA
 
and undeclared discard DISLB∗A
 
. The aim of this method is to calculate the
latter quantity, which is unknown and not reported in the logbook.
rDISLHA ¼
DISLHA
DISLHA þ LSCLHA
ð19:6Þ
rDISLBA ¼
DISLBA þ DISLB∗A
DISLBA þ DISLB∗A þ LSCLBA
ð19:7Þ
By equating the discard ratio of the LH rDISLHA
 
of Species A to the logbook discard
ratio rDISLBA
 
, the discard ratio of Species A in a given ﬂeet segment is:
rDISLHA ¼
DISLBA þ DISLB∗A
DISLBA þ DISLB∗A þ LSCLBA
ð19:8Þ
This corresponds to:
DISLB∗A ¼
rDISLHA  LSCLBA
1 rDISLHA
 DISLBA ð19:9Þ
Using Eq. 19.9, we can calculate the unreported discard ratio rDISA for Species A:
rDISA ¼ DIS
LB∗
A
DISLBA þ DISLB∗A þ LSCLBA
ð19:10Þ
Replacing DISLB∗A
 
of Eq. 19.9 in Eq. 19.10, we end with:
rDISA ¼
rDISLHA  LSCLBA þ DISLBA
  DISLBA
LSCLBA
ð19:11Þ
If high-grading (discarding of legal size catch) occurs, the estimation resulting from
Method A does not take that into account and should be considered an underestimate.
This is because the high-grading component is not recorded in the LH data (e.g. it is
not expected that ﬁshermen are high-grading during a LH inspection).
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19.4.2 Method B: Discard of BMS Catches for Species
Subjected to the Landing Obligation
This method is very similar to Method A but should be used when the species of
interest is subjected to the LO. The non-reference data continues to consist of two
catch components: the wanted and unwanted catch, as in Method A. However, in
Method B there is an additional catch component to be considered in the
non-reference data – the unwanted catch component that is now landed. This method
is appropriate when the discarded catch consists only of ﬁsh below the minimum
conservation reference size (MCRS), designated as below minimum size (BMS).
Similar to Method A, this method requires reference data of the size catch
composition of the species being analysed, such as data collected during detailed
inspections on board (LH). If the species is subjected to the LO, when conducting a
LH inspection, the unwanted (BMS) and wanted catch (legal-size catch, LSC)
quantities are recorded separately. The estimation of the discards of non-reference
data is based on the proportion of unwanted catch of the species in the reference data,
which is the BMS ratio rBMSLHB
 
. For a given ﬂeet segment, the BMS catch ratio of
Species B in the LH data rBMSLHB
 
is compared to the BMS catch ratio in the
logbook rBMSLBB .
From the LH data, the available information is the quantity of the ﬁsh retained
below MCRS BMSLHB
 
and above MCRS LSCLHB
 
. Therefore, the BMS ratio from
LH of Species B rBMSLHB
 
is:
rBMSLHB ¼
BMSLHB
BMSLHB þ LSCLHB
ð19:12Þ
However, the non- reference data rBMSLBB
 
might have an additional illegal and
unreported component of ﬁsh below MCRS that is discarded, DISLB∗B . This compo-
nent is not recorded in the LH data because it is not expected that ﬁshers discard a
species subjected to the LO in the presence of an inspector.
rBMSLBB ¼
BMSLBB þ DISLB∗B
BMSLBB þ DISLB∗B þ LSCLBB
ð19:13Þ
Method B calculates the quantity of illegal discards,DISLB∗B , which is unknown and
not reported in the logbook.
Assuming that rBMSLHB ¼ rBMSLBB , the total BMS ratio of non-reference data is:
rBMSLHB ¼
BMSLBB þ DISLB∗B
BMSLBB þ DISLB∗B þ LSCLBB
ð19:14Þ
which corresponds to:
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DISLB∗B ¼
rBMSLHB  LSCLBB
1 rBMSLHB
 BMSLBB ð19:15Þ
Using the Eq. 19.15, the discard ratio rDISB for a given Species B subjected to the
LO is:
rDISB ¼ DIS
LB∗
B
BMSLBB þ DISLB∗B þ LSCLBB
ð19:16Þ
Replacing DISLB∗A
 
of Eq. 19.15 in Eq. 19.16:
rDISB ¼
rBMSLHB  LSCLBB þ BMSLBB
  BMSLBB
LSCLBB
ð19:17Þ
19.4.3 Method C: Discards of Low-Market Species Subjected
to the LO Regardless of Size
In this method, discards of a certain Species Cmight occur because of its low market
value, and the partDISLBC is made of both the BMS and the LSC component. For such
Species C, subjected to the LO, the recorded BMS from the reference data (LH) is
not indicative of the usual discarding ﬁshers’ behaviour, as it is not expected that
ﬁshers discard either BMS or LSC components during an inspection.
Since the discards also occur in the LSC component, Method B is not appropriate.
Method C to estimate of the discard ratio (rDISC), for a given Species C subjected to
LO, is based on the catch proﬁle similarity between the two species. As in the other
methods, LH data are used as references and compared with the data recorded in the
logbooks. The model assumes that within each ﬂeet segment, the catch proportion of
Species C, named rC in the following equations, in relation to the total catch, is
similar. Considering two species both subjected to the landing obligation, Species B
and Species C, but with Species C discarded regardless of ﬁsh size, it is assumed that
r LHC ¼ r LBC . Therefore,
r LHC ¼
t LHC
t LHC þ t LHB
ð19:18Þ
r LBC ¼
t LBC
t LBC þ t LBB
ð19:19Þ
where tB and tC correspond to the total catch of Species B and Species C, respectively,
in the LH and logbook (LB). The total catches for each species in the logbook are:
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t LBC ¼ DISLB∗C þ BMSLBC þ LSCLBC ð19:20Þ
t LBB ¼ DISLB∗B þ BMSLBB þ LSCLBB ð19:21Þ
where DISLB∗C is the unknown discarded quantity of Species C. The discard
component of Species B,DISLB∗B , also unknown, is estimated by applying Method
B by Eq. 19.15.
Based on the above-mentioned assumption r LHC ¼ r LBC , the ratio of Species C is:
r LHC ¼
t LBC
t LBC þ t LBB
) t LBC 1 r LHC
  ¼ r LHC  t LBB ð19:22Þ
Replacing t LBB in Eq. 19.23 withDIS
LB∗
B þ BMSLBB þ LSCLBB from Eq. 19.20, the total
catch of Species C is:
t LBC ¼
r LHC
1 r LHC
 DISLB∗B þ BMSLBB þ LSCLBB
  ð19:23Þ
Substituting the resulting t LBC from Eq. 19.23 into Eq. 19.20, the DIS
LB
C can be
calculated, and discard ratio, rDISC, of Species C is (Eq. 19.28):
DISLB∗C ¼ t LBC  BMSLBC þ LSCLBC
  ð19:24Þ
rDISC ¼ DIS
LB∗
C
t LBC
ð19:25Þ
rDISC ¼
t LBC  BMSLBC þ LSCLBC
 
t LBC
ð19:26Þ
rDISC ¼ 1 BMS
LB
C þ LSCLBC
r LHC
1r LHC
 DISLB∗B þ BMSLBB þ LSCLBB
  ð19:27Þ
rDISC ¼ 1
1 r LHC
  BMSLBC þ LSCLBC 
r LHC  DISLB∗B þ BMSLBB þ LSCLBB
  ð19:28Þ
19.4.4 Method D: High-Grading Discards
Method D should be used in similar cases as Method C, i.e. when discarding also
involves the legal-size component of the catch. However, Method D should be
applied when there are data available on the size structure of the catch for both
reference and non-reference data sets. The size structure considered here is the grade
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size information, information which is easily collected. Other size structure infor-
mation, such as the length frequency distribution of the catches, could be used but
are more difﬁcult to collect and therefore are not addressed here.
To estimate total discards, there is a need to consider two components: one to
estimate the high-grading (discarding of LSC) and another to estimate the discarding
of BMS, using Method 1 or 2, depending if the species is subjected to the LO or not,
which should only be applied if the LSC are corrected with the estimates of LSC
discards.
Method D assumes that high-grading practices are similar within a ﬂeet segment
or within the unit used for the analysis. Also, it assumes that high-grading does not
occur for larger ﬁsh.
Considering the catch proportion of each grade size x, denoted as Px, as:
Px ¼ CxCTOTAL ð19:29Þ
Being Cx, the catch of grade x and the total catch of all grades, as:
CTOTAL ¼
X5
x¼1
Cx ¼ C1 þ C2 þ C3 þ C4 þ C5 ð19:30Þ
In Eq. 19.30, ﬁve grade sizes are considered, but a different grade size number
could be adopted as a different stratiﬁcation, such as considering a group of
combined grades (e.g. grade size equal or smaller than grade 3).
If the catch proportion of the non-reference data to be assessed (Pn,x) of grade
size x is lower than the catch proportion of the same grade size x of the reference
data (Pf,x), then there is an indication of discarding, because the method assumes
similar size structures between reference ( f ) and non-reference data (n).
Based on Eq.19.29, the catch proportion of reference data could be calculated as:
P f ,x ¼ Cf ,xC f ,TOTAL ð19:31Þ
To estimate the high-grading of non-reference data, it is necessary to identify the
grade sizes for which high-grading is not perceived to be an issue, i.e. grades with
similar catch proportion in reference and non-reference data.
Pn,xePf ,x ð19:32Þ
Assuming that the grade size with no discarding (high-grading) are grade size
1 and 2, then Eq. 19.31 for reference data would be:
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P f , 12 ¼ Cf , 1þCf , 2Cf ,TOTAL ð19:33Þ
There is a need to verify that the catch proportion of reference and non-reference
data is similar for those grade sizes (Eq. 19.32). After identifying the grades with no
discards (100% retained), it is then possible to estimate the total catch of
non-reference data, Cn,TOTAL, using Eq. 19.29. Considering that the grades with no
discarding are grades 1 and 2, the catch proportion of reference data of
non-discarded grades deﬁned in Eq. 19.33 can be written as:
Cn,TOTAL ¼ rCn, 1 þ rCn, 2Pf , 12 ð19:34Þ
where rCn,1 and rCn,2 are the declared landings of grade sizes 1 and 2 of non-reference
data, respectively, which are assumed to be grades with no high-grading.
The total weight of high-grading, H, is:
HTOTAL ¼ Cn,TOTAL 
X5
x¼1
Cn,x ð19:35Þ
ETo calculate the high-grading weight of a given grade size, x, the proportion of
the reference data of that grade size is applied to the total catch of non-reference data
(from Eq. 19.34), to obtain the total catch of each grade, which is then subtracted
from the reported catch of that grade, as:
Hx ¼ P f ,x  Cn,TOTAL
  rCx ð19:36Þ
The estimation of the total high-grading ratio, HR, is:
HR ¼ HTOTAL
Cn,TOTAL
ð19:37Þ
Note that the high-grading ratio is a discard ratio only for the legal-size compo-
nent of the catch and does not consider the discards of ﬁsh below the MCRS.
19.4.5 Method E: Discard of Species with Quota Limitations
(Choke Species) and Subjected to the Landing
Obligation
Method E should not be considered as a method but a combination of different
methods based on available information of discard practices. Discards in this case
originates due to quota limitations. The more appropriate method to estimate the
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discard ratios is the application of Method C, but data analysis should be conducted
regularly throughout the year as the discard pattern might change depending on the
quota availability throughout the year.
19.4.6 Method F: Discard of Species Subjected
to the Landing Obligation with Exemption Cases
Method F is a combination of methods according to the main discard reasons and
should only be applied to the catch proportion that is not exempted. Therefore, there
is a need to estimate the catch proportion that is subjected to the LO and the
exempted component.
19.5 Outcome and Way Forward
The results from the LH programme are an important input into the annual risk
assessment workshops, for the evaluation of the likelihood of non-compliance with
the landing obligation. The outcome of the risk assessment is then used as a key
input for the planning of the JDP for the upcoming year control activities. It should
be noted that the objective of the collection of LH data is not to obtain precise discard
ratios but to identify where problems are present, and in which magnitude, to focus
monitoring and control efforts. The information collected by MS under their scien-
tiﬁc discard observers’ programmes is also taken into account when evaluating
compliance. This information is compiled in a public database available at https://
stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/web/stecf/reports. The Joint Research Centre is assembling
ﬁshery data collected under the EU Data Collection Framework (DCF)2,3 and acting
as secretariat of the Scientiﬁc, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
(STECF).
During the EFCA JDP risk assessment workshops, the main threats, including
non-compliance with the LO and associated misreporting, are identiﬁed at ﬂeet
segment level, and the spatial and temporal distributions of ﬁsheries are assessed,
allowing for the planning of future JDPs. A set of possible risk treatment measures is
then developed, and, on this basis, a series of “speciﬁc actions” addressing the main
threats are implemented in the JDPs. In addition to the risk assessment workshops,
2Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008 of 25 February 2008 concerning the establishment of a
community framework for the collection, management and use of data in the ﬁsheries sector and
support for scientiﬁc advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy.
3Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 on the
establishment of a union framework for the collection, management and use of data in the ﬁsheries
sector and support for scientiﬁc advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy and repealing
Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008.
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the CEGs formally requested the assistance of EFCA to facilitate a joint compliance
evaluation with the provisions of the LO. In this context, EFCA is using the methods
described in this chapter to derive indicators that can be used in the evaluation of
compliance with the LO, one of which being based on the comparison of reference
ﬁshing activity information (inspected activity using LH, with information coming
from electronic monitoring (EM) with video or observers) versus non-inspected
activity. Differences could be measured and utilised in the form of a compliance
indicator. This approach has been followed in the context of the LO and assisted in
deriving the characterisation of the nature of possible non-compliance behaviours.
Regarding standardisation of how LH inspections are conducted, EFCA devel-
oped basic guidelines, produced in cooperation with MS in 2015. The standardised
sampling procedure differs by region and type of ﬁshery (segment) and includes
observing the whole catch or taking a determined minimum sample size for large
hauls (i.e. 300 kg). For these larger hauls, it is recommended that three sets are taking
at the beginning, middle and end of the haul. A good approach to standardisation is
also the exchange of experiences and best practices among MS in dedicated work-
shops, exchanges of inspectors and participation of EFCA coordinators. The issue of
last haul standardisation was also raised in other meetings, speciﬁc LH and discard
workshops organised by EFCA, in which relevant scientists, MS authorities and
other stakeholders’ feedback on the LH programme was acknowledged. The current
guidelines provide a common basis for promoting standardisation and
harmonisation, and more detailed guidelines to further improve LH data quality
are being developed between EFCA and MS.
Additionally, reference data on catch composition could be observed through
fully documented ﬁsheries (FDF), including EM with video. These observed data
could then be systematically compared with catch composition data from the
reported landings of vessels of the same ﬂeet segment that have operated in the
same area at the same time.
Incentives may continue to exist for discarding, for example, of specimens below
MCRS, smaller market categories [high-grading], species that threaten to choke the
ﬁshery, species of low market value, etc. If such specimens are being discarded due
to non-compliance with the LO, it is expected that these will be found in smaller
proportions of the reported landed catch than in the observed catch. One limitation of
the LH programme could be that discrepancy between the observed and the reported
catch composition cannot be used as evidence of discarding in any individual case
(because catch compositions can vary by chance or due to differences in the skills of
skippers), but trends in the magnitude of these discrepancies at aggregate level are
being considered by EFCA and the MS as an indicator to evaluate compliance with
the LO (see, e.g. Valentinsson et al., this volume). At the same time, declining trends
in the proportions of unwanted catch (below MCRS or of the choke stock) in the
inspected catch could be an indicator of progression in avoidance behaviour. These
trends could be interpreted by looking at changes in selective gear uptake or changes
in spatiotemporal effort allocation.
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Annexes
Table Annex.19.1 Overview of different methodologies used by
EFCA to estimate discards and the discard ratio
Subject
to LO
Discarded
component
Type of
reference
data
needed Assumptions Discard ratio
Method
A
No BMS Reference
catch data
discriminated
as retained
and discarded
No high-grading in
the retained
component
uDRn ¼ uDISnuDISnþrDISnþRETn
Uniform catch
size composition
within the ﬂeet
segment
Method
B
Yes BMS Reference
catch data
discriminated
as BMS and
LSC
No high-grading in
the LSC
component
uDRn ¼ DR f LSCn1DR f  rBMS
 
 1DR fLSCn
 
Uniform catch
size composition
within the ﬂeet
segment
Method
C
Yes BMS and
LSC
Reference
catch data of
two species
discriminated
as BMS and
LSC
Uniform catch size
and species com-
position within the
ﬂeet segment
uDRA,n¼ uAnAn,TOTAL
Method
D
Yes BMS and
LSC
Reference
data with size
structure
information
(i.e. grade
size)
Uniform catch size
composition within
the ﬂeet segment
DRn ¼ uBMSnþHTOTALuBMSnþrBMSnþCn,TOTAL
No high-grading
of the grade size
classes of larger
ﬁsh and similar
retained propor-
tion of reference
and non-reference
data
Method
E
Yes BMS and
LSC
Similar to
Method C
Similar to Method
C
Similar to Method C
Method
F
Yes,
partially
See other
methodsa
See other
methodsa
See other methodsa See other methodsa
aDependent on the discarding practices in the nonexempted component
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Annex 19.2 Baltic Sea JDP ﬂeet segments
Fishery Gear Segment Area
Segment
code
Demersal ﬁsheries, active gears all
vessels lengths
Demersal
active
OTa (105) 22–24 BS01
SXb (105) 22–24 BS02
OTa (105) 25–27 BS03
Pelagic ﬁshery for sprat and herring,
active gears and all lengths
Pelagic
active
OTa, PTc (16 and
<32)
22–27 BS04
OTa, PTc (32and <90) 22–27 BS05
OTa, PTc (16 and
<105)
28–32 BS06
Salmon South Pelagic
passive
GNd (157) 22–29 BS07f
LLe 22–29 BS08f
Salmon North Pelagic
passive
FIX (national rules) 22–32 BS09f
Passive gear ﬁshery Demersal
passive
GNd (110), LLe 22–24 BS10
GNd (110), LLe 25–27 BS11
Pelagic
passive
GNe (32 and <110),
FIX (national rules)
22–32 BS12
Other Other Other non-reported in
segments 1–12
22–32 BS13
Notes:
aOT includes the following gear codes according to Annex XI of Regulation (EU) No 404/2011:
OTB, TBN, TBS, TB, OTT, OTM
bSX includes the following gear codes according to Annex XI of Regulation (EU) No 404/2011:
SDN, SSC, SPR, SX, SV
cPT includes the following gear codes according to Annex XI of Regulation (EU) No 404/2011:
PTB, PTM
dGN includes the following gear codes according to Annex XI of Regulation (EU) No 404/2011:
GN, GNS, GNC, GTN, GTR
eLL includes the following gear codes according to Annex XI of Regulation (EU) No 404/2011:
LHP, LHM, LLS, LLD, LL, LTL, LX
fDirect ﬁshing for salmon (i.e., when salmon catches are > 50% of total catches per ﬁshing
trip)
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Glossary of Terms and Symbols Used in the Equations
Glossary of Terms
Below minimum size (BMS) Marine organism with size below the minimum
conservation reference size (MCRS).
Discard(s) Catch component that is not retained (discarded) and not landed.
Abbreviated in this document as DIS. Discarding is the practice of returning
unwanted catches to the sea, either dead or alive, because they are undersized, due
to market demand or due to speciﬁc regulations such as quota exhaustion or catch
composition rules.
Discard rate See discard ratio deﬁnition.
Discard ratio Proportion of discard quantities in relation to the total catch. Usually
expressed in percentage (%) and often also designated as “discard rate”.
Grade size Size category determined according to weight or number of ﬁshes in 1 kg.
The EU grade deﬁnition is laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 2406/96.
High-grading Discarding of legal-size catch (see LSC deﬁnition below).
Landing Obligation EU term for the obligation to land all catches of regulated
commercial species on board and to count those catches against quota. As deﬁned
in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, the LO applies to all catches of
species subject to catch limits or, in the Mediterranean, species which are subject
to minimum sizes. The LO includes some exemptions: de minimis (that allows
the discarding of a small percentage of catches), high survivability (deﬁned in the
discard plans and that allows the discarding of specimens with a high chance of
surviving) or for catch damaged by predators, disease or contaminated and
therefore unﬁt for human consumption.
Last haul (LH) Hauls in which ﬁsheries inspectors have recorded the amounts of
the different components of the catch (i.e. BMS, LSC, etc.) per species. Data
collected at those hauls are considered reference data to estimate discards.
Legal-size catch (LSC) The catch of marine organisms of size above the minimum
conservation reference size (MCRS).
Non-reference data In this document, it refers to data recorded in logbooks or
landing declarations, where the discarding component has not been fully veriﬁed.
PACT Partnership, Accountability (compliance), Cooperation and Transparency.
This concept allowed assistance to be given by EFCA to the MS in accordance
with provisions of Articles 7 and 15 of EFCA’s founding regulation. EFCA
cooperated with control expert groups from the main regional bodies created in
the framework of regionalisation and enlarged the assistance in areas and for
species where there is no SCIP in place and thus not covered by the JDP
framework.
Reference data Data assumed to be representative of the true catch composition. In
opposition to non-reference data, in reference data, the discarding component is
likely to have been fully veriﬁed.
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REM Remote electronic monitoring. Vessels which are equipped with video cam-
eras and a system of sensors and vessel monitoring tools, to record ﬁshing and
ﬁsh sorting operations. Very often ﬁshing data from these vessels are considered
reference data.
Retained catch Catch component that is retained (not discarded) and landed.
Abbreviated in this document as RET.
Unwanted catch Designates the catch that was, usually, discarded prior to the
coming into force of the LO. Very often, associated with undersized or low
market demand ﬁsh or cases of catches for which the quota had been exhausted
or in contradiction with catch composition rules.
Wanted catch Is used to designate the quantity of ﬁsh that would be landed in the
absence of the LO.
Symbols Used in the Equations
BMS Catch below minimum size
rBMS Ratio of catch below minimum size
t Total catch
DIS Discards
rDIS Discard ratio, also designated as discard rate
H High-grading weight
HR High-grading ratio
LSC Legal-size catch
r Catch proportion of a certain species in relation to the total catch
P Proportion (e.g. of grade sizes in relation to the total catch)
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Chapter 20
Possible Uses of Genetic Methods
in Fisheries Under the EU Landing
Obligation
Magnus Wulff Jacobsen, Brian Klitgaard Hansen, and Einar Eg Nielsen
Abstract While genetics has assisted ﬁsheries management for over 50 years,
genetic applications aiming to alleviate or eliminate discards have received little
attention. In this chapter, we focus on how genetics can be applied under the EU
Landing Obligation, to identify and prevent unwanted catches and to estimate the
composition of products made from such catches. Three themes are covered: (i) the
genetic identiﬁcation of bycatch; (ii) the genetic analysis of species composition in
nutritional products made from unwanted ﬁsh; (iii) the potential of using so-called
environmental DNA (DNA shedded from aquatic organisms into the water) to
reduce bycatch. For all themes, we introduce and explain the relevant genetic
techniques, including data formats and analyses. We present the most signiﬁcant
limitations of the methodologies for their implementation in ﬁsheries and provide
examples of their use through relevant case studies. Finally, we discuss the potential
future perspectives, with emphasis on the rapid progress in portable and automatic
DNA devices, which may revolutionize the use of real-time onsite genetic analyses.
Keywords Discard · Environmental DNA · Fisheries bycatch · Genetics · Species
composition · Species identiﬁcation
20.1 Introduction
For more than 50 years, genetics has been assisting ﬁsheries management and marine
conservation efforts (Ovenden et al. 2015). During this period, the molecular
techniques for studying genetic variation and associated analytical methods have
changed tremendously (e.g., Goodwin et al. 2016; Herbert et al. 2003), which in turn
have prompted new possibilities in relation to ﬁsheries (Ovenden et al. 2015).
Examples of the application of genetics are diverse and cover issues like species
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identiﬁcation, analysis of stock structure and food traceability, which are all relevant
for conservation, ﬁsheries managers and consumers (reviewed by Ovenden et al.
2015). So far, most uses have focussed on ecosystem management and sustainable
harvest of ﬁsh resources, while genetic applications aiming to alleviate or eliminate
discards have received little attention.
In this chapter, we focus on how genetics can be applied under the EU Landing
Obligation, in order to assess and mitigate unwanted catches (e.g., undersized
juvenile and low-proﬁt species that will have to be retained and landed under the
Landing Obligation) and identify the composition of processed products made from
these catches. For all themes, we introduce the relevant genetic techniques, the
associated data format and downstream analyses. Moreover, we present the most
signiﬁcant limitations of the techniques, provide examples of their use through
relevant case studies and ﬁnally discuss potential future perspectives.
20.2 Genomes, Genes and Genetic Markers
All genetic approaches described in this chapter rely on the analysis of
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), which constitutes the genetic code. When
populations of organisms are isolated from each other, they follow separate evolu-
tionary trajectories and accumulate genetic differences over time due to the evolu-
tionary forces of mutation, selection and genetic drift (stochastic changes in the
frequencies of genetic variants accumulating from generation to generation) (Coyne
and Orr 2004; Mayr 1942, 1963). Accordingly, when two sympathetic species have
been geographically separated for long enough, their DNA will contain genetic
differences, which can be used to unambiguously identify these species using
various techniques.
Within a normal animal cell, two different genomes can be found, i.e. the nuclear
genome and the mitochondrial genome also referred to as the “mitogenome”
(Fig. 20.1). The nuclear genome is located within the cell nucleus in one copy per
cell. This genome contains most of the organisms’ genes and is by far the largest,
consisting of millions or billions of base pairs. The mitochondrial genome is a much
smaller circular genome of around 15–17,000 base pairs in length, and normally
includes 37 genes (Ballard and Whitlock 2004). One mitogenome is located in each
mitochondrion, i.e. the small organelles responsible for energy production (Saraste
1999), which is also found in the cell. The number of mitochondria varies between cell
types, with numbers ranging from ~80 to ~2000 in mammals (Cole 2016). Hence,
there are many copies of the mitogenome, but only one nuclear genome within each
cell. The high number of mitogenomes per cell is an advantage for many genetic
applications, as it is easier to obtain a sufﬁcient amount of intact DNA suitable for
downstream applications (Ballard and Whitlock 2004; Galtier et al. 2009). Combined
with other attributes like a highly conserved gene content and architecture, which
promote easy inter-species comparisons, this feature has made the mitochondrial DNA
the most widely used marker for many genetic applications.
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20.3 Species Detection and Bycatch Assignment
20.3.1 The Technology and Its Applications in Fisheries
With the implementation of the Landing Obligation, many species that previously
would have been discarded, e.g. undersized juvenile and low-proﬁt species will now
have to be retained and landed. This will challenge the ﬁshing industry, requiring
authorities and managers to ensure the correct identiﬁcation of all landed ﬁsh. This
information will allow for a more accurate assessment of ﬁsheries’ impacts on
species and populations, improving possibilities for evaluating the effect of ﬁshing
on the viability of the species or populations of interest (Ovenden et al. 2015). Thus,
if ﬁshing has a signiﬁcant impact on certain species, legal actions can be put in place
to reduce bycatch.
Species identiﬁcation is often based on morphological characters alone; however,
in many cases proper species assignment can be problematic. For example, diag-
nostic characters may not be present across juvenile life stages of some species
(McEachran and Musick 1973). Moreover, species may lack morphological charac-
ters for easy taxonomic identiﬁcation because they are badly preserved (or damaged
by the ﬁshing gear), are poorly deﬁned (due to limited taxonomic knowledge), or do
not exist (cryptic species, i.e. different species that are morphological identical)
(Ovenden et al. 2015). Even when good diagnostic morphological characters exist,
taxonomic analysis can be difﬁcult, labour intensive and expensive, as it relies on the
expertise of highly specialised taxonomists, the number of which is declining
worldwide (Hopkins and Freckleton 2002; Wheeler et al. 2004). Hence, alternative
ways of conducting species assignment are warranted.
DNA-based identiﬁcation methods offer fast, standardized and accurate tools for
species assignment. The only prerequisites are that the focal species and its sister-
species have been described taxonomically, that regions of their DNA have been
Nuclear DNA Mitochondrial DNA
General information:
- One genome per cell
- Large genome
- Thousands of genes
General information
- Multiple genomes per cell
- Small genome
- Around 37 genes
An animal cell
Cell nucleus
Mitochondria
Fig. 20.1 Key differences between the nuclear and mitochondrial genomes. The drawing depicts
an animal cell and the arrows show the location of the nuclear and mitochondrial DNA. For
simplicity, not all cellular organelles are shown
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sequenced and that there is sufﬁcient variation within these sequences to discrimi-
nate between target and other taxa. The most commonly used technique is “DNA
barcoding” described by Herbert et al. (2003) (for description of technical terms in
bold, see text box 20.1). This technique relies on region-speciﬁc DNA ampliﬁcation
using a method known as Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and is typically
followed by conventional Sanger DNA sequencing. Typically, for animals, the
mitochondrial cytochrome oxidase subunit 1 gene (abbreviated COI) is sequenced
and compared to a validated sequence reference database (Fig. 20.2a).
The ampliﬁed gene segment is approximately 650 base pairs long and was
originally chosen based on the level of sequence variation, for most taxa showing
only minute genetic variation within the species, while still enabling the discrimi-
nation of even closely related species (Hebert et al. 2003). Moreover, several
universal PCR assays have been developed rendering it possible to amplify and
sequence COI across large taxonomic groups, e.g. ﬁsh, vertebrates and invertebrates
(Ivanova et al. 2007). However, other gene regions of either mitochondrial or nuclear
origin are also used, but to a lesser degree, provided they are diagnostic for the
species under investigation. For example, in ﬁsh the mitochondrial cytochrome b
gene (Cytb) is extensively used as a DNA marker for species identiﬁcation
(Teletchea 2009).
Textbox 20.1 Descriptions of the Molecular Methods Mentioned in This
Chapter
PCR
Polymerase Chain Reaction or PCR is a method to amplify a speciﬁc region
of the DNA, allowing the generation of billions of DNA copies of speciﬁc
genomic regions. The technique relies on two short DNA sequences, so-called
primers, and an enzyme, a polymerase, which copies DNA during repeated
cycles of heating and cooling (so-called PCR cycles). Primers only bind to a
speciﬁc region of the target DNA and serve as starting point for the DNA
polymerase. PCR can be conducted with species-speciﬁc primers, targeting a
single species, or universal primers that ampliﬁes a speciﬁc region across taxa.
The latter is normally used for DNA barcoding when the identity of the
specimen is not known a priori.
PCR assay
The speciﬁc combination of primers used in PCR. For qPCR and ddPCR
the assay include primers and reporter molecule.
DNA barcoding
DNA barcoding relies on PCR using universal primers that ampliﬁes a
speciﬁc region, normally the mitochondrial COI gene, across taxa. Following
ampliﬁcation, the region can be puriﬁed, sequenced and ﬁnally compared to a
database in order to establish species identity.
(continued)
410 M. W. Jacobsen et al.
TextBox 20.1 (continued)
Sanger sequencing
Sanger sequencing is a technique that allows for DNA sequencing of one
sequence at the time of up to around 1000 base pairs.
Next generation sequencing
Next generation sequencing or NGS refers to DNA sequencing, which
allows individual sequencing of million of sequences in parallel. Many plat-
forms only generate short sequences up to few hundred base pairs.
Meta-barcoding
Meta-barcoding is a method that combines DNA based identiﬁcation and
Next generation Sequencing DNA sequencing. It relies on the use of universal
primers, which allows ampliﬁcation of a speciﬁc target region across species
groups (e.g. ﬁsh) in environmental or other mixed species samples, which
subsequently can be sequenced. Output sequences can following be matched
to a reference database in order to analyse the number of species present in the
sample. Moreover, a measure of relative species composition can be made by
counting the number of sequences from each observed species. However, in
some cases, the primers may work better for some species than other, which
will bias such estimates.
qPCR
Real-time PCR, also called quantitative PCR or qPCR, is a method that
allows for analysis of a PCR reaction in real-time, which enables enumeration
of DNA copies. qPCR is based on the same approach as PCR but additionally
contains a ﬂuorescence region-speciﬁc reporter molecule, which allows for
visualization of the increase in DNA copies during PCR. A positive detection
is based on the accumulation of the ﬂuorescent signal and the cycle threshold
(Ct), which is deﬁned as the number of cycles required for the signal to be
signiﬁcantly higher than the background ﬂuorescence level. If a qPCR reaction
is analysed together with a dilution series (a standard curve) of a known
number of targets, the number of DNA molecules in the reaction can be
estimated.
ddPCR
Like in qPCR, droplet digital PCR or ddPCR relies on PCR using region
speciﬁc primers and a DNA speciﬁc reporter. However, differently from qPCR
the total PCR reaction is fractionated into thousands of small oil droplets, and
PCR is subsequently carried out separately within each droplet. Following
PCR each droplet is analysed for positive ampliﬁcation and number of initial
DNA targets. Compared to qPCR, ddPCR provide an absolute count of target
DNA copies per sample without the need for running a standard curve and
enables more accurate measurements of small fold changes in target DNA
amongst samples.
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When comparing a sequence from a specimen with unknown taxonomic identity to
the database, it is important to make sure that the obtained sequence is of high quality
and that the database includes all closely related species. If this is the case, the identity
of the specimen can be inferred with very high precision, except in cases where
diagnostic variants do not exist. A lack of diagnostic variants can be found e.g.
between extremely closely related species and in groups of organisms with low levels
of variation in the chosen barcoding region or due to introgression events where the
DNA is shared between species because of hybridization. When no close matches of
the DNA sequence can be found in the database, the sample likely belongs to an
unknown species or one that is not included in the database (Ovenden et al. 2015).
Genetics can also be used to assign individuals to populations within species (Nielsen
2016). In these cases, several nuclear genetic markers are normally used in a proba-
bilistic framework, combining the statistical power of individual genetic markers into
an overall likelihood of origin. This is necessary, as populations are rarely ﬁxed for
speciﬁc (diagnostic) gene variants of either mitochondrial or nuclear genes.
20.3.2 Current Limitations
The accuracy of DNA barcoding is generally high with most species showing
distinctive COI sequences (Hebert et al. 2003). For example, among 207
Australian ﬁsh species, the identiﬁcation success rate was 93–98% across groups
A B
Species identification by DNA barcoding Species identification by qPCR
?
ATGATAGTCGTAACTGATGACTGAGTCCGT
AAGATAGTCGTTACTGATGAATGAGTCCGT – Species 1 
AAGATAGTCCTAACTGATGACTGAGTTCGT – Species 2
ATGATAGTCGTAACTGATGACTGAGTCCGT – Species 3
ATGCTAGTCGTAACCGATGACTGAGTCCCT – Species 4
ATGCTAGTCGTAACCGATGACTGCGTCCCT – Species 5
1) Tissue from 
    unknown species
2) Extraction of DNA
3) PCR followed 
by sequencing
of COI gene
4) Matching to
database
?1) Tissue from      unknown species
2) Extraction of DNA
3) qPCR using species-specific assay
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Fig. 20.2 Overview of the analytical steps in genetic species-identiﬁcation either by (a) DNA
barcoding or (b) Quantitative PCR (qPCR). In DNA barcoding, the barcoding gene (e.g. COI) is
ampliﬁed by PCR and the product subsequently sequenced and ﬁnally compared to a database for
species-match. In qPCR species-speciﬁc assays are used. Such assays are initially tested for possible
cross-ampliﬁcation to other species in order to control for false-positive detections. Hence, a
positive ampliﬁcation signal denotes a positive identiﬁcation for the tested species
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(Ward et al. 2005), and a 90% accuracy has been documented for North American
freshwater ﬁsh (April et al. 2011). Nonetheless, the overall precision of the
methods critically depends on the reference database used (Ovenden et al. 2015).
To assure transparency, sequences should optimally be matched against DNA
sequence data from voucher specimens or other curated museum specimens to
ensure the reliability of the data (Ratnasingham and Hebert 2007). Currently
several public DNA databases exist. GenBank (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
genbank/) and the Barcode of Life (http://www.boldsystems.org/index.php/data
bases) are probably the best known and contain sequences from thousands of
species. While the Barcode of Life database consists of several recognized DNA
barcoding genes with high quality assurance assessment, Genbank acts as a general
repository for genetic data and has therefore a lower quality standard. Due to a
general increase in the use of genetics for species identiﬁcation and taxonomic
purposes, as well as the establishment of databases for commercial species, the
databases already contain sequences from many species and are constantly
expanding. For example, the Barcode of Life database (on the 16th of June
2018) contained 18,843 species of ray-ﬁnned ﬁshes. However, the databases
remain incomplete, especially for some cryptic, rare and non-commercial species
and for geographical regions with high species diversity.
Another limiting factor is the labour expenditure needed for sequencing and
analysing of the data. However, other genetic methods can be used for performing
species-level assignment that do not involve direct visualization of the genetic
code, thereby potentially allowing faster and easier species identiﬁcation. One such
technique is real-time PCR, also known as quantitative PCR (qPCR)
(Fig. 20.2b). Quantitative PCR relies on species-speciﬁc detection and utilizes a
chemistry, which emit light when in contact with DNA from the target organism.
The technique allows for simultaneous analysis of one or multiple samples in
parallel thereby permitting a fast, sensitive and a potentially cost-efﬁcient alterna-
tive to conventional DNA barcoding for routine presence/absence applications.
While the risk of false-positives in DNA barcoding both depends on the accuracy
of the reference databases and the target region’s ability to discriminate between
species, false-positives in qPCR analysis depend on potential cross-ampliﬁcation
to non-target species (the method provides a signal of presence of the species,
while it is not there). Hence, for qPCR analysis thorough testing for cross-
ampliﬁcation is needed before an assay can be validated. This can be particularly
laborious and expensive for marine species due to the often-large number of related
and co-occurring species. Moreover, since a single qPCR assay is speciﬁc to a
particular species or related group of organisms, qPCR is most useful to identify
samples where the number of candidate species can be restricted to a few (for
example by using morphological characteristics, see Helyar et al. 2014). In cases
where the species identity is completely unknown (e.g. highly damaged or
processed individuals) many independent qPCR analyses might be needed to
provide a positive detection, which increases the cost signiﬁcantly. In these
cases, DNA barcoding may be more cost effective.
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20.3.3 Case Studies
Skates and rays are particularly vulnerable to overharvesting due to their life history
patterns involving slow growth rates, high age of maturity and low fecundity and
slow reproductive rates (Holden 1973). Currently, several species are considered
threatened and are therefore protected, while others are still targeted or caught as
bycatch and sold commercially (STECF 2017). These include several species that
can be difﬁcult to distinguish from protected species based on morphology alone
(McEachran and Musick 1973): e.g., the thorny skate (Amblyraja radiata) is
protected in the North Sea ﬁsheries (STECF 2017) but can be difﬁcult to distinguish
from the thornback ray (Raja clavata), which may be landed (Larsen et al. 2013).
Moreover, identiﬁcation is commonly based on the number of dorsal spines, which
in cases where only the ray “wings” are retained, as practiced in some countries (e.g.,
Denmark), renders species assessment nearly impossible - even by trained special-
ists. Hence, to monitor rays and skates, genetic tools should be applied. This may
especially become relevant with the introduction of the Landing Obligation, as there
is a risk that protected species will be landed. Here a standardized genetic approach
may be of vital importance for accurate species monitoring of the landed catches,
which in turn should eventually lead to better management of the species. Examples
of this already exist for other species. For example, albatrosses have suffered high
mortality as bycatch in long line ﬁsheries (Burg 2007; Walsh and Edwards 2005).
These species are highly mobile, migrating thousands of kilometres between breed-
ing and feeding grounds. As feeding habitat often overlaps between species or
populations, and because bycatch carcasses may be highly degraded, it has been
difﬁcult to assign individuals to species or populations. Analyses of genetic markers
either mitochondrial DNA (Walsh and Edwards 2005) alone or in combination with
nuclear markers (Burg 2007) have demonstrated that species, sub-species and even
breeding populations could be assigned with high accuracy. This has permitting the
impacts of bycatch on speciﬁc populations or species to be more accurately
estimated.
20.4 Monitoring Species Composition in Processed Fish
Products
20.4.1 The Technology and Its Applications in Fisheries
Millions of tonnes of ﬁsh are thrown back to the sea as bycatch every year
(Kelleher 2005). With the introduction of the EU Landing Obligation, all catches
of regulated commercial species will have to be landed and counted against quota.
This procedure is expected to lead to large amounts of bycatch being landed, which
can be utilized in the feed or food industry (Iñarra et al., this volume). Given a low
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price for unwanted catch (e.g. due to low valued species or individuals), methods for
minimizing handling time and costs are likely to be implemented, which will
probably lead to storing of catch as mixed or bulk products. One promising approach
is the application of ﬁsh silage (Viðarsson et al., this volume). Fish silage is a liquid
product made from grounded ﬁsh in the presence of added acids or lactic-acid-
producing bacteria. This product can be pre-processed on board at sea, requires low
investments and can be stored at room temperature for an extended period (Arruda
et al. 2007). Due the expanding aquaculture industry, especially salmon farming, the
demand for ﬁsh feed has grown. Accordingly, the price for prime ﬁsh silage has
increased and is now in a price range where it is a valid alternative to other storage
methods like freezing (personal communication, Erling P. Larsen, Senior Executive
Consultant, DTU Aqua, Technical University of Denmark). Frozen ﬁsh can be used
for production of feed (ﬁsh meal) but also for food like surimi. However, freezing of
low cost ﬁsh will reduce the storage capacity for more high-priced catch rendering
ﬁsh silage an economical and practical alternative. Fish silage can also be produced
from the discarded fraction of the primary catch, such as guts, liver and other organs
(Arruda et al. 2007), which increases the economic motivation for its use. However,
before such products can be introduced to the relevant industry, accurate labelling of
species composition according to the food safety standard regulation of the European
Union, needs to be ensured (EU Commission Directive 2002/86/EC). As this task
cannot be done by visual inspections of bulk products like ﬁsh silage, other
approaches are needed to analyse and quantify species composition.
Extensive research has been conducted into molecular methods enabling assess-
ment of the species-identity of processed meats. Immunological methods have
been used for species detection in meat (Ballin et al. 2009). These methods
typically rely on the detection of a species-speciﬁc protein, but have now largely
been replaced by genetic methods. Targeting DNA compared to proteins has
several advantages. First of all, DNA has a higher thermal stability, allowing
detection in both processed and raw products. DNA is present in all living cells,
regardless of tissue origin and hence easier to detect than proteins that may be
located in speciﬁc tissues (Lockley and Bardsley 2000). Secondly, the variation in
the genetic code between species makes DNA more suitable for species discrim-
ination, especially between closely related species. Finally, PCR-based techniques
have lower limits of detection (deﬁned as the lowest concentration of target that
can be detected on 95% of occasions) with estimates of 0.001%–1% of the total
weight in mixed meat samples (Ballin et al. 2009).
Overall, the methods used for species identiﬁcation can also detect species
presence in processed products. For example, DNA Barcoding, has been used in
investigations of adulterated labelling of ﬁsh products like fresh or frozen ﬁsh ﬁllets,
ﬁsh ﬁngers, ﬁsh cakes and surimi (Helyar et al. 2014; Huxley-Jones et al. 2012; Pepe
et al. 2007). However, as conventional Sanger sequencing techniques do not allow
for analysis of multiple DNA sequences, this technique only qualiﬁes when used on
products originating from a single species. Moreover, in processed samples, shorter
and more variable DNA segments may be preferred, as the DNA normally is
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degraded into short fragments often only few hundred of base pairs long (e.g. Pepe
et al. 2007). Quantitative PCR can be used for detection of short species-speciﬁc
DNA sequences (often < 200 bases) in mixed species products and has been used for
example for testing the presence of haddock (Melanogrammus aegleﬁnus) and cod
(Gadus morhua) in products labelled as whiteﬁsh and sold from supermarkets in the
UK (Helyar et al. 2014). This technique also allows for quantitative estimation of
DNA copy numbers when analysed in combination with a standard dilution series of
known DNA concentration. It therefore combines fast identiﬁcation with quantita-
tive applications (Fig. 20.3a). Another well-established PCR-based method is the
droplet digital PCR (abbreviated ddPCR) (Fig. 20.3b). This technique builds on
the same principles as qPCR but is more precise when used for quantiﬁcation and
does not require a standard curve for quantiﬁcation of DNA copies. Both qPCR and
ddPCR have been used with success to analyse species composition in mixed meat
products (e.g., Floren et al. 2015), but so far few studies exists for ﬁsh (Bojolly et al.
2017). However, with the increased focus on species identiﬁcation in mixed ﬁsh
products and a continuous declining cost of the chemistry used, it is likely to become
a more common practice within a few years.
20.4.2 Current Limitations
Quantitative DNA based methods can be used to accurately determine the number of
DNA molecules present in a mixed-species product. However, translating this into
percentages by weight, which is the normal standard within the food industry, is
difﬁcult. For example, the number of mitochondria and hence mitochondrial DNA
copies per cell varies across cell types, as well as species (Cole 2016). For this
reason, several researchers have advocated for the use of nuclear markers, as they
exist in a ﬁxed number of copies per cell (Ballin et al. 2009). However, for products
like ﬁsh silage generated from whole un-gutted ﬁsh, complications may still arise.
For example, liver and intestines contain more cells and hence nuclear DNA copies
per weight than white muscle. As organ size is not ﬁxed relative to the size of the
ﬁsh, but varies according to size, age, maturity and species, inaccuracies using
nuclear DNA is also expected. A solution may be to use a small fraction of the
total catch to estimate species weight composition, which then can be used to
estimate a correction factor (Thomas et al. 2016) or to label mixed products in a
genome to genome equivalent, instead of weight (Ballin et al. 2009). A ﬁnal issue
with using whole ﬁsh, or ﬁsh guts, is that DNA from prey items also can be detected.
As part of the prey may be other commercial species, which in theory would then be
deducted from the quota. However, since prey items normally constitute a minute
fraction of the entire product, this risk may be avoided by using a minimum
threshold for quota deductions.
Another limitation relates to the fact that both qPCR and ddPCR rely on species-
speciﬁc detections, which make these techniques expensive for screening products
of unknown composition. In such cases, meta-barcoding may be a better
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alternative. In meta-barcoding, a gene, like COI, is sequenced across one taxon
(e.g. ﬁsh) using a high-throughput next generation sequencing (NGS) platform.
This allows for the sequencing of millions of individual gene sequences, which can
be matched to a reference database and counted, and hence combines DNA
barcoding with possible quantiﬁcation (Fig. 20.3c). This method has been used to
assess species identity and composition for different kinds of mixed species samples.
Meta-barcoding has been used for assessing animal diet by analysing the gut content
(e.g., Murray et al. 2011) and has been one of the favoured tools for analysing
environmental DNA samples (see next section) (Hansen et al. 2018). However, often
only a subset of species can be targeted simultaneously due to variation in the DNA
code used for PCR ampliﬁcation, which moreover can lead to quantiﬁcation bias if
some species amplify better than others during PCR. In addition, as most NGS
platforms generate short sequences, the sequenced DNA region will be shorter than
for conventional Sanger sequencing. This represents a potential problem, as the
shorter sequences contain less variation to discriminate between species. Hence,
often sequences cannot be resolved to a species level but only to higher taxonomic
levels (Pompanon et al. 2012; Stat et al. 2017).
20.4.3 Case Study
In order for ﬁsh silage to be a valid alternative to frozen ﬁsh, several questions need
to be addressed. Earlier unpublished studies conducted by DTU Aqua, Technical
University of Denmark, have demonstrated that DNA is still present in ﬁsh silage
after 21 days at both 5 and 20 degrees, as conﬁrmed by ampliﬁcation and sequencing
of the mitochondrial COI gene. However, whether the product also allows accurate
quantiﬁcation of species composition remains unknown. This was investigated in a
preliminary study, conducted as part of the Discardless project funded by the
European Union. Here speciﬁc mitochondrial qPCR assays were developed for
cod, haddock and whiting. Subsequently ﬁsh silage was made from the same species
and DNA samples were extracted over a period of 21 days. Finally, qPCR analysis
was undertaken in order to estimate the distribution of DNA copy number among
species in the mixture, which then could be compared to the relative difference in
weight. The results show that, overall, there is a good correspondence between the
input (in weight) of the three species and the number of DNA copies present. The
largest difference is found at the ﬁrst day of the experiment, probably indicating
insufﬁcient liquefaction and mixing (Fig. 20.4). After that, the difference decreased
signiﬁcantly, although smaller differences could still be observed until day 21. In
general, whiting, which represented the smallest biomass, was overrepresented in the
DNA quantiﬁcation. Similar results have been documented in other studies, but can
be improved by calculating a correction factor from a subsample (Thomas et al.
2016). Hence, although more empirical studies are needed, the results hold promise
for the application of DNA-based methods for determining the composition of
species in silage and other mixed products from bycatch.
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20.5 Environmental DNA and Pre-assessment
of Appropriate Fishing Grounds
20.5.1 The Technology and Its Applications in Fisheries
Traditional DNA-based monitoring of ﬁsheries entails direct DNA sampling of the
catch. However, non-invasive monitoring is possible through analysis of so-called
environmental DNA (abbreviated eDNA). Environmental DNA simply refers to
genetic material, obtained directly from an environmental sample (water, air or
soil), without any obvious parts of macro-organisms (Hansen et al. 2018). DNA is
continuously shed by all organisms to the surrounding environment through skin
(scales and mucus from ﬁsh), faeces, gametes, etc. (Hansen et al. 2018). Since
marine organisms shed DNA “particles” directly into the sea, eDNA can be obtained
from a water sample. The procedure is relatively simple: following water collection
(normally ranging from typically 250 mL–5 L (Goldberg et al. 2016)), the water is
ﬁltered through a ﬁlter that retains the minute particles containing DNA, which can
be extracted and analysed by either qPCR, ddPCR or meta-barcoding methods
(Fig. 20.3). Quantitative PCR has been the preferred method to analyse the presence
(and abundance) of speciﬁc species of interest (e.g., Thomsen et al. 2012b). For
example, qPCR has been used extensively as a tool for the detection of rare and
invasive species, which otherwise can be difﬁcult to detect by conventional
methods (e.g. Thomsen et al. 2012b). On the other hand, meta-barcoding has
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Fig. 20.4 Analysed species composition in ﬁsh silage made from whiting, haddock and Atlantic
cod. The estimates are based on qPCR analysis of the number of species-speciﬁc DNA copies. The
ﬁrst column represents the actual biomass while the latter show the qPCR estimates following 1, 7,
14 and 21 days from when the silage was produced
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been the favoured tool for identifying and describing entire marine biological
communities within or across taxonomic groups (e.g. Stat et al. 2017; Thomsen
et al. 2012a, 2016). For such purposes, meta-barcoding is considered superior to
qPCR because a large number of species can be targeted at the same time. For
example, a recent study by Stat et al. (2017) tested several ‘universal’ PCR
barcoding assays, including one for ﬁsh that recovered 69 different taxa, of
which 33 of them were resolved to species.
The application of eDNA has been shown to be a cost-effective and sensitive
sampling method (Sigsgaard et al. 2015) and shows comparable or even more
accurate estimates of species diversity compared to established monitoring
approaches like net ﬁshing and diving (Thomsen et al. 2012a). Moreover, several
studies have found positive correlations between species-speciﬁc DNA concentra-
tions and biomass and abundance in controlled experimental settings like aquaria
and ponds (Doi et al. 2015; Klymus et al. 2015), thus opening up possibilities for
interesting applications. For example, it has been suggested that eDNA may be used
as a future substitute or supplement to established stock assessments of commercial
ﬁsh (Thomsen et al. 2016). Although we are still quite far from this scenario (Hansen
et al. 2018), eDNA may be used in the future to reduce potential bycatch by
focusing ﬁshing efforts in areas with low numbers of potential bycatch species. In
fact, Thomsen et al. (2016) have already tested such an application indirectly. They
used a meta-barcoding approach to analyse seawater samples collected in South-
western Greenland and compared it to trawling catch data. They generally observed
weak but signiﬁcant correlations between numbers of sequences belonging to
speciﬁc groups of ﬁsh and biomass/abundance data, indicating a potential applica-
tion for using eDNA as a tool for targeted ﬁshing.
20.5.2 Current Limitations
Several issues exist which needs to be properly addressed before eDNA can be
implemented to assist in more selective ﬁshing efforts. First, faster ways of
processing and analysing samples are needed to allow analysis directly at the ﬁshing
grounds. Such techniques, however, are already under development (see below
section on future perspectives). Other more fundamental issues relate to
(i) retention time of DNA (i.e. how long can it be detected in the environment)
and (ii) its correlation with biomass. The ﬁrst issue depends on the effects of abiotic
and biotic factors that inﬂuence the production, degradation and transport of eDNA
(see Hansen et al. (2018)). Here, abiotic factors like water temperature, pH and UV
light determine the rate of DNA decay in the water, while biotic factors like size, age,
species, health, sex and food condition inﬂuence eDNA production. Moreover,
ocean currents will determine the distribution of eDNA, which may be carried
hundreds of kilometres away from the source within days (Thomsen et al. 2012a).
Still, marine eDNA studies report good concordance between eDNA analyses and
visual surveys of local vertebrate communities (Port et al. 2016; Thomsen et al.
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2012a). Nonetheless, environmental conditions play a large role in the production
and turnover of eDNA and will likely vary signiﬁcantly due to the widely different
geospatial environmental conditions in our oceans (Klymus et al. 2015; Strickler
et al. 2014).
An improved understanding of DNA production is crucial for assessing the
relationship between the number of observed eDNA copies and the biomass in
natural environments. While experimental studies in general have shown solid
positive correlations between DNA and biomass (Doi et al. 2015; Klymus et al.
2015), relationships from natural systems are less pronounced, or in some cases even
lacking (Spear et al. 2015; Thomsen et al. 2016). This is likely due to the complexity
of such systems. For example, compared to a controlled experiment, natural habitats
comprise many different size and age groups of ﬁsh, which will shed different
amounts of DNA per mass, e.g. due to differences in metabolism, life stage or
condition (Hansen et al. 2018). Moreover, different species of ﬁsh may shed more
DNA than others, rendering it difﬁcult to directly compare eDNA levels across
species with widely different biology. Hence, before eDNA can be used in targeted
ﬁsheries, more empirical research is needed. This will improve our understanding
about how these issues affect eDNA quantiﬁcation and pave the way for future
research into ﬁsheries application.
20.5.3 Case-Study
In a current study, conducted by DTU Aqua, Denmark, the potential for using eDNA
to avoid bycatch is being directly investigated. Speciﬁcally, this study aims at
testing the potential for applying qPCR as a tool for monitoring absolute and relative
biomass of European sprat (Sprattus sprattus), Atlantic herring (Clupea harengus)
and sand eel (Ammodytidae). While all species are harvested commercially, the
bycatch of herring is a well-known problem, especially in sprat ﬁsheries, and to
some extent, in sand eel ﬁsheries. Currently, bycatch of herring are discarded when
the bycatch quota is exceeded. However, with the introduction of the Landing
Obligation, all bycatch of herring should, in theory, be deducted from this quota.
This may lead to a scenario where herring is a “choke species” for sprat and sand eel
ﬁsheries leading to their closure. Thus, approaches facilitating more selective ﬁsh-
eries are warranted by the industry.
In the study, water samples were collected on board the ﬁshing vessels while
ﬁshing and estimates of catch and bycatch were conducted. Subsequently the water
samples were analysed for the quantity of species-speciﬁc DNA to assess potential
correlations. The data are still being analysed, thus only a few preliminary results are
available. However, they demonstrate large differences in the relative proportion of
DNA from Atlantic herring in the European sprat ﬁsheries across ﬁshing localities
(Fig. 20.5). Whether this is also well correlated with the actual biomass caught is
currently being investigated.
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20.6 Future Perspectives
Some of the major limitations of the methods described in this chapter are their
accessibility, time from sampling to results, the required manual labour and associ-
ated cost. Most of the techniques are currently only performed by highly trained
personnel in well-equipped molecular laboratories. However, in the near future, it is
possible that people with little molecular training can use many of the techniques in
situ, e.g. on board ﬁshing vessels or at ﬁshing ports. This should lower the costs and
facilitate faster communication between ﬁshers and managers regarding bycatch
and catch composition, potentially leading to more efﬁcient ﬁsheries management
and conservation. On board analyses of eDNA in water samples prior to ﬁshing
would, moreover, enhance the potential of using eDNA for targeted ﬁshing efforts,
as it would allow near real-time analysis at the ﬁshing grounds.
Already today, novel portable devices and kits exist that allow for DNA extrac-
tion and sequencing outside the laboratory. For example, Oxford Nanopore Tech-
nologies has designed a device for automated sample preparation and even PCR
(https://nanoporetech.com/products/voltrax). Combined with small portable
sequencing machines like, for example, the MinION or the smartphone compatible
SmidgION (Oxford Nanopore Technologies), this allows for fast onsite DNA
barcoding (Menegon et al. 2017). The MinION device has the same size as a normal
smart phone but can sequence up to 20 Gigabases of DNA (20 billion A, C, T and
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Fig. 20.5 Quantitative PCR (qPCR) estimates of the difference in species-speciﬁc DNA from
European sprat and Atlantic herring observed in the North Sea ﬁsheries for European sprat. The
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G’s) per run. The sequences are directly uploaded to a laptop computer and can
therefore be analysed in close-to-real-time. The major disadvantage of the MinION
is a high sequencing error rate, compared to laboratory DNA sequencing. However,
this is to some degree neutralized by the large sequencing output and recent
development in analytical methods. This poses another challenge, as analysis of
genomic data is computationally intensive and hence some applications may need
internet access to upload the data to an online server for fast on site analysis
(Srivathsan et al. 2018) and subsequent storing of results. Moreover, automated
methods and software, that can transfer gigabytes of DNA data from these devices
into a format that can be interpreted by the non-expert (ﬁshers), is a ﬁeld, which
needs more research and development. Further, the cost per run is still high com-
pared to conventional DNA barcoding, however; sequencing methods exist for
tagging, pooling and subsequent sequencing of up to hundreds of samples per
MinION run, thereby lowering the cost per sample signiﬁcantly (Srivathsan et al.
2018). Another option is stopping the sequencing run when just enough sequences
have been obtained for producing proper species identiﬁcation. Subsequently, the
device can be washed and used again until reaching the overarching sequencing
capacity.
Onsite analysis of species composition and quantiﬁcation in mixed species
products or eDNA may also be conducted using qPCR. For example, the
US-based company Biomeme (https://biomeme.com) has developed an ultra-small
qPCR device that attaches to a smartphone and can run up to nine samples with up to
two different target species within an hour (e.g. sprat and herring). The same
company has also developed fast DNA extraction kits that allows for DNA prepa-
ration within a few minutes without need of any lab equipment. This kit uses
disposable, single-use consumables, which decreases the possibility for DNA con-
tamination among samples. Lastly, future eDNA analysis may also be conducted by
so called “ecogenomic sensors”, which are submersible instruments for autonomous
in situ automatic DNA analysis of water samples (Scholin 2009). The 2nd generation
environmental sample processor (2G ESP) is such a device and is essentially a DNA
lab in a waterproof can. The 2G ESP has already shown practical applications for
monitoring microorganisms (Ottensen et al. 2014), zooplankton (Harvey et al. 2012)
and eDNA from ﬁsh (personal communication, Brian K. Hansen)). The 2G ESP can
be moored to a speciﬁc location (e.g. a dockside or buoy), be mobile (free drifting) or
carried on board ﬁshing vessels where it can conduct automatized water sampling,
DNA extraction and qPCR analysis. The ESP provides two-way communications,
which allows the end-user to remotely assess the results in near real-time. This has
potential interesting applications for ﬁsheries, as this may allow for eDNA analysis
directly at the ﬁshing grounds, which then can be communicated to the ﬁshing ﬂeet
and act as a supplement in order to avoid bycatch.
In conclusion, DNA-based methods can already provide important information
that can be used under the Landing Obligation to identify and prevent bycatch as
well as in control, management and consumer protection. The rapid and continuous
development of portable and automatic real-time devices for DNA analysis are
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expected to become more powerful, user-friendly and much cheaper in the near
future. This will likely increase the incentives to use genetics in ﬁsheries manage-
ment, including subjects related to discards.
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